MILITARY 

REMINISCENCES   OF 

THE   CIVIL  WAR 


OTHER   BOOKS  BY 

GENERAL  JACOB   D.  COX 

The  Battle  of  Franklin.  With  maps. 
8vo $2.00 

Atlanta.  With  maps.  [Campaigns  of 
the  Civil  War\.  izmo  .  .  $1.00 

The  March  to  the  Sea.  Franklin  and 
Nashville.  With  maps.  [Campaigns  of 
the  Civil  War\.  I2mo  .  .  $1.00 

Gen.  Jacob  D.  Cox  has  given  proof  of  his  ability  as 
a  military  historian.  His  work  is  a  valuable  contri 
bution  to  our  military  history  and  the  narrative  is  told 
in  a  style  that  combines  the  knowledge  of  the  warrior 
with  the  skill  of  the  literary  artist.  —  The  Dial. 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS,  Publishers 
*S3-*S7  FIFTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK  CITY 


JACOB    D.COX.    MAJ,   GEN 
AET     34 


E470 


v> 


Copyright,  1900, 
BY  CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS. 


UNIVERSITY    PRESS     •     JOHN    WILSON 
AND     SON    •     CAMBRIDGE,    U.S.A. 


PREFACE 


MY  aim  in  this  book  has  been  to  reproduce  my  own 
experience  in  our  Civil  War  in  such  a  way  as  to 
help  the  reader  understand  just  how  the  duties  and  the 
problems  of  that  great  conflict  presented  themselves  suc 
cessively  to  one  man  who  had  an  active  part  in  it  from  the 
beginning  to  the  end.  In  my  military  service  I  was  so 
conscious  of  the  benefit  it  was  to  me  to  get  the  personal 
view  of  men  who  had  served  in  our  own  or  other  wars,  as 
distinguished  from  the  general  or  formal  history,  that  I 
formed  the  purpose,  soon  after  peace  was  restored,  to 
write  such  a  narrative  of  my  own  army  life.  My  relations 
to  many  prominent  officers  and  civilians  were  such  as  to 
give  opportunities  for  intimate  knowledge  of  their  personal 
qualities  as  well  as  their  public  conduct.  It  has  seemed 
to  me  that  it  might  be  useful  to  share  with  others  what  I 
thus  learned,  and  to  throw  what  light  I  could  upon  the 
events  and  the  men  of  that  time. 

As  I  have  written  historical  accounts  of  some  campaigns 
separately,  it  may  be  proper  to  say  that  I  have  in  this  book 
avoided  repetition,  and  have  tried  to  make  the  personal 
narrative  supplement  and  lend  new  interest  to  the  more 
formal  story.  Some  of  the  earlier  chapters  appeared  in  an 


R404U59 


VI 


PREFACE 


abridged  form  in  "  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War," 
and  the  closing  chapter  was  read  before  the  Ohio  Com- 
mandery  of  the  Loyal  Legion.  By  arrangements  courte 
ously  made  by  the  Century  Company  and  the  Commandery, 
these  chapters,  partly  re-written,  are  here  found  in  their 
proper  connection. 

Though  my  private  memoranda  are  full  enough  to 
give  me  reasonable  confidence  in  the  accuracy  of  these 
reminiscences,  I  have  made  it  a  duty  to  test  my  memory 
by  constant  reference  to  the  original  contemporaneous 
material  so  abundantly  preserved  in  the  government  pub 
lication  of  the  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confed 
erate  Armies.  Where  the  series  of  these  records  is  not 
given,  my  references  are  to  the  First  Series,  with  the 
abbreviation  O.  R.,  and  I  have  preferred  to  adhere  to  the 
official  designation  of  the  volumes  in  parts,  as  each  volume 
then  includes  the  documents  of  a  single  campaign. 

J.  D.  C. 


NOTE.  —  The  manuscript  of  this  work  had  been  completed  by  General 
"Cox,  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  publishers  several  weeks  before  his 
untimely  death  at  Magnolia,  Mass.,  August  4,  1900.  He  himself  had 
read  and  revised  some  four  hundred  pages  of  the  press-work.  The  work 
of  reading  and  revising  the  remaining  proofs  and  of  preparing  a  general 
index  for  the  work  was  undertaken  by  the  undersigned  from  a  deep  sense  of 
obligation  to  and  loving  regard  for  the  author,  which  could  not  find  a  more 
fitting  expression  at  this  time.  No  material  changes  have  been  made  in 
text  or  notes.  Citations  have  been  looked  up  and  references  verified  with 
care,  yet  errors  may  have  crept  in,  which  his  well-known  accuracy  would  have 
excluded.  For  all  such  and  for  the  imperfections  of  the  index,  the  under 
signed  must  accept  responsibility,  and  beg  the  indulgence  of  the  reader,  who 
•will  find  in  the  text  itself  enough  of  interest  and  profit  to  excuse  many 

shortcomings. 

WILLIAM   C.  COCHRAN. 
CINCINNATI,  October  i,  1900. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER   I 

PAGE 
THE  OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR i 

Ohio  Senate,  April  12  —  Sumter  bombarded  —  "Glory  to  God!"  — 
The  surrender  —  Effect  on  public  sentiment  —  Call  for  troops  — 
Politicians  changing  front  — David  Tod— Stephen  A.  Douglas 

—  The  insurrection  must  be  crushed  —  Garfield  on  personal  duty 

—  Troops  organized  by  the  States  —  The  militia  —  Unprepared- 
ness —  McClellan   at  Columbus  —  Meets   Governor   Dennison  — 
Put  in  command  —  Our  stock  of  munitions  —  Making  estimates  — 
McClellan's  plan  —  Camp  Jackson  —  Camp  Dennison —  Gather 
ing  of  the  volunteers  —  Garibaldi  uniforms  —  Officering  the  troops 

—  Off  for  Washington—  Scenes  in  the  State  Capitol  —  Governor 
Dennison's    labors  —  Young    regulars  —  Scott's    policy  —  Alex. 
McCook  —  Orlando  Poe  —  Not  allowed  to  take  state  commis- 


CHAPTER   II 
CAMP  DENNISON 21 

Laying  out  the  camp  —  Rosecrans  as  engineer  —  A  comfortless  night 

—  Waking   to   new  duties  —  Floors  or  no  floors  for  the  huts  — 
Hardee's  Tactics  —  The  water-supply  — Colonel  Tom  Worthington 

—  Joshua  Sill — Brigades  organized — Bates's  brigade —  Schleich's 

—  My   own  —  McClellan's    purpose  —  Division    organization  — 
Garfield  disappointed  —  Camp  routine  —  Instruction  and  drill  — 
Camp  cookery  —  Measles  —  Hospital   barn  —  Sisters  of   Charity 

—  Ferment  over  re-enlistment  —  Musters  by  Gordon  Granger  — 
"  Food  for  powder  "  —  Brigade  staff  —  De  Villiers  —  "A  Captain 
of  Calvary"  — The   "Bloody   Tinth"  —  Almost  a  row  — Sum 
moned  to  the  field. 


viil  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  III 

PAGE 
McCLELLAN   IN   WEST   VIRGINIA 40 

Political  attitude  of  West  Virginia  —  Rebels  take  the  initiative  — 
McClellan  ordered  to  act  —  Ohio  militia  cross  the  river  —  The 
Philippi  affair — Significant  dates  —  The  vote  on  secession  — 
Virginia  in  the  Confederacy  —  Lee  in  command  —  Topography  — 
The  mountain  passes  —  Garnett's  army  —  Rich  Mountain  position 

—  McClellan  in  the  field  —  His  forces  —  Advances  against  Garnett 

—  Rosecrans's  proposal  —  His  fight  on  the  mountain  —  McClel- 
lan's  inaction  —  Garnett's   retreat  —  Affair  at  Carrick's   Ford  — 
Garnett  killed  —  Hill's  efforts  to  intercept  —  Pegram  in  the  wil 
derness  —  He  surrenders  —  Indirect  results  important  —  McClel- 
lan's  military  and  personal  traits. 

CHAPTER   IV 
THE  KANAWHA  VALLEY .    .     .     ...     59 

Orders  for  the  Kanawha  expedition  —  The  troops  and  their  quality  — 
Lack  of  artillery  and  cavalry  —  Assembling  at  Gallipolis  —  District 
of  the  Kanawha  —  Numbers  of  the  opposing  forces  —  Method  of 
advance  —  Use  of  steamboats  —  Advance  guards  on  river  banks 

—  Camp  at  Thirteen-mile  Creek  —  Night  alarm  —  The  river  chutes 

—  Sunken  obstructions  —  Pocotaligo  —  Affair  at  Barboursville  — 
Affair  at  Scary   Creek  —  Wise's  position  at  Tyler  Mountain  — 
His  precipitate  retreat  —  Occupation  of  Charleston  —  Rosecrans 
succeeds  McClellan  —  Advance   toward  Gauley  Bridge  —  Insub 
ordination  —  The   Newspaper    Correspondent  —  Occupation    of 
Gauley  Bridge. 

CHAPTER  V 
GAULEY  BRIDGE 80 

The  gate  of  the  Kanawha  valley — The  wilderness  beyond — West 
Virginia  defences  —  A  romantic  post  —  Chaplain  Brown  —  An  ad 
venturous  mission  —  Chaplain  Dubois  —  "The  river  path"  — 
Gauley  Mount — Colonel  Tompkins's  home  —  Bowie-knives  — 
Truculent  resolutions  —  The  Engineers  —  Whittlesey,  Benham, 
Wagner  —  Fortifications  —  Distant  reconnoissances  —  Compari 
son  of  forces — Dangers  to  steamboat  communications  —  Allot 
ment  of  duties  —  The  Summersville  post —  Seventh  Ohio  at  Cross 
Lanes  —  Scares  and  rumors —  Robert  E.  Lee  at  Valley  Mountain 

—  Floyd  and   Wise  advance  —  Rosecrans's  orders  —  The    Cross 
Lanes   affair  —  Major   Casement's   creditable   retreat  —  Colonel 
Tyler's    reports  —  Lieutenant-Colonel    Creighton  —  Quarrels    of 
Wise  and  Floyd  —  Ambushing  rebel  cavalry  —  Affair  at   Boone 


CONTENTS  IX 


PAGE 

Court  House  —  New  attack  at  Gaul ey  Bridge  —  An  incipient 
mutiny  —  Sad  result  —  A  notable  court-martial  —  Rosecrans 
marching  toward  us  —  Communications  renewed  —  Advance 
toward  Lewisburg  —  Camp  Lookout  —  A  private  sorrow. 

CHAPTER   VI 
CARNIFEX  FERRY — To  SEWELL  MOUNTAIN  AND  BACK   .     .     105 

Rosecrans's  march  to  join  me —  Reaches  Cross  Lanes  —  Advance 
against  Floyd  —  Engagement  at  Carnifex  Ferry  —  My  advance 
to  Sunday  Road  —  Conference  with  Rosecrans  —  McCook's 
brigade  joins  me  —  Advance  to  Camp  Lookout  —  Brigade  com 
manders  —  Rosecrans's  personal  characteristics  —  Hartsuff  — 
Floyd  and  Wise  again  —  "  Battle  of  Bontecou  "  —  Sewell  Moun 
tain  —  The  equinoctial  —  General  Schenck  arrives  —  Rough 
lodgings  —  Withdrawal  from  the  mountain  —  Rear-guard  duties 

—  Major  Slemmer  of  Fort  Pickens  fame  — New  positions  cover 
ing  Gauley  Bridge  —  Floyd  at  Cotton  Mountain  —  Rosecrans's 
methods  with  private  soldiers  —  Progress  in  discipline. 

CHAPTER  VII 
COTTON  MOUNTAIN 129 

Floyd  cannonades  Gauley  Bridge  —  Effect  on  Rosecrans  —  Topog 
raphy  of  Gauley  Mount  —  De  Villiers  runs  the  gantlet  —  Move 
ments  of  our  forces  —  Explaining  orders  —  A  hard  climb  on  the 
mountain  —  In  the  post  at  Gauley  Bridge  —  Moving  magazine 
and  telegraph  —  A  balky  mule-team  —  Ammunition  train  under 
fire  —  Captain  Fitch  a  model  quartermaster  —  Plans  to  entrap 
Floyd — Moving  supply  trains  at  night  —  Method  of  working 
the  ferry  —  Of  making  flatboats  —  The  Cotton  Mountain  affair 

—  Rosecrans  dissatisfied  with  Benham  —  Vain  plans  to  reach 
East  Tennessee. 

CHAPTER  VIII 
WINTER- QUARTERS 146 

An  impracticable  country  —  Movements  suspended  —  Experienced 
troops  ordered  away —  My  orders  from  Washington  —  Rosecrans 
objects  —  A  disappointment  —  Winter  organization  of  the  De 
partment  —  Sifting  our  material —  Courts-martial  —  Regimental 
schools  —  Drill  and  picket  duty  —  A  military  execution  —  Effect 
upon  the  army  —  Political  sentiments  of  the  people  —  Rules  of 
conduct  toward  them — Case  of  Mr.  Parks — Mr.  Summers  — 
Mr.  Patrick  —  Mr.  Lewis  Ruffner  —  Mr.  Doddridge  —  Mr.  B.  F. 
Smith  —  A  house  divided  against  itself  —  Major  Smith's  journal 

—  The  contrabands  —  A  fugitive-slave  case  —  Embarrassments 
as  to  military  jurisdiction. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER   IX 

PACK 
VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS 165 

High  quality  of  first  volunteers  —  Discipline  milder  than  that  of 
the  regulars  —  Reasons  for  the  difference  —  Practical  efficiency 
of  the  men  —  Necessity  for  sifting  the  officers  —  Analysis  of 
their  defects  —  What  is  military  aptitude  ?  —  Diminution  of 
number  in  ascending  scale  —  Effect  of  age  —  Of  former  life  and 
occupation  —  Embarrassments  of  a  new  business  —  Quick  prog 
ress  of  the  right  class  of  young  men  —  Political  appointments 

—  Professional  men  —  Political  leaders  naturally  prominent  in  a 
civil  war  —  "  Cutting  and  trying  "  —  Dishonest  methods  —  An 
excellent  army  at  the  end  of  a  year  —  The  regulars  in  1861  — 
Entrance  examinations  for  West  Point  —  The  curriculum  there 

—  Drill  and  experience —  Its  limitations  —  Problems  peculiar  to 
the  vast  increase  of  the  army  —  Ultra-conservatism  —  Attitude 
toward  the  Lincoln  administration  —  "  Point  de   zele  "  —  Lack 
of  initiative  —  Civil  work  of  army  engineers —  What  is  military 
art  ?  —  Opinions  of  experts  —  Military  history —  European  armies 
in  the  Crimean  War  —  True  generalship  —  Anomaly  of  a  double 
army  organization. 

CHAPTER   X 
THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  —  SPRING  CAMPAIGN     .     .     .     192 

Rosecrans's  plan  of  campaign  —  Approved  by  McClellan  with 
modifications  —  Wagons  or  pack-mules  —  Final  form  of  plan  — 
Changes  in  commands  —  McClellan  limited  to  Army  of  the 
Potomac —  Halleck's  Department  of  the  Mississippi  —  Fremont's 
Mountain  Department  —  Rosecrans  superseded  —  Preparations 
in  the  Kanawha  District  —  Batteaux  to  supplement  steamboats 

—  Light  wagons  for  mountain  work  —  Fremont's   plan  —  East 
Tennessee  as  an  objective  —  The  supply  question  —  Banks  in  the 
Shenandoah  valley —  Milroy's  advance  —  Combat  at  McDowell 

—  Banks  defeated  —  Fremont's  plans  deranged  —  Operations  in 
the  Kanawha  valley  —  Organization  of  brigades  —  Brigade  com 
manders  —  Advance  to  Narrows  of  New  River  —  The  field  tele 
graph —  Concentration  of  the   enemy  —  Affair  at  Princeton  — 
Position  at  Flat-top  Mountain. 

CHAPTER   XI 
POPE  IN  COMMAND  —  TRANSFER  TO  WASHINGTON  .     .     .     .     217 

A  key  position  —  Crook's  engagement  at  Lewisburg —  Watching 
and  scouting  —  Mountain  work  —  Pope  in  command  —  Consoli 
dation  of  Departments —  Suggestions  of  our  transfer  to  the  East 


CONTENTS  XI 


PAGB 

—  Pope's  Order  No.  1 1  and  Address  to  the  Army  —  Orders  to 
march  across  the  mountains  —  Discussion  of  them — Changed 
to  route  by  water  and  rail  —  Ninety-mile  march  —  Logistics  — 
Arriving  in  Washington  —  Two  regiments  reach  Pope  —  Two 
sent  to  Manassas  —  Jackson  captures  Manassas  —  Railway 
broken  —  McClellan  at  Alexandria — Engagement  at  Bull  Run 
Bridge  —  Ordered  to  Upton's  Hill  —  Covering  Washington  — 
Listening  to  the  Bull  Run  battle  —  111  news  travels  fast. 


CHAPTER  XII 

RETREAT  WITHIN  THE  LINES  —  REORGANIZATION  —  HALLECK 

AND  HIS  SUBORDINATES 240 

McClellan's  visits  to  my  position  —  Riding  the  lines  —  Discussing 
the  past  campaign  —  The  withdrawal  from  the  James  —  Proph 
ecy —  McClellan  and  the  soldiers — He  is  in  command  of  the 
defences — Intricacy  of  official  relations  —  Reorganization  begun 

—  Pope's    army    marches    through    our   works  —  Meeting    of 
McClellan   and  Pope — Pope's  characteristics  —  Undue  depre 
ciation  of  him  —  The  situation  when  Halleck  was  made  General- 
in-Chief —  Pope's  part  in  it  —  Reasons  for  dislike  on  the  part  of 
the   Potomac  Army  —  McClellan's   secret  service  —  Deceptive 
information  of  the  enemy's  force  —  Information  from  prisoners 
and  citizens —  Effects  of  McClellan's  illusion  as  to  Lee's  strength 

—  Halleck's  previous  career  —  Did  he  intend  to  take  command 
in  the  field?  —  His   abdication   of  the   field  command  —  The 
necessity  for  a  union  of  forces  in  Virginia  —  McClellan's  inac 
tion  was  Lee's  opportunity  —  Slow  transfer  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  —  Halleck  burdened  with  subordinate's  work  —  Burn- 
side  twice  declines  the  command  —  It  is  given  to  McClellan  — 
Pope  relieved —  Other  changes  in  organization  —  Consolidation 
— New  campaign  begun. 


CHAPTER   XIII 
SOUTH  MOUNTAIN 263 

March  through  Washington  —  Reporting  to  Burnside  —  The  Ninth 
Corps  —  Burnside's  personal  qualities  —  To  Leesboro  —  Strag 
gling  —  Lee's  army  at  Frederick  —  Our  deliberate  advance  — 
Reno  at  New  Market  —  The  march  past  —  Reno  and  Hayes  — 
Camp  gossip  —  Occupation  of  Frederick  —  Affair  with  Hamp 
ton's  cavalry — Crossing  Catoctin  Mountain  —  The  valley  and 
South  Mountain  —  Lee's  order  found  —  Division  of  his  army  — 
Jackson  at  Harper's  Ferry  —  Supporting  Pleasonton's  recon- 
noissance  —  Meeting  Colonel  Moor  —  An  involuntary  warning  — 
Kanawha  Division's  advance  —  Opening  of  the  battle  —  Carrying 


Xll  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

the  mountain  crest  —  The  morning  fight  —  Lull  at  noon  — 
Arrival  of  supports  —  Battle  renewed — Final  success — Death 
of  Reno  —  Hooker's  battle  on  the  right  —  His  report  —  Burn- 
side's  comments  —  Franklin's  engagement  at  Crampton's  Gap. 

CHAPTER    XIV 
ANTIETAM  :    PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS 295 

Lee's  plan  of  invasion  —  Changed  by  McClellan's  advance  —  The 
position  at  Sharpsburg  —  Our  routes  of  march  —  At  the  An- 
tietam  —  McClellan  reconnoitring  —  Lee  striving  to  concentrate 

—  Our  delays  —  Tuesday's  quiet — Hooker's  evening  march  — 
The  Ninth  Corps  command  —  Changing  our  positions  —  McClel 
lan's  plan  of   battle  —  Hooker's  evening  skirmish  —  Mansfield 
goes    to   support   Hooker  —  Confederate    positions  —  Jackson 
arrives  —  McLaws  and  Walker  reach  the  field  —  Their  places. 

CHAPTER  XV 
ANTIETAM  :    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  RIGHT 312 

Hooker  astir  early  —  The  field  near  the  Dunker  Church  —  Artillery 
combat — Positions  of  Hooker's  divisions  —  Rocky  ledges  in 
the  woods  —  Advance  of  Doubleday  through  Miller's  orchard 
and  garden  —  Enemy's  fire  from  West  Wood  —  They  rush  for 
Gibbon's  battery  —  Repulse  —  Advance  of  Patrick's  brigade  — 
Fierce  fighting  along  the  turnpike  —  Ricketts's  division  in  the 
East  Wood  —  Fresh  effort  of  Meade's  division  in  the  centre  — 
A  lull  in  the  battle —  Mansfield's  corps  reaches  the  field  —  Con 
flicting  opinions  as  to  the  hour — Mansfield  killed  —  Command 
devolves  on  Williams  —  Advance  through  East  Wood  — 
Hooker  wounded  —  Meade  in  command  of  the  corps  —  It  with 
draws  —  Greene's  division  reaches  the  Dunker  Church  —  Craw 
ford's  in  the  East  Wood  —  Terrible  effects  on  the  Confederates 

—  Sumner's  corps  coming  up  —  Its  formation  —  It  moves  on  the 
Dunker  Church  from  the  east  —  Divergence  of  the  divisions  — 
Sedgwick's  passes  to  right  of  Greene  —  Attacked  in  flank  and 
broken  —  Rallying   at   the    Poffenberger  hill — Twelfth    Corps 
hanging  on  near  the  church  —  Advance  of  French's  division  — 
Richardson  follows  later  —  Bloody  Lane  reached  —  The  Piper 
house  —  Franklin's  corps  arrives  —  Charge  of  Irwin's  brigade. 

CHAPTER  XVI 
ANTIETAM  :    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  LEFT 332 

Ninth  Corps  positions  near  Antietam  Creek  —  Rodman's  division 
at  lower  ford — Sturgis's  at  the  bridge  —  Burnside's  headquar 
ters  on  the  field —  View  from  his  place  of  the  battle  on  the  right 


CONTENTS  xill 


PAGE 

—  French's  fight  —  An  exploding  caisson  —  Our  orders  to  attack 

—  The  hour  —  Crisis  of  the  battle  — Discussion  of  the  sequence 
of  events  —  The  Burnside  bridge  —  Exposed   approach  —  Enfi 
laded  by  enemy's  artillery  —  Disposition  of  enemy's  troops  —  His 
position  very  strong  —  Importance  of  Rodman's  movement  by 
the  ford  —  The  fight  at  the  bridge  —  Repulse  —  Fresh  efforts  — 
Tactics  of  the  assault  —  Success  —  Formation  on  further  bank 

—  Bringing  up   ammunition  —  Willcox   relieves    Sturgis — The 
latter  now  in  support  —  Advance  against  Sharpsburg  —  Fierce 
combat  —  Edge  of  the  town  reached  —  Rodman's  advance  on  the 
left  —  A.  P.  Hill's  Confederate  division  arrives  from  Harper's 
Ferry  —  Attacks  Rodman's  flank  —  A  raw  regiment  breaks  — 
The  line  retires  —  Sturgis  comes  into  the  gap  —  Defensive  posi 
tion    taken    and    held  —  Enemy's    assaults    repulsed  —  Troops 
sleeping   on  their  arms  —  McClellan's  reserve  —  Other  troops 
not  used  —  McClellan's  idea  of  Lee's  force  and  plans — Lee's 
retreat  —  The  terrible  casualty  lists. 


CHAPTER   XVII 

McCLELLAN   AND    POLITICS HlS    REMOVAL   AND    ITS    CAUSE       354 

Meeting  Colonel  Key — His  changes  of  opinion  —  His  relations 
to  McClellan  —  Governor  Dennison's  influence — McClellan's 
attitude  toward  Lincoln  —  Burnside's  position  —  The  Harrison 
Landing  letter  —  Compared  with  Lincoln's  views  —  Probable 
intent  of  the  letter  —  Incident  at  McClellan's  headquarters  — 
John  W.  Garrett  —  Emancipation  Proclamation  —  An  after- 
dinner  discussion  of  it — Contrary  influences  —  Frank  advice  — 
Burnside  and  John  Cochrane  —  General  Order  163  —  Lincoln's 
visit  to  camp  —  Riding  the  field  —  A  review  —  Lincoln's  desire 
for  continuing  the  campaign  —  McClellan's  hesitation  —  His 
tactics  of  discussion  —  His  exaggeration  of  difficulties  —  Effect 
on  his  army  —  Disillusion  a  slow  process  —  Lee's  army  not  better 
than  Johnston's  —  Work  done  by  our  Western  army  —  Differ 
ence  in  morale  —  An  army  rarely  bolder  than  its  leader  — 
Correspondence  between  Halleck  and  McClellan  —  Lincoln's 
remarkable  letter  on  the  campaign  —  The  army  moves  on 
November  2  —  Lee  regains  the  line  covering  Richmond  — 
McClellan  relieved  —  Burnside  in  command. 


CHAPTER    XVIII 
PERSONAL  RELATIONS  OF  MCCLELLAN,  BURNSIDE,  AND  PORTER     376 

Intimacy  of  McClellan  and  Burnside  —  Private  letters  in  the  official 
files — Burnside's  mediation  —  His  self-forgetful  devotion  — 
The  movement  to  join  Pope  —  Burnside  forwards  Porter's  dis- 


XIV  CONTENTS 

PAGB 

patches  —  His  double  refusal  of  the  command  —  McClellan 
suspends  the  organization  of  wings  —  His  relations  to  Porter  — 
Lincoln's  letter  on  the  subject  —  Fault-finding  with  Burnside  — 
Whose  work  ?  —  Burnside's  appearance  and  bearing  in  the  field. 

CHAPTER   XIX 
RETURN  TO  WEST  VIRGINIA 391 

Ordered  to  the  Kanawha  valley  again  —  An  unwelcome  surprise  — 
Reasons  for  the  order — Reporting  to  Halleck  at  Washington 

—  Affairs  in  the  Kanawha  in  September  —  Lightburn's  positions 

—  Enemy  under  Loring  advances  —  Affair  at  Fayette  C.  H.  — 
Lightburn   retreats  —  Gauley   Bridge  abandoned  —  Charleston 
evacuated  —  Disorderly  flight   to   the    Ohio  —  Enemy's  cavalry 
raid  under  Jenkins  —  General  retreat  in  Tennessee    and   Ken 
tucky —  West  Virginia  not  in  any  Department  —  Now  annexed 
to  that  of   Ohio  —  Morgan's  retreat  from   Cumberland  Gap  — 
Ordered  to  join  the  Kanawha  forces  —  Milroy'.s  brigade  also  — 
My  interviews  with  Halleck  and    Stanton  —  Promotion  —  My 
task — My  division  sent  with  me  —  District  of  West  Virginia  — 
Colonel  Crook  promoted  —  Journey  westward  —  Governor  Peir- 
point  —  Governor    Tod  —  General    Wright  —  Destitution     of 
Morgan's   column  —  Refitting  at  Portland,  Ohio  —  Night  drive 
to   Gallipolis  —  An   amusing    accident  —  Inspection   at    Point 
Pleasant  —  Milroy  ordered  to  Parkersburg  —  Milroy's  qualities 

—  Interruptions  to  movement  of  troops  —  No  wagons  —  Supplies 
delayed — Confederate    retreat — Loring    relieved — Echols   in 
command  —  Our  march  up  the  valley  —  Echols  retreats —  We  oc 
cupy  Charleston  and  Gauley  Bridge  —  Further  advance  stopped 

—  Our  forces  reduced  —  Distribution    of    remaining   troops  — 
Alarms  and  minor   movements  —  Case  of  Mr.  Summers  —  His 
treatment  by  the  Confederates. 

CHAPTER    XX 
WINTER  QUARTERS,   1862-63  —  PROMOTIONS  AND   POLITICS     420 

Central  position  of  Marietta,  Ohio  —  Connection  with  all  parts  of 
West  Virginia  —  Drill  and  instruction  of  troops  —  Guerilla 
warfare  —  Partisan  Rangers  —  Confederate  laws  —  Disposal  of 
plunder  —  Mosby's  Rangers  as  a  type  —  Opinions  of  Lee,  Stuart, 
and  Rosser  —  Effect  on  other  troops  —  Rangers  finally  abolished 

—  Rival  home-guards  and   militia  —  Horrors  of  neighborhood 
war  —  Staff  and  staff  duties  —  Reduction   of  forces  —  General 
Cluseret  —  Later   connection   with   the   Paris  Commune  —  His 
relations    with    Milroy  —  He    resigns  —  Political    situation  — 
Congressmen    distrust   Lincoln  —  Cutler's   diary — Resolutions 
regarding   appointments  of  general  officers  —  The  number  au- 


CONTENTS  XV 

PAGE 

thorized  by  law —  Stanton's  report  —  Effect  of  Act  of  July,  1862 

—  An   excess    of    nine    major-generals  —  The    legal   questions 
involved  —  Congressional   patronage   and   local   distribution  — 
Ready  for  a  "  deal  "  —  Bill  to  increase  the  number  of  generals 

—  A  u  slate  "  made   up  to  exhaust  the  number  —  Senate   and 
House  disagree  —  Conference  —  Agreement  in  last  hours  of  the 
session  —  The  new  list  —  A  few  vacancies  by  resignation,  etc. — 
List  of  those  dropped  —  My  own  case  —  Faults  of  the  method 

—  Lincoln's   humorous   comments  —  Curious    case   of   General 
Turchin  —  Congestion  in  the  highest   grades  —  Effects  —  Con 
federate  grades  of  general  and  lieutenant-general  —  Superiority 
of  our  system  —  Cotemporaneous  reports  and  criticisms  —  New 
regiments  instead  of  recruiting  old  ones  —  Sherman's  trenchant 
opinion. 

CHAPTER    XXI 

FAREWELL  TO  WEST  VIRGINIA  —  BURNSIDE  IN  THE  DEPART 
MENT  OF  THE  OHIO 442 

Desire  for  field  service —  Changes  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  — 
Judgment  of  McClellan  at  that  time  —  Our  defective  knowledge 

—  Changes  in  West  Virginia  —  Errors  in  new  organization  — 
Embarrassments  resulting  —  Visit  to  General  Schenck  —  New 
orders  from  Washington  —  Sent  to  Ohio  to  administer  the  draft _^ 

—  Burnside  at   head  of  the  department — District   of  Ohio  — 
Headquarters  at  Cincinnati  —  Cordial  relations  of  Governor  Tod 
with  the  military  authorities  —  System  of  enrolment  and  draft  — 
Administration  by  Colonel  Fry  —  Decay  of  the  veteran  regiments 

—  Bounty-jumping  —  Effects  on  political  parties  —  Soldiers  vot 
ing —  Burnside's  military  plans  —  East  Tennessee  —  Rosecrans 
aiming    at    Chattanooga  —  Burnside's    business    habits  —  His 
frankness  —  Stories  about  him  —  His  personal  characteristics  — 
Cincinnati  as  a  border  city  —  Rebel  sympathizers  —  Order  No.  38 

—  Challenged  by  Vallandigham  —  The  order  not  a  new  departure 

—  Lincoln's  proclamation  —  General  Wright's  circular. 


CHAPTER   XXII 
THE  VALLANDIGHAM  CASE  —  THE  HOLMES  COUNTY  WAR   .     458 

Clement  L.  Vallandigham  —  His  opposition  to  the  war  —  His 
theory  of  reconstruction  —  His  Mount  Vernon  speech — His 
arrest  —  Sent  before  the  military  commission  —  General  Potter 
its  president  —  Counsel  for  the  prisoner — The  line  of  defence 
—  The  judgment —  Habeas  Corpus  proceedings  —  Circuit  Court 
of  the  United  States  —  Judge  Leavitt  denies  the  release —  Com 
mutation  by  the  President  —  Sent  beyond  the  lines  —  Conduct 
of  Confederate  authorities  —  Vallandigham  in  Canada  —  Candi- 


xvi  CONTENTS 


PAGE 

date  for  Governor  —  Political  results  —  Martial  law  —  Principles 
underlying  it  —  Practical  application  —  The  intent  to  aid  the 
public  enemy  —  The  intent  to  defeat  the  draft  —  Armed  resist 
ance  to  arrest  of  deserters,  Noble  County  —  To  the  enrolment 
in  Holmes  County  —  A  real  insurrection  —  Connection  of  these 
with  Vallandigham's  speeches  —  The  Supreme  Court  refuses  to 
interfere  —  Action  in  the  Milligan  case  after  the  war  —  Judge 
Davis's  personal  views  —  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle  —  The 
Holmes  County  outbreak  —  Its  suppression  —  Letter  to  Judge 
Welker. 

CHAPTER   XXIII 
BURNSIDE    AND    ROSECRANS THE    SUMMER'S    DELAYS         .       .       473 

Condition  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  —  Halleck's  instructions  to 
Burnside  —  Blockhouses  at  bridges  —  Relief  of  East  Tennessee 

—  Conditions  of   the  problem  —  Vast   wagon-train    required  — 
Scheme  of   a  railroad — Surveys  begun  —  Burnside's  efforts  to 
arrange  co-operation  with  Rosecrans  —  Bragg  sending  troops  to 
Johnston  —  Halleck   urges   Rosecrans  to   activity  —  Continued 
inactivity — Burnside  ordered  to  send  troops  to  Grant — Rose- 
crans's    correspondence  with    Halleck  —  Lincoln's    dispatch  — 
Rosecrans  collects  his  subordinates'  opinions  —  Councils  of  war 

—  The  situation  considered —  Sheridan  and  Thomas  —  Compu 
tation  of   effectives  —  Garfield's  summing  up  —  Review  of  the 
situation  when  Rosecrans  succeeded  Buell  —  After  Stone's  River 

—  Relative  forces  —  Disastrous  detached  expeditions  —  Appeal 
to  ambition  —  The  major-generalship  in  regular  army  —  Views 
of   the    President   justified  —  Burnside's    forces  —  Confederate 
forces  in  East  Tennessee  —  Reasons  for  the  double  organization 
of  the  Union  armies. 

CHAPTER   XXIV 
THE  MORGAN  RAID 491 

Departure  of  the  staff  for  the  field — An  amusingly  quick  return  — 
Changes  in  my  own  duties  —  Expeditions  to  occupy  the  enemy 

—  Sanders'  raid  into  East  Tennessee  —  His  route —  His  success 
and  return  —  The  Confederate  Morgan's  raid — His  instructions 

—  His    reputation    as    a  soldier  —  Compared    with    Forrest  — 
Morgan's  start  delayed  —  His  appearance  at  Green  River,  Ky. 

—  Foiled  by  Colonel  Moore  —  Captures  Lebanon  —  Reaches  the 
Ohio  at  Brandenburg — General  Hobson  in  pursuit  — -  Morgan 
crosses  into  Indiana  —  Was  this  his  original  purpose? — His 

route  out  of  Indiana  into  Ohio — He  approaches  Cincinnati  — 
Hot  chase  by  Hobson  —  Gunboats  co-operating  on  the  river  — 
Efforts  to  block  his  way  —  He  avoids  garrisoned  posts  and  cities 

—  Our   troops   moved   in   transports   by  water  —  Condition  of 
Morgan's  jaded  column  —  Approaching  the  Ohio  at  Buffington's 


CONTENTS  xvn 


PAGE 

—  Gunboats  near  the  ford  —  Hobson  attacks  —  Part  captured, 
the   rest   fly  northward  —  Another   capture  —  A  long   chase  — 
Surrender  of  Morgan  with  the  remnant  —  Summary  of  results 

—  A  burlesque  capitulation. 

CHAPTER  XXV 
THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST  TENNESSEE 510 

News  of  Grant's  victory  at  Vicksburg  —  A  thrilling  scene  at  the 
opera — Burnside's  Ninth  Corps  to  return — Stanton  urges 
Rosecrans  to  advance  —  The  Tullahoma  manoeuvres  —  Testy 
correspondence  — Its  real  meaning  —  Urgency  with  Burnside  — 
Ignorance  concerning  his  situation  —  His  disappointment  as  to 
Ninth  Corps  —  Rapid  concentration  of  other  troops  —  Burn- 
side's  march  into  East  Tennessee  —  Occupation  of  Knoxville  — 
Invests  Cumberland  Gap  —  The  garrison  surrenders  —  Good 
news  from  Rosecrans — Distances  between  armies — Divergent 
lines  —  No  railway  communication  —  Burnside  concentrates  to 
ward  the  Virginia  line  —  Joy  of  the  people  —  Their  intense 
loyalty  — Their  faith  in  the  future. 

CHAPTER    XXVI 
BURNSIDE  IN  EAST  TENNESSEE 530 

Organizing    and    arming    the    loyalists  —  Burnside   concentrates    _ 
near  Greeneville  —  His  general  plan  —  Rumors  of  Confederate 
reinforcements  —  Lack   of    accurate    information  —  The   Ninth 
Corps  in  Kentucky  —  Its  depletion  by  malarial  disease —  Death 
of  General  Welsh' from  this  cause  —  Preparing  for  further  work 

Situation  on  i6th  September  —  Dispatch  from  Halleck —  Its 

apparent  purpose  —  Necessity  to  dispose  of  the  enemy  near 
Virginia  border  —  Burnside  personally  at  the  front  —  His  great 
activity — Ignorance  of  Rosecrans's  peril  —  Impossibility  of 
joining  him  by  the  2Oth  —  Ruinous  effects  of  abandoning  East 
Tennessee  —  Efforts  to  aid  Rosecrans  without  such  abandon 
ment  —  Enemy  duped  into  burning  Watauga  bridge  themselves 
Ninth  Corps  arriving  —  Willcox's  division  garrisons  Cumber 
land  Gap —  Reinforcements  sent  Rosecrans  from  all  quarters  — 
Chattanooga  made  safe  from  attack  — The  supply  question  — 
Meigs's  description  of  the  roads  —  Burnside  halted  near  London 

—  Halleck's  misconception  of  the  geography  — The  people  im 
ploring  the  President  not  to  remove  the  troops  —  How  Long- 
street  got   away  from  Virginia  —  Burnside's  alternate  plans  — 
Minor  operations   in   upper   Holston  valley  —  Wolford's   affair 
on  the  lower  Holston. 

APPENDIX  A 547 

APPENDIX  B 547 


MILITARY  REMINISCENCES 


OF 


THE  CIVIL  WAR 

CHAPTER  I 

THE   OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


Ohio  Senate  April  12  —  Sumter  bombarded  —  "  Glory  to  God  1 "  —  The 
surrender  —  Effect  on  public  sentiment  —  Call  for  troops  —  Politicians 
changing  front  —  David  Tod  —  Stephen  A.  Douglas  —  The  insurrection 
must  be  crushed  —  Garfield  on  personal  duty  —  Troops  organized  by  the 
States  —  The  militia  —  Unpreparedness  —  McClellan  at  Columbus  — 
Meets  Governor  Dennison — Put  in  command  —  Our  stock  of  munitions  — 
Making  estimates  —  McClellan's  plan  —  Camp  Jackson  —  Camp  Den 
nison  —  Gathering  of  the  volunteers  —  Garibaldi  uniforms  —  Officering 
the  troops  —  Off  for  Washington  —  Scenes  in  the  State  Capitol  —  Gov 
ernor  Dennison's  labors  —  Young  regulars  —  Scott's  policy  —  Alex. 
McCook  —  Orlando  Poe  —  Not  allowed  to  take  state  commissions. 

ON  Friday  the  twelfth  day  of  April,  1861,  the  Senate 
of  Ohio  was  in  session,  trying  to  go  on  in  the 
ordinary  routine  of  business,  but  with  a  sense  of  anxiety 
and  strain  which  was  caused  by  the  troubled  condition  of 
national  affairs.  The  passage  of  Ordinances  of  Secession 
by  one  after  another  of  the  Southern  States,  and  even  the 
assembling  of  a  provisional  Confederate  government  at 
Montgomery,  had  not  wholly  destroyed  the  hope  that 
some  peaceful  way  out  of  our  troubles  would  be  found ; 
yet  the  gathering  of  an  army  on  the  sands  opposite  Fort 
Sumter  was  really  war,  and  if  a  hostile  gun  were  fired,  we 
knew  it  would  mean  the  end  of  all  effort  at  arrangement. 
Hoping  almost  against  hope  that  blood  would  not  be  shed, 
and  that  the  pageant  of  military  array  and  of  a  rebel  gov 
ernment  would  pass  by  and  soon  be  reckoned  among  the 
VOL.  i. —  i 


2  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

disused  scenes  and  properties  of  a  political  drama  that 
never  pretended  to  be  more  than  acting,  we  tried  to  give 
our  thoughts  to  business;  but  there  was  no  heart  in  it, 
and  the  morning  hour  lagged,  for  we  could  not  work  in 
earnest  and  we  were  unwilling  to  adjourn. 

Suddenly  a  senator  came  in  from  the  lobby  in  an  ex 
cited  way,,  and  catching  the  chairman's  eye,  exclaimed, 
/\Mf.ijRr&sident,  the  telegraph  announces  that  the  seces- 
.sioaists  are^bombarding  Fort  Sumter!"  There  was  a 
.solemn  drid'j&inful  hush,  but  it  was  broken  in  a  moment 
by  a  woman's  shrill  voice  from  the  spectators'  seats,  cry 
ing,  "  Glory  to  God  !  "  It  startled  every  one,  almost  as  if 
the  enemy  were  in  the  midst.  But  it  was  the  voice  of  a 
radical  friend  of  the  slave,  who  after  a  lifetime  of  public 
agitation  believed  that  only  through  blood  could  freedom 
be  won.  Abby  Kelly  Foster  had  been  attending  the  ses 
sion  of  the  Assembly,  urging  the  passage  of  some  meas 
ures  enlarging  the  legal  rights  of  married  women,  and, 
sitting  beyond  the  railing  when  the  news  came  in,  shouted 
a  fierce  cry  of  joy  that  oppression  had  submitted  its  cause 
to  the  decision  of  the  sword.  With  most  of  us,  the 
gloomy  thought  that  civil  war  had  begun  in  our  own 
land  overshadowed  everything,  and  seemed  too  great  a 
price  to  pay  for  any  good ;  a  scourge  to  be  borne  only  in 
preference  to  yielding  the  very  groundwork  of  our  re 
publicanism,  —  the  right  to  enforce  a  fair  interpretation 
of  the  Constitution  through  the  election  of  President  and 
Congress. 

The  next  day  we  learned  that  Major  Anderson  had  sur 
rendered,  and  the  telegraphic  news  from  all  the  Northern 
States  showed  plain  evidence  of  a  popular  outburst  of  loy 
alty  to  the  Union,  following  a  brief  moment  of  dismay. 
Judge  Thomas  M.  Key  of  Cincinnati,  chairman  of  the 
Judiciary  Committee,  was  the  recognized  leader  of  the 
Democratic  party  in  the  Senate,1  and  at  an  early  hour 

1  Afterward  aide-de-camp  and  acting  judge-advocate  on  McClellan's  staff. 


THE   OUTBREAK  OF   THE    WAR 


moved  an  adjournment  to  the  following  Tuesday,  in  order, 
as  he  said,  that  the  senators  might  have  the  opportunity 
to  go  home  and  consult  their  constituents  in  the  perilous 
crisis  of  public  affairs.  No  objection  was  made  to  the 
adjournment,  and  the  representatives  took  a  similar  re 
cess.  All  were  in  a  state  of  most  anxious  suspense,  —  the 
Republicans  to  know  what  initiative  the  Administration 
at  Washington  would  take,  and  the  Democrats  to  deter 
mine  what  course  they  should  follow  if  the  President 
should  call  for  troops  to  put  down  the  insurrection. 

Before  we  met  again,  Mr.  Lincoln's  proclamation  and 
call  for  seventy-five  thousand  militia  for  three  months' 
service  were  out,  and  the  great  mass  of  the  people  of  the 
North,  forgetting  all  party  distinctions,  answered  with  an 
enthusiastic  patriotism  that  swept  politicians  off  their 
feet.  When  we  met  again  on  Tuesday  morning,  Judge 
Key,  taking  my  arm  and  pacing  the  floor  outside  the  rail 
ing  in  the  Senate  chamber,  broke  out  impetuously,  "  Mr. 
Cox,  the  people  have  gone  stark  mad ! "  "I  knew  they 
would  if  a  blow  was  struck  against  the  flag,"  said  I,  re 
minding  him  of  some  previous  conversations  we  had  had 
on  that  subject.  He,  with  most  of  the  politicians  of  the 
day,  partly  by  sympathy  with  the  overwhelming  current 
of  public  opinion,  and  partly  by  the  reaction  of  their  own 
hearts  against  the  false  theories  which  had  encouraged 
the  secessionists,  determined  to  support  the  war  measures 
of  the  government,  and  to  make  no  factious  opposition  to 
such  state  legislation  as  might  be  necessary  to  sustain 
the  federal  administration. 

The  attitude  of  Mr.  Key  is  only  a  type  of  many  others, 
and  marks  one  of  the  most  striking  features  of  the  time. 
On  the  8th  of  January  the  usual  Democratic  convention 
and  celebration  of  the  Battle  of  New  Orleans  had  taken 
place,  and  a  series  of  resolutions  had  been  passed,  which 
were  drafted,  as  was  understood,  by  Judge  Thurman.  In 
these,  professing  to  speak  in  the  name  of  "  two  hundred 


4  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

thousand  Democrats  of  Ohio,"  the  convention  had  very 
significantly  intimated  that  this  vast  organization  of  men 
would  be  found  in  the  way  of  any  attempt  to  put  down 
secession  until  the  demands  of  the  South  in  respect  to 
slavery  were  complied  with.  A  few  days  afterward  I 
was  returning  to  Columbus  from  my  home  in  Trumbull 
County,  and  meeting  upon  the  railway  train  with  David 
Tod,  then  an  active  Democratic  politician,  but  afterward 
one  of  our  loyal  "war  governors,"  the  conversation 
turned  on  the  action  of  the  convention  which  had  just 
adjourned.  Mr.  Tod  and  I  were  personal  friends  and 
neighbors,  and  I  freely  expressed  my  surprise  that  the 
convention  should  have  committed  itself  to  what  must  be 
interpreted  as  a  threat  of  insurrection  in  the  North  if  the 
administration  should,  in  opposing  secession  by  force, 
follow  the  example  of  Andrew  Jackson,  in  whose  honor 
they  had  assembled.  He  rather  vehemently  reasserted 
the  substance  of  the  resolution,  saying  that  we  Republi 
cans  would  find  the  two  hundred  thousand  Ohio  Demo 
crats  in  front  of  us,  if  we  attempted  to  cross  the  Ohio 
River.  My  answer  was,  "  We  will  give  up  the  contest  if 
we  cannot  carry  your  two  hundred  thousand  over  the 
heads  of  you  leaders." 

The  result  proved  how  hollow  the  party  professions  had 
been;  or  perhaps  I  should  say  how  superficial  was  the 
hold  of  such  party  doctrines  upon  the  mass  of  men  in  a 
great  political  organization.  In  the  excitement  of  politi 
cal  campaigns  they  had  cheered  the  extravagant  language 
of  party  platforms  with  very  little  reflection,  and  the 
leaders  had  imagined  that  the  people  were  really  and 
earnestly  indoctrinated  into  the  political  creed  of  Cal- 
houn;  but  at  the  first  shot  from  Beauregard's  guns  in 
Charleston  harbor  their  latent  patriotism  sprang  into  vig 
orous  life,  and  they  crowded  to  the  recruiting  stations  to 
enlist  for  the  defence  of  the  national  flag  and  the  national 
Union.  It  was  a  popular  torrent  which  no  leaders  could 


THE   OUTBREAK  OF  THE    WAR 


resist;  but  many  of  these  should  be  credited  with  the 
same  patriotic  impulse,  and  it  made  them  nobly  oblivi 
ous  of  party  consistency.  Stephen  A.  Douglas  passed 
through  Columbus  on  his  way  to  Washington  a  few  days 
after  the  surrender  of  Sumter,  and  in  response  to  the 
calls  of  a  spontaneous  gathering  of  people,  spoke  to 
them  from  his  bedroom  window  in  the  American  House. 
There  had  been  no  thought  for  any  of  the  common  sur 
roundings  of  a  public  meeting.  There  were  no  torches, 
no  music.  A  dark  crowd  of  men  filled  full  the  dim-lit 
street,  and  called  for  Douglas  with  an  earnestness  of  tone 
wholly  different  from  the  enthusiasm  of  common  political 
gatherings.  He  came  half-dressed  to  his  window,  and 
without  any  light  near  him,  spoke  solemnly  to  the  people 
upon  the  terrible  crisis  which  had  come  upon  the  nation. 
Men  of  all  parties  were  there:  his  own  followers  to  get 
some  light  as  to  their  duty;  the  Breckinridge  Democrats 
ready,  most  of  them,  repentantly  to  follow  a  Northern 
leader,  now  that  their  recent  candidate  was  in  the  rebel 
lion;1  the  Republicans  eagerly  anxious  to  know  whether 
so  potent  an  influence  was  to  be  unreservedly  on  the  side 
of  the  country.  I  remember  well  the  serious  solicitude 
with  which  I  listened  to  his  opening  sentences  as  I  leaned 
against  the  railing  of  the  State  House  park,  trying  in  vain 
to  get  more  than  a  dim  outline  of  the  man  as  he  stood  at 
the  unlighted  window.  His  deep  sonorous  voice  rolled 
down  through  the  darkness  from  above  us,  —  an  earnest, 
measured  voice,  the  more  solemn,  the  more  impressive, 
because  we  could  not  see  the  speaker,  and  it  came  to  us 
literally  as  "a  voice  in  the  night,"  —  the  night  of  our 
country's  unspeakable  trial.  There  was  no  uncertainty 
in  his  tone :  the  Union  must  be  preserved  and  the  insur 
rection  must  be  crushed,  — he  pledged  his  hearty  support 
to  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration  in  doing  this.  Other 

1  Breckinridge  did  not  formally  join  the  Confederacy  till  September,  but 
his  accord  with  the  secessionists  was  well  known. 


6  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

questions  must  stand  aside  till  the  national  authority 
should  be  everywhere  recognized.  I  do  not  think  we 
greatly  cheered  him,  —  it  was  rather  a  deep  Amen  that 
went  up  from  the  crowd.  We  went  home  breathing  freer 
in  the  assurance  we  now  felt  that,  for  a  time  at  least,  no 
organized  opposition  to  the  federal  government  and  its 
policy  of  coercion  would  be  formidable  in  the  North. 
We  did  not  look  for  unanimity.  Bitter  and  narrow  men 
there  were  whose  sympathies  were  with  their  country's 
enemies.  Others  equally  narrow  were  still  in  the  chains 
of  the  secession  logic  they  had  learned  from  the  Calhoun- 
ists;  but  the  broader-minded  men  found  themselves  happy 
in  being  free  from  disloyal  theories,  and  threw  them 
selves  sincerely  and  earnestly  into  the  popular  move 
ment.  There  was  no  more  doubt  where  Douglas  or  Tod 
or  Key  would  be  found,  or  any  of  the  great  class  they 
represented. 

Yet  the  situation  hung  upon  us  like  a  nightmare. 
Garfield  and  I  were  lodging  together  at  the  time,  our 
wives  being  kept  at  home  by  family  cares,  and  when  we 
reached  our  sitting-room,  after  an  evening  session  of  the 
Senate,  we  often  found  ourselves  involuntarily  groaning, 
"  Civil  war  in  our  land ! "  The  shame,  the  outrage,  the 
folly,  seemed  too  great  to  believe,  and  we  half  hoped  to 
wake  from  it  as  from  a  dream.  Among  the  painful  re 
membrances  of  those  days  is  the  ever-present  weight  at 
the  heart  which  never  left  me  till  I  found  relief  in  the 
active  duties  of  camp  life  at  the  close  of  the  month.  I 
went  about  my  duties  (and  I  am  sure  most  of  those  I 
associated  with  did  the  same)  with  the  half-choking 
sense  of  a  grief  I  dared  not  think  of:  like  one  who  is 
dragging  himself  to  the  ordinary  labors  of  life  from  some 
terrible  and  recent  bereavement. 

We  talked  of  our  personal  duty,  and  though  both  Gar- 
field  and  myself  had  young  families,  we  were  agreed 
that  our  activity  in  the  organization  and  support  of  the 


THE   OUTBREAK  OF   THE    WAR 


Republican  party  made  the  duty  of  supporting  the  govern 
ment  by  military  service  come  peculiarly  home  to  us. 
He  was,  for  the  moment,  somewhat  trammelled  by  his 
half-clerical  position,  but  he  very  soon  cut  the  knot.  My 
own  path  seemed  unmistakably  clear.  He,  more  careful 
for  his  friend  than  for  himself,  urged  upon  me  his  doubts 
whether  my  physical  strength  was  equal  to  the  strain  that 
would  be  put  upon  it.  "I,"  said  he,  "am  big  and  strong, 
and  if  my  relations  to  the  church  and  the  college  can  be 
broken,  I  shall  have  no  excuse  for  not  enlisting;  but  you 
are  slender  and  will  break  down."  It  was  true  that  I 
looked  slender  for  a  man  six  feet  high  (though  it  would 
hardly  be  suspected  now  that  it  was  so),  yet  I  had  assured 
confidence  in  the  elasticity  of  my  constitution;  and  the 
result  justified  me,  whilst  it  also  showed  how  liable  to 
mistake  one  is  in  such  things.  Garfield  found  that  he 
had  a  tendency  to  weakness  of  the  alimentary  system 
which  broke  him  down  on  every  campaign  in  which  he 
served  and  led  to  his  retiring  from  the  army  much  earlier 
than  he  had  intended.  My  own  health,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  strengthened  by  out-door  life  and  exposure, 
and  I  served  to  the  end  with  growing  physical  vigor. 

When  Mr.  Lincoln  issued  his  first  call  for  troops,  the 
existing  laws  made  it  necessary  that  these  should  be  fully 
organized  and  officered  by  the  several  States.  Then,  the 
treasury  was  in  no  condition  to  bear  the  burden  of  war 
expenditures,  and  till  Congress  could  assemble,  the  Presi 
dent  was  forced  to  rely  on  the  States  to  furnish  the  means 
necessary  for  the  equipment  and  transportation  of  their 
own  troops.  This  threw  upon  the  governors  and  legisla 
tures  of  the  loyal  States  responsibilities  of  a  kind  wholly 
unprecedented.  A  long  period  of  profound  peace  had 
made  every  military  organization  seem  almost  farcical. 
A  few  independent  military  companies  formed  the  merest 
shadow  of  an  army;  the  state  militia  proper  was  only  a 
nominal  thing.  It  happened,  however,  that  I  held  a  com- 


8  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

mission  as  Brigadier  in  this  state  militia,  and  my  inti 
macy  with  Governor  Dennison  led  him  to  call  upon  me 
for  such  assistance  as  I  could  render  in  the  first  enrol 
ment  and  organization  of  the  Ohio  quota.  Arranging  to 
be  called  to  the  Senate  chamber  when  my  vote  might 
be  needed  upon  important  legislation,  I  gave  my  time 
chiefly  to  such  military  matters  as  the  governor  ap 
pointed.  Although,  as  I  have  said,  my  military  com 
mission  had  been  a  nominal  thing,  and  in  fact  I  had 
never  worn  a  uniform,  I  had  not  wholly  neglected  theo 
retic  preparation  for  such  work.  For  some  years  the 
possibility  of  a  war  of  secession  had  been  one  of  the 
things  which  would  force  itself  upon  the  thoughts  of  re 
flecting  people,  and  I  had  been  led  to  give  some  careful 
study  to  such  books  of  tactics  and  of  strategy  as  were 
within  easy  reach.  I  had  especially  been  led  to  read 
military  history  with  critical  care,  and  had  carried  away 
many  valuable  ideas  from  this  most  useful  means  of  mili 
tary  education.  I  had  therefore  some  notion  of  the  work 
before  us,  and  could  approach  its  problems  with  less  loss 
of  time,  at  least,  than  if  I  had  been  wholly  ignorant.1 

My  commission  as  Brigadier-General  in  the  Ohio  quota 
in  national  service  was  dated  on  the  23d  of  April,  though 
it  had  been  understood  for  several  days  that  my  tender  of 
service  in  the  field  would  be  accepted.  Just  about  the 
same  time  Captain  George  B.  McClellan  was  requested 
by  Governor  Dennison  to  come  to  Columbus  for  consul 
tation,  and  by  the  governor's  request  I  met  him  at  the 
railway  station  and  took  him  to  the  State  House.  I  think 
Mr.  Larz  Anderson  (brother  of  Major  Robert  Anderson) 
and  Mr.  L'Hommedieu  of  Cincinnati  were  with  him. 
The  intimation  had  been  given  me  that  he  would  prob 
ably  be  made  major-general  and  commandant  of  our  Ohio 
contingent,  and  this,  naturally,  made  me  scan  him  closely. 

1  I  have  treated  this  subject  somewhat  more  fully  in  a  paper  in  the  "Atlan 
tic  Monthly  "  for  March,  1892,  "  Why  the  Men  of  '61  fought  for  the  Union." 


THE   OUTBREAK   OF  THE    WAR 


He  was  rather  under  the  medium  height,  but  muscularly 
formed,  with  broad  shoulders  and  a  well-poised  head, 
active  and  graceful  in  motion.  His  whole  appearance 
was  quiet  and  modest,  but  when  drawn  out  he  showed  no 
lack  of  confidence  in  himself.  He  was  dressed  in  a  plain 
travelling  suit,  with  a  narrow- rimmed  soft  felt  hat.  In 
short,  he  seemed  what  he  was,  a  railway  superintendent 
in  his  business  clothes.  At  the  time  his  name  was  a 
good  deal  associated  with  that  of  Beauregard ;  they  were 
spoken  of  as  young  men  of  similar  standing  in  the  Engi 
neer  Corps  of  the  Army,  and  great  things  were  expected 
of  them  both  because  of  their  scientific  knowledge  of  their 
profession,  though  McClellan  had  been  in  civil  life  for 
some  years.  His  report  on  the  Crimean  War  was  one  of 
the  few  important  memoirs  our  old  army  had  produced, 
and  was  valuable  enough  to  give  a  just  reputation  for 
comprehensive  understanding  of  military  organization, 
and  the  promise  of  ability  to  conduct  the  operations  of 
an  army. 

I  was  present  at  the  interview  which  the  governor  had 
with  him.  The  destitution  of  the  State  of  everything 
like  military  material  and  equipment  was  very  plainly 
put,  and  the  magnitude  of  the  task  of  building  up  a  small 
army  out  of  nothing  was  not  blinked.  The  governor 
spoke  of  the  embarrassment  he  felt  at  every  step  from  the 
lack  of  practical  military  experience  in  his  staff,  and  of 
his  desire  to  have  some  one  on  whom  he  could  properly 
throw  the  details  of  military  work.  McClellan  showed 
that  he  fully  understood  the  difficulties  there  would  be 
before  him,  and  said  that  no  man  could  wholly  master 
them  at  once,  although  he  had  confidence  that  if  a  few 
weeks'  time  for  preparation  were  given,  he  would  be  able 
to  put  the  Ohio  division  into  reasonable  form  for  taking 
the  field.  The  command  was  then  formally  tendered  and 
accepted.  All  of  us  who  were  present  felt  that  the  selec 
tion  was  one  full  of  promise  and  hope,  and  that  the 


10  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

governor  had  done  the  wisest  thing  practicable  at  the 
time. 

The  next  morning  McClellan  requested  me  to  accom 
pany  him  to  the  State  Arsenal,  to  see  what  arms  and 
material  might  be  there.  We  found  a  few  boxes  of 
smooth-bore  muskets  which  had  once  been  issued  to 
militia  companies  and  had  been  returned  rusted  and 
damaged.  No  belts,  cartridge-boxes,  or  other  accoutre 
ments  were  with  them.  There  were  two  or  three  smooth 
bore  brass  fieldpieces,  six-pounders,  which  had  been 
honeycombed  by  firing  salutes,  and  of  which  the  vents 
had  been  worn  out,  bushed,  and  worn  out  again.  In  a 
heap  in  one  corner  lay  a  confused  pile  of  mildewed  har 
ness,  which  had  probably  been  once  used  for  artillery 
horses,  but  was  now  not  worth  carrying  away.  There 
had  for  many  years  been  no  money  appropriated  to  buy 
military  material  or  even  to  protect  the  little  the  State 
had.  The  federal  government  had  occasionally  distrib 
uted  some  arms  which  were  in  the  hands  of  the  independ 
ent  uniformed  militia,  and  the  arsenal  was  simply  an 
empty  storehouse.  It  did  not  take  long  to  complete  our 
inspection.  At  the  door,  as  we  were  leaving  the  build 
ing,  McClellan  turned,  and  looking  back  into  its  empti 
ness,  remarked,  half  humorously  and  half  sadly,  "  A  fine 
stock  of  munitions  on  which  to  begin  a  great  war!" 

We  went  back  to  the  State  House,  where  a  room  in  the 
Secretary  of  State's  department  was  assigned  us,  and  we 
sat  down  to  work.  The  first  task  was  to  make  out  de 
tailed  schedules  and  estimates  of  what  would  be  needed 
to  equip  ten  thousand  men  for  the  field.  This  was  a  unit 
which  could  be  used  by  the  governor  and  legislature  in 
estimating  the  appropriations  needed  then  or  subsequently. 
Intervals  in  this  labor  were  used  in  discussing  the  general 
situation  and  plans  of  campaign.  Before  the  close  of  the 
week  McClellan  drew  up  a  paper  embodying  his  own 
views,  and  forwarded  it  to  Lieutenant-General  Scott.  He 


THE   OUTBREAK   OF   THE    WAR  II 

read  it  to  me,  and  my  recollection  of  it  is  that  he  sug 
gested  two  principal  lines  of  movement  in  the  West, —  one, 
to  move  eastward  by  the  Kanawha  valley  with  a  heavy 
column  to  co-operate  with  an  army  in  front  of  Washing 
ton;  the  other,  to  march  directly  southward  and  to  open 
the  valley  of  the  Mississippi.  Scott's  answer  was  appre 
ciative  and  flattering,  without  distinctly  approving  his 
plan ;  and  I  have  never  doubted  that  the  paper  prepared 
the  way  for  his  appointment  in  the  regular  army  which 
followed  at  so  early  a  day.1 

During  this  week  McClellan  was  invited  to  take  the 
command  of  the  troops  to  be  raised  in  Pennsylvania,  his 
native  State.  Some  things  beside  his  natural  attachment 
to  Pennsylvania  made  the  proposal  an  attractive  one  to 
him.  It  was  already  evident  that  the  army  which  might 
be  organized  near  Washington  would  be  peculiarly  in  the 
public  eye,  and  would  give  to  its  leading  officers  greater 
opportunities  of  prompt  recognition  and  promotion  than 
would  be  likely  to  occur  in  the  West.  The  close  associa 
tion  with  the  government  would  also  be  a  source  of  power 
if  he  were  successful,  and  the  way  to  a  chief  command 
would  be  more  open  there  than  elsewhere.  McClellan 
told  me  frankly  that  if  the  offer  had  come  before  he  had 
assumed  the  Ohio  command,  he  would  have  accepted  it; 
but  he  promptly  decided  that  he  was  honorably  bound  to 
serve  under  the  commission  he  had  already  received  and 
which,  like  my  own,  was  dated  April  23. 

My  own  first  assignment  to  a  military  command  was 
during  the  same  week,  on  the  completion  of  our  esti 
mates,  when  I  was  for  a  few  days  put  in  charge  of  Camp 

1  I  am  not  aware  that  McClellan's  plan  of  campaign  has  been  published. 
Scott's  answer  to  it  is  given  in  General  Townsend's  "  Anecdotes  of  the  Civil 
War,"  p.  260.  It  was,  with  other  communications  from  Governor  Dennison, 
carried  to  Washington  by  Hon.  A.  F.  Perry  of  Cincinnati,  an  intimate  friend 
of  the  governor,  who  volunteered  as  special  messenger,  the  mail  service  being 
unsafe.  See  a  paper  by  Mr.  Perry  in  "  Sketches  of  War  History  "  (Ohio  Loyal 
Legion),  vol.  iii.  p.  345. 


12  REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Jackson,  the  depot  of  recruits  which  Governor  Dennison 
had  established  in  the  northern  suburb  of  Columbus  and 
had  named  in  honor  of  the  first  squelcher  of  secessionism. 
McClellan  soon  determined,  however,  that  a  separate 
camp  of  instruction  should  be  formed  for  the  troops  mus 
tered  into  the  United  States  service,  and  should  be  so 
placed  as  to  be  free  from  the  temptations  and  inconven 
iences  of  too  close  neighborhood  to  a  large  city,  whilst  it 
should  also  be  reasonably  well  placed  for  speedy  defence 
of  the  southern  frontier  of  the  State.  Other  camps  could 
be  under  state  control  and  used  only  for  the  organization 
of  regiments  which  could  afterward  be  sent  to  the  camp 
of  instruction  or  elsewhere.  Railway  lines  and  connec 
tions  indicated  some  point  in  the  Little  Miami  valley  as 
the  proper  place  for  such  a  camp ;  and  Mr.  Woodward,  the 
chief  engineer  of  the  Little  Miami  Railroad,  being  taken 
into  consultation,  suggested  a  spot  on  the  line  of  that 
railway  about  thirteen  miles  from  Cincinnati,  where  a 
considerable  bend  of  the  Little  Miami  River  encloses 
wide  and  level  fields,  backed  on  the  west  by  gently  rising 
hills.  I  was  invited  to  accompany  the  general  in  mak 
ing  the  inspection  of  the  site,  and  I  think  we  were  ac 
companied  by  Captain  Rosecrans,  an  officer  who  had 
resigned  from  the  regular  army  to  seek  a  career  as  civil 
engineer,  and  had  lately  been  in  charge  of  some  coal 
mines  in  the  Kanawha  valley.  Mr.  Woodward  was  also 
of  the  party,  and  furnished  a  special  train  to  enable  us 
to  stop  at  as  many  eligible  points  as  it  might  be  thought 
desirable  to  examine.  There  was  no  doubt  that  the  point 
suggested  was  best  adapted  for  our  work,  and  although 
the  owners  of  the  land  made  rather  hard  terms,  McClellan 
was  authorized  to  close  a  contract  for  the  use  of  the  mili 
tary  camp,  which,  in  honor  of  the  governor,  he  named 
Camp  Dennison. 

But  in  trying  to  give  a  connected  idea  of  the  first  mili 
tary  organization  of  the  State,  I  have  outrun  some  inci- 


THE   OUTBREAK  OF  THE    WAR  13 

dents  of  those  days  which  are  worth  recollection.  From 
the  hour  the  call  for  troops  was  published,  enlistments 
began,  and  recruits  were  parading  the  streets  continually. 
At  the  Capitol  the  restless  impulse  to  be  doing  some 
thing  military  seized  even  upon  the  members  of  the  leg 
islature,  and  a  large  number  of  them  assembled  every 
evening  upon  the  east  terrace  of  the  State  House  to  be 
drilled  in  marching  and  facing,  by  one  or  two  of  their 
own  number  who  had  some  knowledge  of  company  tactics. 
Most  of  the  uniformed  independent  companies  in  the 
cities  of  the  State  immediately  tendered  their  services, 
and  began  to  recruit  their  numbers  to  the  hundred  men 
required  for  acceptance.  There  was  no  time  to  procure 
uniform,  nor  was  it  desirable;  for  these  independent 
companies  had  chosen  their  own,  and  would  have  to 
change  it  for  that  of  the  United  States  as  soon  as  this 
could  be  furnished.  For  some  days  companies  could  be 
seen  marching  and  drilling,  of  which  part  would  be  uni 
formed  in  some  gaudy  style,  such  as  is  apt  to  prevail  in 
holiday  parades  in  time  of  peace,  whilst  another  part 
would  be  dressed  in  the  ordinary  working  garb  of  citizens 
of  all  degrees.  The  uniformed  files  would  also  be  armed 
and  accoutred ;  the  others  would  be  without  arms  or  equip 
ments,  and  as  awkward  a  squad  as  could  well  be  imag 
ined.  The  material,  however,  was  magnificent,  and  soon 
began  to  take  shape.  The  fancy  uniforms  were  left  at 
home,  and  some  approximation  to  a  simple  and  useful 
costume  was  made.  The  recent  popular  outburst  in  Italy 
furnished  a  useful  idea,  and  the  "  Garibaldi  uniform  "  of 
.a  red  flannel  shirt  with  broad  falling  collar,  with  blue 
trousers  held  by  a  leathern  waist-belt,  and  a  soft  felt  hat 
for  the  head,  was  extensively  copied,  and  served  an  excel 
lent  purpose.  It  could  be  made  by  the  wives  and  sisters 
at  home,  and  was  all  the  more  acceptable  for  that.  The 
spring  was  opening,  and  a  heavy  coat  would  not  be  much 
needed,  so  that  with  some  sort  of  overcoat  and  a  good 


14  REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

blanket  in  an  improvised  knapsack,  the  new  company  was 
not  badly  provided.  The  warm  scarlet  color,  reflected 
from  their  enthusiastic  faces  as  they  stood  in  line,  made 
a  picture  that  never  failed  to  impress  the  mustering  offi 
cers  with  the  splendid  character  of  the  men. 

The  officering  of  these  new  troops  was  a  difficult  and 
delicate  task,  and  so  far  as  company  officers  were  con 
cerned,  there  seemed  no  better  way  at  the  beginning  than 
to  let  the  enlisted  men  elect  their  own,  as  was  in  fact 
done.  In  most  cases  where  entirely  new  companies  were 
raised,  it  had  been  by  the  enthusiastic  efforts  of  some 
energetic  volunteers  who  were  naturally  made  the  com 
missioned  officers.  But  not  always.  There  were  numer 
ous  examples  of  self-denying  patriotism  which  stayed  in 
the  ranks  after  expending  much  labor  and  money  in  re 
cruiting,  modestly  refusing  the  honors,  and  giving  way  to 
some  one  supposed  to  have  military  knowledge  or  experi 
ence.  The  war  in  Mexico  in  1847  was  the  latest  conflict 
with  a  civilized  people,  and  to  have  served  in  it  was  a 
sure  passport  to  confidence.  It  had  often  been  a  service 
more  in  name  than  in  fact ;  but  the  young  volunteers  felt 
so  deeply  their  own  ignorance  that  they  were  ready  to 
yield  to  any  pretence  of  superior  knowledge,  and  gener 
ously  to  trust  themselves  to  any  one  who  would  offer  to 
lead  them.  Hosts  of  charlatans  and  incompetents  were 
thus  put  into  responsible  places  at  the  beginning,  but  the 
sifting  work  went  on  fast  after  the  troops  were  once  in 
the  field.  The  election  of  field  officers,  however,  ought 
not  to  have  been  allowed.  Companies  were  necessarily 
regimented  together,  of  which  each  could  have  but  little 
personal  knowledge  of  the  officers  of  the  others;  intrigue 
and  demagogy  soon  came  into  play,  and  almost  fatal  mis 
takes  were  made  in  selection.  After  a  time  the  evil 
worked  its  own  cure,  but  the  ill  effects  of  it  were  long 
visible. 

The  immediate  need  of  troops  to  protect  Washington 


THE   OUTBREAK   OF   THE    WAR  15 

caused  most  of  the  uniformed  companies  to  be  united 
into  the  first  two  regiments,  which  were  quickly  de 
spatched  to  the  East.  It  was  a  curious  study  to  watch 
the  indications  of  character  as  the  officers  commanding 
companies  reported  to  the  governor,  and  were  told  that 
the  pressing  demand  from  Washington  made  it  necessary 
to  organize  a  regiment  or  two  and  forward  them  at  once, 
without  waiting  to  arm  or  equip  the  recruits.  Some 
promptly  recognized  the  necessity  and  took  the  undesir 
able  features  as  part  of  the  duty  they  had  assumed. 
Others  were  querulous,  wishing  some  one  else  to  stand 
first  in  the  breach,  leaving  them  time  for  drill,  equip 
ment,  and  preparation.  One  figure  impressed  itself  very 
strongly  on  my  memory.  A  sturdy  form,  a  head  with 
more  than  ordinary  marks  of  intelligence,  but  a  bearing 
with  more  of  swagger  than  of  self -poised  courage,  yet  evi 
dently  a  man  of  some  importance  in  his  own  community, 
stood  before  the  seat  of  the  governor,  the  bright  lights  of 
the  chandelier  over  the  table  lighting  strongly  both  their 
figures.  The  officer  was  wrapped  in  a  heavy  blanket  or 
carriage  lap-robe,  spotted  like  a  leopard  skin,  which  gave 
him  a  brigandish  air.  He  was  disposed  to  protest.  "  If 
my  men  were  hellions,"  said  he,  with  strong  emphasis  on 
the  word  (a  new  one  to  me),  "I  wouldn't  mind;  but  to 
send  off  the  best  young  fellows  of  the  county  in  such  a 
way  looks  like  murder."  The  governor,  sitting  with 
pale,  delicate  features,  but  resolute  air,  answered  that 
the  way  to  Washington  was  not  supposed  to  be  danger 
ous,  and  the  men  could  be  armed  and  equipped,  he  was 
assured,  as  soon  as  they  reached  there.  It  would  be  done 
at  Harrisburg,  if  possible,  and  certainly  if  any  hostility 
should  be  shown  in  Maryland.  The  President  wanted 
the  regiments  at  once,  and  Ohio's  volunteers  were  quite 
as  ready  to  go  as  any.  He  had  no  choice,  therefore,  but 
to  order  them  off.  The  order  was  obeyed ;  but  the  obedi 
ence  was  with  bad  grace,  and  I  felt  misgivings  as  to  the 


1 6  REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

officer's  fitness  to  command, —  misgivings  which  about  a 
year  afterward  were  vividly  recalled  with  the  scene  I 
have  described. 

No  sooner  were  these  regiments  off  than  companies 
began  to  stream  in  from  all  parts  of  the  State.  On  their 
first  arrival  they  were  quartered  wherever  shelter  could 
be  had,  as  there  were  no  tents  or  sheds  to  make  a  camp 
for  them.  Going  to  my  evening  work  at  the  State  House, 
as  I  crossed  the  rotunda,  I  saw  a  company  marching  in 
by  the  south  door,  and  another  disposing  itself  for  the 
night  upon  the  marble  pavement  near  the  east  entrance; 
as  I  passed  on  to  the  north  hall,  I  saw  another,  that  had 
come  a  little  earlier,  holding  a  prayer-meeting,  the  stone 
arches  echoing  with  the  excited  supplications  of  some 
one  who  was  borne  out  of  himself  by  the  terrible  pres 
sure  of  events  around  him,  whilst,  mingling  with  his 
pathetic,  beseeching  tones  as  he  prayed  for  his  country, 
came  the  shrill  notes  of  the  fife,  and  the  thundering  din 
of  the  inevitable  bass  drum  from  the  company  marching 
in  on  the  other  side.  In  the  Senate  chamber  a  company 
was  quartered,  and  the  senators  were  there  supplying 
them  with  paper  and  pens,  with  which  the  boys  were 
writing  their  farewells  to  mothers  and  sweethearts  whom 
they  hardly  dared  hope  they  should  see  again.  A  similar 
scene  was  going  on  in  the  Representatives'  hall,  another 
in  the  Supreme  Court  room.  In  the  executive  office  sat 
the  governor,  the  unwonted  noises,  when  the  door  was 
opened,  breaking  in  on  the  quiet  business-like  air  of  the 
room,  —  he  meanwhile  dictating  despatches,  indicating 
answers  to  others,  receiving  committees  of  citizens,  giv 
ing  directions  to  officers  of  companies  and  regiments, 
accommodating  himself  to  the  wilful  democracy  of  our 
institutions  which  insists  upon  seeing  the  man  in  chief 
command  and  will  not  take  its  answer  from  a  subordi 
nate,  until  in  the  small  hours  of  the  night  the  noises 
were  hushed,  and  after  a  brief  hour  of  effective,  undis- 


THE   OUTBREAK  OF  THE   WAR  1 7 

turbed  work  upon  the  matters  of  chief  importance,  he 
could  leave  the  glare  of  his  gas-lighted  office,  and  seek 
a  few  hours'  rest,  only  to  renew  the  same  wearing  labors 
on  the  morrow. 

On  the  streets  the  excitement  was  of  a  rougher  if  not 
more  intense  character.  A  minority  of  unthinking  par 
tisans  could  not  understand  the  strength  and  sweep  of  the 
great  popular  movement,  and  would  sometimes  venture 
to  speak  out  their  sympathy  with  the  rebellion  or  their 
sneers  at  some  party  friend  who  had  enlisted.  In  the 
boiling  temper  of  the  time  the  quick  answer  was  a  blow; 
and  it  was  one  of  the  common  incidents  of  the  day  for 
those  who  came  into  the  State  House  to  tell  of  a  knock 
down  that  had  occurred  here  or  there,  when  this  popular 
punishment  had  been  administered  to  some  indiscreet 
"rebel  sympathizer." 

Various  duties  brought  young  army  officers  of  the  regu 
lar  service  to  the  state  capital,  and  others  sought  a  brief 
leave  of  absence  to  come  and  offer  their  services  to  the 
governor  of  their  native  State.  General  Scott,  too  much 
bound  up  in  his  experience  of  the  Mexican  War,  and  not 
foreseeing  the  totally  different  proportions  which  this 
must  assume,  planted  himself  firmly  on  the  theory  that 
the  regular  army  must  be  the  principal  reliance  for  severe 
work,  and  that  the  volunteers  could  only  be  auxiliaries 
around  this  solid  nucleus  which  would  show  them  the 
way  to  perform  their  duty  and  take  the  brunt  of  every 
encounter.  The  young  regulars  who  asked  leave  to  accept 
commissions  in  state  regiments  were  therefore  refused, 
and  were  ordered  to  their  own  subaltern  positions  and 
posts.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  true  policy  would 
have  been  to  encourage  the  whole  of  this  younger  class  to 
enter  at  once  the  volunteer  service.  They  would  have 
been  the  field  officers  of  the  new  regiments,  and  would 
have  impressed  discipline  and  system  upon  the  organiza 
tion  from  the  beginning.  The  Confederacy  really  profited 

VOL.  I.  —  2 


1 8  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

by  having  no  regular  army.  They  gave  to  the  officers 
who  left  our  service,  it  is  true,  commissions  in  their  so- 
called  "provisional  army,"  to  encourage  them  in  the  as 
surance  that  they  would  have  permanent  military  posi 
tions  if  the  war  should  end  in  the  independence  of  the 
South;  but  this  was  only  a  nominal  organization,  and 
their  real  army  was  made  up  (as  ours  turned  out  practi 
cally  to  be)  from  the  regiments  of  state  volunteers. 
Less  than  a  year  afterward  we  changed  our  policy,  but  it 
was  then  too  late  to  induce  many  of  the  regular  officers 
to  take  regimental  positions  in  the  volunteer  troops.  I 
hesitate  to  declare  that  this  did  not  turn  out  for  the  best; 
for  although  the  organization  of  our  army  would  have 
been  more  rapidly  perfected,  there  are  other  considera 
tions  which  have  much  weight.  The  army  would  not 
have  been  the  popular  thing  it  was,  its  close  identifica 
tion  with  the  people's  movement  would  have  been  weak 
ened,  and  it  perhaps  would  not  so  readily  have  melted 
again  into  the  mass  of  the  nation  at  the  close  of  the  war. 

Among  the  first  of  the  young  regular  officers  who  came 
to  Columbus  was  Alexander  McCook.  He  was  ordered 
there  as  inspection  and  mustering  officer,  and  one  of  my 
earliest  duties  was  to  accompany  him  to  Camp  Jackson 
to  inspect  the  cooked  rations  which  the  contractors  were 
furnishing  the  new  troops.  I  warmed  to  his  earnest, 
breezy  way,  and  his  business-like  activity  in  performing 
his  duty.  As  a  makeshift,  before  camp  equipage  and 
cooking  utensils  could  be  issued  to  the  troops,  the  con 
tractors  placed  long  trestle  tables  under  an  improvised 
shed,  and  the  soldiers  came  to  these  and  ate,  as  at  a 
country  picnic.  It  was  not  a  bad  arrangement  to  bridge 
over  the  interval  between  home  life  and  regular  soldiers' 
fare,  and  the  outcry  about  it  at  the  time  was  senseless,  as 
all  of  us  know  who  saw  real  service  afterward.  McCook 
bustled  along  from  table  to  table,  sticking  a  long  skewer 
into  a  boiled  ham,  smelling  of  it  to  see  if  the  interior  of 


THE   OUTBREAK  OF  THE    WAR 


the  meat  was  tainted  ;  breaking  open  a  loaf  of  bread  and 
smelling  of  it  to  see  if  it  was  sour;  examining  the  coffee 
before  it  was  put  into  the  kettles,  and  after  it  was  made; 
passing  his  judgment  on  each,  in  prompt,  peremptory 
manner  as  we  went  on.  The  food  was,  in  the  main,  ex 
cellent,  though,  as  a  way  of  supporting  an  army,  it  was 
quite  too  costly  to  last  long. 

While  mustering  in  the  recruits,  McCook  was  elected 
colonel  of  the  First  Regiment  Ohio  Volunteers,  which 
had,  I  believe,  already  gone  to  Washington.  He  was 
eager  to  accept,  and  telegraphed  to  Washington  for  per 
mission.  Adjutant-General  Thomas  replied  that  it  was 
not  the  policy  of  the  War  Department  to  permit  it. 
McCook  cut  the  knot  in  gallant  style.  He  immediately 
tendered  his  resignation  in  the  regular  army,  taking  care 
to  say  that  he  did  so,  not  to  avoid  his  country's  service 
or  to  aid  her  enemies,  but  because  he  believed  he  could 
serve  her  much  more  effectively  by  drilling  and  leading 
a  regiment  of  Union  volunteers.  He  notified  the  gov 
ernor  of  his  acceptance  of  the  colonelcy,  and  his  coup-de- 
main  was  a  success;  for  the  department  did  not  like  to 
accept  a  resignation  under  such  circumstances,  and  he  had 
the  exceptional  luck  to  keep  his  regular  commission  and 
gain  prestige  as  well,  by  his  bold  energy  in  the  matter. 

Orlando  Poe  came  about  the  same  time,  for  all  this  was 
occurring  in  the  last  ten  days  of  April.  He  was  a  lieu 
tenant  of  topographical  engineers,  and  was  stationed  with 
General  (then  Captain)  Meade  at  Detroit,  doing  duty 
upon  the  coast  survey  of  the  lakes.  He  was  in  person 
the  model  for  a  young  athlete,  tall,  dark,  and  strong, 
with  frank,  open  countenance,  looking  fit  to  repeat  his 
ancestor  Adam  Poe's  adventurous  conflicts  with  the  In 
dians  as  told  in  the  frontier  traditions  of  Ohio.  He 
too  was  eager  for  service;  but  the  same  rule  was  applied 
to  him,  and  the  argument  that  the  engineers  would  be 
especially  necessary  to  the  army  organization  kept  him 


20  REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

for  a  time  from  insisting  upon  taking  volunteer  service, 
as  McCook  had  done.  He  was  indefatigable  in  his 
labors,  assisting  the  governor  in  organizing  the  regi 
ments,  smoothing  the  difficulties  constantly  arising  from 
lack  of  familiarity  with  the  details  of  the  administrative 
service  of  the  army,  and  giving  wise  advice  to  the  volun 
teer  officers  who  made  his  acquaintance.  I  asked  him, 
one  day,  in  my  pursuit  of  practical  ideas  from  all  who 
I  thought  could  help  me,  what  he  would  advise  as  the 
most  useful  means  of  becoming  familiar  with  my  duties. 
Study  the  Army  Regulations,  said  he,  as  if  it  were  your 
Bible!  There  was  a  world  of  wisdom  in  this  :  much  more 
than  I  appreciated  at  the  time,  though  it  set  me  earnestly 
to  work  in  a  right  direction.  An  officer  in  a  responsible 
command,  who  had  already  a  fair  knowledge  of  tactics, 
might  trust  his  common  sense  for  guidance  in  an  action 
on  the  field;  but  the  administrative  duties  of  the  army  as 
a  machine  must  be  thoroughly  learned,  if  he  would  hope 
to  make  the  management  of  its  complicated  organization 
an  easy  thing  to  him. 

Major  Sidney  Burbank  came  to  take  McCook's  place 
as  mustering  officer :  a  grave,  earnest  man,  of  more  age 
and  more  varied  experience  than  the  men  I  have  named. 
Captain  John  Pope  also  visited  the  governor  for  consulta 
tion,  and  possibly  others  came  also,  though  I  saw  them 
only  in  passing,  and  did  not  then  get  far  in  making  their 
acquaintance. 


CHAPTER  II 

CAMP  DENNISON 

Laying  out  the  camp  —  Rosecrans  as  engineer  —  A  comfortless  night  — 
Waking  to  new  duties  —  Floors  or  no  floors  for  the  huts  —  Hardee's 
Tactics  —  The  water-supply  —  Colonel  Tom.  Worthington  —  Joshua  Sill 
—  Brigades  organized  —  Bates's  brigade  —  Schleich's  —  My  own  —  Mc- 
Clellan's  purpose  —  Division  organization  —  Garfield  disappointed  — 
Camp  routine  —  Instruction  and  drill  —  Camp  cookery  —  Measles  — 
Hospital  barn  —  Sisters  of  Charity  —  Ferment  over  re-enlistment  — 
Musters  by  Gordon  Granger  —  "  Food  for  powder  "  —  Brigade  staff  — 
De  Villiers  —  "  A  Captain  of  Calvary  "  —  The  "  Bloody  Tinth  "  —  Almost 
a  row  —  Summoned  to  the  field. 

ON  the  2Qth  of  April  I  was  ordered  by  McClellan  to 
proceed  next  morning  to  Camp  Dennison,  with  the 
Eleventh  and  half  of  the  Third  Ohio  regiments.  The  day 
was  a  fair  one,  and  when  about  noon  our  railway  train 
reached  the  camping  ground,  it  seemed  an  excellent  place 
for  our  work.  The  drawback  was  that  very  little  of  the 
land  was  in  meadow  or  pasture,  part  being  in  wheat  and 
part  in  Indian  corn,  which  was  just  coming  up.  Captain 
Rosecrans  met  us,  as  McClellan' s  engineer  (later  the 
well-known  general),  coming  from  Cincinnati  with  a 
train-load  of  lumber.  He  had  with  him  his  compass  and 
chain,  and  by  the  help  of  a  small  detail  of  men  soon  laid 
off  the  ground  for  the  two  regimental  camps,  and  the 
general  lines  of  the  whole  encampment  for  a  dozen  regi 
ments.  It  was  McClellan's  purpose  to  put  in  two  bri 
gades  on  the  west  side  of  the  railway,  and  one  on  the 
east.  My  own  brigade  camp  was  assigned  to  the  west 
side,  and  nearest  to  Cincinnati.  The  men  of  the  two 
regiments  shouldered  their  pine  boards  and  carried  them 
up  to  the  line  of  the  company  streets,  which  were  close 


22  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

to  the  hills  skirting  the  valley,  and  which  opened  into 
the  parade  and  drill  ground  along  the  railway. 

A  general  plan  was  given  to  the  company  officers  by 
which  the  huts  should  be  made  uniform  in  size  and  shape. 
The  huts  of  each  company  faced  each  other,  three  or  four 
on  each  side,  making  the  street  between,  in  which  the 
company  assembled  before  marching  to  its  place  on  the 
regimental  color  line.  At  the  head  of  each  street  were 
the  quarters  of  the  company  officers,  and  those  of  the 
"field  and  staff"  still  further  in  rear.  The  Regulations 
were  followed  in  this  plan  as  closely  as  the  style  of  bar 
racks  and  nature  of  the  ground  would  permit.  Vigorous 
work  housed  all  the  men  before  night,  and  it  was  well 
that  it  did  so,  for  the  weather  changed  in  the  evening,  a 
cold  rain  came  on,  and  the  next  morning  was  a  chill  and 
dreary  one.  My  own  headquarters  were  in  a  little  brick 
schoolhouse  of  one  story,  which  stood  (and  I  think  still 
stands)  on  the  east  side  of  the  track  close  to  the  railway. 
My  improvised  camp  equipage  consisted  of  a  common 
trestle  cot  and  a  pair  of  blankets,  and  I  made  my  bed  in 
the  open  space  in  front  of  the  teacher's  desk  or  pulpit. 
My  only  staff  officer  was  an  aide-de-camp,  Captain  Bas- 
com  (afterward  of  the  regular  army),  who  had  graduated 
at  an  Eastern  military  school,  and  proved  himself  a  faith 
ful  and  efficient  assistant.  He  slept  on  the  floor  in  one 
of  the  little  aisles  between  the  pupils'  seats.  One  lesson 
learned  that  night  remained  permanently  fixed  in  my 
memory,  and  I  had  no  need  of  a  repetition  of  it.  I  found 
that,  having  no  mattress  on  my  cot,  the  cold  was  much 
more  annoying  below  than  above  me,  and  that  if  one  can't 
keep  the  under  side  warm,  it  does  n't  matter  how  many 
blankets  he  may  have  atop.  I  procured  later  an  army  cot 
with  low  legs,  the  whole  of  which  could  be  taken  apart 
and  packed  in  a  very  small  parcel,  and  with  this  I  carried 
a  small  quilted  mattress  of  cotton  batting.  It  would  have 
been  warmer  to  have  made  my  bed  on  the  ground  with  a 


CAMP   DENNISON  2$ 

heap  of  straw  or  leaves  under  me;  but  as  my  tent  had  to 
be  used  for  office  work  whenever  a  tent  could  be  pitched, 
I  preferred  the  neater  and  more  orderly  interior  which 
this  arrangement  permitted.  This,  however,  is  antici 
pating.  The  comfortless  night  passed  without  much  re 
freshing  sleep,  the  strange  situation  doing  perhaps  as 
much  as  the  limbs  aching  from  cold  to  keep  me  awake. 
The  storm  beat  through  broken  window-panes,  and  the 
gale  howled  about  us,  but  day  at  last  began  to  break,  and 
with  its  dawning  light  came  our  first  reveille  in  camp.  I 
shall  never  forget  the  peculiar  plaintive  sound  of  the  fifes 
as  they  shrilled  out  on  the  damp  air.  The  melody  was 
destined  to  become  very  familiar,  but  to  this  day  I  can't 
help  wondering  how  it  happened  that  so  melancholy  a 
strain  was  chosen  for  the  waking  tune  of  the  soldiers' 
camp.  The  bugle  reveille  is  quite  different;  it  is  even 
cheery  and  inspiriting;  but  the  regulation  music  for  the 
drums  and  fifes  is  better  fitted  to  waken  longings  for 
home  and  all  the  sadder  emotions  than  to  stir  the  host 
from  sleep  to  the  active  duties  of  the  day.  I  lay  for  a 
while  listening  to  it,  finding  its  notes  suggesting  many 
things  and  becoming  a  thread  to  string  my  reveries 
upon,  as  I  thought  of  the  past  which  was  separated  from 
me  by  a  great  gulf,  the  present  with  its  serious  duties, 
and  the  future  likely  to  come  to  a  sudden  end  in  the 
shock  of  battle.  We  roused  ourselves;  a  dash  of  cold 
water  put  an  end  to  dreaming;  we  ate  a  breakfast  from  a 
box  of  cooked  provisions  we  had  brought  with  us,  and 
resumed  the  duty  of  organizing  and  instructing  the  camp. 
The  depression  which  had  weighed  upon  me  since  the 
news  of  the  opening  guns  at  Sumter  passed  away,  never 
to  return.  The  consciousness  of  having  important  work 
to  do,  and  the  absorption  in  the  work  itself,  proved  the 
best  of  all  mental  tonics.  The  Rubicon  was  crossed,  and 
from  this  time  out,  vigorous  bodily  action,  our  wild  out 
door  life,  and  the  strenuous  use  of  all  the  faculties,  men- 


24  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

tal  and  physical,  in  meeting  the  daily  exigencies,  made 
up  an  existence  which,  in  spite  of  all  its  hardships  and 
all  its  discouragements,  still  seems  a  most  exhilarating 
one  as  I  look  back  on  it  across  a  long  vista  of  years. 

The  first  of  May  proved,  instead,  a  true  April  day,  of 
the  most  fickle  and  changeable  type.  Gusts  of  rain  and 
wind  alternated  with  flashes  of  bright  sunshine.  The 
second  battalion  of  the  Third  Regiment  arrived,  and  the 
work  of  completing  the  cantonments  went  on.  The  huts 
which  were  half  finished  yesterday  were  now  put  in  good 
order,  and  in  building  the  new  ones  the  men  profited  by 
the  experience  of  their  comrades.  We  were  however 
suddenly  thrown  into  one  of  those  small  tempests  which 
it  is  so  easy  to  get  up  in  a  .  .ew  camp,  and  which  for  the 
moment  always  seems  to  have  an  importance  out  of  all 
proportion  to  its  real  consequence.  Captain  Rosecrans, 
as  engineer,  was  superintending  the  work  of  building, 
and  finding  that  the  companies  were  putting  floors  and 
bunks  in  their  huts,  he  peremptorily  ordered  that  these 
should  be  taken  out,  insisting  that  the  huts  were  only  in 
tended  to  take  the  place  of  tents  and  give  such  shelter  as 
tents  could  give.  The  company  and  regimental  officers 
loudly  protested,  and  the  men  were  swelling  with  indig 
nation  and  wrath.  Soon  both  parties  were  before  me ; 
Rosecrans  hot  and  impetuous,  holding  a  high  tone,  and 
making  use  of  General  McClellan's  name  in  demanding, 
as  an  officer  of  his  staff,  that  the  floors  should  be  torn 
out,  and  the  officers  of  the  regiments  held  responsible  for 
obedience  to  the  order  that  no  more  should  be  made.  He 
fairly  bubbled  with  anger  at  the  presumption  of  those 
who  questioned  his  authority.  As  soon  as  a  little  quiet 
could  be  got,  I  asked  Rosecrans  if  he  had  specific  orders 
from  the  general  that  the  huts  should  have  no  floors. 
No,  he  had  not,  but  his  staff  position  as  engineer  gave 
him  sufficient  control  of  the  subject.  I  said  I  would  ex 
amine  the  matter  and  submit  it  to  General  McClellan, 


CAMP  DENNIS  ON  2$ 

and  meanwhile  the  floors  already  built  might  remain, 
though  no  new  ones  should  be  made  till  the  question  was 
decided.  I  reported  to  the  general  that,  in  my  judgment, 
the  huts  should  have  floors  and  bunks,  because  the  ground 
was  wet  when  they  were  built,  —  they  could  not  be  struck 
like  tents  to  dry  and  air  the  earth,  and  they  were  meant 
to  be  permanent  quarters  for  the  rendezvous  of  troops  for 
an  indefinite  time.  The  decision  of  McClellan  was  in 
accordance  with  the  report.  Rosecrans  acquiesced,  and 
indeed  seemed  rather  to  like  me  the  better  on  finding 
that  I  was  not  carried  away  by  the  assumption  of  indefi 
nite  power  by  a  staff  officer. 

This  little  flurry  over,  the  quarters  were  soon  got  in  as 
comfortable  shape  as  rough  lumber  could  make  them,  and 
the  work  of  drill  and  instruction  was  systematized.  The 
men  were  not  yet  armed,  so  there  was  no  temptation  to 
begin  too  soon  with  the  manual  of  the  musket,  and  they 
were  kept  industriously  employed  in  marching  in  single 
line,  by  file,  in  changing  direction,  in  forming  columns  of 
fours  from  double  line,  etc.,  before  their  guns  were  put 
in  their  hands.  Each  regiment  was  treated  as  a  separate 
camp,  with  its  own  chain  of  sentinels,  and  the  officers  of 
the  guard  were  constantly  busy  teaching  guard  and  picket 
duty  theoretically  to  the  reliefs  off  duty,  and  inspecting 
the  sentinels  on  post.  Schools  were  established  in  each 
regiment  for  field  and  staff  and  for  the  company  officers, 
and  Hardee's  Tactics  was  in  the  hands  of  everybody  who 
could  procure  a  copy.  It  was  one  of  our  great  inconven 
iences  that  the  supply  of  the  authorized  Tactics  was  soon 
exhausted,  and  it  was  difficult  to  get  the  means  of  in 
struction  in  the  company  schools.  An  abridgment  was 
made  and  published  in  a  very  few  days  by  Thomas  Wor- 
thington,  a  graduate  of  West  Point  in  one  of  the  earliest 
classes,  — of  1827,  I  think,  — a  son  of  one  of  the  first  gov 
ernors  of  Ohio.  This  eccentric  officer  had  served  in  the 
regular  army  and  in  the  Mexican  War,  and  was  full  of  ideas, 


26  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

but  was  of  so  irascible  and  impetuous  a  temper  that  he  was 
always  in  collision  with  the  powers  that  be,  and  spoiled 
his  own  usefulness.  He  was  employed  to  furnish  water 
to  the  camp  by  contract,  and  whilst  he  ruined  himself  in 
his  efforts  to  do  it  well,  he  was  in  perpetual  conflict  with 
the  troops,  who  capsized  his  carts,  emptied  his  barrels, 
and  made  life  a  burden  to  him.  The  quarrel  was  based 
on  his  taking  the  water  from  the  river  just  opposite  the 
camp,  though  there  was  a  slaughter-house  some  distance 
above.  Worthington  argued  that  the  distance  was  such 
that  the  running  water  purified  itself  ;  but  the  men 
wouldn't  listen  to  his  science,  vigorously  enforced  as  it 
was  by  idiomatic  expletives,  and  there  was  no  safety  for 
his  water-carts  till  he  yielded.  He  then  made  a  reservoir 
on  one  of  the  hills,  filled  it  by  a  steam-pump,  and  carried 
the  water  by  pipes  to  the  regimental  camps  at  an  expense 
beyond  his  means,  and  which,  as  it  was  claimed  that  the 
scheme  was  unauthorized,  was  never  half  paid  for.  His 
subsequent  career  as  colonel  of  a  regiment  was  no  more 
happy,  and  talents  that  seemed  fit  for  highest  responsi 
bilities  were  wasted  in  chafing  against  circumstances 
which  made  him  and  fate  seem  to  be  perpetually  playing 
at  cross  purposes.1 

A  very  different  character  was  Joshua  W.  Sill,  who 
was  sent  to  us  as  ordnance  officer.  He  too  had  been  a 
regular  army  officer,  but  of  the  younger  class.  Rather 
small  and  delicate  in  person,  gentle  and  refined  in  man 
ner,  he  had  about  him  little  that  answered  to  the  popu 
lar  notion  of  a  soldier.  He  had  resigned  from  the  army 
some  years  before,  and  was  a  professor  in  an  important 
educational  institution  in  Brooklyn,  N.  Y.,  when  at  the 
first  act  of  hostility  he  offered  his  services  to  the  gov- 

1  He  was  later  colonel  of  the  Forty-sixth  Ohio,  and  became  involved  in  a 
famous  controversy  with  Halleck  and  Sherman  over  his  conduct  in  the  Shiloh 
campaign  and  the  question  of  fieldworks  there.  He  left  the  service  toward 
the  close  of  1862. 


CAMP  DENNISON  27 

ernor  of  Ohio,  his  native  State.  After  our  day's  work,  we 
walked  together  along  the  railway,  discussing  the  politi 
cal  and  military  situation,  and  especially  the  means  of 
making  most  quickly  an  army  out  of  the  splendid  but 
untutored  material  that  was  collecting  about  us.  Under 
his  modest  and  scholarly  exterior  I  quickly  discerned  a 
fine  temper  in  the  metal,  that  made  his  after  career  no 
enigma  to  me,  and  his  heroic  death  at  the  head  of  his 
division  in  the  thickest  of  the  strife  at  Stone's  River  no 
surprise. 

The  two  regiments  which  began  the  encampment  were 
quickly  followed  by  others,  and  the  arriving  regiments 
sometimes  had  their  first  taste  of  camp  life  under  cir 
cumstances  well  calculated  to  dampen  their  ardor.  The 
Fourth  Ohio,  under  Colonel  Lorin  Andrews,  President  of 
Kenyon  College,  came  just  before  a  thunderstorm  one 
evening,  and  the  bivouac  that  night  was  as  rough  a  one 
as  his  men  were  likely  to  experience  for  many  a  day. 
They  made  shelter  by  placing  boards  from  the  fence  tops 
to  the  ground,  but  the  fields  were  level  and  soon  became 
a  mire,  so  that  they  were  a  queer-looking  lot  when  they 
crawled  out  next  morning.  The  sun  was  then  shining 
bright,  however,  and  they  had  better  cover  for  their  heads 
by  the  next  night.  The  Seventh  Ohio,  which  was  re 
cruited  in  Cleveland  and  on  the  Western  Reserve,  sent  a 
party  in  advance  to  build  some  of  their  huts,  and  though 
they  too  came  in  a  rain-storm,  they  were  less  uncom 
fortable  than  some  of  the  others.  Three  brigades  were 
organized  from  the  regiments  of  the  Ohio  contingent, 
exclusive  of  the  two  which  had  been  hurried  to  Wash 
ington.  The  brigadiers,  beside  myself,  were  Generals 
Joshua  H.  Bates  and  Newton  Schleich.  General  Bates, 
who  was  the  senior,  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  who 
had  served  some  years  in  the  regular  army,  but  had  re 
signed  and  adopted  the  profession  of  the  law.  He  lived 
at  Cincinnati,  and  organized  his  brigade  in  that  city. 


28  REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

They  marched  to  Camp  Dennison  on  the  2Oth  of  May, 
when,  by  virtue  of  his  seniority,  General  Bates  assumed 
command  of  the  camp  in  McClellan's  absence.  His  bri 
gade  consisted  of  the  Fifth,  Sixth,  Ninth,  and  Tenth  regi 
ments,  and  encamped  on  the  east  side  of  the  railroad  in 
the  bend  of  the  river.  General  Schleich  was  a  Demo 
cratic  senator,  who  had  been  in  the  state  militia,  and  was 
also  one  of  the  drill-masters  of  the  legislative  squad 
which  had  drilled  upon  the  Capitol  terrace.  His  brigade 
included  the  Third,  Twelfth,  and  Thirteenth  regiments, 
and,  with  mine,  occupied  the  fields  on  the  west  side  of  the 
railroad  close  to  the  slopes  of  the  hills.  My  own  brigade  was 
made  up  of  the  Fourth,  Seventh,  Eighth,  and  Eleventh 
regiments,  and  our  position  was  the  southernmost  in  the 
general  camp.  McClellan  had  intended  to  make  his  own 
headquarters  in  the  camp;  but  the  convenience  of  attend 
ing  to  official  business  in  Cincinnati  kept  him  in  the  city. 
His  purpose  was  to  make  the  brigade  organizations  per 
manent,  and  to  take  them  as  a  division  to  the  field  when 
they  were  a  little  prepared  for  the  work.  Like  many 
other  good  plans,  it  failed  to  be  carried  out.  I  was  the 
only  one  of  the  brigadiers  who  remained  in  the  service 
after  the  first  enlistment  for  ninety  days,  and  it  was  my 
fate  to  take  the  field  with  new  regiments,  only  one  of 
which  had  been  in  my  brigade  in  camp.  Schleich  did 
not  show  adaptation  to  field  work,  and  though  taken  into 
West  Virginia  with  McClellan  in  June,  he  was  relieved 
of  active  service  in  a  few  weeks.  He  afterward  sought 
and  obtained  the  colonelcy  of  the  Sixty-first  Ohio;  but 
his  service  with  it  did  not  prove  a  success,  and  he  re 
signed  in  September,  1862,  under  charges.1  General 
Bates  had  some  reason  to  expect  an  assignment  to  staff 
duty  with  McClellan,  and  therefore  declined  a  colonelcy 
in  the  line  at  the  end  of  the  three  months'  service.  He 
was  disappointed  in  this  expectation  after  waiting  some 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  308-310. 


CAMP  DENNISON  29 


time  for  it,  and  returned  to  civil  life  with  the  regrets  of 
his  comrades.  There  were  some  disappointments,  also, 
in  the  choice  of  regimental  officers  who  were  elected  in 
the  regiments  first  organized,  but  were  afterward  ap 
pointed  by  the  governor.  The  companies  were  organized 
and  assigned  to  regiments  before  they  came  to  camp,  but 
the  regimental  elections  were  held  after  the  companies 
were  assembled.  Garfield  was  a  candidate  for  the  colo 
nelcy  of  the  Seventh  Regiment,  but  as  he  was  still  en 
gaged  in  important  public  duties  and  was  not  connected 
with  any  company,  he  was  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  sort 
of  competition  which  was  then  rife.  He  was  defeated,  — 
a  greater  disappointment  to  me  than  to  him,  for  I  had 
hoped  that  our  close  friendship  would  be  made  still 
closer  by  comradeship  in  the  field.  In  a  few  weeks  he 
was  made  colonel  of  the  Forty-second  Ohio,  in  the  sec 
ond  levy. 

Up  to  the  time  that  General  Bates  relieved  me  of  the 
command  of  the  camp,  and  indeed  for  two  or  three  days 
longer,  the  little  schoolhouse  was  my  quarters  as  well 
as  telegraph  and  express  office.  We  had  cleared  out 
most  of  the  desks  and  benches,  but  were  still  crowded 
together,  day  and  night,  in  a  way  which  was  anything 
but  comfortable  or  desirable.  Sheds  for  quartermaster's 
and  subsistence  stores  were  of  first  necessity,  and  the 
building  of  a  hut  for  myself  and  staff  had  to  be  postponed 
till  these  were  up.  On  the  arrival  of  General  Bates  with 
two  or  three  staff  officers,  the  necessity  for  more  room 
could  not  be  longer  ignored,  and  my  own  hut  was  built 
on  the  slope  of  the  hillside  behind  my  brigade,  close 
under  the  wooded  ridge,  and  here  for  the  next  six  weeks 
was  my  home.  The  morning  brought  its  hour  of  busi 
ness  correspondence  relating  to  the  command ;  then  came 
the  drill,  when  the  parade  ground  was  full  of  marching 
companies  and  squads.  Officers'  drill  followed,  with 
sword  exercise  and  pistol  practice.  The  day  closed  with 


30  REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  inspection  of  the  regiments  in  turn  at  dress  parade, 
and  the  evening  was  allotted  to  schools  of  theoretic  tac 
tics,  outpost  duty,  and  the  like.  Besides  their  copies  of 
the  regulation  tactics,  officers  supplied  themselves  with 
such  manuals  as  Mahan's  books  on  Field  Fortifications 
and  on  Outpost  Duty.  I  adopted  at  the  beginning  a  rule 
to  have  some  military  work  in  course  of  reading,  and  kept 
it  up  even  in  the  field,  sending  home  one  volume  and 
getting  another  by  mail.  In  this  way  I  gradually  went 
through  all  the  leading  books  I  could  find  both  in  Eng 
lish  and  in  French,  including  the  whole  of  Jomini's 
works,  his  histories  as  well  as  his  "Napoleon"  and  his 
"  Grandes  Operations  Militaires. "  I  know  of  no  intellec 
tual  stimulus  so  valuable  to  the  soldier  as  the  reading 
of  military  history  narrated  by  an  acknowledged  master 
in  the  art  of  war.  To  see  what  others  have  done  in  im 
portant  junctures,  and  to  have  both  their  merits  and  their 
mistakes  analyzed  by  a  competent  critic,  rouses  one's 
mind  to  grapple  with  the  problem  before  it,  and  begets 
a  generous  determination  to  try  to  rival  in  one's  own 
sphere  of  action  the  brilliant  deeds  of  soldiers  who  have 
made  a  name  in  other  times.  Then  the  example  of  the 
vigorous  way  in  which  history  will  at  last  deal  with  those 
who  fail  when  the  pinch  comes,  tends  to  keep  a  man  up 
to  his  work  and  to  make  him  avoid  the  rock  on  which  so 
many  have  split,  the  disposition  to  take  refuge  in  doing 
nothing  when  he  finds  it  difficult  to  decide  what  should 
be  done. 

The  first  fortnight  in  camp  was  the  hardest  for  the 
troops.  The  ploughed  fields  became  deep  with  mud, 
which  nothing  could  remove  but  the  good  weather  which 
should  allow  them  to  pack  hard  under  the  continued 
tramp  of  thousands  of  men.  The  organization  of  the 
camp  kitchens  had  to  be  learned  by  the  hardest  also,  and 
the  men  in  each  company  who  had  some  aptitude  for 
cooking  had  to  be  found  by  a  slow  process  of  natural 


CAMP  DENNIS  ON  31 

selection,  during  which  many  an  unpalatable  meal  had 
to  be  eaten.  A  disagreeable  bit  of  information  came  to 
us  in  the  proof  that  more  than  half  the  men  had  never 
had  the  contagious  diseases  of  infancy.  The  measles 
broke  out,  and  we  had  to  organize  a  camp  hospital  at 
once.  A  large  barn  near  by  was  taken  for  this  purpose, 
and  the  surgeons  had  their  hands  full  of  cases  which, 
however  trivial  they  might  seem  at  home,  were  here  ag 
gravated  into  dangerous  illness  by  the  unwonted  sur 
roundings  and  the  impossibility  of  securing  the  needed 
protection  from  exposure.  As  soon  as  the  increase  of 
sickness  in  the  camp  was  known  in  Cincinnati,  the  good 
women  of  that  city  took  promptly  in  hand  the  task  of 
providing  nurses  for  the  sick,  and  proper  diet  and  deli 
cacies  for  hospital  uses.  The  Sisters  of  Charity,  under 
the  lead  of  Sister  Anthony,  a  noble  woman,  came  out  in 
force,  and  their  black  and  white  robes  harmonized  pictur 
esquely  with  the  military  surroundings,  as  they  flitted 
about  under  the  rough  timber  framing  of  the  old  barn, 
carrying  comfort  and  hope  from  one  rude  couch  to  an 
other.  As  to  supplies,  hardly  a  man  in  a  regiment  knew 
how  to  make  out  a  requisition  for  rations  or  for  clothing, 
and  easy  as  it  is  to  rail  at  "red  tape,"  the  necessity  of 
keeping  a  check  upon  embezzlement  and  wastefulness 
justified  the  staff  bureaus  at  Washington  in  insisting 
upon  regular  vouchers  to  support  the  quartermaster's  and 
commissary's  accounts.  But  here,  too,  men  were  grad 
ually  found  who  had  special  talent  for  the  work. 

The  infallible  newspapers  had  no  lack  of  material  for 
criticism.  There  were  plenty  of  real  blunders  to  invite 
it,  but  the  severest  blame  was  quite  as  likely  to  be  vis 
ited  upon  men  and  things  which  did  not  deserve  it.  The 
governor  was  violently  attacked  for  things  which  he  had 
no  responsibility  for,  or  others  in  which  he  had  done  all 
that  forethought  and  intelligence  could  do.  When  every 
body  had  to  learn  a  new  business,  it  would  have  been 


32          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

miraculous  if  grave  errors  had  not  frequently  occurred. 
Looking  back  at  it,  the  wonder  is  that  the  blunders  and 
mishaps  had  not  been  tenfold  more  numerous  than  they 
were.  By  the  middle  of  May  the  confusion  had  given 
place  to  reasonable  system,  but  we  were  now  obliged  to 
meet  the  embarrassments  of  reorganization  for  three 
years,  under  the  President's  second  call  for  troops.  We 
had  more  than  ten  thousand  men  who  had  begun  to  know 
something  of  their  duties,  and  it  was  worth  a  serious 
effort  to  transfer  them  into  the  permanent  service;  but 
no  one  who  did  not  go  through  the  ordeal  can  imagine 
how  trying  it  was.  In  every  company  some  discontented 
spirits  wanted  to  go  home,  shrinking  from  the  perils  to 
which  they  had  committed  themselves  in  a  moment  of 
enthusiasm.  For  a  few  to  go  back,  however,  would  be  a 
disgrace;  and  every  dissatisfied  man,  to  avoid  the  odium 
of  going  alone,  became  a  mischief-maker,  seeking  to  pre 
vent  the  whole  company  from  re-enlisting.  The  recruit 
ing  of  a  majority  was  naturally  made  the  condition  of 
allowing  the  company  organization  to  be  preserved,  and  a 
similar  rule  applied  to  the  regiment.  The  growing  dis 
cipline  was  relaxed  or  lost  in  the  solicitations,  the  elec 
tioneering,  the  speech-making,  and  the  other  common 
arts  of  persuasion.  After  a  majority  had  re-enlisted  and 
an  organization  was  secure,  it  would  have  been  better  to 
have  discharged  the  remaining  three  months'  men  and  to 
have  sent  them  home  at  once;  but  authority  for  this  could 
not  be  got,  for  the  civil  officers  could  not  see,  and  did  not 
know  what  a  nuisance  these  men  were.  Dissatisfied  with 
themselves  for  not  going  with  their  comrades,  they  be 
came  sulky,  disobedient,  complaining,  trying  to  make 
the  others  as  unhappy  as  themselves  by  arguing  that  faith 
was  not  kept  with  them,  and  doing  all  the  mischief  it 
was  possible  to  do. 

In   spite  of   all   these  discouragements,   however;  the 
daily  drills  and  instruction  went  on  with  some  approach 


CAMP  DENNIS  ON  33 

to  regularity,  and  our  raw  volunteers  began  to  look  more 
like  soldiers.  Captain  Gordon  Granger  of  the  regular 
army  came  to  muster  the  re-enlisted  regiments  into  the 
three  years'  service,  and  as  he  stood  at  the  right  of  the 
Fourth  Ohio,  looking  down  the  line  of  a  thousand  stal 
wart  men,  all  in  their  Garibaldi  shirts  (for  we  had  not 
yet  received  our  uniforms),  he  turned  to  me  and  ex 
claimed:  "My  God!  that  such  men  should  be  food  for 
powder !  "  It  certainly  was  a  display  of  manliness  and 
intelligence  such  as  had  hardly  ever  been  seen  in  the 
ranks  of  an  army.  There  were  in  camp  at  that  time 
three  if  not  four  companies,  in  different  regiments,  that 
were  wholly  made  up  of  undergraduates  of  colleges  who 
had  enlisted  together,  their  officers  being  their  tutors 
and  professors;  and  where  there  was  not  so  striking  evi 
dence  as  this  of  the  enlistment  of  the  best  of  our  youth, 
every  company  could  still  show  that  it  was  largely  re 
cruited  from  the  best-nurtured  and  most  promising  young 
men  of  the  community. 

Granger  had  been  in  the  Southwest  when  the  secession 
movement  began,  had  seen  the  formation  of  military  com 
panies  everywhere,  and  the  incessant  drilling  which  had 
been  going  on  all  winter,  whilst  we,  in  a  strange  condi 
tion  of  political  paralysis,  had  been  doing  nothing.  His 
information  was  eagerly  sought  by  us  all,  and  he  lost  no 
opportunity  of  impressing  upon  us  the  fact  that  the  South 
was  nearly  six  months  ahead  of  us  in  organization  and 
preparation.  He  did  not  conceal  his  belief  that  we  were 
likely  to  find  the  war  a  much  longer  and  more  serious 
piece  of  business  than  was  commonly  expected,  and  that 
unless  we  pushed  hard  our  drilling  and  instruction  we 
should  find  ourselves  at  a  disadvantage  in  our  earlier  en 
counters.  What  he  said  had  a  good  effect  in  making 
officers  and  men  take  more  willingly  to  the  laborious 
routine  of  the  parade  ground  and  the  regimental  school ; 
for  such  opinions  as  his  soon  ran  through  the  camp,  and 
VOL.  i.  — 3 


34  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

they  were  commented  upon  by  the  enlisted  men  quite  as 
earnestly  as  among  the  officers.  Still,  hope  kept  the 
upper  hand,  and  if  the  question  had  been  put  to  vote,  I 
believe  that  three-fourths  of  us  still  cherished  the  belief 
that  a  single  campaign  would  end  the  war. 

In  the  organization  of  my  own  brigade  I  had  the  assist 
ance  of  Captain  McElroy,  a  young  man  who  had  nearly 
completed  the  course  at  West  Point,  and  who  was  subse 
quently  made  major  of  the  Twentieth  Ohio.  He  was  sent 
to  the  camp  by  the  governor  as  a  drill  officer,  and  I  as 
signed  him  to  staff  duty.  For  commissary,  I  detailed 
Lieutenant  Gibbs,  who  accompanied  one  of  the  regiments 
from  Cincinnati,  and  who  had  seen  a  good  deal  of  service 
as  clerk  in  one  of  the  staff  departments  of  the  regular  army. 
I  had  also  for  a  time  the  services  of  one  of  the  picturesque 
adventurers  who  turn  up  in  such  crises.  In  the  Seventh 
Ohio  was  a  company  recruited  in  Cleveland,  of  which  the 
nucleus  was  an  organization  of  Zouaves,  existing  for  some 
time  before  the  war.  It  was  made  up  of  young  men  who 
had  been  stimulated  by  the  popularity  of  Ellsworth's 
Zouaves  in  Chicago  to  form  a  similar  body.  They  had 
had  as  their  drill  master  a  Frenchman  named  De  Villiers. 
His  profession  was  that  of  a  teacher  of  fencing;  but  he 
had  been  an  officer  in  Ellsworth's  company,  and  was 
familiar  with  fancy  manoeuvres  for  street  parade,  and  with 
a  special  skirmish  drill  and  bayonet  exercise.  Small, 
swarthy,  with  angular  features,  and  a  brusque,  military 
manner,  in  a  showy  uniform  and  jaunty  ktpi  of  scarlet 
cloth,  covered  with  gold  lace,  he  created  quite  a  sensa 
tion  among  us.  His  assumption  of  knowledge  and  expe 
rience  was  accepted  as  true.  He  claimed  to  have  been  a 
surgeon  in  the  French  army  in  Algiers,  though  we  after 
ward  learned  to  doubt  if  his  rank  had  been  higher  than 
that  of  a  barber-surgeon  of  a  cavalry  troop.  From  the 
testimonials  he  brought  with  him,  I  thought  I  was  doing 
a  good  thing  in  making  him  my  brigade-major,  as  the 


CAMP  DENNISON  35 

officer  was  then  called  whom  we  afterward  knew  as  in 
spector-general.     He  certainly  was  a  most  indefatigable 
fellow,   and  went  at  his  work  with  an  enthusiasm   that 
made  him  very  useful  for  a  time.      It  was  worth  some 
thing  to  see  a  man  who  worked  with  a  kind  of  dash,  — 
with  a  prompt,  staccato  movement  that  infused  spirit  and 
energy  into  all  around  him.     He  would  drill  all  day,  and 
then  spend  half  the  night  trying  to  catch  sentinels  and 
officers  of  the  guard  at  fault  in  their  duty.      My  first  im 
pression  was  that  I  had  got  hold  of  a  most  valuable  man, 
and  others  were  so  much  of  the  same  mind  that  in  the 
reorganization  of  regiments  he  was  successively  elected 
major  of  the  Eighth,  and  then  colonel  of  the  Eleventh. 
We  shall  see  more  of  him  as  we  go  on;  but  it  turned  out 
that    his    sharp   discipline  was   not   steady  or  just;    his 
knowledge  was  only  skin-deep,  and  he  had  neither  the 
education  nor  the  character  for  so  responsible  a  situation 
as  he  was  placed  in.     He  nearly  plagued  the  life  out  of 
the  officers  of  his  regiment  before  they  got  rid  of  him, 
and  was  a  most  brilliant  example  of  the  way  we  were  im 
posed  upon  by  military  charlatans  at  the  beginning.     He 
was,  however,  good  proof  also  of  the  speed  with  which 
real  service  weeds  out   the  undesirable  material  which 
seemed  so  splendid  in  the  days  of  common  inexperience 
and  at  a  distance  from  danger.     We  had  visits  from  cleri 
cal  adventurers,  too,  for  the  "pay  and  emoluments  of  a 
captain  of  cavalry"  which  the  law  gave  to  a   chaplain 
induced  some  to  seek  the  office  who  were  not  the  best 
representatives    of   their  profession.       One   young   man 
who  had  spent  a  morning  soliciting  the  appointment  in 
one  of  the  regiments,  came  to  me  in  a  shamefaced  sort 
of  way  before  leaving  camp  and  said,  "  General,  before  I 
decide  this  matter,  I  wish  you  would  tell  me  just  what 
are  the  pay  and  emoluments  of  a  Captain  of  Calvary  !  " 

Though  most  of  our  men  were  native  Ohioans,  General 
Bates' s  brigade  had  in  it  two  regiments  made  up  of  quite 


36  REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

contrasted  nationalities.  The  Ninth  Ohio  was  recruited 
from  the  Germans  of  Cincinnati,  and  was  commanded  by 
Colonel  "  Bob "  McCook.  In  camp,  the  drilling  of  the 
regiment  fell  almost  completely  into  the  hands  of  the  ad 
jutant,  Lieutenant  Willich  (afterward  a  general  of  divi 
sion),  and  McCook,  who  humorously  exaggerated  his  own 
lack  of  military  knowledge,  used  to  say  that  he  was  only 
"clerk  for  a  thousand  Dutchmen,"  so  completely  did  the 
care  of  equipping  and  providing  for  his  regiment  engross 
his  time  and  labor.  The  Tenth  was  an  Irish  regiment, 
and  its  men  used  to  be  proud  of  calling  themselves  the 
"  Bloody  Tinth. "  The  brilliant  Lytle  was  its  commander, 
and  his  control  over  them,  even  in  the  beginning  of  their 
service  and  near  the  city  of  their  home,  showed  that  they 
had  fallen  into  competent  hands.  It  happened,  of  course, 
that  the  guard-house  pretty  frequently  contained  repre 
sentatives  of  the  Tenth  who,  on  the  short  furloughs  that 
were  allowed  them,  took  a  parting  glass  too  much  with 
their  friends  in  the  city,  and  came  to  camp  boisterously 
drunk.  But  the  men  of  the  regiment  got  it  into  their 
heads  that  the  Thirteenth,  which  lay  just  opposite  them 
across  the  railroad,  took  a  malicious  pleasure  in  filling 
the  guard-house  with  the  Irishmen.  Some  threats  had 
been  made  that  they  would  go  over  and  "  clean  out "  the 
Thirteenth,  and  one  fine  evening  these  came  to  a  head.  I 
suddenly  got  orders  from  General  Bates  to  form  my  bri 
gade,  and  march  them  at  once  between  the  Tenth  and 
Thirteenth  to  prevent  a  collision  which  seemed  immi 
nent.  My  brigade  was  selected  because  it  was  the  one 
to  which  neither  of  the  angry  regiments  belonged,  the 
others  being  ordered  into  their  quarters.  My  little 
Frenchman,  De  Villiers,  covered  himself  with  glory. 
His  horse  flew,  under  the  spur,  to  the  regimental  head 
quarters,  the  long  roll  was  beaten  as  if  the  drummers 
realized  the  full  importance  of  the  first  opportunity  to 
sound  that  warlike  signal,  and  the  brigade-major's  some- 


CAMP  DENNISON  37 

what  theatrical  energy,  was  so  contagious  that  many  of 
the  companies  were  assembled  and  ready  to  file  out  of 
the  company  streets  before  the  order  reached  them.  We 
marched  by  the  moonlight  into  the  space  between  the 
belligerent  regiments ;  but  Lytle  had  already  got  his  own 
men  under  control,  and  the  less  mercurial  Thirteenth  were 
not  disposed  to  be  aggressive,  so  that  we  were  soon  dis 
missed  with  a  compliment  for  our  promptness.  I  ordered 
the  colonels  to  march  the  regiments  back  to  the  camps 
separately,  and  with  my  staff  rode  through  that  of  the 
Thirteenth,  to  see  how  matters  were  there.  All  was 
quiet,  the  men  being  in  their  quarters;  so,  turning,  I 
passed  along  near  the  railway,  in  rear  of  the  quartermas 
ter's  sheds.  In  the  shadow  of  the  buildings  I  had  nearly 
ridden  over  some  one  on  foot,  when  he  addressed  me,  and 
I  recognized  an  officer  of  high  rank  in  that  brigade.  He 
was  in  great  agitation,  and  exclaimed,  "  Oh,  General, 
what  a  horrible  thing  that  brothers  should  be  killing 
each  other!"  I  assured  him  the  danger  of  that  was  all 
over,  and  rode  on,  wondering  a  little  at  his  presence  in 
that  place  under  the  circumstances. 

The  six  weeks  of  our  stay  in  Camp  Dennison  seem  like 
months  in  the  retrospect,  so  full  were  they  crowded  with 
new  experiences.  The  change  came  in  an  unexpected 
way.  The  initiative  taken  by  the  Confederates  in  West 
Virginia  had  to  be  met  by  prompt  action,  and  McClellan 
was  forced  to  drop  his  own  plans  to  meet  the  emergency. 
The  organization  and  equipment  of  the  regiments  for  the 
three  years'  service  were  still  incomplete,  and  the  bri 
gades  were  broken  up,  to  take  across  the  Ohio  the  regi 
ments  best  prepared  to  go.  One  by  one  my  regiments 
were  ordered  away,  till  finally,  when  on  the  3d  of  July  I 
received  orders  to  proceed  to  the  Kanawha  valley,  I  had 
but  one  of  the  four  regiments  to  which  I  had  been  trying 
to  give  something  of  unity  and  brigade  feeling,  and  that 
regiment  (the  Eleventh  Ohio)  was  still  incomplete. 


38  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

General  Bates  fared  even  worse;  for  he  saw  all  his  regi 
ments  ordered  away,  whilst  he  was  left  to  organize  new 
ones  from  freshly  recruited  companies  that  were  sent  to 
the  camp.  This  was  discouraging  to  a  brigade  com 
mander,  for  even  with  veteran  troops  mutual  acquaint 
ance  between  the  officer  and  his  command  is  a  necessary 
condition  of  confidence  and  a  most  important  element  of 
strength.  My  own  assignment  to  the  Great  Kanawha 
district  was  one  I  had  every  reason  to  be  content  with, 
except  that  for  several  months  I  felt  the  disadvantage  I 
suffered  from  assuming  command  of  troops  which  I  had 
never  seen  till  we  met  in  the  field. 

The  period  of  organization,  brief  as  it  was,  had  been 
valuable  to  the  regiments,  and  it  had  been  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  secure  the  re-enlistment  of  those  which  had 
received  some  instruction.  It  had  been,  in  the  condition 
of  the  statute  law,  from  necessity  and  not  from  choice 
that  the  Administration  had  called  out  the  state  militia 
for  ninety  days.  The  new  term  of  enrolment  was  for 
"three  years  or  the  war,"  and  the  forces  were  now  desig 
nated  as  United  States  Volunteers.  It  would  have  been 
well  if  the  period  of  apprenticeship  could  have  been 
prolonged ;  but  events  would  not  wait.  All  recognized 
the  necessity,  and  thankful  as  we  should  have  been  for 
a  longer  preparation  and  more  thorough  instruction,  we 
were  eager  to  be  ordered  away. 

McClellan  had  been  made  a  major-general  in  the  regu 
lar  army,  and  a  department  had  been  placed  under  his 
command  which  included  the  States  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  and 
Illinois,  to  which  was  added  a  little  later  West  Virginia 
north  of  the  Great  Kanawha.1  Rosecrans  was  also  ap 
pointed  a  brigadier-general  in  the  regulars,  and  there 
was  much  debate  at  the  time  whether  the  Administration 
had  intended  this.  Many  insisted  that  he  was  nominated 

1  McClellan's  Report  and  Campaigns  (New  York,  1864),  P-  8.  McClellan's 
Own  Story,  p.  44.  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  p.  633. 


CAMP  DENNISON  39 


for  the  volunteer  service,  and  that  the  regular  appoint 
ment  was  a  clerical  mistake  in  the  bureaus  at  Washing 
ton.  There  was  no  solid  foundation  for  this  gossip.  A 
considerable  increase  of  the  regular  army  was  authorized 
by  law,  and  corresponding  appointments  were  made,  from 
major-general  downward.  It  was  at  this  time  that  Sher 
man  was  made  colonel  of  one  of  the  new  regiments  of 
regulars.  It  would  perhaps  have  been  wiser  to  treat  the 
regular  commissions  as  prizes  to  be  won  only  by  con 
spicuous  and  successful  service  in  the  field,  as  was  done 
later;  but  this  policy  was  not  then  adopted,  and  the  newly 
created  offices  were  filled  in  all  grades.  They  were,  of 
course,  given  to  men  from  whom  great  services  could 
reasonably  be  expected;  but  when  none  had  been  tested 
in  the  great  operations  of  war,  every  appointment  was  at 
the  risk  that  the  officer  might  not  show  the  special  talent 
for  command  which  makes  a  general.  It  was  something 
of  a  lottery,  at  best;  but  the  system  would  have  been  im 
proved  if  a  method  of  retiring  inefficient  officers  had  been 
adopted  at  once.  The  ostensible  reason  for  the  different 
organization  of  volunteers  and  regulars  was  that  the 
former,  as  a  temporary  force  to  meet  an  exigency,  might 
be  wholly  disbanded  when  the  war  should  end,  without 
affecting  the  permanent  army,  which  was  measured  in  size 
by  the  needs  of  the  country  in  its  normal  condition. 


CHAPTER  III 

MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA 

Political  attitude  of  West  Virginia  —  Rebels  take  the  initiative  —  McClellan 
ordered  to  act  —  Ohio  militia  cross  the  river  —  The  Phiiippi  affair  — 
Significant  dates  —  The  vote  on  secession — Virginia  in  the  Confederacy  — 
Lee  in  command  —  Topography  —  The  mountain  passes  —  Garnett's 
army  —  Rich  mountain  position  —  McClellan  in  the  field  —  His  forces 
—  Advances  against  Garnett  —  Rosecrans's  proposal  —  His  fight  on  the 
mountain  —  McClellan's  inaction  —  Garnett's  retreat  —  Affair  at  Car- 
rick's  Ford  —  Garnett  killed  —  Hill's  efforts  to  intercept  —  Pegram  in 
the  wilderness  —  He  surrenders  —  Indirect  results  important  —  McClel 
lan's  military  and  personal  traits. 

THE  reasons  which  made  it  important  to  occupy  West 
Virginia  were  twofold,  political  and  military.  The 
people  were  strongly  attached  to  the  Union,  and  had  gen 
erally  voted  against  the  Ordinance  of  Secession  which  by 
the  action  of  the  Richmond  Convention  had  been  submitted 
to  a  popular  vote  on  May  23d.  Comparatively  few  slaves 
were  owned  by  them,  and  their  interests  bound  them  more 
to  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  than  to  eastern  Virginia. 
Under  the  influence  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration, 
strongly  backed  and  chiefly  represented  by  Governor 
Dennison  of  Ohio,  a  movement  was  on  foot  to  organize  a 
loyal  Virginia  government,  repudiating  that  of  Governor 
Letcher  and  the  state  convention  as  self-destroyed  by  the 
act  of  secession.  Governor  Dennison,  in  close  correspond 
ence  with  the  leading  loyalists,  had  been  urging  Mc 
Clellan  to  cross  the  Ohio  to  protect  and  encourage  the 
loyal  men,  when  on  the  26th  of  May  news  came  that  the 
Secessionists  had  taken  the  initiative,  and  that  some 
bridges  had  been  burned  on  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Rail 
road  a  little  west  of  Grafton,  the  crossing  of  the  Mononga- 


42  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

hela  River  where  the  two  western  branches  of  the  road 
unite  as  they  come  from  Wheeling  and  Parkersburg.  The 
great  line  of  communication  between  Washington  and  the 
West  had  thus  been  cut,  and  action  on  our  part  was 
necessary.1 

Governor  Dennison  had  anticipated  the  need  of  more 
troops  than  the  thirteen  regiments  which  had  been  organ 
ized  as  Ohio's  quota  under  the  President's  first  call,  and 
had  enrolled  nine  other  regiments,  numbering  them  con 
secutively  with  the  others.  These  last  he  had  put  in 
camps  near  the  Ohio  River,  where  at  a  moment's  notice 
they  could  occupy  Wheeling,  Parkersburg,  and  the  mouth 
of  the  Great  Kanawha.2  Two  Union  regiments  were  also 
organizing  in  West  Virginia  itself,  of  which  the  first  was 
commanded  by  Colonel  B.  F.  Kelley  of  Wheeling.  The 
left  bank  of  the  Ohio  was  in  McClellan's  department,  and 
on  the  24th  General  Scott,  having  heard  that  two  Virginia 
companies  had  occupied  Grafton,  telegraphed  the  fact  to 
McClellan,  directing  him  to  act  promptly  in  counteracting 
the  effect  of  this  movement.3 

On  the  2/th  Colonel  Kelley  was  sent  by  rail  from  Wheel 
ing  to  drive  off  the  enemy,  who  withdrew  at  his  approach, 
and  the  bridges  were  quickly  rebuilt.4  Several  of  the  Ohio 
regiments  were  ordered  across  the  river  at  the  same  time, 
and  an  Indiana  brigade  under  General  Thomas  A.  Morris  of 
that  State  was  hurried  forward  from  Indianapolis.  As  the 
Ohio  troops  at  Camp  Dennison  which  had  been  mustered 
into  national  service  were  in  process  of  reorganizing  for 
the  three  years'  term,  McClellan  preferred  not  to  move 
them  till  this  was  completed.  He  also  adhered  to  his  plan 
of  making  his  own  principal  movement  in  the  Great  Ka 
nawha  valley,  and  desired  to  use  there  the  Ohio  division  at 
our  camp.5  The  Ohio  regiments  first  sent  into  West  Vir 
ginia  were  not  mustered  in,  and  were  known  as  State  troops. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  p.  44.  2  Id.,  pp.  46,  47.  8  Id.,  p.  648. 

*  Id.,  pp.  46,  49,  655.  5  Id.,  pp.  50,  656,  674. 


MCCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA  43 

General  Morris  reached  Grafton  on  the  ist  of  June,  and 
was  intrusted  with  the  command  of  all  the  troops  in  West 
Virginia.  He  found  that  Colonel  Kelley  had  already 
planned  an  expedition  against  the  enemy,  who  had  retired 
southward  to  Philippi,  about  fifteen  miles  in  a  straight  line, 
but  some  twenty-five  by  the  crooked  country  roads.1 
Morris  approved  the  plan,  but  enlarged  it  by  sending 
another  column,  under  Colonel  E.  Dumont  of  the  Seventh 
Indiana,  to  co-operate  with  Kelley.  Both  columns  were 
directed  to  make  a  night  march,  starting  from  points  on 
the  railroad  about  twelve  miles  apart  and  converging  on 
Philippi,  which  they  were  to  attack  at  daybreak  on  June 
3d.  Each  column  consisted  of  about  fifteen  hundred  men, 
and  Dumont  had  also  two  smooth  six-pounder  cannon. 
The  Confederate  force  was  commanded  by  Colonel  G.  A. 
Porterfield,  and  was  something  less  than  a  thousand  strong, 
one-fourth  cavalry.2 

The  night  was  dark  and  stormy,  and  Porterfield's  raw 
troops  had  not  learned  picket  duty.  The  concerted  move 
ment  against  them  was  more  successful  than  such  marches 
commonly  are,  and  Porterfield's  first  notice  of  danger  was 
the  opening  of  the  artillery  upon  his  sleeping  troops.  It 
had  been  expected  that  the  two  columns  would  enclose  the 
enemy's  camp  and  capture  the  whole ;  but,  though  in  dis 
orderly  rout,  Porterfield  succeeded,  by  personal  coolness 
and  courage,  in  getting  them  off  with  but  few  casualties 
and  the  loss  of  a  few  arms.  The  camp  equipage  and  sup 
plies  were,  of  course,  captured.  Colonel  Kelley  was 
wounded  in  the  breast  by  a  pistol-shot  which  was  at  first 
supposed  to  be  fatal,  though  it  did  not  turn  out  so,  and 
this  was  the  only  casualty  reported  on  the  National  side.3 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  p.  66.  2  Id.,  pp.  70,  72. 

3  Colonel  Kelley  was  a  man  already  of  middle  age,  and  a  leading  citizen 
of  northwestern  Virginia.  His  whole  military  career  was  in  that  region, 
where  his  services  were  very  valuable  throughout  the  war.  He  was  promoted 
to  brigadier-general  among  the  first,  and  was  brevet-major-general  when 
mustered  out  in  1865. 


44  REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

No  prisoners  were  taken,  nor  did  any  dead  or  wounded 
fall  into  our  hands.  Porterfield  retreated  to  Beverly, 
some  thirty  miles  further  to  the  southeast,  and  the  Na 
tional  forces  occupied  Philippi.  The  telegraphic  reports 
had  put  the  Confederate  force  at  2000,  and  their  loss  at  15 
killed.  This  implied  a  considerable  list  of  wounded  and 
prisoners,  and  the  newspapers  gave  it  the  air  of  a  consid 
erable  victory.  The  campaign  thus  opened  with  apparent 
Mat  for  McClellan  (who  was  personally  at  Cincinnati),  and 
the  "  Philippi  races,"  as  they  were  locally  called,  greatly 
encouraged  the  Union  men  of  West  Virginia  and  corre 
spondingly  depressed  the  Secessionists.1 

Nearly  a  month  elapsed,  when,  having  received  reports 
that  large  forces  of  the  enemy  were  gathered  at  Beverly, 
McClellan  determined  to  proceed  in  person  to  that  region 
with  his  best  prepared  troops,  postponing  his  Kanawha 
campaign  till  northwestern  Virginia  should  be  cleared  of 
the  enemy. 

Military  affairs  in  West  Virginia  had  been  complicated 
by  the  political  situation,  and  it  is  necessary  to  recollect 
the  dates  of  the  swift  following  steps  in  Virginia's  progress 
into  the  Confederacy.  Sumter  surrendered  on  Saturday, 
the  1 3th  of  April,  and  on  Monday  the  I5th  President  Lin 
coln  issued  his  first  call  for  troops.  On  Wednesday  the 
1 7th  the  Virginia  convention  passed  the  Ordinance  of 
Secession  in  secret  session.  On  Friday  the  iQth  it  was 
known  in  Washington,  and  on  Saturday  Lee  and  Johnston 
resigned  their  commissions  in  the  United  States  Army, 
sorrowfully  "  going  with  their  State."  2  On  the  following 
Tuesday  (23d)  the  chairman  of  the  Virginia  Convention 
presented  to  Lee  his  commission  as  Major-General  and 
Commander  of  the  Virginia  Forces.  On  the  same  day 
Governor  Dennison  handed  to  McClellan  his  commission 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  64-74. 

2  Johnston's  Narrative,  p.  10.    Townsend's  Anecdotes  of  the  Civil  War, 
p.  31.     Long's  Memoirs  of  Lee,  pp.  94,  96. 


McCLELLAN  IN  WEST   VIRGINIA  45 

to  command  the  Ohio  forces  in  the  service  of  the  Union. 
Although  the  Confederate  Congress  at  Montgomery  ad 
mitted  Virginia  to  the  Confederacy  early  in  May,  this  was 
not  formally  accepted  in  Virginia  till  after  the  popular 
vote  on  secession  (May  23d)  and  the  canvassing  of  the 
returns  of  that  election.  Governor  Letcher  issued  on  June 
8th  his  proclamation  announcing  the  result,  and  transfer 
ring  the  command  of  the  Virginia  troops  to  the  Confeder 
ate  Government.1  During  the  whole  of  May,  therefore, 
Virginia's  position  was  unsettled.  Her  governor,  by  the 
authority  of  the  convention,  regarded  her  as  independent  of 
the  United  States,  but  by  an  inchoate  act  of  secession 
which  would  not  become  final  till  ratified  by  the  popular 
vote.  The  Virginia  troops  were  arrayed  near  the  Potomac 
to  resist  the  advance  of  national  forces ;  but  Confederate 
troops  had  been  welcomed  in  eastern  Virginia  as  early  as 
the  loth  of  May,  and  President  Davis  had  authorized  Lee, 
as  Commander  of  the  Virginia  forces,  to  assume  control  of 
them.2 

It  was  well  known  that  the  prevailing  sentiment  in  West 
Virginia  was  loyal  to  the  Union,  and  each  party  avoided 
conflict  there  for  fear  of  prejudicing  its  cause  in  the  elec 
tion.  Hence  it  was  that  as  soon  as  the  vote  was  cast,  the 
aggressive  was  taken  by  the  Virginia  government  in  the 
burning  of  the  bridges  near  Grafton.  The  fire  of  war  was 
thus  lighted.  The  crossing  of  the  Ohio  was  with  a  full 
understanding  with  Colonel  Kelley,  who  recognized  Mc- 
Clellan  at  once  as  his  military  commander.3  The  affair 
at  Philippi  was,  in  form,  the  last  appearance  of  Virginia  in 
the  role  of  an  independent  nation,  for  in  a  very  few  days  Lee 
announced  by  a  published  order  that  the  absorption  of  the 
Virginia  troops  into  the  Confederate  Army  was  complete.4 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  p.  911.  2  Id.,  p.  827. 

3  I  treated  the  relations  of  Lee  and  Virginia  to  the  Confederacy  in  a  paper 
in  "  The  Nation,"  Dec.  23,  1897,  entitled  "  Lee,  Johnston,  and  Davis." 

4  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  p.  912. 


46  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

It  will  be  well  to  understand  the  topography  of  the 
Virginia  mountains  and  their  western  slope,  if  we  would 
reach  the  reasons  which  determined  the  lines  of  advance 
chosen  by  the  Confederates  and  the  counter  moves  of 
McClellan.  The  Alleghany  range  passing  out  of  Pennsyl 
vania  and  running  southwest  through  the  whole  length 
of  Virginia,  consists  of  several  parallel  lines  of  mountains 
enclosing  narrow  valleys.  The  Potomac  River  breaks 
through  at  the  common  boundary  of  Virginia  and  Mary 
land,  and  along  its  valley  runs  the  National  Road  as  well 
as  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  Canal.  The  Baltimore  and 
Ohio  Railroad  also  follows  this  natural  highway,  which  is 
thus  indicated  as  the  most  important  line  of  communica 
tion  between  Washington  and  the  Ohio  valley,  though 
a  high  mountain  summit  must  be  passed,  even  by  this 
route,  before  the  tributaries  of  the  Ohio  can  be  reached. 
Half-way  across  the  State  to  the  southward,  is  a  high  water 
shed  connecting  the  mountain  ridges  and  separating  the 
streams  tributary  to  the  Potomac  on  the  north  from  those 
falling  into  the  James  and  New  rivers  on  the  south.  The 
Staunton  and  Parkersburg  turnpike  follows  the  line  of  this 
high  "  divide  "  looking  down  from  among  the  clouds  into 
the  long  and  nearly  straight  defiles  on  either  hand,  which 
separate  the  Alleghany  Mountains  proper  from  the  Blue 
Ridge  on  the  east  and  from  Cheat  Mountain  and  other 
ranges  on  the  west.  Still  further  to  the  southwest  the 
James  River  and  the  New  River  interlace  their  headwaters 
among  the  mountains,  and  break  out  on  east  and  west, 
making  the  third  natural  pass  through  which  the  James 
River  and  Kanawha  turnpike  and  canal  find  their  way. 
These  three  routes  across  the  mountains  were  the  only 
ones  on  which  military  operations  were  at  all  feasible. 
The  northern  one  was  usually  in  the  hands  of  the  National 
forces,  and  the  other  two  were  those  by  which  the  Confed 
erates  attempted  the  invasion  of  West  Virginia.  Beverly, 
a  hundred  miles  from  Staunton,  was  near  the  gate  through 


McCLELLAN  IN  WEST   VIRGINIA  47 

which  the  Staunton  road  passes  on  its  way  northwestward 
to  Parkersburg  and  Wheeling,  whilst  Gauley  Bridge  was 
the  key-point  of  the  Kanawha  route  on  the  westerly  slope 
of  the  mountains. 

General  Lee  determined  to  send  columns  upon  both 
these  lines.  General  Henry  A.  Wise  (formerly  Governor 
of  Virginia)  took  the  Kanawha  route,  and  General  Robert 
S.  Garnett  (lately  Lee's  own  adjutant-general)  marched  to 
Beverly.1  Upon  Porterfield's  retreat  to  Beverly,  Garnett, 
who  had  also  been  an  officer  in  the  United  States  Army, 
was  ordered  to  assume  command  there  and  to  stimulate 
the  recruiting  and  organization  of  regiments  from  the 
secession  element  of  the  population.  Some  Virginia  regi 
ments  raised  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  mountains  were 
sent  with  him,  and  to  these  was  soon  added  the  First 
Georgia.  On  the  ist  of  July  he  reported  his  force  as  4500 
men,  but  declared  that  his  efforts  to  recruit  had  proven  a 
complete  failure,  only  23  having  joined.  The  West  Vir 
ginians,  he  says,  "  are  thoroughly  imbued  with  an  ignorant 
and  bigoted  Union  sentiment." 2  Other  reinforcements 
were  promised  Garnett,  but  none  reached  him  except  the 
Forty-fourth  Virginia  Regiment,  which  arrived  at  Beverly 
the  very  day  of  his  engagement  with  McClellan's  troops, 
but  did  not  take  part  in  the  fighting.3 

Tygart's  valley,  in  which  Beverly  lies,  is  between  Cheat 
Mountain  on  the  east,  and  Rich  Mountain  on  the  west. 
The  river,  of  the  same  name  as  the  valley,  flows  north 
ward  about  fifteen  miles,  then  turns  westward,  breaking 
through  the  ridge,  and  by  junction  with  the  Buckhannon 
River  forms  the  Monongahela,  which  passes  by  Philippi 
and  afterward  crosses  the  railroad  at  Grafton.  The  Staun 
ton  and  Parkersburg  turnpike  divides  at  Beverly,  the 
Parkersburg  route  passing  over  a  saddle  in  Rich  Moun 
tain,  and  the  Wheeling  route  following  the  river  to 
Philippi.  The  ridge  north  of  the  river  at  the  gap  is 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  908,  915.         2  /</.,  p.  239.         3  Id.,  pp.  240,  274. 


48 


REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 


known  as  Laurel  Mountain,  and  the  road  passes  over  a 
spur  of  it.  Garnett  regarded  the  two  positions  at  Rich 
Mountain  and  Laurel  Mountain  as  the  gates  to  all  the 
region  beyond  and  to  the  West.  A  rough  mountain  road, 


A.Garnett's  Position. 

B.&  C.Pegram's  >• 

D.McClellanls 

E.Morris' 

F.Kosecrans'  Line  of  March 


COMBAT  AT 

RICH  JHOUNTAIN, 

SCALE-Ofi  MILES 


barely  passable,  connected  the  Laurel  Mountain  position 
with  Cheat  River  on  the  east,  and  it  was  possible  to  go 
by  this  way  northward  through  St.  George  to  the  North 
western  turnpike,  turning  the  mountain  ranges. 

Garnett  thought  the  pass  over  Rich  Mountain  much 
the  stronger  and  more  easily  held,  and  he  therefore  in 
trenched  there  about  1300  of  his  men  and  four  cannon, 


McCLELLAN  IN  WEST   VIRGINIA  49 

under  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Pegram.1  The 
position  chosen  was  on  a  spur  of  the  mountain  near  its 
western  base,  and  it  was  rudely  fortified  with  breastworks 
of  logs  covered  with  an  abatis  of  slashed  timber  along 
its  front.  The  remainder  of  his  force  he  placed  in  a 
similar  fortified  position  on  the  road  at  Laurel  Mountain, 
where  he  also  had  four  guns,  of  which  one  was  rifled. 
Here  he  commanded  in  person.  His  depot  of  supplies 
was  at  Beverly,  which  was  sixteen  miles  from  the  Laurel 
Mountain  position  and  five  from  that  at  Rich  Mountain. 
He  was  pretty  accurately  informed  of  McClellan's  forces 
and  movements,  and  his  preparations  had  barely  been 
completed  by  the  Qth  of  July,  when  the  Union  general 
appeared  in  his  front.2 

McClellan  entered  West  Virginia  in  person  on  the  2ist 
of  June,  and  on  the  23d  issued  from  Grafton  a  proclama 
tion  to  the  inhabitants.3  He  had  gradually  collected  his 
forces  along  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  these, 
at  the  time  of  the  affair  at  Rich  Mountain,  consisted  of  six 
teen  Ohio  regiments,  nine  from  Indiana,  and  two  from 
West  Virginia;  in  all,  twenty-seven  regiments  with  four 
batteries  of  artillery  of  six  guns  each,  two  troops  of  cav 
alry,  and  an  independent  company  of  riflemen.  Of  his 
batteries,  one  was  of  the  regular  army,  and  another,  a 
company  of  regulars  (Company  I,  Fourth  U.  S.  Artillery), 
was  with  him  awaiting  mountain  howitzers,  which  arrived 
a  little  later.4  The  regiments  varied  somewhat  in  strength, 
but  all  were  recently  organized,  and  must  have  averaged  at 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  p.  268.          2  Id.,  pp.  241,  248.          3  Id.,  pp.  194,  196. 

4  As  part  of  the  troops  were  State  troops  not  mustered  into  the  United 
States  service,  no  report  of  them  is  found  in  the  War  Department ;  but  the 
following  are  the  numbers  of  the  regiments  found  named  as  present  in  the 
correspondence  and  reports,  — viz.,  3d,  4th,  5th,  6th,  7th,  8th,  9th,  loth,  I3th, 
I4th,  i sth,  i6th,  lyth,  i8th,  I9th,  2Oth,  and  22d  Ohio  ;  6th,  7th,  8th,  9th,  loth, 
nth,  I3th,  I4th,  I5th  Indiana,  and  ist  and  2d  Virginia;  also  Howe's  United 
States  Battery,  Barnett's  Ohio  Battery,  Loomis's  Michigan  Battery,  and 
Daum's  Virginia  Battery;  the  cavalry  were  Burdsal's  Ohio  Dragoons  and 
Barker's  Illinois  Cavalry. 
VOL.  I. —4 


50  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

least  700  men  each,  making  the  whole  force  about  20,000. 
Of  these,  about  5000  were  guarding  the  railroad  and  its 
bridges  for  some  two  hundred  miles,  under  the  command 
of  Brigadier-General  C.  W.  Hill,  of  the  Ohio  Militia  ;  a 
strong  brigade  under  Brigadier-General  Morris  of  Indiana, 
was  at  Philippi,  and  the  rest  were  in  three  brigades  form 
ing  the  immediate  command  of  McClellan,  the  brigadiers 
being  General  W.  S.  Rosecrans,  U.  S.  A.,  General  Newton 
Schleich  of  Ohio,  and  Colonel  Robert  L.  McCook  of 
Ohio.  On  the  date  of  his  proclamation  McClellan  intended, 
as  he  informed  General  Scott,  to  move  his  principal  column 
to  Buckhannon  on  June  25th,  and  thence  at  once  upon 
Beverly ; l  but  delays  occurred,  and  it  was  not  till  July  2d 
that  he  reached  Buckhannon,  which  is  twenty-four  miles 
west  of  Beverly,  on  the  Parkersburg  branch  of  the  turn 
pike.  Before  leaving  Grafton  the  rumors  he  heard  had 
made  him  estimate  Garnett's  force  at  6000  or  7000  men, 
of  which  the  larger  part  were  at  Laurel  Mountain  in  front 
of  General  Morris.2  On  the  7th  of  July  he  moved  McCook 
with  two  regiments  to  Middle  Fork  bridge,  about  half-way 
to  Beverly,  and  on  the  same  day  ordered  Morris  to  march 
with  his  brigade  from  Philippi  to  a  position  one  and  a 
half  miles  in  front  of  Garnett's  principal  camp,  which  was 
promptly  done.3  Three  days  later,  McClellan  concen 
trated  the  three  brigades  of  his  own  column  at  Roaring 
Creek,  about  two  miles  from  Colonel  Pegram's  position  at 
the  base  of  Rich  Mountain.  The  advance  on  both  lines 
had  been  made  with  only  a  skirmishing  resistance,  the 
Confederates  being  aware  of  McClellan's  great  superiority 
in  numbers,  and  choosing  to  await  his  attack  in  their  forti 
fied  positions.  The  National  commander  was  now  con 
vinced  that  his  opponent  was  10,000  strong,  of  which 
about  2OOO  were  before  him  at  Rich  Mountain.4  A  recon- 
noissance  made  on  the  loth  showed  that  Pegram's  position 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  p.  195.  2  Id.,  p.  205. 

8  Id.,  p.  200.  4  Id.,  pp.  203,  204. 


McCLELLAN  IN  WEST   VIRGINIA  5 1 

would  be  difficult  to  assail  in  front,  but  preparations  were 
made  to  attack  the  next  day,  while  Morris  was  directed 
to  hold  firmly  his  position  before  Garnett,  watching  for 
the  effect  of  the  attack  at  Rich  Mountain.  In  the  evening 
Rosecrans  took  to  McClellan  a  young  man  named  Hart, 
whose  father  lived  on  the  top  of  the  mountain  two  miles 
in  rear  of  Pegram,  and  who  thought  he  could  guide  a 
column  of  infantry  to  his  father's  farm  by  a  circuit  around 
Pegram's  left  flank  south  of  the  turnpike.  The  paths 
were  so  difficult  that  cannon  could  not  go  by  them,  but 
Rosecrans  offered  to  lead  a  column  of  infantry  and  seize 
the  road  at  the  Hart  farm.  After  some  discussion  McClel 
lan  adopted  the  suggestion,  and  it  was  arranged  that 
Rosecrans  should  march  at  daybreak  of  the  nth  with 
about  2000  men,  including  a  troop  of  horse,  and  that 
upon  the  sound  of  his  engagement  in  the  rear  of  Pe 
gram  McClellan  would  attack  in  force  in  front.  By  a 
blunder  in  one  of  the  regimental  camps,  the  reveille  and 
assembly  were  sounded  at  midnight,  and  Pegram  was  put 
on  the  qui  vive.  He,  however,  believed  that  the  attempt 
to  turn  his  position  would  be  by  a  path  or  country  road 
passing  round  his  right,  between  him  and  Garnett  (of 
which  the  latter  had  warned  him),  and  his  attention  was 
diverted  from  Rosecrans's  actual  route,  which  he  thought 
impracticable.1  The  alert  which  had  occurred  at  midnight 
made  Rosecrans  think  it  best  to  make  a  longer  circuit 
than  he  at  first  intended,  and  it  took  ten  hours  of  severe 
marching  and  mountain  climbing  to  reach  the  Hart  farm. 
The  turning  movement  was  made,  but  he  found  an  enemy 
opposing  him.  Pegram  had  detached  about  350  men 
from  the  1300  which  he  had,  and  had  ordered  them  to 
guard  the  road  at  the  mountain  summit.  He  sent  with 
them  a  single  cannon  from  the  four  which  constituted  his 
only  battery,  and  they  threw  together  a  breastwork  of 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  215,  256,  260.     Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  vi.  (Rose 
crans),  pp.  2,  3. 


52  REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

logs.  The  turnpike  at  Hart's  runs  in  a  depression  of  the 
summit,  and  as  Rosecrans,  early  in  the  afternoon,  came 
out  upon  the  road,  he  was  warmly  received  by  both  mus 
ketry  and  cannon.  The  ground  was  rough,  the  men  were 
for  the  first  time  under  fire,  and  the  skirmishing  combat 
varied  through  two  or  three  hours,  when  a  charge  by  part 
of  Rosecrans's  line,  aided  by  a  few  heavy  volleys  from 
another  portion  of  his  forces  which  had  secured  a  good 
position,  broke  the  enemy's  line.  Reinforcements  from 
Pegram  were  nearly  at  hand,  with  another  cannon ;  but 
they  did  not  come  into  action,  and  the  runaway  team  of 
the  caisson  on  the  hill-top,  dashing  into  the  gun  that  was 
coming  up,  capsized  it  down  the  mountain-side  where  the 
descending  road  was  scarped  diagonally  along  it.  Both 
guns  fell  into  Rosecrans's  hands,  and  he  was  in  possession 
of  the  field.  The  march  and  the  assault  had  been  made 
in  rain  and  storm.  Nothing  was  heard  from  McClellan; 
and  the  enemy,  rallying  on  their  reinforcements,  made 
such  show  of  resistance  on  the  crest  a  little  further  on, 
that  Rosecrans  directed  his  men  to  rest  upon  their  arms 
till  next  morning.  When  day  broke  on  the  I2th,  the 
enemy  had  disappeared  from  the  mountain-top,  and  Rose 
crans,  feeling  his  way  down  to  the  rear  of  Pegram's  posi 
tion,  found  it  also  abandoned,  the  two  remaining  cannon 
being  spiked,  and  a  few  sick  and  wounded  being  left  in 
charge  of  a  surgeon.  Still  nothing  was  seen  of  McClellan, 
and  Rosecrans  sent  word  to  him,  in  his  camp  beyond 
Roaring  Creek,  that  he  was  in  possession  of  the  enemy's 
position.  Rosecrans's  loss  had  been  12  killed  and  49 
wounded.  The  Confederates  left  20  wounded  on  the 
field,  and  63  were  surrendered  at  the  lower  camp,  includ 
ing  the  sick.  No  trustworthy  report  of  their  dead  was 
made.1 

The  noise  of  the  engagement  had  been  heard  in  McClel- 
lan's  camp,  and  he  formed  his  troops  for  attack,  but  the 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  ii  pp.  215,  260,  265.     C.  W.,  vol.  vi.  (Rosecrans)  pp.  3-5. 


McCLELLAN  IN  WEST  VIRGINIA  53 

long  continuance  of  the  cannonade  and  some  signs  of 
exultation  in  Pegram's  camp  seem  to  have  made  him  think 
Rosecrans  had  been  repulsed.  The  failure  to  attack  in 
accordance  with  the  plan  has  never  been  explained.1 
Rosecrans's  messengers  had  failed  to  reach  McClellan 
during  the  nth,  but  the  sound  of  the  battle  was  sufficient 
notice  that  he  had  gained  the  summit  and  was  engaged ; 
and  he  was,  in  fact,  left  to  win  his  own  battle  or  to  get 
out  of  his  embarrassment  as  he  could.  Toward  evening 
McClellan  began  to  cut  a  road  for  artillery  to  a  neighboring 
height,  from  which  he  hoped  his  twelve  guns  would  make 
Pegram's  position  untenable ;  but  his  lines  were  withdrawn 
again  beyond  Roaring  Creek  at  nightfall,  and  all  further 
action  postponed  to  the  next  day. 

About  half  of  Pegram's  men  had  succeeded  in  passing 
around  Rosecrans's  right  flank  during  the  night  and  had 
gained  Beverly.  These,  with  the  newly  arrived  Confed 
erate  regiment,  fled  southward  on  the  Staunton  road. 
Garnett  had  learned  in  the  evening,  by  messenger  from 
Beverly,  that  Rich  Mountain  summit  was  carried,  and 
evacuated  his  camp  in  front  of  Morris  about  midnight. 
He  first  marched  toward  Beverly,  and  was  within  five 
miles  of  that  place  when  he  received  information  (false  at 
the  time)  that  the  National  forces  already  occupied  it.  He 
then  retraced  his  steps  nearly  to  his  camp,  and,  leaving  the 
turnpike  at  Leadsville,  he  turned  off  upon  a  country  road 
over  Cheat  Mountain  into  Cheat  River  valley,  following 
the  stream  northward  toward  St.  George  and  West  Union, 
in  the  forlorn  hope  of  turning  the  mountains  at  the  north 
end  of  the  ridges,  and  regaining  his  communications  by  a 
very  long  detour.  He  might  have  continued  southward 

i  C.  W.,  vol.  vi.  p.  6.  McClellan  seems  to  have  expected  Rosecrans  to 
reach  the  rear  of  Pegram's  advanced  work  before  his  own  attack  should  be 
made ;  but  the  reconnoissance  of  Lieutenant  Poe,  his  engineer,  shows  that 
this  work  could  be  turned  by  a  much  shorter  route  than  the  long  and 
difficult  one  by  which  Rosecrans  went  to  the  mountain  ridge.  See  Poe's 
Report,  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  14. 


54  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

through  Beverly  almost  at  leisure,  for  McClellan  did  not 
enter  the  town  till  past  noon  on  the  I2th. 

Morris  learned  of  Garnett's  retreat  at  dawn,  and  started 
in  pursuit  as  soon  as  rations  could  be  issued.  He  marched 
first  to  Leadsville,  where  he  halted  to  communicate  with 
McClellan  at  Beverly  and  get  further  orders.  These 
reached  him  in  the  night,  and  at  daybreak  of  the  I3th  he 
resumed  the  pursuit.  His  advance-guard  of  three  regi 
ments,  accompanied  by  Captain  H.  W.  Benham  of  the 
Engineers,  overtook  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  column 
about  noon  and  continued  a  skirmishing  pursuit  for  some 
two  hours.  Garnett  himself  handled  his  rear-guard  with 
skill,  and  at  Carrick's  Ford  a  lively  encounter  was  had. 
A  mile  or  two  further,  at  another  ford  and  when  the  skir 
mishing  was  very  slight,  he  was  killed  while  withdrawing 
his  skirmishers  from  behind  a  pile  of  driftwood  which  he 
had  used  as  a  barricade.  One  of  his  cannon  had  become 
stalled  in  the  ford,  and  with  about  forty  wagons  fell  into 
Morris's  hands.  The  direct  pursuit  was  here  discontinued, 
but  McClellan  had  sent  a  dispatch  to  General  Hill  at  Graf- 
ton,  to  collect  the  garrisons  along  the  railroad  and  block 
the  way  of  the  Confederates  where  they  must  pass  around 
the  northern  spurs  of  the  mountains.1 

His  military  telegraph  terminated  at  the  Roaring  Creek 
camp,  and  the  dispatch  written  in  the  evening  of  the  I2th 
was  not  forwarded  to  Hill  till  near  noon  of  the  I3th.  This 
officer  immediately  ordered  the  collection  of  the  greater 
part  of  his  detachments  at  Oakland,  and  called  upon  the 
railway  officials  for  special  trains  to  hurry  them  to  the 
rendezvous.  About  1000  men  under  Colonel  James 
Irvine  of  the  Sixteenth  Ohio  were  at  West  Union,  where 
the  St.  George  road  reaches  the  Northwestern  Turnpike, 
and  Hill's  information  was  that  a  detachment  of  these  held 
Red  House,  a  crossing  several  miles  in  advance,  by  which 
the  retreating  enemy  might  go.  Irvine  was  directed  to 

1  Reports  of  Morris  and  Benham,  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  220,  222. 


McCLELLAN  IN  WEST   VIRGINIA  55 

hold  his  positions  at  all  hazards  till  he  could  be  reinforced. 
Hill  himself  hastened  with  the  first  train  from  Grafton  to 
Oakland  with  about  500  men  and  three  cannon,  reached 
his  destination  at  nightfall,  and  hurried  his  detachment 
forward  by  a  night  march  to  Irvine,  ten  or  twelve  miles 
over  rough  roads.  It  turned  out  that  Irvine  did  not 

o 

occupy  Red  House,  and  the  prevalent  belief  that  the 
enemy  was  about  8000  in  number,  with  the  uncertainty 
of  the  road  he  would  take,  made  it  proper  to  keep  the 
little  force  concentrated  till  reinforcements  should  come. 
The  first  of  these  reached  Irvine  about  six  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  1 4th,  raising  his  command  to  1500;  but 
a  few  moments  after  their  arrival  he  learned  that  the 
enemy  had  passed  Red  House  soon  after  daylight.  He 
gave  chase,  but  did  not  overtake  them. 

Meanwhile  General  Hill  had  spent  the  night  in  trying 
to  hasten  forward  the  railway  trains,  but  none  were  able 
to  reach  Oakland  till  morning,  and  Garnett's  forces  had 
now  more  than  twenty  miles  the  start,  and  were  on  fairly 
good  roads,  moving  southward  on  the  eastern  side  of  the 
mountains.  McClellan  still  telegraphed  that  Hill  had  the 
one  opportunity  of  a  lifetime  to  capture  the  fleeing  army, 
and  that  officer  hastened  in  pursuit,  though  unprovided 
with  wagons  or  extra  rations.  When  however  the  Union 
commander  learned  that  the  enemy  had  fairly  turned  the 
mountains,  he  ordered  the  pursuit  stopped.  Hill  had  used 
both  intelligence  and  energy  in  his  attempt  to  concentrate 
his  troops,  but  it  proved  simply  impossible  for  the  rail 
road  to  carry  them  to  Oakland  before  the  enemy  had 
passed  the  turning-point,  twenty  miles  to  the  southward.1 

During  the  I2th  Pegram's  situation  and  movements  were 
unknown.  He  had  intended,  when  he  evacuated  his  camp, 
to  follow  the  line  of  retreat  taken  by  the  detachment 
already  near  the  mountain-top,  but,  in  the  darkness  of  the 
night  and  in  the  tangled  woods  and  thickets  of  the  moun- 

1  Report  of  Hill,  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  p.  224. 


56  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

tain-side,  his  column  got  divided,  and,  with  the  rear  por 
tion  of  it,  he  wandered  all  day  of  the  I2th,  seeking  to 
make  his  way  to  Garnett.  He  halted  at  evening  at  the 
Tygart  Valley  River,  six  miles  north  of  Beverly,  and 
learned  from  some  country  people  of  Garnett's  retreat. 
It  was  still  possible  to  reach  the  mountains  east  of  the 
valley,  but  beyond  lay  a  hundred  miles  of  wilderness  and 
half  a  dozen  mountain  ridges  on  which  little,  if  any,  food 
could  be  found  for  his  men.  He  called  a  council  of  war, 
and,  by  advice  of  his  officers,  sent  to  McClellan,  at  Beverly, 
an  offer  of  surrender.  This  was  received  on  the  I3th,  and 
Pegram  brought  in  30  officers  and  525  men.1  McClellan 
then  moved  southward  himself,  following  the  Staunton 
road,  by  which  the  remnant  of  Pegram's  little  force  had 
escaped,  and  on  the  I4th  occupied  Huttonsville.  Two 
regiments  of  Confederate  troops  were  hastening  from 
Staunton  to  reinforce  Garnett.  These  were  halted  at 
Monterey,  east  of  the  principal  ridge  of  the  Alleghanies, 
and  upon  them  the  retreating  forces  rallied.  Brigadier- 
General  H.  R.  Jackson  was  assigned  to  command  in  Gar 
nett's  place,  and  both  Governor  Letcher  and  General  Lee 
made  strenuous  efforts  to  increase  this  army  to  a  force 
sufficient  to  resume  aggressive  operations.2  On  McClel- 
lan's  part  nothing  further  was  attempted  till  on  the  22d 
he  was  summoned  to  Washington  to  assume  command  of 
the  army  which  had  retreated  to  the  capital  after  the  panic 
of  the  first  Bull  Run  battle. 

The  affair  at  Rich  Mountain  and  the  subsequent  move 
ments  were  among  the  minor  events  of  a  great  war,  and 
would  not  warrant  a  detailed  description,  were  it  not  for 
the  momentous  effect  they  had  upon  the  conduct  of  the 
war,  by  being  the  occasion  of  McClellan's  promotion  to 
the  command  of  the  Potomac  army.  The  narrative  which 
has  been  given  contains  the  "  unvarnished  tale,"  as  nearly 
as  official  records  of  both  sides  can  give  it,  and  it  is 

1  Report  of  Pegram,  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  265,  266.        2  Id.,  pp.  247,  254. 


McCLELLAN  IN  WEST   VIRGINIA  $? 

a  curious  task  to  compare  it  with  the  picture  of  the  cam 
paign  and  its  results  which  was  then  given  to  the  world 
in  the  series  of  proclamations  and  dispatches  of  the  young 
general,  beginning  with  his  first  occupation  of  the  country 
and  ending  with  his  congratulations  to  his  troops,  in  which 
he  announced  that  they  had  "  annihilated  two  armies, 
commanded  by  educated  and  experienced  soldiers,  in 
trenched  in  mountain  fastnesses  fortified  at  their  leisure." 
The  country  was  eager  for  good  news,  and  took  it  as 
literally  true.  McClellan  was  the  hero  of  the  moment, 
and  when,  but  a  week  later,  his  success  was  followed  by 
the  disaster  to  McDowell  at  Bull  Run,  he  seemed  pointed 
out  by  Providence  as  the  ideal  chieftain  who  could  repair 
the  misfortune  and  lead  our  armies  to  certain  victory. 
His  personal  intercourse  with  those  about  him  was  so 
kindly,  and  his  bearing  so  modest,  that  his  dispatches, 
proclamations,  and  correspondence  are  a  psychological 
study,  more  puzzling  to  those  who  knew  him  well  than 
to  strangers.  Their  turgid  rhetoric  and  exaggerated  pre 
tence  did  not  seem  natural  to  him.  In  them  he  seemed 
to  be  composing  for  stage  effect  something  to  be  spoken 
in  character  by  a  quite  different  person  from  the  sensible 
and  genial  man  we  knew  in  daily  life  and  conversation. 
The  career  of  the  great  Napoleon  had  been  the  study 
and  the  absorbing  admiration  of  young  American  soldiers, 
and  it  was  perhaps  not  strange  that  when  real  war  came 
they  should  copy  his  bulletins  and  even  his  personal  bear 
ing.  It  was,  for  the  moment,  the  bent  of  the  people 
to  be  pleased  with  McClellan's  rendering  of  the  r61e; 
they  dubbed  him  the  young  Napoleon,  and  the  photogra 
phers  got  him  to  stand  with  folded  arms,  in  the  historic 
pose.  For  two  or  three  weeks  his  dispatches  and  letters 
were  all  on  fire  with  enthusiastic  energy.  He  appeared 
to  be  in  a  morbid  condition  of  mental  exaltation.  When 
he  came  out  of  it,  he  was  as  genial  as  ever.  The  assumed 
dash  and  energy  of  his  first  campaign  made  the  disap- 


58  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

pointment  and  the  reaction  more  painful  when  the  exces 
sive  caution  of  his  conduct  in  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  seen.  But  the  Rich  Mountain  affair, 
when  analyzed,  shows  the  same  characteristics  which 
became  well  known  later.  There  was  the  same  over 
estimate  of  the  enemy,  the  same  tendency  to  interpret 
unfavorably  the  sights  and  sounds  in  front,  the  same 
hesitancy  to  throw  in  his  whole  force  when  he  knew  that 
his  subordinate  was  engaged.  If  Garnett  had  been  as 
strong  as  McClellan  believed  him,  he  had  abundant  time 
and  means  to  overwhelm  Morris,  who  lay  four  days  in 
easy  striking  distance,  while  the  National  commander 
delayed  attacking  Pegram ;  and  had  Morris  been  beaten, 
Garnett  would  have  been  as  near  Clarksburg  as  his 
opponent,  and  there  would  have  been  a  race  for  the 
railroad.  But,  happily,  Garnett  was  less  strong  and  less 
enterprising  than  he  was  credited  with  being.  Pegram 
was  dislodged,  and  the  Confederates  made  a  precipitate 
retreat. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  KANAWHA  VALLEY 

Orders  for  the  Kanawha  expedition  —  The  troops  and  their  quality  —  Lack 
of  artillery  and  cavalry  —  Assembling  at  Gallipolis  —  District  of  the 
Kanawha  —  Numbers  of  the  opposing  forces  —  Method  of  advance  •  - 
Use  of  steamboats  —  Advance  guards  on  river  banks  —  Camp  at  Thir 
teen-mile  Creek  —  Night  alarm  —  The  river  chutes  —  Sunken  obstruc 
tions  —  Pocotaligo  —  Affair  at  Barboursville  —  Affair  at  Scary  Creek 
—  Wise's  position  at  Tyler  Mountain  —  His  precipitate  retreat  —  Occu 
pation  of  Charleston  —  Rosecrans  succeeds  McClellan  —  Advance 
toward  Gauley  Bridge  —  Insubordination  —  The  Newspaper  Correspond 
ent  —  Occupation  of  Gauley  Bridge. 

WHEN  McClellan  reached  Buckhannon,  on  the  2d 
of  July,  the  rumors  he  heard  of  Garnett's  strength, 
and  the  news  of  the  presence  of  General  Wise  with  a 
considerable  force  in  the  Great  Kanawha  valley,  made 
him  conclude  to  order  a  brigade  to  that  region  for  the 
purpose  of  holding  the  lower  part  of  the  valley  defensively 
till  he  might  try  to  cut  off  Wise's  army  after  Garnett 
should  be  disposed  of.  This  duty  was  assigned  to  me. 
On  the  22d  of  June  I  had  received  my  appointment  as 
Brigadier-General,  U.  S.  Volunteers,  superseding  my  state 
commission.  I  had  seen  the  regiments  of  my  brigade 
going  one  by  one,  as  fast  as  they  were  reorganized  for 
the  three  years'  service,  and  I  had  hoped  to  be  ordered 
to  follow  them  to  McClellan's  own  column.  The  only 
one  left  in  camp  was  the  Eleventh  Ohio,  of  which  only 
five  companies  were  present,  though  two  more  companies 
were  soon  added. 

McClellan's  letter  directed  me  to  assume  command  of 
the  First  and  Second  Kentucky  regiments  with  the 
Twelfth  Ohio,  and  to  call  upon  the  governor  for  a  troop 


60  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

of  cavalry  and  a  six-gun  battery:  to  expedite  the  equip 
ment  of  the  whole  and  move  them  to  Gallipolis  via 
Hampden  and  Portland,  stations  on  the  Marietta  Railroad, 
from  which  a  march  of  twenty-five  miles  by  country  roads 
would  take  us  to  our  destination.  At  Gallipolis  was  the 
Twenty-first  Ohio,  which  I  should  add  to  my  command 
and  proceed  at  once  with  two  regiments  to  Point  Pleasant 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Kanawha,  five  miles  above.  When 
all  were  assembled,  one  regiment  was  to  be  left  at  Point 
Pleasant,  two  were  to  be  advanced  up  the  valley  to  Ten-mile 
Creek,  and  the  other  placed  at  an  intermediate  position. 
"  Until  further  orders,"  the  letter  continued,  "  remain  on 
the  defensive  and  endeavor  to  induce  the  rebels  to  remain  at 
Charleston  until  I  can  cut  off  their  retreat  by  a  movement 
from  Beverly."  Captain  W.  J.  Kountz,  an  experienced 
steamboat  captain,  was  in  charge  of  water-transportation, 
and  would  furnish  light-draught  steamboats  for  my  use.1 

1  What  purports  to  be  McClellan's  letter  to  me  is  found  in  the  Records 
(O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  pt.  i.  p.  197),  but  it  seems  to  be  only  an  abstract  of  it,  made  to 
accompany  his  dispatch  to  Washington  (Id,,  p.  198),  and  by  a  clerical  error 
given  the  form  of  the  complete  letter.  It  does  not  contain  the  quotation  given 
above,  which  was  reiterated  before  the  letter  was  closed,  in  these  words  : 
"  Remember  that  my  present  plan  is  to  cut  them  off  by  a  rapid  march  from 
Beverly  after  driving  those  in  front  of  me  across  the  mountains,  and  do  all 
you  can  to  favor  that  by  avoiding  offensive  movements." 

After  the  printing  of  the  earlier  volumes  of  the  Records,  covering  the 
years  1861-1862,  I  learned  that  the  books  and  papers  of  the  Department  of 
the  Ohio  had  not  been  sent  to  Washington  at  the  close  of  the  war,  but 
were  still  in  Cincinnati.  I  brought  this  fact  to  the  attention  of  the  Ad 
jutant-General,  and  at  the  request  of  that  officer  obtained  and  forwarded 
them  to  the  Archives  office.  With  them  were  my  letter  books  and  the 
original  files  of  my  correspondence  with  McClellan  and  Rosecrans  in  1861 
and  1862.  Colonel  Robert  N.  Scott,  who  was  then  in  charge  of  the  pub 
lication,  informed  me  that  the  whole  would  be  prepared  for  printing  and 
would  appear  in  the  supplemental  volumes,  after  the  completion  of  the  rest 
of  the  First  Series.  Owing  to  changes  in  the  Board  of  Publication  in  the 
course  of  twenty  years,  there  were  errors  in  the  arrangement  of  the  matter 
for  the  printer,  and  a  considerable  part  of  the  correspondence  between  the 
generals  named  and  myself  was  accidentally  omitted  from  the  supplemental 
volume  (O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.)  in  which  it  should  have  appeared.  The  orig 
inals  are  no  doubt  in  the  files  of  the  Archives  office,  and  for  the  benefit 


THE  KAN  AW  HA    VALLEY  6 1 

Governor  Dennison  seconded  our  wishes  with  his  usual 
earnestness,  and  ordered  the  battery  of  artillery  and  com 
pany  of  cavalry  to  meet  me  at  Gallipolis ;  but  the  guns 
for  the  battery  were  not  to  be  had,  and  a  section  of  two 
bronze  guns  (six-pounder  smooth-bores  rifled)  was  the 
only  artillery,  whilst  the  cavalry  was  less  than  half  a  troop 
of  raw  recruits,  useful  only  as  messengers.  I  succeeded 
in  getting  the  Eleventh  Ohio  sent  with  me,  the  lacking 
companies  to  be  recruited  and  sent  later.  The  Twelfth 
Ohio  was  an  excellent  regiment  which  had  been  some 
what  delayed  in  its  reorganization  and  had  not  gone  with 
the  rest  of.  its  brigade  to  McClellan.  The  Twenty-first 
was  one  of  the  regiments  enlisted  for  the  State  in  excess 
of  the  first  quota,  and  was  now  brought  into  the  national 
service  under  the  President's  second  call.  The  two  Ken 
tucky  regiments  had  been  organized  in  Cincinnati,  and 
were  made  up  chiefly  of  steamboat  crews  and  "  longshore 
men  "  thrown  out  of  employment  by  the  stoppage  of 
commerce  on  the  river.  There  were  in  them  some  com 
panies  of  other  material,  but  these  gave  the  distinctive 
character  to  the  regiments.  The  colonels  and  part  of  the 
field  officers  were  Kentuckians,  but  the  organizations  were 
Ohio  regiments  in  nearly  everything  but  the  name.  The 
men  were  mostly  of  a  rough  and  reckless  class,  and  gave 
a  good  deal  of  trouble  by  insubordination ;  but  they  did 
not  lack  courage,  and  after  they  had  been  under  discipline 
for  a  while,  became  good  fighting  regiments.  The  diffi 
culty  of  getting  transportation  from  the  railway  company 
delayed  our  departure.  It  was  not  till  the  6th  of  July 
that  a  regiment  could  be  sent,  and  another  followed  in 
two  or  three  days.  The  two  Kentucky  regiments  were 
not  yet  armed  and  equipped,  but  after  a  day  or  two 
were  ready  and  were  ordered  up  the  river  by  steamboats. 
I  myself  left  Camp  Dennison  on  the  evening  of  Sunday 

of  investigators  I  give  in  Appendix  A  a  list  of  the  numbers  missing  from 
the  printed  volume,  as  shown  by  comparison  with  my  retained  copies. 


62  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  7th  with  the  Eleventh  Ohio  (seven  companies) 
and  reached  Gallipolis  in  the  evening  of  the  Qth.  The 
three  Ohio  regiments  were  united  on  the  loth  and  carried 
by  steamers  to  Point  Pleasant,  and  we  entered  the  theatre 
of  war.1 

My  movement  had  been  made  upon  a  telegram  from 
General  McClellan,  and  I  found  at  Gallipolis  his  letter  of 
instructions  of  the  2d,  and  another  of  the  6th  which  en 
larged  the  scope  of  my  command.  A  territorial  district 
was  assigned  to  me,  including  the  southwestern  part  of 
Virginia  below  Parkersburg  on  the  Ohio,  and  north  of  the 
Great  Kanawha,  reaching  back  into  the  country  as  I 
should  occupy  it.2  The  directions  to  restrict  myself  to  a 
defensive  occupation  of  the  Lower  Kanawha  valley  were 
changed  to  instructions  to  march  on  Charleston  and  Gau- 
ley  Bridge,  and,  with  a  view  to  his  resumption  of  the  plan 
to  make  this  his  main  line  of  advance,  to  "  obtain  all 
possible  information  in  regard  to  the  roads  leading  toward 
Wytheville  and  the  adjacent  region."  I  was  also  ordered 
to  place  a  regiment  at  Ripley,  on  the  road  from  Parkers- 
burg  to  Charleston,  and  advised  "  to  beat  up  Barboursville, 
Guyandotte,  etc.,  so  that  the  entire  course  of  the  Ohio 
may  be  secured  to  us."  Communication  with  Ripley 
was  by  Letart's  Falls  on  the  Ohio,  some  thirty  miles 
above  Gallipolis,  or  by  Ravenswood,  twenty  miles  further. 
Guyandotte  was  a  longer  distance  below  Gallipolis,  and 
Barboursville  was  inland  some  miles  up  the  Guyandotte 
River.  As  to  General  Wise,  McClellan  wrote:  "Drive 
Wise  out  and  catch  him  if  you  can.  If  you  do  catch 
him,  send  him  to  Columbus  penitentiary."  A  regiment 
at  Parkersburg  and  another  at  Roane  Court  House  on  the 
northern  border  of  my  district  were  ordered  to  report  to 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  416 :  my  report  to  McClellan. 

2  The  territorial  boundary  of  McClellan's  Department  had  been  placed 
at  the  Great  Kanawha  and  the  Ohio  rivers,  probably  with  some  political  idea 
of  avoiding  the  appearance  of  aggression  upon  regions  of  doubtful  loyalty. 
When  warlike  operations  began,  such  ideas,  of  course,  were  abandoned. 


THE   KANAWHA    VALLEY  63 

me,  but  I  was  not  authorized  to  move  them  from  the 
stations  assigned  them,  and  they  were  soon  united  to 
McClellan's  own  column. 

At  Gallipolis  I  heard  that  a  steamboat  on  the  Ohio  had 
been  boarded  by  a  rebel  party  near  Guyandotte,  and  the 
news  giving  point  to  McClellan's  suggestion  to  "  beat  up  " 
that  region,  I  dispatched  a  small  steamboat  down  the  river 
to  meet  the  Kentucky  regiments  with  orders  for  the  lead 
ing  one  to  land  at  Guyandotte  and  suppress  any  insurgents 
in  that  neighborhood.1  It  was  hazardous  to  divide  my 
little  army  into  three  columns  on  a  base  of  a  hundred  miles, 
but  it  was  thought  wise  to  show  some  Union  troops  at 
various  points  on  the  border,  and  I  purposed  to  unite  my 
detachments  by  early  convergent  movements  forward  to 
the  Kanawha  valley  as  soon  as  I  should  reach  Red  House, 
thirty-two  miles  up  the  river,  with  my  principal  column. 

Before  I  reached  Charleston  I  added  to  my  artillery  one 
iron  and  one  brass  cannon,  smooth  six-pounders,  borrowed 
from  the  civil  authorities  at  Gallipolis ;  but  they  were  with 
out  caissons  or  any  proper  equipment,  and  were  manned 
by  volunteers  from  the  infantry.2  My  total  force,  when 
assembled,  would  be  a  little  over  3000  men,  the  regiments 
having  the  same  average  strength  as  those  with  McClellan. 
The  opposing  force  under  General  Wise  was  4000  by  the 
time  the  campaign  was  fully  opened,  though  somewhat  less 
at  the  beginning.3 

The  Great  Kanawha  River  was  navigable  for  small  steam 
boats  about  seventy  miles,  to  a  point  ten  or  twelve  miles 
above  Charleston,  the  only  important  town  of  the  region, 
which  was  at  the  confluence  of  the  Kanawha  and  Elk  rivers. 
Steamboats  were  plenty,  owing  to  the  interruption  of  trade, 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  417.  2  Ibid. 

8  Wise  reported  his  force  on  the  lyth  of  July  as  3500  "effective  "  men 
and  ten  cannon,  and  says  he  received  "  perhaps  300  "  in  reinforcements  on 
the  i8th.  When  he  abandoned  the  valley  ten  days  later,  he  reported  his 
force  4000  in  round  numbers.  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  pp.  290,  292^  ion. 


64  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

and  wagons  were  wholly  lacking ;  so  that  my  column  was 
accompanied  and  partly  carried  by  a  fleet  of  stern-wheel 
steamers. 

On  Thursday  the  nth  of  July  the  movement  from  Point 
Pleasant  began.  An  advance-guard  was  sent  out  on  each 
side  of  the  river,  marching  upon  the  roads  which  were  near 
its  banks.  The  few  horsemen  were  divided  and  sent  with 
them  to  carry  messages,  and  the  boats  followed,  steaming 
slowly  along  in  rear  of  the  marching  men.  Most  of  tv/o 
regiments  were  carried  on  the  steamers,  to  save  fatigue  to 
the  men,  who  were  as  yet  unused  to  their  work,  and  many 
of  whom  were  footsore  from  their  first  long  march  of 
twenty-five  miles  to  Gallipolis  from  Hampden  station,  where 
they  had  been  obliged  to  leave  the  railway.  The  arrange 
ment  was  also  a  good  one  in  a  military  point  of  view,  for 
if  an  enemy  were  met  on  either  bank  of  the  stream,  the 
boats  could  land  in  a  moment  and  the  troops  disembark 
without  delay. 

Our  first  day's  sail  was  thirteen  miles  up  the  river,  and  it 
was  the  very  romance  of  campaigning.  I  took  my  station  on 
top  of  the  pilot-house  of  the  leading  boat,  so  that  I  might 
see  over  the  banks  of  the  stream  and  across  the  bottom 
lands  to  the  high  hills  which  bounded  the  valley.  The 
afternoon  was  a  lovely  one.  Summer  clouds  lazily  drifted 
across  the  sky,  the  boats  were  dressed  in  their  colors  and 
swarmed  with  the  men  like  bees.  The  bands  played  na 
tional  tunes,  and  as  we  passed  the  houses  of  Union  citizens, 
the  inmates  would  wave  their  handkerchiefs  to  us,  and 
were  answered  by  cheers  from  the  troops.  The  scenery 
was  picturesque,  the  gently  winding  river  making  beautiful 
reaches  that  opened  new  scenes  upon  us  at  every  turn. 
On  either  side  the  advance-guard  could  be  seen  in  the  dis 
tance,  the  main  body  in  the  road,  with  skirmishers  explor 
ing  the  way  in  front,  and  flankers  on  the  sides.  Now  and 
then  a  horseman  would  bring  some  message  to  the  bank 
from  the  front,  and  a  small  boat  would  be  sent  to  receive 


THE  KANAWHA    VALLEY  65 

_^___ 4 — 

it,  giving  us  the  rumors  with  which  the  country  was  rife, 
and  which  gave  just  enough  of  excitement  and  of  the  spice 
of  possible  danger  to  make  this  our  first  day  in  an  enemy's 
country  key  everybody  to  just  such  a  pitch  as  apparently 
to  double  the  vividness  of  every  sensation.  The  landscape 
seemed  more  beautiful,  the  sunshine  more  bright,  and  the 
exhilaration  of  out-door  life  more  joyous  than  any  we  had 
ever  known. 

The  halt  for  the  night  had  been  assigned  at  a  little  village 
on  the  right  (northern)  bank  of  the  stream,  which  was 
nestled  beneath  a  ridge  which  ran  down  from  the  hills 
toward  the  river,  making  an  excellent  position  for  defence 
against  any  force  which  might  come  against  it  from  the 
upper  valley.  The  sun  was  getting  low  behind  us  in  the 
west,  as  we  approached  it,  and  the  advance-guard  had 
already  halted.  Captain  Cotter's  two  bronze  guns  gleamed 
bright  on  the  top  of  the  ridge  beyond  the  pretty  little  town, 
and  before  the  sun  went  down,  the  new  white  tents  had 
been  carried  up  to  the  slope  and  pitched  there.  The 
steamers  were  moored  to  the  shore,  and  the  low  slanting  rays 
of  the  sunset  fell  upon  as  charming  a  picture  as  was  ever 
painted.  An  outpost  with  pickets  was  set  on  the  southern 
side  of  the  river,  both  grand  and  camp  guards  were  put 
out  also  on  the  side  we  occupied,  and  the  men  soon  had 
their  supper  and  went  to  rest.  Late  in  the  evening  a 
panic-stricken  countryman  came  in  with  the  news  that 
General  Wise  was  moving  down  upon  us  with  4000 
men.  The  man  was  evidently  in  earnest,  and  was  a  loyal 
one.  He  believed  every  word  he  said,  but  he  had  in 
fact  seen  only  a  few  of  the  enemy's  horsemen  who  were 
scouting  toward  us,  and  believed  their  statement  that  an 
army  was  at  their  back.  It  was  our  initiation  into  an  ex 
perience  of  rumors  that  was  to  continue  as  long  as  the 
war.  We  were  to  get  them  daily  and  almost  hourly; 
sometimes  with  a  little  foundation  of  fact,  sometimes  with 
none ;  rarely  purposely  deceptive,  but  always  grossly 
VOL.  i.  — 5 


66  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

exaggerated,  making  chimeras  with  which  a  commanding 
officer  had  to  wage  a  more  incessant  warfare  than  with  the 
substantial  enemy  in  his  front.  I  reasoned  that  Wise's 
troops  were,  like  my  own,  too  raw  to  venture  a  night 
attack  with,  and  contented  myself  with  sending  a  strong 
reconnoitring  party  out  beyond  my  pickets,  putting  in 
command  of  it  Major  Hines  of  the  Twelfth  Ohio,  an  officer 
who  subsequently  became  noted  for  his  enterprise  and 
activity  in  charge  of  scouting  parties.  The  camp  rested 
quietly,  and  toward  morning  Hines  returned,  reporting  that 
a  troop  of  the  enemy's  horse  had  come  within  a  couple  of 
miles  of  our  position  in  search  of  information  about  us  and 
our  movement.  They  had  indulged  in  loud  bragging  as  to 
what  Wise  and  his  army  would  do  with  us,  but  this  and 
nothing  more  was  the  basis  of  our  honest  friend's  fright 
The  morning  dawned  bright  and  peaceful,  the  steamers 
were  sent  back  for  a  regiment  which  was  still  at  Point 
Pleasant,  and  the  day  was  used  in  concentrating  the  little 
army  and  preparing  for  another  advance. 

On  July  1 3th  we  moved  again,  making  about  ten  miles, 
and  finding  the  navigation  becoming  difficult  by  reason  of 
the  low  water.  At  several  shoals  in  the  stream  rough 
wing-dams  had  been  built  from  the  sides  to  concentrate 
the  water  in  the  channel,  and  at  Knob  Shoals,  in  one  of 
these  "  chutes "  as  they  were  called,  a  coal  barge  had 
sometime  before  been  sunk.  In  trying  to  pass  it  our 
leading  boat  grounded,  and,  the  current  being  swift,  it  was 
for  a  time  doubtful  if  we  should  get  her  off.  We  finally 
succeeded,  however,  and  the  procession  of  boats  slowly 
steamed  up  the  rapids.  We  had  hardly  got  beyond  them 
when  we  heard  a  distant  cannon-shot  from  our  advance- 
guard  which  had  opened  a  long  distance  between  them 
and  us  during  our  delay.  We  steamed  rapidly  ahead. 
Soon  we  saw  a  man  pulling  off  from  the  south  bank  in  a 
skiff.  Nearing  the  steamer,  he  stood  up  and  excitedly 
shouted  that  a  general  engagement  had  begun.  We 


THE  KANAWHA    VALLEY 


laughingly  told  him  it  could  n't  be  very  general  till  we 
got  in,  and  we  moved  on,  keeping  a  sharp  outlook  for  our 
parties  on  either  bank.  When  we  came  up  to  them,  we 
learned  that  a  party  of  horsemen  had  appeared  on  the 
southern  side  of  the  river  and  had  opened  a  skirmishing 
fire,  but  had  scampered  off  as  if  the  Old  Nick  were  after 
them  when  a  shell  from  the  rifled  gun  was  sent  over  their 
heads.  The  shell,  like  a  good  many  that  were  made  in 
those  days,  did  not  explode,  and  the  simple  people  of 
the  vicinity  who  had  heard  its  long-continued  scream  told 
our  men  some  days  after  that  they  thought  it  was  "  going 
yet." 

From  this  time  some  show  of  resistance  was  made  by 
the  enemy,  and  the  skirmishing  somewhat  retarded  the 
movement.  Still,  about  ten  miles  was  made  each  day 
till  the  evening  of  the  i6th,  when  we  encamped  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Pocotaligo,  a  large  creek  which  enters  the 
Kanawha  from  the  north.1  The  evening  before,  we  had 
had  one  of  those  incidents,  not  unusual  with  new  troops, 
which  prove  that  nothing  but  habit  can  make  men  cool 
and  confident  in  their  duties.  We  had,  as  usual,  moored 
our  boats  to  the  northern  bank  and  made  our  camp  there, 
placing  an  outpost  on  the  left  bank  opposite  us  support 
ing  a  chain  of  sentinels,  to  prevent  a  surprise  from  that 
direction.  A  report  of  some  force  of  the  enemy  in  their 
front  made  me  order  another  detachment  to  their  support 
after  nightfall.  The  detachment  had  been  told  off  and 
ferried  across  in  small  boats.  They  were  dimly  seen 
marching  in  the  starlight  up  the  river  after  landing,  when 
suddenly  a  shot  was  heard,  and  then  an  irregular  volley  was 
both  seen  and  heard  as  the  muskets  flashed  out  in  the 
darkness.  A  supporting  force  was  quickly  sent  over,  and, 
no  further  disturbance  occurring,  a  search  was  made  for  an 
enemy,  but  none  was  found.  A  gun  had  accidentally  gone 
off  in  the  squad,  and  the  rest  of  the  men,  surprised  and 
1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  418. 


68  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

bewildered,  had  fired,  they  neither  knew  why  nor  at  what. 
Two  men  were  killed,  and  several  others  were  hurt.  This 
and  the  chaffing  the  men  got  from  their  comrades  was  a 
lesson  to  the  whole  command.  The  soldiers  were  brave 
enough,  and  were  thoroughly  ashamed  of  themselves,  but 
they  were  raw ;  that  was  all  that  could  be  said  of  it.1 

We  were  here  overtaken  by  the  Second  Kentucky,  which 
had  stopped  at  Guyandotte  on  its  way  up  the  river,  and 
had  marched  across  the  country  to  join  us  after  our  prog 
ress  had  sufficiently  covered  that  lower  region.  From 
Guyandotte  a  portion  of  the  regiment,  under  command  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Neff,  had  gone  to  Barboursville  and 
had  attacked  and  dispersed  an  encampment  of  Confeder 
ates  which  was  organizing  there.  It  was  a  very  creditable 
little  action,  in  which  officers  and  men  conducted  them 
selves  well,  and  which  made  them  for  the  time  the  envy 
of  the  rest  of  the  command. 

The  situation  at  "  Poca,"  as  it  was  called  in  the  neighbor 
hood,  was  one  which  made  the  further  advance  of  the 
army  require  some  consideration.  Information  which 
came  to  us  from  loyal  men  showed  that  some  force  of 
the  enemy  was  in  position  above  the  mouth  of  Scary 
Creek  on  the  south  side  of  the  Kanawha,  and  about  three 
miles  from  us.  We  had  for  two  days  had  constant  light 
skirmishing  with  the  advance-guard  of  Wise's  forces  on 
the  north  bank  of  the  river,  and  supposed  that  the  princi 
pal  part  of  his  command  was  on  our  side,  and  not  far  in 
front  of  us.  It  turned  out  in  fact  that  this  was  so,  and 
that  Wise  had  placed  his  principal  camp  at  Tyler  Moun 
tain,  a  bold  spur  which  reaches  the  river  on  the  northern 
side  (on  which  is  also  the  turnpike  road),  about  twelve 
miles  above  my  position,  while  he  occupied  the  south  side 
with  a  detachment.  The  Pocotaligo,  which  entered  the 
river  from  the  north  at  our  camp,  covered  us  against  an 
attack  on  that  side;  but  we  could  not  take  our  steam- 
1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  421. 


THE  KANAWHA    VALLEY  69 

boats  further  unless  both  banks  of  the  river  were  cleared. 
We  had  scarcely  any  wagons,  for  those  which  had  been 
promised  us  could  not  yet  be  forwarded,  and  we  must 
either  continue  to  keep  the  steamboats  with  us,  or  organize 
wagon  transportation  and  cut  loose  from  the  boats.1  My 
urgent  dispatches  were  hurrying  the  wagons  toward  us, 
but  meanwhile  I  hoped  the  opposition  on  the  south  bank 
of  the  river  would  prove  trifling,  for  artillery  in  position  at 
any  point  on  the  narrow  river  would  at  once  stop  naviga 
tion  of  our  light  and  unarmed  transports.  On  the  morning 
of  the  1 7th  a  reconnoitring  party  sent  forward  on  the 
south  side  of  the  river  under  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  White  of  the  Twelfth  Ohio,  reported  the  enemy 
about  five  hundred  strong  intrenched  on  the  further  side 
of  Scary  Creek,  which  was  not  fordable  at  its  mouth,  but 
could  be  crossed  a  little  way  up  the  stream.  Colonel 
Lowe  of  the  Twelfth  requested  the  privilege  of  driving 
off  this  party  with  his  regiment  accompanied  by  our  two 
cannon.  He  was  ordered  to  do  so,  whilst  the  enemy's 
skirmishers  should  be  pushed  back  from  the  front  of  the 
main  column,  and  it  should  be  held  ready  to  advance 
rapidly  up  the  north  bank  of  the  river  as  soon  as  the 
hostile  force  at  Scary  Creek  should  be  dislodged. 

The  Twelfth  and  two  companies  of  the  Twenty-first 
Ohio  were  ferried  over  and  moved  out  soon  after  noon. 
The  first  reports  from  them  were  encouraging  and  full  of 
confidence,  the  enemy  were  retreating  and  they  had  dis 
mounted  one  of  his  guns;  but  just  before  evening  they 
returned,  bringing  the  account  of  their  repulse  in  the  effort 
to  cross  at  the  mouth  of  the  creek,  and  their  failure  to  find 
the  ford  a  little  higher  up.  Their  ammunition  had  run 
short,  some  casualties  had  occurred,  and  they  had  become 
discouraged  and  given  it  up.  Their  loss  was  10  men 
killed  and  35  wounded.  If  they  had  held  on  and  asked 
for  assistance,  it  would  have  been  well  enough;  but, 
1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  420;  dispatch  of  i7th  also. 


70  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

as  was  common  with  new  troops,  they  passed  from  confi 
dence  to  discouragement  as  soon  as  they  were  checked, 
and  they  retreated. 

The  affair  was  accompanied  by  another  humiliating  in 
cident  which  gave  me  no  little  chagrin.  During  the 
progress  of  the  engagement  Colonel  Woodruff  and  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Neff  of  the  Second  Kentucky,  with  Colonel 
De  Villiers  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio,  rode  out  in  front,  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  river,  till  they  came  opposite  the  enemy's 
position,  the  hostile  party  on  our  side  of  the  stream  having 
fallen  back  beyond  this  point.  They  were  told  by  a  negro 
that  the  rebels  were  in  retreat,  and  they  got  the  black 
man  to  ferry  them  over  in  a  skiff,  that  they  might  be  the 
first  to  congratulate  their  friends.  To  their  amazement 
they  were  welcomed  as  prisoners  by  the  Confederates,  who 
greatly  enjoyed  their  discomfiture.  The  negro  had  told 
the  truth  in  saying  that  the  enemy  had  been  in  retreat ;  for 
the  fact  was  that  both  sides  retreated,  but  the  Confederates, 
being  first  informed  of  this,  resumed  their  position  and 
claimed  a  victory.  The  officers  who  were  captured  had 
gone  out  without  permission,  and,  led  on  by  the  hare 
brained  De  Villiers,  had  done  what  they  knew  was  foolish 
and  unmilitary,  resulting  for  them  in  a  severe  experience 
in  Libby  Prison  at  Richmond,  and  for  us  in  the  momen 
tary  appearance  of  lack  of  discipline  and  order  which 
could  not  fairly  be  charged  upon  the  command.  I  re 
ported  the  facts  without  disguise  or  apology,  trusting  to 
the  future  to  remove  the  bad  impression  the  affair  must 
naturally  make  upon  McClellan. 

The  report  of  the  strength  of  the  position  attacked  and 
our  knowledge  of  the  increasing  difficulty  of  the  ground 
before  us,  led  me  to  conclude  that  the  wisest  course  would 
be  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  wagons,  now  daily  expected, 
and  then,  with  supplies  for  several  days  in  hand,  move 
independent  of  the  steamers,  which  became  only  an  em 
barrassment  when  it  was  advisable  to  leave  the  river  road 


THE  KAN  AW  HA    VALLEY  /I 

for  the  purpose  of  turning  a  fortified  position  like  that  we 
had  found  before  us.  We  therefore  rested  quietly  in  our 
strong  camp  for  several  days,  holding  both  banks  of  the 
river  and  preparing  to  move  the  main  column  by  a  country 
road  leading  away  from  the  stream  on  the  north  side,  and 
returning  to  it  at  Tyler  Mountain,  where  Wise's  camp  was 
reported  to  be.  I  ordered  up  the  First  Kentucky  from 
Ravenswood  and  Ripley,  but  its  colonel  found  obstacles 
in  his  way,  and  did  not  join  us  till  we  reached  Charleston 
the  following  week. 

On  the  23d  of  July  I  had  succeeded  in  getting  wagons 
and  teams  enough  to  supply  the  most  necessary  uses, 
and  renewed  the  advance.  We  marched  rapidly  on  the 
24th  by  the  circuitous  route  I  have  mentioned,  leaving  a 
regiment  to  protect  the  steamboats.  The  country  was 
very  broken  and  the  roads  very  rough,  but  the  enemy  had 
no  knowledge  of  our  movement,  and  toward  evening  we 
again  approached  the  river  immediately  in  rear  of  their 
camp  at  Tyler  Mountain.  When  we  drove  in  their  pickets, 
the  force  was  panic-stricken  and  ran  off,  leaving  their 
camp  in  confusion,  and  their  supper  which  they  were 
cooking  but  did  not  stop  to  eat.  A  little  below  the  point 
where  we  reached  the  river,  and  on  the  other  side,  was  the 
steamboat  "  Maffet"  with  a  party  of  soldiers  gathering  the 
wheat  which  had  been  cut  in  the  neighboring  fields  and  was 
in  the  sheaf.  I  was  for  a  moment  doubtful  whether  it  might 
not  be  one  of  our  own  boats  which  had  ventured  up  the 
river  under  protection  of  the  regiment  left  behind,  and 
directed  our  skirmishers  who  were  deployed  along  the 
edge  of  the  water  to  hail  the  other  side.  "Who  are 
you?"  was  shouted  from  both  banks  simultaneously. 
"  United  States  troops,"  our  men  answered.  "  Hurrah  for 
Jeff  Davis !  "  shouted  the  others,  and  a  rattling  fire  opened 
on  both  sides.  A  shell  was  sent  from  our  cannon  into  the 
steamer,  and  the  party  upon  her  were  immediately  seen 
jumping  ashore,  having  first  set  fire  to  her  to  prevent  her 


72  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

falling  into  our  hands.  The  enemy  then  moved  away  on 
that  side,  under  cover  of  the  trees  which  lined  the  river 
bank.  Night  was  now  falling,  and,  sending  forward  an 
advance-guard  to  follow  up  the  force  whose  camp  we  had 
surprised,  we  bivouacked  on  the  mountain  side. 

In  the  morning,  as  we  were  moving  out  at  an  early  hour, 
we  were  met  by  the  mayor  and  two  or  three  prominent 
citizens  of  Charleston  who  came  to  surrender  the  town  to 
us,  Wise  having  hurriedly  retreated  during  the  night.  He 
had  done  a  very  unnecessary  piece  of  mischief  before 
leaving,  in  partly  cutting  off  the  cables  of  a  fine  suspen 
sion  bridge  which  spans  the  Elk  River  at  Charleston.  As 
this  stream  enters  the  Kanawha  from  the  north  and  below 
the  city,  it  may  have  seemed  to  him  that  it  would  delay 
our  progress;  but  as  a  large  number  of  empty  coal  barges 
were  lying  at  the  town,  it  took  our  company  of  mechanics, 
under  Captain  Lane  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio,  but  a  little  while 
to  improvise  a  good  floating  bridge,  and  part  of  the  com 
mand  passed  through  the  town  and  camped  beyond  it.1 
One  day  was  now  given  to  the  establishment  of  a  depot 
of  supplies  at  Charleston  and  to  the  organization  of 
regular  communication  by  water  with  Gallipolis,  and  by 
wagons  with  such  positions  as  we  might  occupy  further 
up  the  river.  Deputations  of  the  townspeople  were 
informed  that  it  was  not  our  policy  to  meddle  with  private 
persons  who  remained  quietly  at  home,  nor  would  we  make 
any  inquisition  as  to  the  personal  opinions  of  those  who 
attended  strictly  to  their  own  business;  but  they  were 
warned  that  any  communication  with  the  enemy  would  be 
remorselessly  punished. 

We  were  now  able  to  get  more  accurate  information 
about  Wise's  forces  than  we  could  obtain  before,  and  this 
accorded  pretty  well  with  the  strength  which  he  reported 
officially.2  His  infantry  was  therefore  more  than  equal 
to  the  column  under  my  command  in  the  valley,  whilst  in 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  425.  2  Ante,  p.  63  note. 


THE  KAN  AW  HA    VALLEY  73 

artillery  and  in  cavalry  he  was  greatly  superior.  Our 
continued  advance  in  the  face  of  such  opposition  is  suffi 
cient  evidence  that  the  Confederate  force  was  not  well 
handled,  for  as  the  valley  contracted  and  the  hills  crowded 
in  closer  to  the  river,  nearly  every  mile  offered  positions 
in  which  small  numbers  could  hold  at  bay  an  army.  Our 
success  in  reaching  Charleston  was  therefore  good  ground 
for  being  content  with  our  progress,  though  I  had  to 
blame  myself  for  errors  in  the  management  of  my  part  of 
the  campaign  at  Pocataligo.  I  ought  not  to  have  assumed 
as  confidently  as  I  did  that  the  enemy  was  only  five  hun 
dred  strong  at  Scary  Creek  and  that  a  detachment  could 
dispose  of  that  obstacle  whilst  the  rest  of  the  column  pre 
pared  to  advance  on  our  principal  line.  Wise's  force  at 
that  point  was  in  fact  double  the  number  supposed.1  It 
is  true  it  was  very  inconvenient  to  ferry  any  considerable 
body  of  troops  back  and  forth  across  the  river;  but  I 
should  nevertheless  have  taken  the  bulk  of  my  command 
to  the  left  bank,  and  by  occupying  the  enemy's  attention 
at  the  mouth  of  Scary  Creek,  covered  the  movement 
of  a  sufficient  force  upon  his  flank  by  means  of  the  fords 
farther  up  that  stream.  This  would  have  resulted  in  the 
complete  routing  of  the  detachment,  and  it  is  nearly  cer 
tain  that  I  could  have  pushed  on  to  Charleston  at  once, 
and  could  have  waited  there  for  the  organization  of  my 
wagon  train  with  the  prestige  of  victory,  instead  of  doing 
so  at  'Poca'  with  the  appearance  of  a  check. 

McClellan  recognized  the  fact  that  he  was  asking  me  to 
face  the  enemy  with  no  odds  in  my  favor,  and  as  soon  as 
he  heard  that  Wise  was  disposed  to  make  a  stand  he 
directed  me  not  to  risk  attacking  him  in  front,  but  rather 
to  await  the  result  of  his  own  movement  toward  the  Upper 
Kanawha.2  Rosecrans  did  the  same  when  he  assumed 
command ;  but  I  knew  the  hope  had  been  that  I  would 
reach  Gauley  Bridge,  and  I  was  vexed  that  my  move- 
1  O.  R.,  vol.  ii.  p.  ion.  2  Dispatches  of  July  16  and  20. 


74  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ment  should  have  the  appearance  of  failing  when  I  was 
conscious  that  we  had  not  fairly  measured  our  strength 
with  my  opponent.  As  soon,  therefore,  as  the  needful 
preparations  could  be  made,  I  decided  upon  the  turning 
movement  which  I  have  already  described,  and  our  reso 
lute  advance  seems  to  have  thrown  Wise  into  a  panic  from 
which  he  did  not  recover  till  he  got  far  beyond  Gauley 
Bridge. 

At  Charleston  I  learned  of  the  Bull  Run  disaster,  and 
that  McClellan  had  been  ordered  to  Washington,  leaving 
Rosecrans  in  command  of  our  department.  The  latter 
sent  me  orders  which  implied  that  to  reach  Charleston 
was  the  most  he  could  expect  of  me,  and  directing  me  to 
remain  on  the  defensive  if  I  should  succeed  in  getting 
so  far,  whilst  he  should  take  up  anew  McClellan's  plan 
of  reaching  the  rear  of  Wise's  army.1  His  dispatches, 
fortunately,  did  not  reach  me  till  I  was  close  to  Gauley 
Bridge  and  was  sure  of  my  ability  to  take  possession 
of  that  defile,  some  forty  miles  above  Charleston.  An 
additional  reason  for  my  prompt  advance  was  that  the 
Twenty-first  Ohio  was  not  yet  re-enlisted  for  the  war,  was 
only  a  "  three  months "  regiment  whose  time  was  about 
to  expire,  and  Governor  Dennison  had  telegraphed  me 
to  send  it  back  to  Ohio.  I  left  this  regiment  as  a  post- 
garrison  at  Charleston  till  it  could  be  relieved  by  another, 
or  till  my  success  in  reaching  Gauley  Bridge  should  enable 
me  to  send  back  a  detachment  for  that  post,  and,  on  the 
26th  July,  pushed  forward  with  the  rest  of  my  column, 
which,  now  that  the  First  Kentucky  had  joined  me,  con 
sisted  of  four  regiments.  Our  first  night's  encampment 
was  about  eleven  miles  above  Charleston  in  a  lovely  nook 
between  spurs  of  the  hills.  Here  I  was  treated  to  a  little 
surprise  on  the  part  of  three  of  my  subordinates  which 
was  an  unexpected  enlargement  of  my  military  experience. 
The  camp  had  got  nicely  arranged  for  the  night  and 

1  Dispatches  of  July  26  and  29. 


THE  KANAWHA    VALLEY  75 

supper  was  over,  when  these  gentlemen  waited  upon  me 
at  my  tent.  The  one  who  had  shown  the  least  capacity 
as  commander  of  a  regiment  was  spokesman,  and  in 
formed  me  that  after  consultation  they  had  concluded  that 
it  was  foolhardy  to  follow  the  Confederates  into  the  gorge 
we  were  travelling,  and  that  unless  I  could  show  them 
satisfactory  reasons  for  changing  their  opinion  they  would 
not  lead  their  commands  further  into  it.  I  dryly  asked 
if  he  was  quite  sure  he  understood  the  nature  of  his  com 
munication.  There  was  something  probably  in  the  tone 
of  my  question  which  was  not  altogether  expected,  and 
his  companions  began  to  look  a  little  uneasy.  He  then 
protested  that  none  of  them  meant  any  disrespect,  but 
that  as  their  military  experience  was  about  as  extensive  as 
my  own,  they  thought  I  ought  to  make  no  movements  but 
on  consultation  with  them  and  by  their  consent.  The  others 
seemed  to  be  better  pleased  with  this  way  of  putting  it, 
and  signified  assent.  My  answer  was  that  their  conduct 
very  plainly  showed  their  own  lack  both  of  military  expe 
rience  and  elementary  military  knowledge,  and  that  this 
ignorance  was  the  only  thing  which  could  palliate  their 
action.  Whether  they  meant  it  or  not,  their  action 
was  mutinous.  The  responsibility  for  the  movement  of 
the  army  was  with  me,  and  whilst  I  should  be  inclined 
to  confer  very  freely  with  my  principal  subordinates  and 
explain  my  purposes,  I  should  call  no  councils  of  war, 
and  submit  nothing  to  vote  till  I  felt  incompetent  to 
decide  for  myself.  If  they  apologized  for  their  conduct 
and  showed  earnestness  in  military  obedience  to  orders, 
what  they  had  now  said  would  be  overlooked,  but  on  any 
recurrence  of  cause  for  complaint  I  should  enforce  my 
power  by  the  arrest  of  the  offender  at  once.  I  dismissed 
them  with  this,  and  immediately  sent  out  the  formal 
orders  through  my  adjutant-general  to  march  early  next 
morning.  Before  they  slept  one  of  the  three  had  come 
to  me  with  earnest  apology  for  his  part  in  the  matter,  and 


76  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

a  short  time  made  them  all  as  subordinate  as  I  could  wish. 
The  incident  could  not  have  occurred  in  the  brigade 
which  had  been  under  my  command  at  Camp  Dennison, 
and  was  a  not  unnatural  result  of  the  sudden  assembling 
of  inexperienced  men  under  a  brigade  commander  of 
whom  they  knew  nothing  except  that  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war  he  was  a  civilian  like  themselves.  These  very 
men  afterward  became  devoted  followers,  and  some  of 
them  life-long  friends.  It  was  part  of  their  military  edu 
cation  as  well  as  mine.  If  I  had  been  noisy  and  bluster 
ing  in  my  intercourse  with  them  at  the  beginning,  and 
had  done  what  seemed  to  be  regarded  as  the  "regula 
tion  "  amount  of  cursing  and  swearing,  they  would  prob 
ably  have  given  me  credit  for  military  aptitude  at  least; 
but  a  systematic  adherence  to  a  quiet  and  undemonstra 
tive  manner  evidently  told  against  me,  at  first,  in  their 
opinion.  Through  my  army  life  I  met  more  or  less  of 
the  same  conduct  when  assigned  to  a  new  command;  but 
when  men  learned  that  discipline  would  be  inevitably 
enforced,  and  that  it  was  as  necessary  to  obey  a  quiet 
order  as  one  emphasized  by  expletives,  and  especially 
when  they  had  been  a  little  under  fire,  there  was  no  more 
trouble.  Indeed,  I  was  impressed  with  the  fact  that  after 
this  acquaintance  was  once  made,  my  chief  embarrass 
ment  in  discipline  was  that  an  intimation  of  dissatisfaction 
on  my  part  would  cause  deeper  chagrin  and  more  evident 
pain  than  I  intended  or  wished. 

The  same  march  enabled  me  to  make  the  acquaintance 
of  another  army  "institution,"  -the  newspaper  corre 
spondent.  We  were  joined  at  Charleston  by  two  men 
representing  influential  Eastern  journals,  who  wished  to 
know  on  what  terms  they  could  accompany  the  column. 
The  answer  was  that  the  quartermaster  would  furnish 
them  with  a  tent  and  transportation,  and  that  their  letters 
should  be  submitted  to  one  of  the  staff,  to  protect  us  from 
the  publication  of  facts  which  might  aid  the  enemy.  This 


THE  KANAWHA    VALLEY 


seemed  unsatisfactory,  and  they  intimated  that  they 
expected  to  be  taken  into  my  mess  and  to  be  announced 
as  volunteer  aides  with  military  rank.  They  were  told 
that  military  position  or  rank  could  only  be  given  by  au 
thority  much  higher  than  mine,  and  that  they  could  be 
more  honestly  independent  if  free  from  personal  obligation 
and  from  temptation  to  repay  favors  with  flattery.  My 
only  purpose  was  to  put  the  matter  upon  the  foundation 
of  public  right  and  of  mutual  self-respect.  The  day  before 
we  reached  Gauley  Bridge  they  opened  the  subject  again 
to  Captain  McElroy,  my  adjutant-general,  but  were  in 
formed  that  I  had  decided  it  upon  a  principle  by  which  I 
meant  to  abide.  Their  reply  was,  "  Very  well  ;  General 
Cox  thinks  he  can  get  along  without  us,  and  we  will 
show  him.  We  will  write  him  down." 

They  left  the  camp  the  same  evening,  and  wrote  letters 
to  their  papers  describing  the  army  as  demoralized, 
drunken,  and  without  discipline,  in  a  state  of  insubordina 
tion,  and  the  commander  as  totally  incompetent.  As  to 
the  troops,  more  baseless  slander  was  never  uttered.  Their 
march  had  been  orderly.  No  wilful  injury  had  been  done 
to  private  property,  and  no  case  of  personal  violence  to 
any  non-combatant,  man  or  woman,  had  been  even 
charged.  Yet  the  printing  of  such  communications  in 
widely  read  journals  was  likely  to  be  as  damaging  as  if 
it  all  were  true.  My  nomination  as  Brigadier-General 
of  U.  S.  Volunteers  was  then  before  the  Senate  for  con 
firmation,  and  "the  pen"  would  probably  have  proved 
"  mightier  than  the  sword  "  but  for  McClellan's  knowledge 
of  the  nature  of  the  task  we  had  accomplished,  as  he  was 
then  in  the  flood-tide  of  power  at  Washington,  and  ex 
pressed  his  satisfaction  at  the  performance  of  our  part 
of  the  campaign  which  he  had  planned.  By  good  for 
tune,  also,  the  injurious  letters  were  printed  at  the  same 
time  with  the  telegraphic  news  of  our  occupation  of 
Gauley  Bridge  and  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  out  of  the 


78  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

valley. 1  I  was,  however,  deeply  convinced  that  my  position 
was  the  right  one,  and  never  changed  my  rule  of  conduct  in 
the  matter.  The  relations  of  newspaper  correspondents 
to  general  officers  of  the  army  became  one  of  the  crying 
scandals  and  notorious  causes  of  intrigue  and  demoraliza 
tion.  It  was  a  subject  almost  impossible  to  settle  satisfac 
torily  ;  but  whoever  gained  or  lost  by  cultivating  this  means 
of  reputation,  it  is  a  satisfaction  to  have  adhered  through 
out  the  war  to  the  rule  I  first  adopted  and  announced. 

Wise  made  no  resolute  effort  to  oppose  my  march  after 
I  left  Charleston,  and  contented  himself  with  delaying  us 
by  his  rear-guard,  which  obstructed  the  road  by  felling 
trees  into  it  and  by  skirmishing  with  my  head  of  column. 
We  however  advanced  at  the  rate  of  twelve  or  fifteen 
miles  a  day,  reaching  Gauley  Bridge  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th  of  July.  Here  we  captured  some  fifteen  hundred 
stands  of  arms  and  a  considerable  store  of  munitions 
which  the  Confederate  general  had  not  been  able  to  carry 
away  or  destroy.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  in  the  wild  defile 
which  we  had  threaded  for  the  last  twenty  miles  there 
were  as  many  positions  as  there  were  miles  in  which  he 
could  easily  have  delayed  my  advance  a  day  or  two,  forc 
ing  me  to  turn  his  flank  by  the  most  difficult  mountain 
climbing,  and  where  indeed,  with  forces  so  nearly  equal, 
my  progress  should  have  been  permanently  barred.  At 
Gauley  Bridge  he  burned  the  structure  which  gave  name 
to  the  place,  and  which  had  been  a  series  of  substantial 
wooden  trusses  resting  upon  heavy  stone  piers.  My  or- 

1  As  one  of  these  correspondents  became  a  writer  of  history,  it  is  made 
proper  to  say  that  he  was  Mr.  William  Swinton,  of  whom  General  Grant  has 
occasion  to  speak  in  his  "  Personal  Memoirs  "  (vol.  ii.  p.  144),  and  whose 
facility  in  changing  his  point  of  view  in  historical  writing  was  shown  in  his 
"  McClellan's  Military  Career  Reviewed  and  Exposed,"  which  was  pub 
lished  in  1864  by  the  Union  Congressional  Committee  (first  appearing  in 
the  "  New  York  Times  "  of  February,  March,  and  April  of  that  year),  when 
compared  with  his  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  "  which  appeared 
two  years  later.  Burnside  accused  him  of  repeated  instances  of  malicious 
libel  of  his  command  in  June,  1864.  O.  R.,  vol.  xxxvi.  pt.  iii.  p.  751. 


THE  KANAWHA    VALLEY  79 

ders  definitively  limited  me  to  the  point  we  had  now  reached 
in  my  advance,  and  I  therefore  sent  forward  only  a  detach 
ment  to  follow  the  enemy  and  keep  up  his  precipitate 
retreat.  Wise  did  not  stop  till  he  reached  Greenbrier 
and  the  White  Sulphur  Springs,  and  there  was  abundant  evi 
dence  that  he  regarded  his  movement  as  a  final  abandon 
ment  of  this  part  of  West  Virginia.1  A  few  weeks  later 
General  Lee  came  in  person  with  reinforcements  over  the 
mountains  and  began  a  new  campaign ;  but  until  the  2Oth 
of  August  we  were  undisturbed  except  by  a  petty  guerilla 
warfare. 

McClellan  telegraphed  from  Washington  his  congratula 
tions,2  and  Rosecrans  expressed  his  satisfaction  also  in 
terms  which  assured  me  that  we  had  done  more  than  had 
been  expected  of  us.3  The  good  effect  upon  the  com 
mand  was  also  very  apparent;  for  our  success  not  only 
justified  the  policy  of  a  determined  advance,  but  the  offi 
cers  who  had  been  timid  as  to  results  were  now  glad  to 
get  their  share  of  the  credit,  and  to  make  amends  for  their 
insubordination  by  a  hearty  change  in  bearing  and  con 
duct.  My  term  of  service  as  a  brigadier  of  the  Ohio  forces 
in  the  three  months'  enrolment  had  now  ended,  and 
until  the  Senate  should  confirm  my  appointment  as  a 
United  States  officer  there  was  some  doubt  as  to  my  right 
to  continue  in  command.  My  embarrassment  in  this  re 
gard  was  very  pleasantly  removed  by  a  dispatch  from 
General  Rosecrans  in  which  he  conveyed  the  request  of 
Lieutenant-General  Scott  and  of  himself  that  I  should  re 
main  in  charge  of  the  Kanawha  column.  It  was  only  a 
week,  however,  before  notice  of  the  confirmation  was  re 
ceived,  and  dropping  all  thoughts  of  returning  home,  I 
prepared  my  mind  for  continuous  active  duty  till  the  war 
should  end. 

1  Floyd's  Dispatches,  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  ii.  pp.  208,  213. 

2  Dispatch  of  August  i.  8  Dispatch  of  July  31. 


CHAPTER  V 

GAULEY   BRIDGE 

The  gate  of  the  Kanawha  valley  —  The  wilderness  beyond  —  West  Virginia 
defences  —  A  romantic  post  —  Chaplain  Brown  —  An  adventurous  mis 
sion  —  Chaplain  Dubois  —  "  The  River  Path  "  —  Gauley  Mount  — 
Colonel  Tompkins's  home  —  Bowie-knives  —  Truculent  resolutions  — 
The  Engineers  —  Whittlesey,  Benham,  Wagner  —  Fortifications  —  Dis 
tant  reconnoissances  —  Comparison  of  forces  —  Dangers  to  steamboat 
communications  —  Allotment  of  duties  —  The  Summersville  post  — 
Seventh  Ohio  at  Cross  Lanes  —  Scares  and  rumors  —  Robert  E.  Lee  at 
Valley  Mountain  —  Floyd  and  Wise  advance  —  Rosecrans's  orders  — 
The  Cross  Lanes  affair  —  Major  Casement's  creditable  retreat —  Colonel 
Tyler's  reports  —  Lieutenant-Colonel  Creighton  —  Quarrels  of  Wise  and 
Floyd  —  Ambushing  rebel  cavalry  —  Affair  at  Boone  Court  House  — 
New  attack  at  Gauley  Bridge  —  An  incipient  mutiny  —  Sad  result  —  A 
notable  court-martial — Rosecrans  marching  toward  us —  Communications 
renewed  —  Advance  toward  Lewisburg  —  Camp  Lookout  —  A  private 


THE  position  at  Gauley  Bridge  was  an  important  one 
from  a  military  point  of  view.  It  was  where  the 
James  River  and  Kanawha  turnpike,  after  following  the 
highlands  along  the  course  of  New  River  as  it  comes 
from  the  east,  drops  into  a  defile  with  cliffs  on  one  side 
and  a  swift  and  unfordable  torrent  upon  the  other,  and 
then  crosses  the  Gauley  River,  which  is  a  stream  of  very 
similar  character.  The  two  rivers,  meeting  at  a  right 
angle,  there  unite  to  form  the  Great  Kanawha,  which 
plunges  over  a  ledge  of  rocks  a  mile  below  and  winds 
its  way  among  the  hills,  some  thirty  miles,  before  it  be 
comes  a  navigable  stream  even  for  the  lightest  class  of 
steamboats.  From  Gauley  Bridge  a  road  runs  up  the 
Gauley  River  to  Cross  Lanes  and  Carnifex  Ferry,  some 
thing  over  twenty  miles,  and  continuing  northward  reaches 
Summersville,  Sutton,  and  Weston,  making  almost  the 


GAULEY  BRIDGE  8 1 


only  line  of  communication  between  the  posts  then  occu 
pied  by  our  troops  in  northwestern  Virginia  and  the  head 
of  the  Kanawha  valley.  Southwestward  the  country  was 
extremely  wild  and  broken,  with  few  and  small  settle 
ments  and  no  roads  worthy  the  name.  The  crossing  of 
the  Gauley  was  therefore  the  gate  through  which  all 
important  movements  from  eastern  into  southwestern 
Virginia  must  necessarily  come,  and  it  formed  an  impor 
tant  link  in  any  chain  of  posts  designed  to  cover  the 
Ohio  valley  from  invasion.  It  was  also  the  most  ad 
vanced  single  post  which  could  protect  the  Kanawha 
valley.  Further  to  the  southeast,  on  Flat-top  Mountain, 
was  another  very  strong  position,  where  the  principal 
road  on  the  left  bank  of  New  River  crosses  a  high  and 
broad  ridge;  but  a  post  could  not  be  safely  maintained 
there  without  still  holding  Gauley  Bridge  in  considerable 
force,  or  establishing  another  post  on  the  right  bank  of 
New  River  twenty  miles  further  up.  All  these  streams 
flow  in  rocky  beds  seamed  and  fissured  to  so  great  a 
degree  that  they  had  no  practicable  fords.  You  might 
go  forty  miles  up  New  River  and  at  least  twenty  up 
the  Gauley  before  you  could  find  a  place  where  either 
could  be  passed  by  infantry  or  wagons.  The  little  ferries 
which  had  been  made  in  a  few  eddies  of  the  rivers  were 
destroyed  in  the  first  campaign,  and  the  post  at  the 
Gauley  became  nearly  impregnable  in  front,  and  could 
only  be  turned  by  long  and  difficult  detours. 

An  interval  of  about  a  hundred  miles  separated  this 
mountain  fastness  from  the  similar  passes  which  guarded 
eastern  Virginia  along  the  line  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  This 
debatable  ground  was  sparsely  settled  and  very  poor  in 
agricultural  resources,  so  that  it  could  furnish  nothing 
for  subsistence  of  man  or  beast.  The  necessity  of  trans 
porting  forage  as  well  as  subsistence  and  ammunition 
through  this  mountainous  belt  forbade  any  extended 
or  continuous  operations  there;  for  actual  computation 

VOL.  I.  —  6 


82 


REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 


showed  that  the  wagon  trains  could  carry  no  more  than 
the  food  for  the  mule  teams  on  the  double  trip,  going 
and  returning,  from  Gauley  Bridge  to  the  narrows  of  New 
River  where  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee  Railroad  crossed 
upon  an  important  bridge  which  was  several  times  made 
the  objective  point  of  an  expedition.  This  alone  proved 
the  impracticability  of  the  plan  McClellan  first  conceived, 


GAULEY  BRIDGE  &  VICINITY., 


of  making  the  Kanawha  valley  the  line  of  an  important 
movement  into  eastern  Virginia.  It  pointed  very  plainly, 
also,  to  the  true  theory  of  operations  in  that  country. 
Gauley  Bridge  should  have  been  held  with  a  good  brigade 
which  could  have  had  outposts  several  miles  forward  in 
three  directions,  and,  assisted  by  a  small  body  of  horse 
to  scour  the  country  fifty  miles  or  more  to  the  front,  the 
garrison  could  have  protected  all  the  country  which  we 
ever  occupied  permanently.  A  similar  post  at  Huttons- 
ville  with  detachments  at  the  Cheat  Mountain  pass  and 


GA  ULE  Y  BRIDGE  8  3 


Elkwater  pass  north  of  Huntersville  would  have  covered 
the  only  other  practicable  routes  through  the  mountains 
south  of  the  line  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railway. 
These  would  have  been  small  intrenched  camps,  defen 
sive  in  character,  but  keeping  detachments  constantly 
active  in  patrolling  the  front,  going  as  far  as  could  be 
done  without  wagons.  All  that  ever  was  accomplished 
in  that  region  of  any  value  would  thus  have  been  attained 
at  the  smallest  expense,  and  the  resources  that  were  for 
three  years  wasted  in  those  mountains  might  have  been 
applied  to  the  legitimate  lines  of  great  operations  from 
the  valley  of  the  Potomac  southward. 

Nothing  could  be  more  romantically  beautiful  than  the 
situation  of  the  post  at  Gauley  Bridge.  The  hamlet  had, 
before  our  arrival  there,  consisted  of  a  cluster  of  two  or 
three  dwellings,  a  country  store,  a  little  tavern,  and  a 
church,  irregularly  scattered  along  the  base  of  the  moun 
tain  and  facing  the  road  which  turns  from  the  Gauley 
valley  into  that  of  the  Kanawha.  The  lower  slope  of  the 
hillside  behind  the  houses  was  cultivated,  and  a  hedge 
row  separated  the  lower  fields  from  the  upper  pasturage. 
Above  this  gentler  slope  the  wooded  steeps  rose  more 
precipitately,  the  sandstone  rock  jutting  out  into  crags 
and  walls,  the  sharp  ridge  above  having  scarcely  soil 
enough  to  nourish  the  chestnut-trees,  here,  like  Mrs. 
Browning's  woods  of  Vallombrosa,  literally  "  clinging  by 
their  spurs  to  the  precipices."  In  the  angle  between 
the  Gauley  and  New  rivers  rose  Gauley  Mount,  the  base 
a  perpendicular  wall  of  rocks  of  varying  height,  with 
high  wooded  slopes  above.  There  was  barely  room  for 
the  road  between  the  wall  of  rocks  and  the  water  on  the 
New  River  side,  but  after  going  some  distance  up 
the  valley,  the  highway  gradually  ascended  the  hillside, 
reaching  some  rolling  uplands  at  a  distance  of  a  couple 
of  miles.  Here  was  Gauley  Mount,  the  country-house 
of  Colonel  C.  Q.  Tompkins,  formerly  of  the  Army  of 


84  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  United  States,  but  now  the  commandant  of  a  Con 
federate  regiment  raised  in  the  Kanavvha  valley.  Across 
New  River  the  heavy  masses  of  Cotton  Mountain  rose 
rough  and  almost  inaccessible  from  the  very  water's  edge. 
The  western  side  of  Cotton  Mountain  was  less  steep,  and 
buttresses  formed  a  bench  about  its  base,  so  that  in  look 
ing  across  the  Kanawha  a  mile  below  the  junction  of  the 
rivers,  one  saw  some  rounded  foothills  which  had  been 
cleared  on  the  top  and  tilled,  and  a  gap  in  the  mountain 
ous  wall  made  room  on  that  side  for  a  small  creek  which 
descended  to  the  Kanawha,  and  whose  bed  served  for 
a  rude  country  road  leading  to  Fayette  C.  H.  At  the 
base  of  Cotton  Mountain  the  Kanawha  equals  the  united 
width  of  the  two  tributaries,  and  flows  foaming  over 
broken  rocks  with  treacherous  channels  between,  till  it 
dashes  over  the  horseshoe  ledge  below,  known  far  and 
wide  as  the  Kanawha  Falls.  On  either  bank  near  the 
falls  a  small  mill  had  been  built,  that  on  the  right  bank 
a  saw-mill  and  the  one  on  the  left  for  grinding  grain. 

Our  encampment  necessarily  included  the  saw-mill 
below  the  falls,  where  the  First  Kentucky  Regiment  was 
placed  to  guard  the  road  coming  from  Fayette  C.  H. 
Two  regiments  were  encamped  at  the  bridge  upon  the 
hillside  above  the  hedgerow,  having  an  advanced  post 
of  half  a  regiment  on  the  Lewisburg  road  beyond  the 
Tompkins  farm,  and  scouting  the  country  to  Sewell 
Mountain.  Smaller  outposts  were  stationed  some  distance 
up  the  valley  of  the  Gauley.  My  headquarters  tents 
were  pitched  in  the  door-yard  of  a  dwelling-house  facing 
the  Gauley  River,  and  I  occupied  an  unfurnished  room 
in  the  house  for  office  purposes.  A  week  was  spent, 
without  molestation,  exploring  the  country  in  all  direc 
tions  and  studying  its  topography.  A  ferry  guided  by  a 
cable  stretching  along  the  piers  of  the  burnt  bridge  com 
municated  with  the  outposts  up  the  New  River,  and  a 
smaller  ferry  below  the  Kanawha  Falls  connected  with  the 


GAULEY  BRIDGE  8$ 


Fayette  road.  Systematic  discipline  and  instruction  in 
outpost  duty  were  enforced,  and  the  regiments  rapidly 
became  expert  mountaineers  and  scouts.  The  popula 
tion  was  nearly  all  loyal  below  Gauley  Bridge,  but  above 
they  were  mostly  Secessionists,  a  small  minority  of  the 
wealthier  slaveholders  being  the  nucleus  of  all  aggressive 
secession  movements.  These,  by  their  wealth  and  social 
leadership,  overawed  or  controlled  a  great  many  who 
did  not  at  heart  sympathize  with  them,  and  between 
parties  thus  formed  a  guerilla  warfare  became  chronic. 
In  our  scouting  expeditions  we  found  little  farms  in 
secluded  nooks  among  the  mountains,  where  grown  men 
assured  us  that  they  had  never  before  seen  the  American 
flag,  and  whole  families  had  never  been  further  from 
home  than  a  church  and  country  store  a  few  miles  away. 
From  these  mountain  people  several  regiments  of  Union 
troops  were  recruited  in  West  Virginia,  two  of  them 
being  organized  in  rear  of  my  own  lines,  and  becoming 
part  of  the  garrison  of  the  district  in  the  following  season. 
I  had  been  joined  before  reaching  Gauley  Bridge  by 
Chaplain  Brown  of  the  Seventh  Ohio,  who  had  obtained 
permission  to  make  an  adventurous  journey  across  the 
country  from  Sutton  to  bring  me  information  as  to  the 
position  and  character  of  the  outposts  that  were  stretch 
ing  from  the  railway  southward  toward  our  line  of 
operations.  Disguised  as  a  mountaineer  in  homespun 
clothing,  his  fine  features  shaded  by  a  slouched  felt  hat, 
he  reported  himself  to  me  in  anything  but  a  clerical  garb. 
Full  of  enterprise  as  a  partisan  leader  of  scouts  could  be, 
he  was  yet  a  man  of  high  attainments  in  his  profession,  of 
noble  character  and  real  learning.  When  he  reached  me, 
I  had  as  my  guest  another  chaplain  who  had  accepted  a 
commission  at  my  suggestion,  the  Rev.  Mr.  Dubois,  son- 
in-law  of  Bishop  Mcllvaine  of  Ohio,  who  had  been  leader 
of  the  good  people  at  Chillicothe  in  providing  a  supper 
for  the  Eleventh  Ohio  as  we  were  on  our  way  from  Camp 


86  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Dennison  to  Gallipolis.  He  had  burned  to  have  some 
part  in  the  country's  struggle,  and  became  a  model  chap 
lain  till  his  labors  and  exposure  broke  his  health  and 
forced  him  to  resign.  The  presence  of  two  such  men 
gave  some  hours  of  refined  social  life  in  the  intervals  of 
rough  work.  One  evening  walk  along  the  Kanawha  has 
ever  since  remained  in  my  memory  associated  with  Whit- 
tier's  poem  "  The  River  Path,"  as  a  wilder  and  more  bril 
liant  type  of  the  scene  he  pictured.  We  had  walked  out 
beyond  the  camp,  leaving  its  noise  and  its  warlike  associa 
tions  behind  us,  for  a  turn  of  the  road  around  a  jutting 
cliff  shut  it  all  out  as  completely  as  if  we  had  been  trans 
ported  to  another  land,  except  that  the  distant  figure  of  a 
sentinel  on  post  reminded  us  of  the  limit  of  safe  sauntering 
for  pleasure.  My  Presbyterian  and  Episcopalian  friends 
forgot  their  differences  of  dogma,  and  as  the  sun  dropped 
behind  the  mountain  tops,  making  an  early  twilight  in  the 
valley,  we  talked  of  home,  of  patriotism,  of  the  relation  of 
our  struggle  to  the  world's  progress,  and  other  high  themes, 

when 

"  Sudden  our  pathway  turned  from  night, 
The  hills  swung  open  to  the  light; 
Through  their  green  gates  the  sunshine  showed, 
A  long,  slant  splendor  downward  flowed. 
Down  glade  and  glen  and  bank  it  rolled ; 
It  bridged  the  shaded  stream  with  gold; 
And  borne  on  piers  of  mist,  allied 
The  shadowy  with  the  sunlit  side  !  " 

The  surroundings,  the  things  of  which  we  talked,  our  own 
sentiments,  all  combined  to  make  the  scene  stir  deep  emo 
tions  for  which  the  poet's  succeeding  lines  seem  the  only 
fit  expression,  and  to  link  the  poem  indissolubly  with  the 
scene  as  if  it  had  its  birth  there. 

When  Wise  had  retreated  from  the  valley,  Colonel 
Tompkins  had  been  unable  to  remove  his  family,  and  had 
left  a  letter  commending  them  to  our  courteous  treatment. 
Mrs.  Tompkins  was  a  lady  of  refinement,  and  her  position 


GAULEY  BRIDGE  8  7 

within  our  outposts  was  far  from  being  a  comfortable  one. 
She,  however,  put  a  cheerful  face  upon  her  situation, 
showed  great  tact  in  avoiding  controversy  with  the  soldiers 
and  in  conciliating  the  good-will  of  the  officers,  and  re 
mained  with  her  children  and  servants  in  her  picturesque 
home  on  the  mountain.  So  long  as  there  was  no  fighting 
in  the  near  vicinity,  it  was  comparatively  easy  to  save  her 
from  annoyance ;  but  when  a  little  later  in  the  autumn 
Floyd  occupied  Cotton  Mountain,  and  General  Rosecrans 
was  with  us  with  larger  forces,  such  a  household  became 
an  object  of  suspicion  and  ill-will,  which  made  it  necessary 
to  send  her  through  the  lines  to  her  husband.  The  men 
fancied  they  saw  signals  conveyed  from  the  house  to  the 
enemy,  and  believed  that  secret  messages  were  sent,  giving 
information  of  our  numbers  and  movements.  All  this  was 
highly  improbable,  for  the  lady  knew  that  her  safety  de 
pended  upon  her  good  faith  and  prudence  ;  but  such  camp 
rumor  becomes  a  power,  and  Rosecrans  found  himself 
compelled  to  end  it  by  sending  her  away.  He  could  no 
longer  be  answerable  for  her  complete  protection.  This, 
however,  was  not  till  November,  and  in  August  it  was  only 
a  pleasant  variation,  in  going  the  rounds,  to  call  at  the 
pretty  house  on  Gauley  Mount,  inquire  after  the  welfare 
of  the  family,  and  have  a  moment's  polite  chat  with  the 
mistress  of  the  mansion. 

For  ten  days  after  we  occupied  Gauley  Bridge,  all  our 
information  showed  that  General  Wise  was  not  likely  to 
attempt  the  reconquest  of  the  Kanawha  valley  voluntarily. 
His  rapid  retrograde  march  ended  at  White  Sulphur  Springs 
and  he  went  into  camp  there.  His  destruction  of  bridges 
and  abandonment  of  stores  and  munitions  of  war  showed 
that  he  intended  to  take  final  leave  of  our  region.1  The 
contrast  between  promise  and  performance  in  his  case  had 
been  ludicrous.  When  we  entered  the  valley,  we  heard  of 

1  My  report  to  Rosecrans,  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  40.  Wise  to  Lee,  Id., 
vol.  ii.  p.  1012 ;  vol.  v.  p.  769. 


88  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

his  proclamations  and  orders,  which  breathed  the  spirit  of 
desperate  hand-to-hand  conflict.  His  soldiers  had  been 
told  to  despise  long-range  fire-arms,  and  to  trust  to  bowie- 
knives,  which  our  invading  hordes  would  never  dare  to  face. 
We  found  some  of  these  knives  among  the  arms  we  cap 
tured  at  the  Gauley,  —  ferocious-looking  weapons,  made 
of  broad  files  ground  to  a  double  edge,  fitted  with  rough 
handles,  and  still  bearing  the  cross-marking  of  the  file  on 
the  flat  sides.  Such  arms  pointed  many  a  sarcasm  among 
our  soldiers,  who  had  found  it  hard  in  the  latter  part  of 
our  advance  to  get  within  even  the  longest  musket-range 
of  the  enemy's  column.  It  was  not  strange  that  ignorant 
men  should  think  they  might  find  use  for  weapons  less 
serviceable  than  the  ancient  Roman  short-sword ;  but  that, 
in  the  existing  condition  of  military  science,  officers  could 
be  found  to  share  and  to  encourage  the  delusion  was 
amusing  enough !  With  the  muskets  we  captured,  we 
armed  a  regiment  of  loyal  Virginians,  and  turned  over  the 
rest  to  Governor  Peirpoint  for  similar  use.1 

On  the  5th  of  August  Lieutenant  Wagner  of  the  En 
gineers  arrived  at  Gauley  Bridge  with  instructions  from 
General  Rosecrans  to  superintend  the  construction  of  such 
fortifications  as  might  be  proper  for  a  post  of  three  regi 
ments.  I  had  already  with  me  Colonel  Whittlesey, 

1  In  some  documents  which  fell  into  our  hands  we  found  a  series  of  reso 
lutions  passed  at  a  meeting  in  the  spring  at  which  one  of  the  companies  now 
with  Wise  was  organized.  It  shows  the  melodramatic  truculence  which  was 
echoed  in  the  exhortations  of  the  general  and  of  other  men  who  should  have 
had  more  judgment.  The  resolutions  were  these  :  — 

"Resolved:  I.  That  this  company  was  formed  for  the  defence  of  this 
Commonwealth  against  her  enemies  of  the  North,  and  for  no  other  purpose. 

Resolved:  2.  That  the  so-called  President  of  the  United  States  by  his 
war  policy  has  deliberately  insulted  the  people  of  this  Commonwealth,  and 
if  blood  he  wants,  blood  he  can  have. 

Resolved:  3.  That  we  are  ready  to  respond  to  the  call  of  the  Governor 
of  this  Commonwealth  for  resisting  Abraham  Lincoln  and  the  New  York 
stock-jobbers,  and  all  who  sympathize  with  them. 

Resolved:  4.  That  we  have  not  forgotten  Harper's  Ferry  and  John 
Brown." 


GAULEY  BRIDGE  89 


Governor  Dennison's  chief  engineer,  an  old  West  Point 
graduate,  who  had  for  some  years  been  devoting  himself 
to  scientific  pursuits,  especially  to  geology.  In  a  few 
days  these  were  joined  by  Captain  Benham,  who  was 
authorized  to  determine  definitely  the  plans  of  our  de 
fences.  I  was  thus  stronger  in  engineering  skill  than  in 
any  other  department  of  staff  assistants,  though  in  truth 
there  was  little  fortifying  to  be  done  beyond  what  the 
contour  of  the  ground  indicated  to  the  most  ordinary 
comprehension.1 

Benham  stayed  but  two  or  three  days,  modified  Wag 
ner's  plans  enough  to  feel  that  he  had  made  them  his  own, 
and  then  went  back  to  Rosecrans's  headquarters,  where  he 
was  met  with  an  appointment  as  brigadier-general,  and  was 
relieved  of  staff  duty.  He  was  a  stout  red-faced  man,  with 
a  blustering  air,  dictatorial  and  assuming,  an  army  engineer 
of  twenty-five  years'  standing.  He  was  no  doubt  well  skilled 
in  the  routine  of  his  profession,  but  broke  down  when  bur 
dened  with  the  responsibility  of  conducting  the  movement 
of  troops  in  the  field.  Wagner  was  a  recent  graduate  of 
the  Military  Academy,  a  genial,  modest,  intelligent  young 
man  of  great  promise.  He  fell  at  the  siege  of  Yorktown 
in  the  next  year.  Whittlesey  was  a  veteran  whose  varied 
experience  in  and  out  of  the  army  had  all  been  turned  to 
good  account.  He  was  already  growing  old,  but  was  inde 
fatigable,  pushing  about  in  a  rather  prim,  precise  way, 
advising  wisely,  criticising  dryly  but  in  a  kindly  spirit,  and 
helping  bring  every  department  into  better  form.  I  soon 
lost  both  him  and  McElroy,  my  adjutant-general,  for  their 
three  months'  service  was  up,  and  they  were  made,  the  one 
colonel,  and  the  other  major  of  the  Twentieth  Ohio  Regi- 

i  The  cause  of  this  visit  of  the  Engineers  is  found  in  a  dispatch  sent  by 
McClellan  to  Rosecrans,  warning  him  that  Lee  and  Johnston  were  both  actu 
ally  in  march  to  crush  our  forces  in  West  Virginia,  and  directing  that  Hut- 
tonsville  and  Gauley  Bridge  be  strongly  fortified.  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  555  ;  Id., 
vol.  li.  pt.  i.  pp.  445,  446. 


90  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ment,  of  which  my  friend  General  Force  was  the  lieutenant- 
colonel. 

We  fortified  the  post  by  an  epaulement  or  two  for  can 
non,  high  up  on  the  hillside  covering  the  ferry  and  the 
road  up  New  River.  An  infantry  trench,  with  parapet 
of  barrels  filled  with  earth,  was  run  along  the  margin  of 
Gauley  River  till  it  reached  a  creek  coming  down  from  the 
hills  on  the  left.  There  a  redoubt  for  a  gun  or  two  was 
made,  commanding  a  stretch  of  road  above,  and  the  infantry 
trench  followed  the  line  of  the  creek  up  to  a  gorge  in  the 
hill.  On  the  side  of  Gauley  Mount  facing  our  post,  we 
slashed  the  timber  from  the  edge  of  the  precipice  nearly  to 
the  top  of  the  mountain,  making  an  entanglement  through 
which  it  was  impossible  that  any  body  of  troops  should 
move.  Down  the  Kanawha,  below  the  falls,  we  strength 
ened  the  saw-mill  with  logs,  till  it  became  a  block-house 
loopholed  for  musketry,  commanding  the  road  to  Charles 
ton,  the  ferry,  and  the  opening  of  the  road  to  Fayette 
C.  H.  A  single  cannon  was  here  put  in  position  also. 

All  this  took  time,  for  so  small  a  force  as  ours  could  not 
make  very  heavy  details  of  working  parties,  especially  as 
our  outpost  and  reconnoitring  duty  was  also  very  labo 
rious.  This  duty  was  done  by  infantry,  for  cavalry  I  had 
none,  except  the  squad  of  mounted  messengers,  who  kept 
carefully  out  of  harm's  way,  more  to  save  their  horses 
than  themselves,  for  they  had  been  enlisted  under  an  old  law 
which  paid  them  for  the  risk  of  their  own  horses,  which  risk 
they  naturally  tried  to  make  as  small  as  possible.  My  recon 
noitring  parties  reached  Big  Sewell  Mountain,  thirty-five 
miles  up  New  River,  Summersville,  twenty  miles  up  the  Gau 
ley,  and  made  excursions  into  the  counties  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Kanawha,  thirty  or  forty  miles  away.  These  were  not 
exceptional  marches,  but  were  kept  up  with  an  industry 
that  gave  the  enemy  an  exaggerated  idea  of  our  strength 
j&s  well  as  of  our  activity. 

About   the   loth  of  August  we  began   to  get   rumors 


GAULEY  BRIDGE 


from  the  country  that  General  Robert  E.  Lee  had  arrived 
at  Lewisburg  to  assume  direction  of  the  Confederate  move 
ments  into  West  Virginia.  We  heard  also  that  Floyd  with 
a  strong  brigade  had  joined  that  of  Wise,  whose  "  legion  " 
had  been  reinforced,  and  that  this  division,  reported  to 
be  10,000  or  12,000  strong,  would  immediately  operate 
against  me  at  Gauley  Bridge.  We  learned  also  of  a  general 
•stir  among  the  Secessionists  in  Fayette,  Mercer,  and  Ra 
leigh  counties,  and  of  the  militia  being  ordered  out  under 
General  Chapman  to  support  the  Confederate  movement 
by  operating  upon  my  line  of  communications,  whilst 
Floyd  and  Wise  should  attack  in  front. 

The  reported  aggregate  of  the  enemy's  troops  was,  as 
usual,  exaggerated,  but  we  now  know  that  it  amounted 
to  about  8000  men,  a  force  so  greatly  superior  to  any 
thing  I  could  assemble  to  oppose  it,  that  the  situation 
became  at  once  a  very  grave  one  for  me.1  To  resist  this 
advance,  I  could  keep  but  two  regiments  at  Gauley  Bridge, 
an  advance-guard  of  eight  companies  vigorously  skirmish 
ing  toward  Sewell  Mountain,  a  regiment  distributed  on  the 
Kanawha  to  cover  steamboat  communications,  and  some 
(Companies  of  West  Virginia  recruits  organizing  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Kanawha.  By  extreme  activity  these  were  able  to 
'baffle  the  enemy,  and  impose  upon  him  the  belief  that  our 
•numbers  were  more  than  double  our  actual  force. 

Small  hostile  parties  began  to  creep  in  toward  the  navi 
gable  part  of  the  Kanawha,  and  to  fire  upon  the  steam 
boats,  which  were  our  sole  dependence  for  supplying  our 
depots  at  Charleston  and  at  the  head  of  navigation.  Gen 
eral  Rosecrans  informed  me  of  his  purpose  to  march  a 

1  On  the  1 4th  of  August  Wise  reported  to  General  Lee  that  he  had  2000 
men  ready  to  move,  and  could  have  2500  ready  in  five  days  ;  that  550  of 
his  cavalry  were  with  Floyd,  besides  a  detachment  of  50  artillerists.  This 
makes  his  total  force  3100.  At  that  time  he  gives  Floyd's  force  at  1200  with 
two  strong  regiments  coming  up,  besides  2000  militia  under  General  Chapman. 
'The  aggregate  force  operating  on  the  Kanawha  line  he  gives  as  7800.  (O.  R. 
>voL  v.  p.  787.) 


92  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

sufficiently  strong  column  to  meet  that  under  Lee  as  soon 
as  the  purpose  of  the  latter  should  be  developed,  and  en 
couraged  me  to  hold  fast  to  my  position.  I  resolved, 
therefore,  to  stand  a  siege  if  need  be,  and  pushed  my 
means  of  transportation  to  the  utmost,  to  accumulate  a 
store  of  supplies  at  Gauley  Bridge.  I  succeeded  in  getting 
up  rations  sufficient  to  last  a  fortnight,  but  found  it  much 
harder  to  get  ammunition,  especially  for  my  ill-assorted 
little  battery  of  cannon. 

The  Twenty-sixth  Ohio  came  into  the  Kanawha  valley  on 
the  8th  through  a  mistake  in  their  orders,  and  their  arrival 
supplied  for  a  few  days  the  loss  of  the  Twenty-first,  which  had 
gone  home  to  be  mustered  out  and  reorganized.  Some 
companies  of  the  newly  forming  Fourth  Virginia  were  those 
who  protected  the  village  of  Point  Pleasant  at  the  mouth 
of  the  river,  and  part  of  the  Twelfth  and  Twenty-sixth  Ohio 
were  in  detachments  from  Charleston  toward  Gauley  Bridge, 
furnishing  guards  for  the  steamboats  and  assisting  in  the 
landing  and  forwarding  of  supplies.  The  Eleventh  Ohio, 
under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Frizell,  which  still  had  only 
eight  companies,  had  the  task  of  covering  and  reconnoi 
tring  our  immediate  front,  and  was  the  advance-guard 
already  mentioned.  Part  of  the  Twelfth  under  Major 
Hines  did  similar  work  on  the  road  to  Summersville,  where 
Rosecrans  had  an  advanced  post,  consisting  of  the  Seventh 
Ohio  (Colonel  E.  B.  Tyler),  the  Thirteenth  (Colonel  Wm. 
Sooy  Smith),  and  the  Twenty-third  (Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stanley  Matthews).  On  the  I3th  of  August  the  Seventh 
Ohio,  by  orders  from  Rosecrans,  marched  to  Cross  Lanes, 
the  intersection  of  the  read  from  Summersville  to  Gauley 
Bridge,  with  one  from  Carnifex  Ferry,  which  is  on  the 
Gauley  near  the  mouth  of  Meadow  River.  A  road  called 
the  Sunday  Road  is  in  the  Meadow  River  valley,  and  joins 
the  Lewisburg  turnpike  about  fifteen  miles  in  front  of  Gau 
ley  Bridge.1  To  give  warning  against  any  movement  of 
1  See  Official  Atlas,  Plate  IX.  3,  and  map,  p.  106,  post 


GAULEY  BRIDGE  '93 

the  enemy  to  turn  my  position  by  this  route  or  to  inter 
vene  between  me  and  Rosecrans's  posts  at  Summersville 
and  beyond,  was  Tyler's  task.  He  was  ordered  to  picket 
all  crossings  of  the  river  near  his  position,  and  to  join  my 
command  if  he  were  driven  away.  I  was  authorized  to 
call  him  to  me  in  an  emergency. 

On  the  1 5th  Tyler  was  joined  at  Cross  Lanes  by  the 
Thirteenth  and  Twenty-third  Ohio,  in  consequence  of 
rumors  that  the  enemy  was  advancing  upon  Summersville 
in  force  from  Lewisburg.  I  would  have  been  glad  of  such 
an  addition  to  my  forces,  but  knowing  that  Rosecrans  had 
stationed  them  as  his  own  outpost  covering  the  Sutton  and 
Weston  road,  I  ordered  Tyler  to  maintain  his  own  posi 
tion,  and  urged  the  others  to  return  at  once  to  Summers 
ville.1  The  road  by  which  they  had  expected  the  enemy 
was  the  Wilderness  road,  which  crossed  the  Gauley  at 
Hughes'  Ferry,  six  miles  above  Carnifex.  If  attacked 
from  that  direction,  they  should  retire  northward  toward 
Rosecrans,  if  possible. 

Rosecrans  gave  orders  to  the  same  effect  as  soon  as 
he  heard  of  the  movement,  saying  that  his  intention  had 
been  to  station  Smith  and  Matthews  at  Sutton,  where 
their  retreat  toward  him  in  case  of  necessity  would  be 
assured.2  His  orders  for  Tyler  were  that  he  should  scout 
far  toward  the  enemy,  "  striking  him  wherever  he  can," 
and  "  hold  his  position  at  the  ferries  as  long  as  he  can 
safely  do  it,  and  then  fall  back,  as  directed,"  toward  Gauley 
Bridge.3  The  incident  throws  important  light  upon  the 
situation  a  week  later,  when  Tyler  was  attacked  by  Floyd. 

Floyd  and  Wise  were  now  really  in  motion,  though 
General  Lee  remained  at  Valley  Mountain  near  Hunters- 
ville,  whence  he  directed  their  movements.  On  the  i/th 
they  had  passed  Sewell  Mountain,  but  made  slow  prog 
ress  in  the  face  of  the  opposition  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio, 

i  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  pp.  449,  453,  454.  2  Dispatch  of  August  16. 

8  Dispatch  of  August  17. 


94  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

which  kept  up  a  constant  skirmish  with  them.1  On  the 
iQth  Floyd's  advance-guard  passed  the  mouth  of  the 
Sunday  Road  on  the  turnpike,  and  on  the  2Oth  made  so 
determined  a  push  at  my  advance-guard  that  I  believed 
it  a  serious  effort  of  the  whole  Confederate  column.  I 
strengthened  my  own  advance-guard  by  part  of  the 
Twelfth  Ohio,  which  was  at  hand,  and  placed  them  at 
Pig  Creek,  a  mile  beyond  the  Tompkins  place,  where  the 
turnpike  crossed  a  gorge  making  a  strongly  defensible 
position.  The  advance-guard  was  able  to  withstand  the 
enemy  alone,  and  drove  back  those  who  assaulted  them 
with  considerable  loss.  It  has  since  appeared  that  this 
movement  of  the  enemy  was  by  Wise's  command  making 
a  direct  attack  upon  my  position,  whilst  Floyd  was  moving 
by  the  diagonal  road  to  Dogwood  Gap  on  the  Sunday 
Road  where  it  crosses  the  old  State  Road.  There  he 
encamped  for  the  night,  and  next  day  continued  his 
march  to  the  mouth  of  Meadow  River  near  Carnifex 
Ferry.2  It  was  an  affair  of  advance-guards  in  which  Wise 
was  satisfied  as  soon  as  he  found  serious  resistance,  and 
he  retired  during  the  night.  On  the  first  evidence  of  the 
enemy's  presence  in  force,  I  called  Tyler  from  Cross 
Lanes  to  Twenty-mile  Creek,  about  six  miles  from  Gauley 
Bridge,  where  it  was  important  to  guard  a  road  passing 
to  my  rear,  and  to  meet  any  attempt  to  turn  my  flank 
if  the  attack  should  be  determinedly  made  by  the  whole 
force  of  the  enemy.3  As  soon  as  the  attack  was  repulsed, 
Tyler  was  ordered  to  return  to  Cross  Lanes  and  resume 
his  watch  of  the  roads  and  river  crossings  there.4  He  was 
delayed  by  the  issue  of  shoes  and  clothing  to  his  men, 
and  when  he  approached  his  former  position  on  the  24th, 
he  found  that  Floyd  was  reported  to  have  crossed  the 
Gauley  at  Carnifex  Ferry.  Without  waiting  to  recon- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  pp.  792,  799 ;  Id.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  pp.  450-453. 

2  Id.,  vol.  v.  p.  800.  8  Dispatch  of  August  20. 
4  Id.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  454. 


GA  ULE  Y  BRIDGE  9$ 

noitre  the  enemy  at  all,  Tyler  retreated  to  Peters  Creek, 
several  miles.  Floyd  had  in  fact  succeeded  in  raising  two 
small  flatboats  which  Tyler  had  sunk  but  had  not  entirely 
destroyed.  With  these  for  a  ferry,  he  had  crossed  and 
was  intrenching  himself  where  he  was  afterward  attacked 
by  Rosecrans. 

In  the  hope  that  only  a  small  force  had  made  the  cross 
ing,  I  ordered  Tyler  to  "  make  a  dash  at  them,  taking  care 
to  keep  your  force  well  in  hand  so  as  to  keep  your  retreat 
safe."  1  I  added :  "  It  is  important  to  give  them  such 
a  check  as  to  stop  their  crossing."  Meanwhile  my 
advance-guard  up  New  River  was  ordered  to  demonstrate 
actively  in  front  and  upon  the  Sunday  Road,  so  as  to 
disquiet  any  force  which  had  gone  towards  Tyler,  and 
I  also  sent  forward  half  a  regiment  to  Peters  Creek  (six 
miles  from  Cross  Lanes)  to  hold  the  pass  there  and  secure 
his  retreat  in  case  of  need.2 

But  Tyler  was  new  to  responsibility,  and  seemed  para 
lyzed  into  complete  inefficiency.  He  took  nearly  the 
whole  of  the  25th  to  move  slowly  to  Cross  Lanes,  though 
he  met  no  opposition.  He  did  nothing  that  evening  or 
night,  and  his  disposal  of  his  troops  was  so  improper 
and  outpost  duty  so  completely  neglected  that  on  the 
morning  of  the  26th,  whilst  his  regiment  was  at  breakfast, 
it  was  attacked  by  Floyd  on  both  flanks  at  once,  and 
was  routed  before  it  could  be  formed  for  action.  Some 
companies  managed  to  make  a  show  of  fighting,  but  it 
was  wholly  in  vain,  and  they  broke  in  confusion.3  About 
15  were  killed  and  50  wounded,  the  latter  with  some 
30  others  falling  into  the  enemy's  hands.  Tyler,  with 
his  lieutenant-colonel,  Creighton,  came  into  Gauley  Bridge 
with  a  few  stragglers  from  the  regiment.  Others  followed 
until  about  200  were  present.  His  train  had  reached 
the  detachment  I  had  sent  to  Peters  Creek,  and  this 

1  Dispatch  of  August  24.  2  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  457. 

»  Id.,  pp.  458,  459,  461. 


96  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

covered  its  retreat  to  camp,  so  that  all  his  wagons  came 
in  safely.  He  reported  all  his  command  cut  to  pieces 
and  captured  except  the  few  that  were  with  him,  and 
wrote  an  official  report  of  the  engagement,  giving  that 
result. 

On  the  28th,  however,  we  heard  that  Major  Case 
ment  had  carried  400  of  the  regiment  safely  into  Charles 
ton.  He  had  rallied  them  on  the  hills  immediately  after 
the  rout,  and  finding  the  direct  road  to  Gauley  Bridge 
intercepted,  had  led  them  by  mountain  paths  over 
the  ridges  to  the  valley  of  Elk  River,  and  had  then 
followed  that  stream  down  to  Charleston  without  being 
pursued.1  This  put  a  new  face  on  the  business,  and  Tyler 
in  much  confusion  asked  the  return  of  his  report  that 
he  might  re-write  it.  I  looked  upon  his  situation  as 
the  not  unnatural  result  of  inexperience,  and  contented 
myself  with  informing  General  Rosecrans  of  the  truth  as 
to  the  affair.  Tyler  was  allowed  to  substitute  a  new 
report,  and  his  unfortunate  affair  was  treated  as  a  lesson 
from  which  it  was  expected  he  would  profit.2  It  made 
trouble  in  the  regiment,  however,  where  the  line  officers 
did  not  conceal  their  opinion  that  he  had  failed  in  his 
duty  as  a  commander,  and  he  was  never  afterward  quite 
comfortable  among  them. 

The  lieutenant-colonel,  Creighton,  was  for  a  time  in 
the  abyss  of  self-reproach.  The  very  day  they  reached 
Gauley  Bridge  in  their  unceremonious  retreat,  he  came 
to  me,  crying  with  shame,  and  said,  "  General,  I  have 
behaved  like  a  miserable  coward,  I  ought  to  be  cashiered," 
and  repeated  many  such  expressions  of  remorse.  I  com 
forted  him  by  saying  that  the  intensity  of  his  own  feeling 
was  the  best  proof  that  he  had  only  yielded  to  a  surprise 
and  that  it  was  clear  he  was  no  coward.  He  died  after 
ward  at  the  head  of  his  regiment  in  the  desperate  charge 
up  the  hills  at  Ringgold,  Georgia,  in  the  campaign  follow- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  462.  2  Rosecrans's  dispatch,  Id.,  p.  460. 


GAULEY  BRIDGE  97 


ing  that  of  Chickamauga  in  the  autumn  of  1863,  having 
had  the  command  for  two  years  after  Tyler  became  a 
brigadier.  During  those  two  years  the  Seventh  had  been 
in  numberless  engagements,  and  its  list  of  casualties  in 
battle,  made  good  by  recruiting,  was  said  to  have  reached 
a  thousand.  Better  soldiers  there  were  none,  and  Creigh- 
ton  proved  himself  a  lion  in  every  fight. 

Casement,  who  rallied  and  led  the  most  of  the  regiment 
from  Cross  Lanes  over  the  mountains  to  Charleston, 
became  afterward  colonel  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Third 
Ohio.  He  came  again  under  my  command  in  East  Ten 
nessee  in  the  winter  of  1863,  and  continued  one  of  my 
brigade  commanders  to  the  close  of  the  war.  He  was 
a  railway  builder  by  profession,  had  a  natural  aptitude 
for  controlling  bodies  of  men,  was  rough  of  speech  but 
generous  of  heart,  running  over  with  fun  which  no  doleful- 
ness  of  circumstance  could  repress,  as  jolly  a  comrade 
and  as  loyal  a  subordinate  as  the  army  could  show. 

After  the  Cross  Lanes  affair  I  fully  expected  that  the 
Confederate  forces  would  follow  the  route  which  Case 
ment  had  taken  to  Charleston.  Floyd's  inactivity  puzzled 
me,  for  he  did  no  more  than  make  an  intrenched  camp 
at  Carnifex  Ferry,  with  outposts  at  Peters  Mountain  and 
toward  Summersville.  The  publication  of  the  Confederate 
Archives  has  partly  solved  the  mystery.  Floyd  called 
on  Wise  to  reinforce  him ;  but  the  latter  demurred,  insist 
ing  that  the  duty  assigned  him  of  attacking  my  position 
in  front  needed  all  the  men  he  had.  Both  appealed  to 
Lee,  and  Lee  decided  that  Floyd  was  the  senior  and 
entitled  to  command  the  joint  forces.1  The  letters  of 
Wise  show  a  capacity  for  keeping  a  command  in  hot 
water  which  was  unique.  If  he  had  been  half  as  trouble 
some  to  me  as  he  was  to  Floyd,  I  should  indeed  have 
had  a  hot  time  of  it.  But  he  did  me  royal  service  by 
preventing  anything  approaching  to  co-operation  between 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  pp.  155-165,  800,  802-813. 
VOL.  i.  —  7 


98  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  two  Confederate  columns.  I  kept  my  advance-guards 
constantly  feeling  of  both,  and  got  through  the  period  till 
Rosecrans  joined  me  with  nothing  more  serious  than 
some  sharp  affairs  of  detachments. 

I  was  not  without  anxiety,  however,  and  was  constantly 
kept  on  the  alert.  Rosecrans  withdrew  the  Twelfth  Ohio 
from  my  command,  excepting  two  companies  under 
Major  Hines,  on  the  iQth  of  August,1  and  the  imperative 
need  of  detachments  to  protect  the  river  below  me  was 
such  that  from  this  time  till  the  middle  of  September  my 
garrison  at  Gauley  Bridge,  including  advance-guards  and 
outposts,  was  never  more  than  two  and  a  half  regiments 
or  1800  men.  My  artillerists  were  also  ordered  back  to 
Ohio  to  reorganize,  leaving  the  guns  in  the  hands  of 
such  infantry  details  as  I  could  improvise.2  I  was  lucky 
enough,  however,  to  get  a  very  good  troop  of  horse  under 
command  of  Captain  Pfau  in  place  of  the  irregular  squad 
I  had  before.8 

On  the  2$th  my  advance-guard  under  Lieutenant-Colo 
nel  Frizell  very  cleverly  succeeded  in  drawing  into  an 
ambuscade  a  body  of  Floyd's  cavalry  under  Colonel 
A.  G.  Jenkins.  The  principal  body  of  our  men  lined  a 
defile  near  the  Hawk's  Nest,  and  the  skirmishers,  retreat 
ing  before  the  enemy,  led  them  into  the  trap.  Our  men 
began  firing  before  the  enemy  was  quite  surrounded,  and 
putting  their  horses  upon  the  run,  they  dashed  back, 
running  the  gantlet  of  the  fire.  Wise  reported  that  he 
met  men  with  their  subordinate  officers  flying  at  four  miles' 
distance  from  the  place  of  the  action,  and  so  panic- 
stricken  that  they  could  not  be  rallied  or  led  back.4  Jen 
kins  was  hurt  by  the  fall  of  his  horse,  but  he  succeeded  in 
getting  away;  for,  as  we  had  no  horsemen  to  pursue  with, 
even  the  wounded,  except  one,  could  not  be  overtaken. 

1  My  dispatch  to  Rosecrans  of  August  19 ;  also  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  454. 

2  Id.,  p.  462.  s  Idtt  p.  464. 
4  Id.,  vol.  v.  p.  816;  Id.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  457. 


GA  ULE  Y  BRIDGE  99 


Hats,  clothing,  arms,  and  saddles  were  left  scattered  along 
the  road  in  as  complete  a  breakneck  race  for  life  as  was 
ever  seen.  The  result,  if  not  great  in  the  list  of  casualties, 
which  were  only  reported  at  10  or  15  by  the  enemy, 
was  so  demoralizing  in  its  influence  upon  the  hostile  cav 
alry  that  they  never  again  showed  any  enterprise  in  harass 
ing  our  outposts,  whilst  our  men  gained  proportionally 
in  confidence. 

About  the  3Oth  of  August  we  heard  of  an  encampment 
of  Confederate  militia  at  Boone  C.  H.  which  was  so 
situated,  southwest  of  the  Kanawha  River,  as  to  menace 
our  communications  with  the  Ohio.  I  sent  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Enyart  with  half  of  the  First  Kentucky  Regiment 
to  beat  up  this  encampment,  and  he  did  so  on  the  2d  of 
September,  completely  routing  the  enemy,  who  left  25 
dead  upon  the  field.  Enyart's  march  and  attack  had  been 
rapid  and  vigorous,  and  the  terror  of  the  blow  kept  that 
part  of  the  district  quiet  for  some  time  afterward.1 

We  had  heard  for  some  days  the  news  of  the  assembling 
of  a  considerable  force  of  Confederate  militia  at  Fayette 
C.  H.  under  General  Chapman  and  Colonel  Beckley. 
They  were  reported  at  2500,  which  was  a  fair  estimate 
of  the  numbers  which  answered  to  the  call.  On  the  3d 
of  September  a  pretty  well  combined  attack  was  made 
by  Wise  and  this  force ;  Wise  pushing  in  sharply  upon  the 
turnpike,  whilst  Chapman,  assisted  by  part  of  Wise's  cav 
alry,  drove  back  our  small  outpost  on  the  Fayette  road. 
Wise  was  met  at  Pig  Creek  as  in  his  former  attack,  the 
eight  companies  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio  being  strengthened 
by  half  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Ohio,  which  was  brought 
from  below  for  this  purpose.  The  effort  was  somewhat 
more  persistent  than  before,  and  Wise  indulged  in  consid 
erable  noisy  cannonading;  but  the  pickets  retreated  to 
the  creek  without  loss,  and  the  whole  advance-guard, 
keeping  under  good  cover  there,  repelled  the  attack  with 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  pp.  465,  468,  472. 


100          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

less  than  half  a  dozen  casualties  on  our  side,  none  being 
fatal.  Wise  retreated  again  beyond  Hawk's  Nest.1  The 
irregular  troops  on  the  Fayette  road  were  more  boldly 
led,  and  as  there  was  no  defensible  position  near  the  river 
for  our  outposts,  these  fell  slowly  back  after  a  very  warm 
skirmish,  inflicting  a  loss,  as  reported  by  prisoners,  of 
6  killed  among  the  enemy.  I  expected  Floyd  to  move 
at  the  same  time,  and  was  obliged  to  continue  upon 
the  defensive  by  reason  of  his  threatening  position  up 
the  Gauley  River;  I,  however,  sent  Major  Hines  with  his 
two  companies  in  that  direction,  and  Floyd  appeared 
to  be  impressed  with  the  idea  that  my  whole  force  was 
moving  to  attack  him  and  attempted  nothing  aggressive. 
As  at  this  time  Wise,  in  his  letters  to  General  Lee,  puts 
Floyd's  force  at  5600,  and  his  own  at  22OO,2  I  had  good 
reason,  therefore,  to  feel  satisfied  with  being  able  to  keep 
them  all  at  bay. 

In  the  midst  of  the  alarms  from  every  side,  my  camp 
itself  was  greatly  excited  by  an  incident  which  would  have 
been  occasion  for  regret  at  any  time,  but  which  at  such  a 
juncture  threatened  for  a  moment  quite  serious  conse 
quences.  The  work  of  intrenching  the  position  was  going 
on  under  the  direction  of  Lieutenant  Wagner  as  rapidly 
as  the  small  working  parties  available  could  perform  it. 
All  were  overworked,  but  it  was  the  rule  that  men  should 
not  be  detailed  for  fatigue  duty  who  had  been  on  picket 
the  preceding  night.  On  August  28th,  a  detail  had  been 
called  for  from  the  Second  Kentucky,  which  lay  above  the 
hedge  behind  my  headquarters,  and  they  had  reported 
without  arms  under  a  sergeant  named  Joyce.  A  supply 
of  intrenching  tools  was  stacked  by  the  gate  leading  into 
the  yard  where  my  staff  tents  were  pitched,  and  my  aide, 
Lieutenant  Conine,  directed  the  sergeant  to  have  his 
men  take  the  tools  and  report  to  Mr.  Wagner,  the  en- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  pp.  468,  470.     Wise's  Report,  Id,,  vol.  v.  p.  124. 

2  Id.,  vol.  v.  p.  840. 


GA  ULE  Y  BRIDGE  to  7 


gineer,  on  the  line.  The  men  began  to  demur  in  a  half- 
mutinous  way,  saying  they  had  been  on  picket  the  night 
before.  Conine,  who  was  a  soldierly  man,  informed  them 
that  that  should  be  immediately  looked  into,  and  if  so, 
they  would  be  soon  relieved,  but  that  they  could  not  argue 
the  matter  there,  as  their  company  commander  was  re 
sponsible  for  the  detail.  He  therefore  repeated  his  order. 
The  sergeant  then  became  excited  and  said  his  men  should 
not  obey.  Lieutenant  Gibbs,  the  district  commissary, 
was  standing  by,  and  drawing  his  pistol,  said  to  Joyce, 
"That's  mutiny;  order  your  men  to  take  the  tools  or 
I  '11  shoot  you."  The  man  retorted  with  a  curse, 
"  Shoot !  "  Gibbs  fired,  and  Joyce  fell  dead.  When  the 
sergeant  first  refused  to  obey,  Conine  coolly  called  out, 
"  Corporal  of  the  guard,  turn  out  the  guard  !  "  intending 
very  properly  to  put  the  man  in  arrest,  but  the  shot  fol 
lowed  too  quick  for  the  guard  to  arrive.  I  was  sitting 
within  the  house  at  my  camp  desk,  busy,  when  the  first 
thing  which  attracted  my  attention  was  the  call  for  the  guard 
and  the  shot.  I  ran  out,  not  stopping  for  arms,  and  saw 
some  of  the  men  running  off  shouting,  "  Go  for  your 
guns,  kill  him,  kill  him  !  "  I  stopped  part  of  the  men, 
ordered  them  to  take  the  sergeant  quickly  to  the  hospital, 
thinking  he  might  not  be  dead.  I  then  ordered  Gibbs  in 
arrest  till  an  investigation  should  be  made,  and  ran  at 
speed  to  a  gap  in  the  hedge  which  opened  into  the  regi 
mental  camp.  It  was  not  a  moment  too  soon.  The  men 
with  their  muskets  were  already  clustering  in  the  path, 
threatening  vengeance  on  Mr.  Gibbs.  I  ordered  them 
to  halt  and  return  to  their  quarters.  Carried  away  by 
excitement,  they  levelled  their  muskets  at  me  and  bade 
me  get  out  of  their  way  or  they  would  shoot  me.  I  man 
aged  to  keep  cool,  said  the  affair  would  be  investigated, 
that  Gibbs  was  already  under  arrest,  but  they  must  go 
back  to  their  quarters.  The  parley  lasted  long  enough 
to  bring  some  of  their  officers  near.  I  ordered  them  to 


;»IQ2      J  ^EMIATISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

come  to  my  side,  and  then  to  take  command  of  the  men 
and  march  them  away.  The  real  danger  was  over  as 
soon  as  the  first  impulse  was  checked.1  The  men  then 
began  to  feel  some  of  their  natural  respect  for  their  com 
mander,  and  yielded  probably  the  more  readily  because 
they  noticed  that  I  was  unarmed.  I  thought  it  wise  to 
be  content  with  quelling  the  disturbance,  and  did  not 
seek  out  for  punishment  the  men  who  had  met  me  at  the 
gap.  Their  excitement  had  been  natural  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  which  were  reported  with  exaggeration  as  a 
wilful  murder.  If  I  had  been  in  command  of  a  larger  force, 
it  would  have  been  easy  to  turn  out  another  regiment  to 
enforce  order  and  arrest  any  mutineers ;  but  the  Second 
Kentucky  was  itself  the  only  regiment  on  the  spot.  The 
First  Kentucky  was  a  mile  below,  and  the  Eleventh  Ohio 
was  the  advance-guard  up  New  River.  Surrounded  as 
we  were  by  so  superior  a  force  of  the  enemy  with  which 
we  were  constantly  skirmishing,  I  could  not  do  otherwise 
than  meet  the  difficulty  instantly  without  regard  to  per 
sonal  risk. 

The  sequel  of  the  affair  was  not  reached  till  some  weeks 
later  when  General  Rosecrans  assembled  a  court-martial 
at  my  request.  Lieutenant  Gibbs  was  tried  and  ac 
quitted  on  the  plain  evidence  that  the  man  killed  was  in 
the  act  of  mutiny  at  the  time.  The  court  was  a  notable 
one,  as  its  judge  advocate  was  Major  R.  B.  Hayes  of  the 
Twenty-third  Ohio,  afterwards  President  of  the  United 
States,  and  one  of  its  members  was  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stanley  Matthews  of  the  same  regiment,  afterwards  one  of 
the  Justices  of  the  Supreme  Court.2 

The  constant  skirmishing  with  the  enemy  on  all  sides 

1  Dispatch  to  Rosecrans,  August  29. 

2  Some  twenty  years  later  a  bill  passed  the  House  of  Representatives 
pensioning  the  mother  of  the  man  killed,  under   the  law  giving  pensions 
to  dependent  relatives  of  those  who  died  in  the  line  of   duty!     It  could 
only  have  been  smuggled  through  by  concealment  and  falsification  of  facts, 
and  was  stopped  in  the  Senate. 


GAULEY  BRIDGE  103 


continued    till    the     roth    of    September,    when    General 
Rosecrans  with  his  column  reached  Cross  Lanes  and  had 
the  action  at  Carnifex  Ferry  which  I   shall   describe  in 
the  next  chapter.     I  had   sent   forward  half  a   regiment 
from    my  little   command   to    open    communication   with 
him   as   soon   as    possible.     On    September   Qth    a  party 
from    this    detachment    had    reached    Cross    Lanes    and 
learned  that   Floyd    was  keeping   close   within   his    lines 
on   the   cliffs   of   Gauley   above   Carnifex   Ferry.     They, 
however,  heard  nothing  of  Rosecrans,  and  the  principal 
body  of  their  troops  heard  no  sound  of  the  engagement 
on  the   loth,  though  within  a  very  few  miles.1     On  the 
1 2th  communication  was  opened,  and  I  learned  of  Floyd's 
retreat    across  the    Gauley.     I    immediately    moved    for 
ward  the  Eleventh  and  Twenty-sixth  Ohio  to  attack  Wise, 
who  retreated  from   Hawk's  Nest   to   the  mouth   of  the 
Sunday  Road,  and  upon   my  closer  approach  retired   to 
Sewell  Mountain.2     At  the   Sunday  Road  I  was  stopped 
by   orders   from    Rosecrans,    who    thought   it   unwise    to 
advance  further  till  he  had  made  a  ferry  at  the  Gauley  and 
succeeded  in  getting  his  command  over;    for  Floyd  had 
again  sunk  the  flatboats  within  reach,  and  these  had  to  be 
a  second  time  raised  and  repaired.    At  his  request  I  visited 
the  General  at  Carnifex  Ferry,  and  then  got  permission 
to  move  my  column  forward  a  few  miles  to  Alderson's,  or 
Camp    Lookout  as   we   dubbed  it,  where    a  commanding 
position    controlled    the    country   to    the  base    of   Sewell 
Mountain.3     I  was   now   able  to  concentrate  the  Seventh 
Ohio  at  Gauley  Bridge,  and  ordered  forward  the   Second 
Kentucky  to  join  me  in  the  new  camp. 

The  period  of  my  separate  responsibility  and  of  struggle 
against  great  odds  was  not  to  close  without  a  private  grief 
which  was  the  more  poignant  because  the  condition  of  the 
campaign  forbade  my  leaving  the  post  of  duty.  On  the 
day  I  visited  General  Rosecrans  at  Carnifex  Ferry  I  got 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  478.         2  Id.,  pp.  479,  481.        3  Id.,  p.  482. 


104          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

news  of  the  critical  illness  ot  my  youngest  child,  a  babe  of 
eight  months  old,  whom  I  had  seen  but  a  single  day  after 
his  birth,  for  I  had  been  ordered  into  camp  from  the  leg 
islature  without  time  to  make  another  visit  to  my  family. 
The  warning  dispatch  was  quickly  followed  by  another 
announcing  the  end,  and  I  had  to  swallow  my  sorrows 
as  well  as  I  could  and  face  the  public  enemy  before  us, 
leaving  my  wife  uncomforted  in  her  bereavement  and  all 
the  more  burdened  with  care  because  she  knew  we  were 
resuming  active  operations  in  the  field. 


CHAPTER  VI 

CARNIFEX  FERRY  —  TO  SEWELL  MOUNTAIN  AND  BACK 

Rosecrans's  march  to  join  me  —  Reaches  Cross  Lanes  —  Advance  against 
Floyd  —  Engagement  at  Carnifex  Ferry  —  My  advance  to  Sunday  Road 

—  Conference  with  Rosecrans  —  McCook's  brigade  joins  me  —  Advance 
to  Camp  Lookout  —  Brigade  commanders  —  Rosecrans's  personal  char 
acteristics  —  Hartsuff  —  Floyd  and  Wise  again  —  "  Battle  of  Bontecou  " 

—  Sewell   Mountain  —  The   equinoctial  —  General    Schenck   arrives  — 
Rough  lodgings  —  Withdrawal  from  the  mountain  —  Rear-guard  duties 

—  Major  Slemmer  of  Fort  Pickens  fame  —  New  positions  covering  Gau- 
ley  Bridge  —  Floyd  at  Cotton  Mountain  —  Rosecrans's  methods  with 
private  soldiers  —  Progress  in  discipline. 

/^ENERAL  ROSECRANS  had  succeeded  McClellan 
^^  as  ranking  officer  in  West  Virginia,  but  it  was  not 
until  the  latter  part  of  September  that  the  region  was 
made  a  department  and  he  was  regularly  assigned  to 
command.1  Meanwhile  the  three  months'  enlistments 
were  expiring,  many  regiments  were  sent  home,  new  ones 
were  received,  and  a  complete  reorganization  of  his  forces 
took  place.  Besides  holding  the  railroad,  he  fortified  the 
Cheat  Mountain  pass  looking  toward  Staunton,  and  the 
pass  at  Elkwater  on  the  mountain  summit  between  Hut- 
tonsville  and  Huntersville.  My  own  fortifications  at 
Gauley  Bridge  were  part  of  the  system  of  defensive  works 
he  had  ordered.  By  the  middle  of  August  he  had  estab 
lished  a  chain  of  posts,  with  a  regiment  or  two  at  each, 
on  a  line  upon  which  he  afterwards  marched,  from  Wes- 
ton  by  way  of  Bulltown,  Sutton,  and  Summersville  to 
Gauley  Bridge. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  pp.  604,  616,  647. 


io6 


REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 


As  soon  as  he  received  the  news  of  Floyd's  attack  upon 
Tyler  at  Cross  Lanes,  he  hastened  his  preparations  and 
began  his  march  southward  from  Clarksburg  with  three 
brigades,  having  left  the  Upper  Potomac  line  in  com 
mand  of  General  Kelley,  and  the  Cheat  Mountain  region 


AFFAIR   AT 

CARNIFEX  FERRY. 

The  Continuous  double  lines 

are  Floyd's  entrenchments. 

RO&ECRANS'   FORCES  ARE  MARKED  THUS'. 

A.9th,10th.l2th  Oliio.    B.12th, 28th,  13th  Ohio. 

C.  Scammon's  Brigade  Moving  up. 

D.  Schneider's  Battery  in  position. 

E.  McMullin's  Battery  Moving-  tip. 


in  command  of  General  J.  J.  Reynolds.  His  route  (al 
ready  indicated)  was  a  rough  one,  and  the  portion  of  it 
between  Sutton  and  Summersville,  over  Birch  Mountain, 
was  very  wild  and  difficult.  He  crossed  the  mountain  on 
the  Qth,  and  left  his  bivouac  on  the  morning  of  the  loth 
of  September,  before  daybreak.  Marching  through  Sum- 


CARNIFEX  FERRY  1 07 

mersville,  he  reached  Cross  Lanes  about  two  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon.1  Floyd's  position  was  now  about  two 
miles  distant,  and,  waiting  only  for  his  column  to  close 
up,  he  again  pressed  forward.  General  Benham's  bri 
gade  was  in  front,  and  soon  met  the  enemy's  pickets. 
Getting  the  impression  that  Floyd  was  in  retreat,  Ben- 
ham  pressed  forward  rather  rashly,  deploying  to  the  left 
and  coming  under  a  sharp  fire  from  the  right  of  the 
enemy's  works.  Floyd  had  intrenched  a  line  across  a 
bend  of  the  Gauley  River,  where  the  road  from  Cross 
Lanes  to  Lewisburg  finds  its  way  down  the  cliffs  to 
Carnifex  Ferry.  His  flanks  rested  upon  precipices  ris 
ing  abruptly  from  the  water's  edge,  and  he  also  in 
trenched  some  rising  ground  in  front  of  his  principal 
line.  Benham's  line  advanced  through  dense  and  tan 
gled  woods,  ignorant  of  the  enemy's  position  till  it  was 
checked  by  the  fire  from  his  breastworks.  It  was  too 
late  for  a  proper  reconnoissance,  and  Rosecrans  could  only 
hasten  the  advance  and  deployment  of  the  other  brigades 
under  Colonels  McCook  and  Scammon.2  Benham  had 
sent  a  howitzer  battery  and  two  rifled  cannon  with  his 
head  of  column  at  the  left,  and  these  soon  got  a  posi 
tion  from  which,  in  fact,  they  enfiladed  part  of  Floyd's 
line,  though  it  was  impossible  to  see  much  of  the  situa 
tion.  Charges  were  made  by  portions  of  Benham's  and 
McCook' s  brigades  as  they  came  up,  but  they  lacked 
unity,  and  Rosecrans  was  dissatisfied  that  his  head  of 
column  should  be  engaged  before  he  had  time  to  plan  an 
attack.  Colonel  Lowe  of  the  Twelfth  Ohio  had  been 
killed  at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  and  Colonel  Lytle  of 
the  Tenth  had  been  wounded ;  darkness  was  rapidly  com 
ing  on,  and  Rosecrans  ordered  the  troops  withdrawn  from 
fire  till  positions  could  be  rectified,  and  the  attack  re 
newed  in  the  morning.  Seventeen  had  been  killed,  and 

1  o.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  129. 

2  For  organization  of  Rosecrans's  forces,  see  /</.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  471. 


108          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

141  had  been  wounded  in  the  sharp  but  irregular  combat.1 
Floyd,  however,  had  learned  that  his  position  could  be 
subjected  to  destructive  cannonade;  he  was  himself 
slightly  wounded,  and  his  officers  and  men  were  dis 
couraged.  He  therefore  retreated  across  the  Gauley  in 
the  night,  having  great  difficulty  in  carrying  his  artillery 
down  the  cliffs  by  a  wretched  road  in  the  darkness.  He 
had  built  a  slight  foot-bridge  for  infantry  in  the  bit  of 
smooth  water  known  as  the  Ferry,  though  both  above 
and  below  the  stream  is  an  impassable  mountain  torrent. 
The  artillery  crossed  in  the  flatboats.  Once  over,  the 
bridge  was  broken  up  and  the  ferry-boats  were  sunk. 
He  reported  but  twenty  casualties,  and  threw  much  of 
the  responsibility  upon  Wise,  who  had  not  obeyed  orders 
to  reinforce  him.  His  hospital,  containing  the  wounded 
prisoners  taken  from  Tyler,  fell  into  Rosecrans's  hands.2 
General  Rosecrans  found  the  country  so  difficult  a  one 
that  he  was  in  no  little  doubt  as  to  the  plan  of  campaign 
it  was  now  best  to  follow.  It  was  out  of  the  question  to 
supply  his  column  by  wagon  trains  over  the  mountainous 
roads  from  Clarksburg,  and  the  Kanawha  River  must 
therefore  be  made  the  line  of  communication  with  his 
base,  which  had  to  be  transferred  to  Gallipolis.  In  antici 
pation  of  this,  I  had  accumulated  supplies  and  ordnance 
stores  at  Gauley  Bridge  as  much  as  possible  with  my 
small  wagon  trains,  and  had  arranged  for  a  larger  depot 
at  the  head  of  steamboat  navigation.  I  was  ready  there 
fore  to  turn  over  the  control  of  my  supply  lines  to 
Rosecrans's  officers  of  the  quartermaster  and  commissary 
departments  as  soon  as  his  wagon  trains  could  be  trans- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  146. 

2  A  very  graphic  description  of  this  engagement  and  of  Floyd's  retreat 
fell  into  my  hands  soon  afterward.    It  was  a  journal  of  the  campaign  written 
by  Major  Isaac  Smith  of  the  Twenty-second  Virginia  Regiment,  which  he 
tried  to  send  through  our   lines  to  his  family  in  Charleston,  W.  Va.,  but 
which  was  intercepted.     A  copy  is  on  file  in  the  War  Archives.     See  also 
Floyd's  report,  Id.,  vol.  v.  pp.  146-148. 


CARNIFEX  FERRY  109 

ferred.  It  was  to  consult  in  regard  to  these  matters,  as 
well  as  in  regard  to  the  future  conduct  of  the  campaign, 
that  the  general  directed  me  to  visit  his  headquarters  at 
Carnifex  Ferry.  I  rode  over  from  my  camp  at  the  Sunday 
Road  junction  on  the  morning  of  the  I5th,  found  that  one 
of  the  little  flatboats  had  been  again  raised  and  repaired 
at  Carnifex  Ferry,  and  passing  through  the  field  of  the 
recent  combat,  reached  the  general's  headquarters  near 
Cross  Lanes.  I  was  able  from  personal  observation  to 
assure  him  that  it  was  easy  for  his  command  to  follow 
the  line  of  march  on  which  Floyd  had  retreated,  if  better 
means  of  crossing  the  Gauley  were  provided;  but  when 
they  should  join  me  on  the  Lewisburg  turnpike,  that 
highway  would  be  the  proper  line  of  supply,  making 
Gauley  Bridge  his  depot.  He  hesitated  to  commit  him 
self  to  either  line  for  decisive  operations  until  the 
Gauley  should  be  bridged,  but  on  my  description  of  the 
commodious  ferry  I  had  made  at  Gauley  Bridge  by  means 
of  a  very  large  flatboat  running  along  a  hawser  stretched 
from  bank  to  bank,  he  determined  to  advance,  and  to  have 
a  bridge  of  boats  made  in  place  of  my  ferry.  McCook's 
brigade  was  ordered  to  report  to  me  as  soon  as  it  could  be 
put  over  the  river,  and  I  was  authorized  to  advance  some 
six  miles  toward  the  enemy,  to  Alderson's  or  Spy  Rock, 
already  mentioned  beyond  which  Big  Sewell  Mountain 
is  fourteen  miles  further  to  the  southeast.1 

At  Cross  Lanes  I  met  the  commanders  of  the  other 
brigades  who  were  called  in  by  General  Rosecrans  for  an 
informal  consultation  based  upon  my  knowledge  of  the 
country  and  the  enemy.  I  naturally  scanned  them  with 
some  interest,  and  tried  to  make  the  most  of  the  oppor 
tunity  to  become  acquainted  with  them.  General  Ben- 
ham  I  knew  already,  from  his  visit  to  me  at  Gauley 
Bridge  in  his  capacity  of  engineer  officer.  I  had  met 
Colonel  Robert  McCook  at  Camp  Dennison,  and  now  that 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  602. 


110          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

it  was  intimated  that  he  would  be  for  some  days  under  my 
command,  I  recalled  a  scene  I  had  witnessed  there  which 
left  many  doubts  in  my  mind  whether  he  would  prove 
an  agreeable  subordinate.  I  had  gone,  one  morning,  to 
General  Bates's  office,  and  as  I  entered  found  McCook 
expressing  himself  with  more  vigor  than  elegance  in  re 
gard  to  some  order  which  had  been  issued  respecting  his 
regiment.  My  presence  did  not  seem  to  interfere  with 
the  fluency  of  his  remarks  or  the  force  of  his  expletives, 
but  after  a  moment  or  two  he  seemed  to  notice  a  look  of 
surprise  in  my  face,  and  his  own  broadened  humorously 
as  his  manner  changed  from  vehemence  to  geniality. 
General  Bates  and  he  were  familiar  acquaintances  at  the 
bar  in  Cincinnati,  and  McCook  had  evidently  presumed 
upon  this  as  a  warrant  for  speaking  his  mind  as  he 
pleased.  When  he  reported  to  me  at  this  later  period, 
I  found  a  hearty  and  loyal  character  under  his  bluff  ex 
terior  and  rough  speech,  with  real  courage,  a  quick  eye 
for  topography,  and  no  lack  of  earnest  subordination  when 
work  was  to  be  done.  Although  our  service  together  was 
short,  I  learned  to  have  real  respect  for  him,  and  sin 
cerely  mourned  his  loss  when,  later  in  the  war,  he  met 
his  tragic  death.  The  other  brigade  commander  was 
Colonel  E.  P.  Scammon  of  the  Twenty-third  Ohio.  He 
had  graduated  from  West  Point  in  1837,  and  had  served 
in  the  Topographical  Engineers  of  the  regular  army  and 
as  instructor  in  the  Military  Academy.  In  the  Mexican 
War  he  had  been  aide-de-camp  to  General  Scott.  He 
had  been  out  of  the  army  for  some  years  before  the  re 
bellion,  and  was  acting  as  professor  of  mathematics  in 
St.  Xavier's  College,  Cincinnati,  when  he  was  appointed 
to  the  colonelcy  of  the  Twenty-third  Ohio  upon  Rose- 
crans's  promotion.  Like  Rosecrans,  he  was  a  Roman 
Catholic,  though  himself  of  Puritan  descent.  It  seems 
that  at  the  time  of  the  Puseyite  movement  in  England 
and  in  this  country  there  had  been  a  good  many  conver- 


CARNIFEX  FERRY  III 

sions  to  Romanism  among  the  students  and  teachers  at 
West  Point,  under  the  influence  of  the  chaplain  of  the 
post,  and  Scammon,  among  a  number  of  young  men  who 
subsequently  became  distinguished  officers,  was  in  this 
number.  It  need  hardly  be  said  that  Scammon  was 
well  instructed  in  his  profession.  He  was  perhaps  too 
much  wedded  to  the  routine  of  the  service,  and  was 
looked  upon  by  his  subordinates  as  a  martinet  who  had 
not  patience  enough  with  the  inexperience  of  volunteer 
soldiers.  He  was  one  of  the  older  men  of  our  army, 
somewhat  under  the  average  height  and  weight,  with  a 
precise  politeness  of  manner  which  reminded  one  of  a 
Frenchman,  and  the  resemblance  was  increased  by  his 
free  use  of  his  snuff-box.  His  nervous  irritability  was 
the  cause  of  considerable  charing  in  his  command,  but 
this  left  him  under  fire,  and  those  who  had  been  with 
him  in  action  learned  to  admire  his  courage  and  conduct. 
He  was  with  me  subsequently  at  South  Mountain  and 
Antietam,  and  still  later  had  the  misfortune  to  be  one 
of  those  prisoners  in  the  Confederates'  hands  who  were 
exposed  to  the  fire  of  our  batteries  in  front  of  Charles 
ton,  S.  C. 

But  being  a  subordinate,  I  was  most  interested  in  the 
characteristics  of  our  commander.  Our  Camp  Dennison 
acquaintance  had  been  a  pleasant  one,  and  he  greeted  me 
with  a  cordiality  that  was  reassuring.  His  general  ap 
pearance  was  attractive.  He  was  tall  but  not  heavy, 
with  the  rather  long  head  and  countenance  that  is  some 
times  called  Norman.  His  aquiline  nose  and  bright 
eyes  gave  him  an  incisive  expression,  increased  by  rapid 
utterance  in  his  speech,  which  was  apt  to  grow  hurried, 
almost  to  stammering,  when  he  was  excited.  His  im 
pulsiveness  was  plain  to  all  who  approached  him ;  his 
irritation  quickly  flashed  out  in  words  when  he  was 
crossed,  and  his  social  geniality  would  show  itself  in 
smiles  and  in  almost  caressing  gestures  when  he  was 


112          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

pleased.  In  discussing  military  questions  he  made  free 
use  of  his  theoretic  knowledge,  often  quoted  authorities 
and  cited  maxims  of  war,  and  compared  the  problem 
before  him  to  analogous  cases  in  military  history.  This 
did  not  go  far  enough  to  be  pedantic,  and  was  full  of  a 
lively  intelligence;  yet  it  did  not  impress  me  as  that 
highest  form  of  military  insight  and  knowledge  which 
solves  the  question  before  it  upon  its  own  merits  and 
without  conscious  comparison  with  historical  examples, 
through  a  power  of  judgment  and  perception  ripened  and 
broadened  by  the  mastery  of  principles  which  have  ruled 
the  great  campaigns  of  the  world.  He  was  fond  of  con 
viviality,  loved  to  banter  good-humoredly  his  staff  officers 
and  intimates,  and  was  altogether  an  attractive  and  com 
panionable  man,  with  intellectual  activity  enough  to  make 
his  society  stimulating  and  full  of  lively  discussion.  I 
could  easily  understand  Garfield's  saying,  in  his  letter  to 
Secretary  Chase  which  afterward  became  the  subject  of 
much  debate,  that  he  "loved  every  bone  in  his  body."1 

Rosecrans' s  adjutant-general  was  Captain  George  L. 
Hartsuff,  an  officer  of  the  regular  army,  who  was  well 
qualified  to  supplement  in  many  ways  the  abilities  and 
deficiencies  of  his  chief.2  He  was  a  large  man,  of  heavy 

1  An  anecdote  told  at  my  table  in  1890  by  the  Rev.  Dr.  Morris,  long 
Professor  in  Lane  Theological  Seminary,  Cincinnati,  is  so  characteristic  of 
Rosecrans  that  it  is  worth  repeating.      After  the  battle  of    Stone's    River 
(January,  1863)  Dr.  Morris,  who  was  then  minister  of  a  Presbyterian  church 
in  Columbus,  was  made  by  Governor  Tod  a  member  of  a  commission  sent 
to  look  after  the  wounded  soldiers.      He  called  on   General  Rosecrans  at 
his  headquarters  in  Murfreesboro,  and  among  others  met  there  Father  Tracy, 
the  general's  chaplain,  a  Roman  Catholic  priest.    During  the  visit  Rosecrans 
was  called  aside  (but  in  the  same  room)  by  a  staff  officer  to  receive  informa 
tion  about  a  spy  who  had  been  caught  within  the  lines.     The  general  got 
quite  excited  over  the  information,  talked  loudly  and  hurriedly  in  giving 
directions  concerning  the  matter,  using  some  profane  language.      It  seemed 
suddenly  to  occur  to  him  that  the  clergymen  were  present,  and  from  the 
opposite  side  of  the  room  he  turned  toward  them,  exclaiming  apologetically, 
"  Gentlemen,  I  sometimes  swear,  but  I  never  blaspheme  !  " 

2  Hartsuff  was  appointed  brigadier-general  of  volunteers  in  the  next  year 


CARNIFEX  FERRY  113 

frame  ;  his  face  was  broad,  and  his  bald  head,  tapering 
high,  gave  a  peculiar  pyramidal  appearance  to  his  figure. 
He  was  systematic  and  accurate  in  administrative  work, 
patient  and  insistent  in  bringing  the  young  volunteer 
officers  in  his  department  into  habits  of  order  and  good 
military  form.  His  coolness  tempered  the  impulsiveness 
of  his  chief,  and  as  they  were  of  similar  age  and  had 
about  the  same  standing  in  the  army  before  the  war,  the 
familiarity  between  them  was  that  of  comrades  and  equals 
more  than  of  commander  and  subordinate. 

My  intercourse  with  these  officers  on  the  occasion  of 
my  visit  to  Cross  Lanes  was  only  the  beginning  of  the 
acquaintance  on  which  I  based  the  estimate  of  them 
which  I  have  given;  but  it  was  a  good  beginning,  for 
the  cordial  freedom  of  thought  and  speech  in  the  confer 
ence  was  such  as  to  bring  out  the  characteristics  of  the 
men.  I  rode  back  to  my  camp  in  the  evening,  feeling  a 
sense  of  relief  at  the  transfer  of  responsibility  to  other 
shoulders.  The  command  of  my  brigade  under  the  orders 
of  Rosecrans  seemed  an  easy  task  compared  with  the 
anxieties  and  the  difficulties  of  the  preceding  three 
months.  And  so  it  was.  The  difference  between  chief 
responsibility  in  military  movements  and  the  leadership 
even  of  the  largest  subordinate  organizations  of  an  army 
is  heaven-wide;  and  I  believe  that  no  one  who  has  tried 
both  will  hesitate  to  say  that  the  subordinate  knows  little 
or  nothing  of  the  strain  upon  the  will  and  the  moral  facul 
ties  which  the  chief  has  to  bear. 

McCook's  brigade  joined  me  on  the  i6th,  and  we  im 
mediately  marched  to  Alderson's,  where  we  made  a  camp 
afterward  known  as  Camp  Lookout.1  I  was  able  to  bring 
up  the  Second  Kentucky  Regiment  from  Gauley  Bridge, 

and  was  severely  wounded  at  Antietam,  after  which  he  was  made  major- 
general  and  commanded  the  Twenty-third  Army  Corps  in  Burnside's  cam 
paign  of  East  Tennessee. 
1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  481. 
VOL.  i.  —  8 


114          REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

giving  me  in  hand  three  regiments  of  my  own  brigade. 
I  sent  forward  Major  Hines  with  five  companies  as  an 
advance-guard,  and  with  these  he  scouted  the  country  as 
far  as  the  top  of  Big  Sewell  Mountain,  and  was  able  to 
give  us  definite  information  that  Floyd  had  retreated  as 
far  as  Meadow  Bluff,  where  the  Wilderness  road  joins  the 
turnpike.  Wise  halted  at  Big  Sewell  Mountain  and  per 
sisted  in  keeping  his  command  separate  from  Floyd,  who 
ordered  him  to  join  the  rest  of  the  column  at  Meadow 
Bluff.1  On  the  2Oth  September  my  advance-guard  oc 
cupied  the  crest  of  the  mountain,  whilst  Wise  withdrew 
to  a  parallel  ridge  a  mile  beyond,  and  loudly  insisted  that 
Floyd  should  join  him  there  instead  of  concentrating  the 
Confederate  force  at  Meadow  Bluff.  General  Lee  reached 
the  latter  place  in  person  on  the  2ist,  but  found  Wise's 
headstrong  and  captious  spirit  hardly  more  amenable  to  his 
discipline  than  to  Floyd's.  He  shared  Floyd's  opinion 
that  it  was  better  to  await  Rosecrans's  advance  at  Meadow 
Bluff,  throwing  upon  the  National  forces  the  burden  of 
transportation  over  the  extended  line,  whilst  guarding 
against  a  possible  turning  movement  by  the  Wilderness 
road.  But  Wise  was  so  noisy  in  his  assertions  that  his 
was  the  only  position  in  which  to  fight,  that  Lee  hesi 
tated  to  order  him  back  peremptorily,  and  finally  yielded 
to  his  clamor  and  directed  Floyd  to  advance  to  Wise's 
position.3  The  scandal  of  the  quarrel  between  the  two 
officers  had,  however,  become  so  notorious  that  the  Rich 
mond  government  had  authorized  Lee  to  send  Wise  else 
where,  and,  probably  on  his  advice,  the  Confederate  War 
Department  ordered  Wise  to  report  at  Richmond  in  per 
son.  The  last  scene  in  the  comedy  was  decidedly  amus 
ing.  Wise  appealed  passionately  to  Lee  to  say  whether 
his  military  honor  did  not  require  that  he  should  disobey 
the  order  till  the  expected  battle  should  be  fought,  and 
Lee,  no  doubt  in  dismay  lest  he  should  still  fail  to  get 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  pp.  854,  855,  862.  z  Id.,  pp.  868,  874,  878,  879. 


TO  SEW  ELL  MOUNTAIN  AND  BACK  115 

rid  of  so  intractable  a  subordinate,  gravely  advised  him 
that  both  honor  and  duty  would  be  safe  in  obeying 
promptly  the  order.1 

Whilst  waiting  at  Camp  Lookout  for  authority  to  move 
forward,  an  incident  occurred  which  gave  us  a  little  ex 
citement  and  amusement,  and  which  shows,  better  than 
much  explanation  could  do,  the  difficult  and  intricate 
character  of  the  country  in  which  we  were  operating.  A 
wagon-master  from  our  camp  had  gone  out  hunting  for 
forage,  which  was  very  scarce.  He  soon  came  back  in 
excitement,  reporting  that  he  had  come  upon  an  encamp 
ment  of  a  regiment  of  the  enemy  between  our  camp  and 
New  River  and  somewhat  in  our  rear.  His  report  was 
very  circumstantial,  but  was  so  improbable  that  I  was 
confident  there  was  some  mistake  about  it.  He  was, 
however,  so  earnest  in  his  assertions  that  he  could  not 
be  mistaken,  that  McCook,  in  whose  brigade  he  was,  sent 
out  an  officer  with  some  men,  guided  by  the  wagon-mas 
ter,  to  verify  the  report.  The  story  was  confirmed,  and 
the  matter  was  brought  to  me  for  action.  Puzzled  but 
not  convinced,  and  thinking  that  as  McCook' s  command 
was  new  to  the  country,  it  would  be  better  to  send  some 
one  who  was  used  to  scouting  in  the  mountains,  I  ordered 
a  lieutenant  named  Bontecou,  of  the  Second  Kentucky 
Regiment,  to  take  a  small  party  and  examine  the  case 
anew.  Bontecou  had  done  a  good  deal  of  successful  work 
in  this  line,  and  was  regarded  as  a  good  woodsman  and  an 
enterprising  scout.  He  too  came  back  at  nightfall,  say 
ing  that  there  could  be  no  mistake  about  it.  He  had 
crept  close  to  the  sentinels  of  the  camp,  had  counted  the 
tents,  and  being  challenged  by  the  guard,  had  made  a  run 
for  it  through  the  thicket,  losing  his  hat.  The  position 
of  the  enemy  was,  by  all  the  reports,  about  three  miles 
from  us,  diagonally  in  rear  of  our  right  flank.  It  now 
seemed  that  it  must  be  true  that  some  detachment  had 

1  o.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  879. 


Il6          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

been  delayed  in  joining  the  retreating  column,  and  had 
found  itself  thus  partly  cut  off  by  our  advance.  I  there 
fore  ordered  McCook  to  start  at  earliest  peep  of  day,  upon 
the  Chestnutburg  road  (on  which  the  wagon-master  had 
been  foraging),  and  passing  beyond  the  hostile  detach- 
rqent,  attack  from  the  other  side,  it  being  agreed  by  all 
the  scouting  parties  that  this  would  drive  the  enemy 
toward  our  camp.  My  own  brigade  would  be  disposed 
of  to  intercept  the  enemy  and  prevent  escape.  McCook 
moved  out  as  ordered,  and  following  his  guides  came  by 
many  devious  turns  to  a  fork  in  the  road,  following 
which,  they  told  him,  a  few  minutes  would  bring  him 
upon  the  enemy.  He  halted  the  column,  and  with  a 
small  skirmishing  party  went  carefully  forward.  The 
guides  pointed  to  a  thicket  from  which  the  Confederates 
could  be  seen.  His  instinct  for  topography  had  made 
him  suspect  the  truth,  as  he  had  noted  the  courses  in 
advancing,  and  crawling  through  the  thicket,  he  looked 
out  from  the  other  side  upon  what  he  at  once  recognized 
as  the  rear  of  his  own  camp,  and  the  tents  of  the  very 
regiment  from  which  he  had  sent  an  officer  to  test  the 
wagon-master's  report.  All  the  scouts  had  been  so  de 
ceived  by  the  tangle  of  wooded  hills  and  circling  roads 
that  they  fully  believed  they  were  still  miles  from  our 
position;  and,  bewildered  in  the  labyrinth,  they  were 
sure  the  tents  they  saw  were  the  enemy's  and  not  ours. 
The  march  had  been  through  rain  and  mist,  through 
dripping  thickets  and  on  muddy  roads,  and  the  first  im 
pulse  was  wrath  at  the  erring  scouts;  but  the  ludicrous 
side  soon  prevailed,  and  officers  and  men  joined  in  hearty 
laughter  over  their  wild-goose  chase.  They  dubbed  the 
expedition  the  "Battle  of  Bontecou,"  and  it  was  long  be 
fore  the  lieutenant  heard  the  last  of  the  chaffing  at  his 
talents  as  a  scout.1 

Major  Hines's  reports  of  the  strength  of  the  position  on 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  pp.  484,  485.- 


TO  SEWELL   MOUNTAIN  AND  BACK 

Sewell  Mountain  which  the  enemy  had  occupied,  and  my 
own  reconnoissance  of  the  intervening  country,  satisfied 
me  that  if  we  meant  to  advance  on  this  line,  we  ought 
not  to  give  the  enemy  time  to  reconsider  and  to  reoccupy 
the  mountain  top  from  which  he  had  retreated.  On  rep 
resenting  this  to  General  Rosecrans,  he  authorized  me 
to  advance  twelve  miles  to  the  Confederate  camp  on  Big 
Sewell,  directing  me,  however,  to  remain  upon  the  de 
fensive  when  there,  and  to  avoid  bringing  on  any  engage 
ment  till  he  could  bring  up  the  rest  of  the  column.1  His 
means  of  crossing  at  Carnifex  Ferry  were  so  poor  that 
what  he  had  thought  would  be  done  in  two  or  three  days 
from  the  time  McCook  joined  me,  took  a  full  fortnight  to 
accomplish. 

I  marched  with  my  own  and  McCook' s  brigades  on  the 
23d  September,  but  when  I  reached  the  Confederate  camp 
where  Hines  with  the  advance-guard  awaited  me,  it  was 
evident  at  a  glance  that  we  must  go  further.2  The  posi 
tion  was  a  very  strong  one  for  resisting  an  approach  from 
our  direction,  but  was  commanded  by  higher  ground  be 
yond.  The  true  crest  of  the  mountain  was  two  miles  fur 
ther  on,  and  there  alone  could  we  successfully  bar  the 
way  against  a  superior  force  coming  from  the  east.  I 
therefore  marched  rapidly  forward  and  occupied  the  crest 
in  force.  It  was  impossible  to  hide  the  whole  of  our 
camp  from  view  and  properly  hold  the  position,  but  we 
made  use  of  such  cover  as  we  could  find,  and  prepared  to 
defend  the  pass  against  all  comers,  since  it  was  vain  to 
attempt  to  mystify  the  enemy  as  to  our  advance  in  force. 

On  the  24th  we  had  a  lively  skirmish  with  Wise's  legion 
in  front,  and  forced  it  to  retire  to  a  ridge  out  of  range  of 
our  artillery.  We  dismounted  one  of  his  howitzers  in  the 
engagement,  but  contented  ourselves  with  making  him 
yield  the  ground  which  would  interfere  with  our  easy 
holding  of  our  own  position  and  the  spurs  of  the  moun- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  pp.  484,  486.  2  Id.,  p.  487. 


118          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

tain  directly  connected  with  it.  Wise  had  learned  that 
Rosecrans  was  not  with  my  column,  and  on  the  supposi 
tion  that  the  advance  was  made  by  my  brigade  only,  Lee 
concluded  to  order  Floyd  to  Wise's  camp,  being  now  sat 
isfied  that  no  movement  of  our  troops  had  been  made  by 
way  of  the  Wilderness  road.  It  was  at  this  time  that 
Wise  was  relieved  of  command  and  ordered  to  Richmond, 
and  Lee  found  it  advisable  to  unite  his  forces  and  take 
command  in  person. 

The  relations  of  these  three  distinguished  Virginians 
had  not  begun  with  this  campaign,  but  dated  back  to  the 
capture  of  John  Brown  at  Harper's  Ferry.  Wise  was  then 
the  governor  of  his  State,  and  received  from  Lee  the  pris 
oner  whose  execution  at  Charlestown  was  to  become  an 
historical  event.  Floyd,  who  himself  had  once  been  gov 
ernor  of  Virginia,  was  then  Buchanan's  Secretary  of 
War,  and  ordered  Lee  with  the  detachment  of  marines  to 
Harper's  Ferry,  where  they  stormed  the  engine-house 
which  Brown  had  made  his  fort.  Dealing  with  such  men 
as  his  subordinates,  and  with  such  a  history  behind  them, 
it  can  easily  be  understood  that  Lee  would  feel  no  ordi 
nary  delicacy  in  asserting  his  authority,  and  no  common 
embarrassment  at  their  quarrels. 

Rosecrans  was  at  first  disturbed  at  my  going  further 
than  had  been  expected;1  but  he  was  soon  satisfied  that 
nothing  better  could  have  been  done.  It  is  true  that  I 
was  thirty-five  miles  from  the  supports  in  the  rear, 
whether  at  Carnifex  Ferry  or  Gauley  Bridge;  but  the 
position  was  almost  impregnable  in  front,  and  by  watch 
fulness  I  should  know  of  any  attempt  to  turn  it  in  time 
to  make  safe  my  retreat  to  Camp  Lookout.  On  the  26th 
Scammon's  brigade  came  within  easy  supporting  dis 
tance,  and  General  Rosecrans  came  in  person  to  my 
camp.  He  had  not  been  able  to  bring  up  his  headquar 
ters  train,  and  was  my  guest  for  two  or  three  days,  shar- 

1  Rosecrans's  Dispatches,  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  pp.  486,  487. 


TO  SEWELL  MOUNTAIN  AND  BACK  119 

ing  my  tent  with  me.  Cold  autumnal  rains  set  in  on  the 
very  day  the  general  came  to  the  front,  and  continued 
almost  without  intermission.  In  the  hope  of  still  hav 
ing  some  favorable  weather  for  campaigning,  the  other 
brigades  were  brought  forward,  and  the  whole  force  was 
concentrated  at  the  mountain  except  the  necessary  garri 
sons  for  the  posts  in  the  rear.  Brigadier-General  Robert 
C  Schenck  reported  for  duty  in  the  evening  of  a  fearfully 
stormy  day  whilst  Rosecrans  was  still  my  tent-mate.  He 
had  heard  rumors  of  fighting  at  the  front,  and  had  hur 
ried  forward  with  a  couple  of  staff  officers,  but  without 
baggage.  My  staff  officers  were  sharing  their  shelter 
with  the  gentlemen  who  had  accompanied  Rosecrans,  but 
the  new-comers  were  made  heartily  welcome  to  what  we 
had.  In  my  own  tent  General  Rosecrans  occupied  my 
camp  cot ;  I  had  improvised  a  rough  bunk  for  myself  on 
the  other  side  of  the  tent,  but  as  General  Schenck  got  in 
too  late  for  the  construction  of  any  better  resting-place, 
he  was  obliged  to  content  himself  with  a  bed  made  of 
three  or  four  camp-stools  set  in  a  row.  Anything  was 
better  than  lying  on  the  damp  ground  in  such  a  storm; 
but  Schenck  long  remembered  the  aching  weariness  of 
that  night,  as  he  balanced  upon  the  narrow  and  unstable 
supports  which  threatened  to  tumble  him  upon  the  ground 
at  the  least  effort  to  change  the  position  of  stiffened  body 
and  limbs.  One  could  not  desire  better  companionship 
than  we  had  during  our  waking  hours,  for  both  my  guests 
had  had  varied  and  interesting  experience  and  knew  how 
to  make  it  the  means  of  delightful  social  intercourse 
and  discussion.  The  chilly  temperature  of  the  tent  was 
pleasantly  modified  by  a  furnace  which  was  the  successful 
invention  of  the  private  soldiers.  A  square  trench  was 
dug  from  the  middle  of  the  tent  leading  out  behind  it; 
this  was  capped  with  flat  stones  three  or  four  inches 
thick,  which  were  abundant  on  the  mountain.  At  the 
end  of  it,  on  the  outside,  a  chimney  of  stones  plastered 


120          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

with  mud  was  built  up,  and  the  whole  topped  out  by  an 
empty  cracker-barrel  by  way  of  chimney-pot.  The  fire 
built  in  the  furnace  had  good  draught,  and  the  thick 
stones  held  the  heat  well,  making,  on  the  whole,  the  best 
means  of  warming  a  tent  which  I  ever  tried.  The  objection 
to  the  little  sheet-iron  stoves  furnished  with  the  Sibley 
tent  is  that  they  are  cold  in  a  minute  if  the  fire  dies  out. 

The  rains,  when  once  they  began,  continued  with  such 
violence  that  the  streams  were  soon  up,  the  common  fords 
became  impassable,  and  the  roads  became  so  muddy  and 
slippery  that  it  was  with  the  utmost  difficulty  our  little 
army  was  supplied.  The  four  brigades  were  so  reduced 
by  sickness  and  by  detachments  that  Rosecrans  reported 
the  whole  as  making  only  5200  effective  men.  Every 
wagon  was  put  to  work  hauling  supplies  and  ammu 
nition,  even  the  headquarters  baggage  wagons  and  the 
regimental  wagons  of  the  troops,  as  well  those  stationed 
in  the  rear  as  those  in  front.  We  were  sixty  miles  from 
the  head  of  steamboat  navigation,  the  wagon  trains  were 
too  small  for  a  condition  of  things  where  the  teams  could 
hardly  haul  half  loads,  and  by  the  ist  of  October  we  had 
demonstrated  the  fact  that  it  was  impossible  to  sustain 
our  army  any  further  from  its  base  unless  we  could  rely 
upon  settled  weather  and  good  roads. 

Lee  had  directed  an  effort  to  be  made  by  General  Lor- 
ing,  his  subordinate,  on  the  Staunton  line,  to  test  the 
strength  of  the  posts  under  Reynolds  at  Cheat  Mountain 
and  Elkwater,  and  lively  combats  had  resulted  on  the 
1 2th  and  I4th  of  September.1  Reynolds  held  firm,  and 
as  Rosecrans  was  not  diverted  from  his  plans  and  was 
pushing  forward  on  the  Lewisburg  line,  Lee  ordered 
Loring  to  report  to  him  with  most  of  his  command. 
Reynolds,  in  return,  made  a  forced  reconnoissance  upon 
the  Confederate  position  at  Greenbrier  River  on  October 
2d,  but  found  it  too  strong  to  be  carried.  The  reinforce- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  pp.  185-193. 


TO  SEWELL  MOUNTAIN  AND  BACK  121 

ment  by  Loring  gave  Lee  a  very  positive  advantage  in 
numbers,  but  the  storms  and  foundering  roads  paralyzed 
both  armies,  which  lay  opposite  each  other  upon  the  crests 
of  Big  Sewell  separated  by  a  deep  gorge.  On  the  5th  of 
October  the  condition  of  the  Kanawha  valley  had  be 
come  such  that  Rosecrans  felt  compelled  to  withdraw  his 
forces  to  the  vicinity  of  Gauley  Bridge.  The  freshet  had 
been  an  extraordinary  one.  At  Charleston  the  Kanawha 
River  usually  flows  in  a  bed  forty  or  fifty  feet  below  the 
plateau  on  which  the  town  is  built;  but  the  waters  now 
rose  above  these  high  banks  and  flooded  the  town  itself, 
being  four  or  five  feet  deep  in  the  first  story  of  dwelling- 
houses  built  in  what  was  considered  a  neighborhood  safe 
from  floods.  The  inundation  almost  stopped  communica 
tion,  though  our  quartermasters  tried  to  remedy  part  of 
the  mischief  by  forcing  light  steamers  up  as  near  to  the 
Kanawha  Falls  as  possible.  But  it  was  very  difficult  to 
protect  the  supplies  landed  upon  a  muddy  bank  where 
were  no  warehouses,  and  no  protection  but  canvas  covers 
stretched  over  the  piles  of  barrels  and  boxes  of  bread  and 
sacks  of  grain.  There  was  enormous  waste  and  loss,  but 
we  managed  to  keep  our  men  in  rations,  and  were  better 
off  than  the  Confederates,  in  regard  to  whom  Floyd  after 
ward  reported  to  his  government  that  the  eleven  days  of 
cold  storms  at  Sewell  Mountain  had  "  cost  more  men,  sick 
and  dead,  than  the  battle  of  Manassas  Plains." 

It  has  been  asserted  by  Confederate  writers  that  Lee 
was  executing  a  movement  to  turn  Rosecrans's  left  flank 
when  the  latter  marched  back  from  Sewell  Mountain.  If 
so,  it  certainly  had  not  gone  far  enough  to  attract  our 
attention,  and  from  my  own  knowledge  of  the  situation, 
I  do  not  believe  it  had  passed  beyond  the  form  of  discus 
sion  of  a  possible  movement  when  the  weather  should  be 
come  settled.  Such  plans  were  discussed  on  both  sides, 
but  the  physical  condition  of  the  country  was  an  impera 
tive  veto  upon  aggressive  action. 


122          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

During  the  5th  of  October  our  sick  and  spare  baggage 
were  sent  back  to  Camp  Lookout.  Tents  were  struck  at 
ten  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and  the  trains  sent  on  their 
way  under  escort  at  eleven.  The  column  moved  as  soon 
as  the  trains  were  out  of  the  way,  except  my  own  brigade, 
to  which  was  assigned  the  duty  of  rear-guard.  We  re 
mained  upon  the  crest  of  the  hill  till  half-past  one,  the 
men  being  formed  in  line  of  battle  and  directed  to  lie 
down  till  the  time  for  them  to  march.  Our  sentinels  had 
been  posted  with  extra  precaution,  so  that  they  might  be 
withdrawn  an  hour  or  two  after  the  brigade  should  move. 
Extra  reserves  were  assigned  to  them,  and  Major  Hines 
put  in  command  of  the  whole  detachment,  with  orders  to 
keep  in  communication  with  me  at  the  extreme  rear  of 
the  marching  column.  It  was  interesting  to  observe  the 
effect  of  this  night  movement  upon  the  men.  Their  im 
agination  was  excited  by  the  novelty  of  the  situation,  and 
they  furnished  abundant  evidence  that  the  unknown  is 
always,  in  such  cases,  the  wonderful.  The  night  had 
cleared  off  and  the  stars  were  out.  The  Confederate 
position  was  eastward  from  us,  and  as  a  bright  star  rose 
above  the  ridge  on  which  the  enemy  was,  we  could  hear 
soldiers  saying  in  a  low  tone  to  each  other,  "There  goes 
a  fire  balloon  —  it  must  be  a  signal  —  they  must  have  dis 
covered  what  we  are  doing  !  "  The  exaggerated  parallax  at 
the  horizon  made  the  rising  star  seem  to  move  rapidly  for 
the  first  few  minutes,  and  men,  ignorant  of  this,  naturally 
mistook  its  character.  In  a  similar  way  an  occasional 
shot  on  the  picket  line  would  be  the  cause  of  a  subdued 
excitement.  I  doubt  if  soldiers  ever  make  a  night  move 
ment  in  an  enemy's  presence  without  being  under  a 
nervous  strain  which  exaggerates  the  importance  of  every 
thing  they  see  and  hear,  and  this  gives  uncertainty  and 
increases  the  difficulty  of  such  duty.  It  is  no  small  part 
of  the  duty  of  officers,  in  such  cases,  to  allay  this  ten 
dency  to  excitement,  to  explain  the  situation,  and  by  a 


TO  SEWELL  MOUNTAIN  AND   BACK  12$ 

wise  mixture  of  information  and  discipline  to  keep  the 
men  intelligently  cool  and  in  full  command  of  their 
faculties. 

General  Rosecrans  had  gone  with  the  head  of  the  col 
umn,  and  had  left  with  me  Major  Slemmer,  his  inspector- 
general,  to  bring  him  word  when  the  rear  of  the  column 
should  be  in  march.  Slemmer  was  the  officer  who,  as  a 
lieutenant,  had  distinguished  himself  by  holding  Fort 
Pickens  in  Pensacola  harbor  at  the  outbreak  of  the  rebel 
lion.  He  was  a  man  of  marked  character,  and  in  view  of 
his  experience  it  may  easily  be  understood  that  we  had 
no  lack  of  interesting  matter  for  conversation  as  we  paced 
in  rear  of  the  reclining  men  during  the  midnight  hours. 
His  failing  health  prevented  his  taking  the  prominent 
part  in  the  war  that  his  abilities  warranted,  but  I  have 
retained,  from  that  evening's  work  together,  a  pleasing 
impression  of  his  character  and  a  respect  for  his  military 
knowledge  and  talents.  In  impressing  on  me  the  fact 
that  my  position  was  the  one  of  special  honor  in  this 
movement,  he  expressed  the  wish  that  Rosecrans  had 
himself  remained  there;  but  the  result  showed  that  hardly 
less  than  the  commanding  general's  own  authority  and 
energy  could  have  got  the  column  forward  in  the  mud  and 
darkness.  The  troops  had  marched  but  a  mile  or  two 
when  they  overtook  part  of  the  wagon  train  toiling  slowly 
over  the  steep  and  slippery  hills.  Here  and  there  a  team 
would  be  "  stalled  "  in  the  mud,  and  it  looked  as  if  day 
light  would  overtake  us  before  even  a  tolerably  defensive 
position  would  be  reached.  Rosecrans  now  gave  his  per 
sonal  supervision  to  the  moving  of  the  wagons  and  artil 
lery,  —  wagon -master's  work,  it  may  be  said,  but  it  was 
work  which  had  to  be  done  if  the  little  army  was  not  to 
be  found  in  the  morning  strung  out  and  exposed  to  the 
blows  of  the  enemy  if  he  should  prove  enterprising. 

We  who  were  at  the  rear  did  not  know  of  the  difficulty 
the  column  was  having,  and  when  my  messenger  reported 


124          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  rear  of  the  preceding  brigade  a  mile  or  more  from  the 
camp,  I  gave  the  order  to  march,  and  my  men  filed  into 
the  road.  Slemmer  went  forward  to  inform  the  general 
that  we  were  in  movement,  and  I  remained  with  Major 
Hines  till  all  was  quiet,  when  he  was  directed  to  call  in 
his  pickets  and  sentinels  and  follow.  I  had  gone  hardly 
a  mile  when  we  were  brought  to  a  halt  by  the  head  of  the 
brigade  overtaking  those  who  had  preceded  us.  Word 
was  brought  back  that  the  artillery  was  finding  great 
difficulty  in  getting  over  the  first  considerable  hill  west 
of  the  mountain.  We  ourselves  were  upon  the  downward 
road  from  the  mountain  crest,  but  our  way  led  along  the 
side  of  a  spur  of  the  mountain  which  towered  above  us 
on  our  left.  We  were  in  a  dense  wood  that  shut  out  the 
stars,  and  in  darkness  that  could  almost  be  felt.  I  rode 
back  a  little  to  meet  Hines  and  to  keep  some  distance 
between  the  column  and  his  little  rear-guard.  We  sent 
a  chain  of  sentinels  over  the  hill  commanding  the  road, 
and  waited,  listening  for  any  evidence  that  the  enemy  had 
discovered  our  movement  and  followed.  An  hour  passed 
in  this  way,  and  the  column  moved  on  a  short  distance. 
Again  there  was  a  halt,  and  again  a  deployment  of  our 
sentries.  When  at  last  day  broke,  we  were  only  three  or 
four  miles  from  our  camp  of  the  evening  before;  but  we 
had  reached  a  position  which  was  easily  defensible,  and 
where  I  could  halt  the  brigade  and  wait  for  the  others  to 
get  entirely  out  of  our  way.  The  men  boiled  their  coffee, 
cooked  their  breakfast,  and  rested.  Early  in  the  forenoon 
a  small  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  followed  us,  but  were 
contented  with  very  slight  skirmishing,  and  we  marched 
leisurely  to  Camp  Lookout  before  evening.  Such  night 
marches  from  the  presence  of  an  enemy  are  among  the 
most  wearing  and  trying  in  the  soldier's  experience,  yet, 
in  spite  of  the  temptation  to  invest  them  with  extraordi 
nary  peril,  they  are  rarely  interfered  with.  It  is  the  un 
certainty,  the  darkness,  and  the  effect  of  these  upon  men 


TO  SEWELL  MOUNTAIN  AND  BACK  125 

and  officers  that  make  the  duty  a  delicate  one.  The  risk 
is  more  from  panic  than  from  the  foe,  and  the  loss  is  more 
likely  to  be  in  baggage  and  in  wagons  than  in  men.  I 
have  several  times  been  in  command  of  rear-guards  on 
such  occasions,  and  I  believe  that  I  would  generally  pre 
fer  an  open  withdrawal  by  day.  It  is  not  hard  to  hold 
even  a  bold  enemy  at  bay  by  a  determined  brigade  or 
division,  and  a  whole  army  may  be  saved  from  the  ex 
haustion  and  exposure  which  rapidly  fill  the  hospitals, 
and  may  cost  more  than  several  combats  between  rear  and 
advance  guards. 

My  brigade  remained  two  or  three  days  at  Camp  Look 
out,  where  we  were  put  upon  the  alert  on  the  /th  by  a 
reported  advance  of  the  enemy,  but  it  amounted  to  noth 
ing  more  than  a  lively  skirmish  of  some  cavalry  with  our 
outposts.  Lee  was  glad  to  move  back  to  Meadow  Bluff 
to  be  nearer  his  supplies,  and  Rosecrans  encamped  his 
troops  between  Hawk's  Nest  and  the  Tompkins  farm, 
all  of  them  being  now  within  a  few  miles  of  Gauley 
Bridge.1  Part  of  my  brigade  garrisoned  the  post  at  the 
bridge,  but  by  Rosecrans's  direction  my  own  headquarters 
tents  were  pitched  near  his  own  upon  the  Tompkins  farm. 
Both  parties  now  remained  in  observation  till  near  the 
end  of  October.  Floyd,  more  enterprising  in  plans  than 
resolute  or  skilful  in  carrying  them  out,  had  obtained 
Lee's  consent  to  make  an  attempt  to  render  our  position 
untenable  by  operations  on  the  opposite  side  of  New 
River.  Lee  had  intended  to  co-operate  by  moving  against 
us  with  the  rest  of  his  force,  but  on  the  2Oth  of  October 
the  reports  from  the  Staunton  region  were  so  threaten 
ing  that  he  determined  to  send  Loring  back  there,2  and 
this,  of  course,  settled  it  that  Lewisburg  would  be  cov 
ered  in  front  only  by  Wise's  Legion,  commanded  by 
Colonel  Davis.  Although  Floyd  complained  of  this 
change  of  plan,  he  did  not  abandon  his  purpose,  but 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  253.     See  also  Official  Atlas,  PL  IX.        2  Id.,  p.  908. 


126          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ordering  the  militia  on  that  side  of  the  river  to  reas 
semble,  he  marched  to  Fayette  C.  H.1 

Rosecrans  had  distributed  his  brigades  in  echelon  along 
the  turnpike,  — Schenck's,  the  most  advanced,  being  ten 
miles  from  Gauley  Bridge;  McCook's  eight  miles,  where 
the  road  from  Fayette  C.  H.  by  way  of  Miller's  Ferry 
comes  in  across  New  River;  Benham's  six  miles,  whilst 
of  my  own  one  regiment  at  the  Tompkins  farm  guarded 
headquarters,  and  the  rest  were  at  Gauley  Bridge  and 
lower  posts  where  they  could  protect  the  navigation  of 
the  Kanawha.2  McCook  by  Rosecrans's  direction  marched 
to  Fayette  C.  H.  about  the  2Oth  of  October,  and  on  his 
return  reported  that  only  guerilla  parties  were  abroad  in 
that  vicinity.  Rosecrans  seems  to  have  expected  that  at 
least  a  foothold  would  be  kept  on  the  other  side  of  New 
River  at  Miller's  Ferry,  but  McCook  left  nothing  there, 
and  when  he  tried  to  place  a  detachment  on  that  side 
about  the  25th,  the  shore  and  cliffs  were  found  to  be  held 
by  a  force  of  sharpshooters.  This  marked  the  advance 
of  Floyd,  who  established  his  camp  in  front  of  Fayette 
C.  H.  at  the  forking  of  the  roads  to  Miller's  Ferry  and 
to  Gauley  Bridge.3  For  a  few  days  he  made  no  serious 
demonstration,  and  Rosecrans  hastened  forward  the  work 
of  clothing  and  paying  his  men,  recruiting  his  teams  and 
bringing  back  to  the  ranks  the  soldiers  whom  exposure 
had  sent  to  the  hospital.  He  had  heard  in  a  trustworthy 
way  of  Lee's  intention  to  move  against  us  by  the  turn 
pike  whilst  Floyd  advanced  on  the  other  side  of  the  river, 
but  he  had  not  yet  learned  of  the  withdrawal  of  Lee  with 
Loring's  troops.  He  therefore  remained  quiet  and  ex 
pectant,  awaiting  the  definite  development  of  events. 

As  this  had  been  my  first  service  in  the  field  as  part  of 
a  larger  command,  I  was  keenly  alive  to  the  opportunity 
of  comparing  the  progress  we  had  made  in  discipline  and 
instruction  with  that  of  other  brigades,  so  that  I  might 

1  o.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  286.  2  id.,  p.  253.  3  id.,  p.  285. 


TO  SEWELL   MOUNTAIN  AND  BACK  I2/ 

cure  defects  in  my  own  methods  and  improve  the  sol 
dierly  character  as  well  as  the  administration  of  my  own 
command.  I  was  gratified  to  see  in  my  troops  evidence 
of  a  pride  in  their  own  organization  and  a  wholesome 
emulation,  which  made  them  take  kindly  to  the  drill  and 
discipline  which  were  necessary  to  improvement.  I  was 
particularly  interested  in  observing  Rosecrans's  methods 
with  the  men.  His  standard  of  soldierly  excellence  was 
high,  and  he  was  earnest  in  insisting  that  his  brigadiers 
and  his  staff  officers  should  co-operate  vigorously  in  try 
ing  to  attain  it.  His  impulsiveness,  however,  led  him 
sometimes  into  personal  efforts  at  discipline  where  the 
results  were  at  least  doubtful.  He  would  sometimes  go 
out  through  the  camps  in  the  evening,  and  if  he  saw  a 
tent  lighted  after  "taps,"  or  heard  men  singing  or  talk 
ing,  he  would  strike  loudly  on  the  canvas  with  the  flat  of 
his  sword  and  command  silence  or  the  extinguishment  of 
the  light.  The  men,  in  good-humored  mischief,  would 
try  different  ways  of  "getting  even  "  with  him.  One  that 
gave  much  amusement  to  the  camp  was  this :  the  men  in 
a  tent  thus  attacked  pretended  to  believe  that  their  regi 
mental  wagon-master  was  playing  a  practical  joke  on 
them,  and  shouted  back  to  him  all  sorts  of  rough  camp 
chaff.  When  the  exasperated  general  appeared  at  the 
door  of  the  tent,  they  were,  of  course,  overwhelmed  with 
the  most  innocent  astonishment,  and  explained  that  that 
wagon-master  was  in  the  habit  of  annoying  them,  and 
that  they  really  had  not  heard  the  "taps."  I  have  been 
with  the  general  in  approaching  a  picket,  when  he  would 
hotly  lecture  a  sentinel  who  showed  ignorance  of  some  of 
his  duties  or  inattention  to  them.  I  thought  I  could  see 
in  all  such  cases  that  it  would  have  been  wiser  to  avoid 
any  unnecessary  collision  with  the  privates,  but  to  take 
the  responsible  officer  aside  and  make  him  privately 
understand  that  he  must  answer  for  such  lack  of  instruc 
tion  or  of  discipline  among  his  men.  An  impulsive  man 


128          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

is  too  apt  to  meddle  with  details,  and  so  to  weaken  the 
sense  of  responsibility  in  the  intermediate  officers,  who 
hate  to  be  ignored  or  belittled  before  the  soldiers.  But 
if  Rosecrans's  method  was  not  an  ideal  one,  it  was  at 
least  vigorous,  and  every  week  showed  that  the  little 
army  was  improving  in  discipline  and  in  knowledge  of 
duty. 


CHAPTER  VII 

COTTON    MOUNTAIN 

Floyd  cannonades  Gauley  Bridge  —  Effect  on  Rosecrans  —  Topography  of 
Gauley  Mount  —  De  Villiers  runs  the  gantlet  —  Movements  of  our 
forces  —  Explaining  orders  —  A  hard  climb  on  the  mountain  —  In  the 
post  at  Gauley  Bridge  —  Moving  magazine  and  telegraph  —  A  balky 
mule-team  —  Ammunition  train  under  fire  —  Captain  Fitch  a  model 
quartermaster  —  Plans  to  entrap  Floyd  —  Moving  supply  trains  at  night 
—  Method  of  working  the  ferry  —  of  making  flatboats  —  The  Cotton 
Mountain  affair  —  Rosecrans  dissatisfied  with  Benham  —  Vain  plans  to 
reach  East  Tennessee. 

ON  the  ist  of  November  the  early  morning  was  fair 
but  misty,  and  a  fog  lay  in  the  gorge  of  New 
River  nearly  a  thousand  feet  below  the  little  plateau  at 
the  Tompkins  farm,  on  which  the  headquarters  tents  were 
pitched.  General  Rosecrans's  tents  were  not  more  than  a 
hundred  yards  above  mine,  between  the  turnpike  and  the 
steep  descent  to  the  river,  though  both  our  little  camps 
were  secluded  by  thickets  of  young  trees  and  laurel 
bushes.  Breakfast  was  over,  the  fog  was  lifting  out  of 
the  valley,  and  I  was  attending  to  the  usual  morning 
routine  of  clerical  work,  when  the  report  and  echo  of  a 
cannon-shot,  down  the  gorge  in  the  direction  of  Gauley 
Bridge,  was  heard.  It  was  unusual,  enough  so  to  set  me 
thinking  what  it  could  mean,  but  the  natural  explanation 
suggested  itself  that  it  was  one  of  our  own  guns,  perhaps 
fired  at  a  target.  In  a  few  moments  an  orderly  came  in 
some  haste,  saying  the  general  desired  to  see  me  at  his 
tent.  As  I  walked  over  to  his  quarters,  another  shot  was 
heard.  As  I  approached,  I  saw  him  standing  in  front  of 
his  tent  door,  evidently  much  excited,  and  when  I  came 
VOL.  i.  — 9 


130          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

up  to  him,  he  said  in  the  rapid,  half-stammering  way 
peculiar  to  him  at  such  times:  "The  enemy  has  got  a 
battery  on  Cotton  Mountain  opposite  our  post,  and  is 
shelling  it !  What  d'  ye  think  of  that  ?  "  The  post  at  the 
bridge  and  his  headquarters  were  connected  by  telegraph, 
and  the  operator  below  had  reported  the  fact  of  the  open 
ing  of  the  cannonade  from  the  mountain  side  above  him, 
and  added  that  his  office  was  so  directly  under  fire  that 
he  must  move  out  of  it.  Indeed  he  was  gone  and  com 
munication  broken  before  orders  could  be  sent  to  him  or 
to  the  post.  The  fact  of  the  cannonade  did  not  disturb 
me  so  much  as  the  way  in  which  it  affected  Rosecrans. 
He  had  been  expecting  to  be  attacked  by  Lee  in  front, 
and  knew  that  McCook  was  exchanging  shots  across  the 
river  with  some  force  of  the  enemy  at  Miller's  Ferry; 
but  that  the  attack  should  come  two  miles  or  more  in 
our  rear,  from  a  point  where  artillery  had  a  plunging  fire 
directly  into  our  depot  of  supplies  and  commanded  our 
only  road  for  a  half-mile  where  it  ran  on  a  narrow  bench 
along  New  River  under  Gauley  Mountain  cliffs,  had  been 
so  startling  as  to  throw  him  decidedly  off  his  balance. 
The  error  in  not  occupying  Cotton  Mountain  himself  was 
now  not  only  made  plain,  but  the  consequences  were  not 
pleasant  to  contemplate.  I  saw  that  the  best  service  I 
could  render  him  for  the  moment  was  to  help  him  back 
into  a  frame  of  mind  in  which  cool  reasoning  on  the 
situation  would  be  possible.  I  have  already  stated  the 
contrast  between  my  own  sense  of  care  when  in  sole  com 
mand  and  the  comparative  freedom  from  it  when  a  senior 
officer  came  upon  the  field;  and  I  now  realized  how  much 
easier  it  was  for  a  subordinate  to  take  things  coolly.  I 
therefore  purposely  entered  into  a  discussion  of  the  proba 
bilities  of  the  situation,  and  drew  it  out  at  length  enough 
to  assist  the  general  in  recovering  full  control  of  himself 
and  of  his  own  faculties.  We  could  not,  from  where  we 
stood,  see  the  post  at  Gauley  Bridge  nor  even  the  place 


COTTON  MOUNTAIN  131 

on  Cotton  Mountain  where  the  enemy's  battery  was 
placed,  and  we  walked  a  little  way  apart  from  our  staff 
officers  to  a  position  from  which  we  could  see  the  occa 
sional  puffs  of  white  smoke  from  the  hostile  guns.  From 
our  camp  the  road  descended  sharply  along  the  shoulders 
of  steep  hills  covered  with  wood  for  a  mile  and  a  half, 
till  it  reached  the  bottom  of  the  New  River  gorge,  and 
then  it  followed  the  open  bench  I  have  mentioned  till  it 
reached  the  crossing  of  the  Gauley.  On  the  opposite  side 
of  New  River  there  was  no  road,  the  mass  of  Cotton 
Mountain  crowding  close  upon  the  stream  with  its  pic 
turesque  face  of  steep  inclines  and  perpendicular  walls  of 
rock.  The  bridge  of  boats  which  Rosecrans  had  planned 
at  Gauley  Bridge  had  not  been  built,  because  it  had  been 
found  impossible  to  collect  or  to  construct  boats  enough 
to  make  it.  We  were  therefore  still  dependent  on  the 
ferry.  Whilst  the  general  and  I  were  talking,  Colonel 
De  Villiers  galloped  up,  having  crossed  at  the  terry  and 
run  the  gantlet  of  skirmishers  whom  he  reported  as  lin 
ing  the  other  side  of  New  River  opposite  the  unsheltered 
part  of  our  road.  He  had  recently  reported  for  duty,  hav 
ing,  as  he  asserted,  escaped  in  a  wonderful  way  from  cap 
tivity  in  Libby  Prison  at  Richmond.1  His  regiment 
was  at  the  bridge  and  he  was  the  senior  officer  there; 
but,  in  his  characteristic  light-headed  way,  instead  of 
taking  steps  to  protect  his  post  and  re-establish  the  tele 
graph  communications,  he  had  dashed  off  to  report  in 
person  at  headquarters.  As  he  was  willing  to  take  the 
risks  of  the  race  back  again,  he  was  allowed  to  go,  after 
being  fully  instructed  to  set  up  a  new  telegraph  office  in 
a  ravine  out  of  range  of  fire,  to  put  the  ferry-boat  out  of 
danger  as  soon  as  he  should  be  over,  and  prepare  the  ord 
nance  stores  to  be  moved  into  the  valley  of  Scrabble 

1  The  Confederates  claimed  that  he  had  been  allowed  to  act  as  hospital 
attendant  on  parole,  and  that  he  violated  his  obligation  in  escaping.  We  had 
no  means  of  verifying  the  facts  in  the  case. 


132  REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Creek  at  night.  I  begged  the  general  to  be  allowed  to 
go  back  with  De  Villiers,  as  the  thing  I  most  feared  was 
some  panic  at  the  post  which  might  result  in  the  destruc 
tion  of  our  stores  in  depot  there.  He,  however,  insisted 
on  my  staying  at  headquarters  for  a  time  at  least. 

Information  of  the  attack  was  sent  to  the  brigades  up 
the  river,  and  Schenck,  who  was  farthest  up,  was  directed 
to  push  out  scouting  parties  and  learn  if  there  was  any 
advance  of  the  enemy  from  Sewell  Mountain.  Benham, 
who  was  nearest,  was  ordered  to  send  down  part  of  his 
brigade  to  meet  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  to  stop  our  com 
munication  with  Gauley  Bridge.  The  battery  of  moun 
tain  howitzers  under  Captain  Mack  of  the  regular  army 
was  also  ordered  to  report  at  headquarters,  with  the  in 
tention  of  placing  it  high  up  on  Gauley  cliffs,  where  it 
could  drop  shells  among  the  enemy's  skirmishers  on  the 
opposite  bank  of  the  river.  An  hour  or  two  passed  and 
the  detachment  from  Benham 's  brigade  approached.  It 
was  the  Thirteenth  Ohio,  led  by  one  of  its  field  offi 
cers,  who  halted  the  column  and  rode  up  to  General 
Rosecrans  for  orders.  The  general's  manner  was  still 
an  excited  one,  and  in  the  rapidity  with  which  his  direc 
tions  were  given  the  officer  did  not  seem  to  get  a  clear 
idea  of  what  was  required  of  him.  He  made  some  effort 
to  get  the  orders  explained,  but  his  failure  to  comprehend 
seemed  to  irritate  Rosecrans,  and  he  therefore  bowed  and 
rode  back  to  his  men  with  a  blank  look  which  did  not 
promise  well  for  intelligent  action.  Noticing  this,  I 
quietly  walked  aside  among  the  bushes,  and  when  out  of 
sight  hurried  a  little  in  advance  and  waited  at  the  road 
side  for  the  column.  I  beckoned  the  officer  to  me,  and 
said  to  him,  "  Colonel,  I  thought  you  looked  as  if  you  did 
not  fully  understand  the  general's  wishes.''  He  replied 
that  he  did  not,  but  was  unwilling  to  question  him  as  it 
seemed  to  irritate  him.  I  said  that  was  a  wrong  prin 
ciple  to  act  on,  as  a  commanding  officer  has  the  greatest 


COTTON  MOUNTAIN  133 

possible  interest  in  being  clearly  understood.  I  then 
explained  at  large  what  I  knew  to  be  Rosecrans's  pur 
poses.  The  officer  thanked  me  cordially  and  rode  away. 
I  have  ventured  to  give  this  incident  with  such  fulness, 
because  subsequent  events  in  Rosecrans's  career  strength 
ened  the  impression  I  formed  at  the  time,  that  the  excit 
ability  of  his  temperament  was  such  that  an  unexpected 
occurrence  might  upset  his  judgment  so  that  it  would  be 
uncertain  how  he  would  act,  —  whether  it  would  rouse 
him  to  a  heroism  of  which  he  was  quite  capable,  or  make 
him  for  the  time  unfit  for  real  leadership  by  suspending 
his  self-command.1 

Soon  after  noon  I  obtained  permission  to  go  to  Gauley 
Bridge  and  assume  command  there ;  but  as  the  road  along 
New  River  was  now  impracticable  by  reason  of  the  in 
creased  fire  of  the  enemy  upon  it,  I  took  the  route  over 
the  top  of  Gauley  Mountain,  intending  to  reach  the  Gauley 
River  as  near  the  post  as  practicable.  I  took  with  me 
only  my  aide,  Captain  Christie,  and  an  orderly.  We 
rode  a  little  beyond  the  top  of  the  mountain,  and  sending 
the  orderly  back  with  the  horses,  proceeded  on  foot  down 
the  northern  slope.  We  soon  came  to  the  slashing  which 
I  had  made  in  August  to  prevent  the  enemy's  easy  ap 
proach  to  the  river  near  the  post.  The  mist  of  the  morn 
ing  had  changed  to  a  drizzling  rain.  We  had  on  our 
heavy  horsemen's  overcoats  with  large  capes,  cavalry 
boots  and  spurs,  swords  and  pistols.  This  made  it  toil 
some  work  for  us.  The  trees  had  been  felled  so  that  they 
crossed  each  other  in  utmost  confusion  on  the  steep  de 
clivity.  Many  of  them  were  very  large,  and  we  slid  over 
the  great  wet  trunks,  climbed  through  and  under  branches, 
let  ourselves  down  walls  of  natural  rock,  tripped  and  ham 
pered  by  our  accoutrements,  till  we  came  to  the  end  of 

1  See  Crittenden's  testimony  in  Buell  Court  of  Inquiry,  O.  R.,  vol.  xvi. 
pt.  i.  p.  578.  Cist's  account  of  Chickamauga,  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
p.  226,  and  chap,  xxvii.,  post. 


134          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  entanglement  at  what  we  supposed  was  the  edge  of 
the  river.  To  our  dismay  we  found  that  we  had  not  kept 
up  stream  far  enough,  and  that  at  this  point  was  a  sheer 
precipice  some  thirty  feet  high.  We  could  find  no  crev 
ices  to  help  us  climb  down  it.  We  tried  to  work  along 
the  edge  till  we  should  reach  a  lower  place,  but  this  ut 
terly  failed.  We  were  obliged  to  retrace  our  steps  to  the 
open  wood  above  the  slashing.  But  if  the  downward 
climbing  had  been  hard,  this  attempt  to  pull  ourselves 

up  again,  — 

"...  superasque  evadere  ad  auras,"  — 

was  labor  indeed.  We  stopped  several  times  from  sheer 
exhaustion,  so  blown  that  it  seemed  almost  impossible  to 
get  breath  again.  Our  clothes  were  heavy  from  the  rain 
on  the  outside  and  wet  with  perspiration  on  the  inside. 
At  last,  however,  we  accomplished  it,  and  resting  for  a 
while  at  the  foot  of  a  great  tree  till  we  gained  a  little 
strength,  we  followed  the  upper  line  of  the  slashing  till 
we  passed  beyond  it,  and  then  turned  toward  the  river, 
choosing  to  reach  its  banks  high  up  above  the  camp  rather 
than  attempt  again  to  climb  through  the  fallen  timber. 
Once  at  the  water's  edge  we  followed  the  stream  down 
till  we  were  opposite  the  guard  post  above  the  camp,  when 
we  hailed  for  a  skiff  and  were  ferried  over. 

It  was  now  almost  dark,  but  the  arrangements  were 
soon  made  to  have  wagons  ready  at  the  building  on  the 
Kanawha  front  used  as  a  magazine,  and  to  move  all  our 
ammunition  during  the  night  to  the  place  I  had  indicated 
in  the  ravine  of  Scrabble  Creek,  which  runs  into  the 
Gauley.  The  telegraph  station  was  moved  there  and 
connection  of  wires  made.  We  also  prepared  to  run  the 
ferry  industriously  during  the  night  and  to  put  over  the 
necessary  trainloads  of  supplies  for  the  troops  above.  A 
place  was  selected  high  up  on  the  hill  behind  us,  where  I 
hoped  to  get  up  a  couple  of  Parrott  guns  which  might 
silence  the  cannon  of  the  enemy  on  Cotton  Mountain.  I 


COTTON  MOUNTAIN  135 

was  naturally  gratified  at  the  expressions  of  relief  and 
satisfaction  of  the  officers  of  the  post  to  have  me  in  person 
among  them.  They  had  already  found  that  the  plunging 
fire  from  the  heights  across  the  river  was  not  a  formidable 
thing,  and  that  little  mischief  would  happen  if  the  men 
were  kept  from  assembling  in  bodies  or  large  groups 
within  range  of  the  enemy's  cannon. 

The  fatigues  of  the  day  made  sleep  welcome  as  soon  as 
the  most  pressing  duties  had  been  done,  and  I  went  early 
to  rest,  giving  orders  to  the  guard  at  my  quarters  to  call 
me  at  peep  of  day.  The  weather  cleared  during  the 
night,  and  when  I  went  out  in  the  morning  to  see  what 
progress  had  been  made  in  transferring  the  ammunition 
to  a  safe  place,  I  was  surprised  to  find  the  train  of  wagons 
stopped  in  the  road  along  the  Gauley  in  front  of  the 
camp.  General  Rosecrans's  ordnance  officer  was  of  the 
regular  army,  but  unfortunately  was  intemperate.  He 
had  neglected  his  duty  during  the  night,  leaving  his  ser 
geant  to  get  on  without  guidance  or  direction.  The 
result  was  that  the  ordnance  stores  had  not  been  loaded 
upon  the  waiting  wagons  till  nearly  daylight,  and  soon 
after  turning  out  of  the  Kanawha  road  into  that  of  the 
Gauley,  the  mules  of  a  team  near  the  head  of  the  train 
balked,  and  the  whole  had  been  brought  to  a  standstill. 
There  was  a  little  rise  in  the  road  on  the  hither  side  of 
Scrabble  Creek,  where  the  track,  cutting  through  the  crest 
of  a  hillock,  was  only  wide  enough  for  a  single  team,  and 
this  rise  was  of  course  the  place  where  the  balky  ani 
mals  stopped.  The  line  of  the  road  was  enfiladed  by  the 
enemy's  cannon,  the  morning  fog  in  the  valley  was  be 
ginning  to  lift  under  the  influence  of  the  rising  sun,  and 
as  soon  as  the  situation  was  discovered  we  might  reckon 
upon  receiving  the  fire  of  the  Cotton  Mountain  battery. 
The  wagon-drivers  realized  the  danger  of  handling  an 
ammunition  train  under  such  circumstances  and  began  to 
be  nervous,  whilst  the  onlookers  not  connected  with  the 


136          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

duty  made  haste  to  get  out  of  harm's  way.  My  pres 
ence  strengthened  the  authority  of  the  quartermaster  in 
charge,  Captain  E.  P.  Fitch,  helped  in  steadying  the 
men,  and  enabled  him  to  enforce  promptly  his  orders. 
He  stopped  the  noisy  efforts  to  make  the  refractory 
mules  move,  and  sent  in  haste  for  a  fresh  team.  As 
soon  as  it  came,  this  was  put  in  place  of  the  balky  ani 
mals,  and  at  the  word  of  command  the  train  started 
quickly  forward.  The  fog  had  thinned  enough,  however, 
to  give  the  enemy  an  inkling  of  what  was  going  on,  and 
the  rattling  of  the  wagons  on  the  road  completed  the 
exposure.  Without  warning,  a  ball  struck  in  the  road 
near  us  and  bounded  over  the  rear  of  the  train,  the  report 
of  the  cannon  following  instantly.  The  drivers  involun 
tarily  crouched  over  their  mules  and  cracked  their  whips. 
Another  shot  followed,  but  it  was  also  short,  and  the  last 
wagon  turned  the  shoulder  of  the  hill  into  the  gorge  of 
the  creek  as  the  ball  bounded  along  up  the  Gauley  valley. 
It  was  perhaps  fortunate  for  us  that  solid  shot  instead  of 
shrapnel  were  used,  but  it  is  not  improbable  that  the 
need  of  haste  in  firing  made  the  battery  officer  feel  that 
he  had  no  time  to  cut  and  adjust  fuses  to  the  estimated 
distance  to  our  train ;  or  it  is  possible  that  shells  were 
used  but  did  not  explode.  It  was  my  first  acquaintance 
with  Captain  Fitch,  who  had  accompanied  Rosecrans's  col 
umn,  and  his  cool  efficiency  was  so  marked  that  I  applied 
for  him  as  quartermaster  upon  my  staff.  He  remained 
with  me  till  I  finally  left  West  Virginia  in  1863,  and  I 
never  saw  his  superior  in  handling  trains  in  the  field. 
He  was  a  West  Virginian,  volunteering  from  civil  life, 
whose  outfit  was  a  good  business  education  and  an  indom 
itable  rough  energy  that  nothing  could  tire. 

During  the  evening  of  the  ist  of  November  General 
Benham's  brigade  came  to  the  post  at  Gauley  Bridge  to 
strengthen  the  garrison,  and  was  encamped  on  the  Ka- 
nawha  side  near  the  falls,  where  the  widening  of  the  valley 


COTTON  MOUNTAIN  137 

put  them  out  of  range  of  the  enemy's  fire.  The  ferry 
below  the  falls  was  called  Montgomery's  and  was  at  the 
mouth  of  Big  Falls  Creek,  up  which  ran  the  road  to  Fay- 
ette  C.  H.  A  detachment  of  the  enemy  had  pushed 
back  our  outposts  on  this  road,  and  had  fired  upon  our 
lower  camp  with  cannon,  but  the  position  was  not  a 
favorable  one  for  them  and  they  did  not  try  to  stay  long. 
After  a  day  or  two  we  were  able  to  keep  pickets  on  that 
side  with  a  flatboat  and  hawser  to  bring  them  back,  cov 
ered  by  artillery  on  our  side  of  the  Kanawha. 

During  November  2d  Rosecrans  matured  a  plan  of  op 
erations  against  Floyd,  who  was  now  definitely  found  to 
be  in  command  of  the  hostile  force  on  Cotton  Mountain. 
It  was  also  learned  through  scouting  parties  and  the 
country  people  that  Lee  had  left  the  region,  with  most  of 
the  force  that  had  been  at  Sewell  Mountain.  It  seemed 
possible  therefore  to  entrap  Floyd,  and  this  was  what 
Rosecrans  determined  to  attempt.  Benham  was  ordered 
to  take  his  brigade  down  the  Kanawha  and  cross  to  the 
other  side  at  the  mouth  of  Loup  Creek,  five  miles  below. 
Schenck  was  ordered  to  prepare  wagon  bodies  as  tempo 
rary  boats,  to  make  such  flatboats  as  he  could,  and  get 
ready  to  cross  the  New  River  at  Townsend's  Ferry,  about 
fifteen  miles  above  Gauley  Bridge.  McCook  was  ordered 
to  watch  Miller's  Ferry  near  his  camp,  and  be  prepared 
to  make  a  dash  on  the  short  road  to  Fayette  C.  H.  I 
was  ordered  to  hold  the  post  at  Gauley  Bridge,  forward 
supplies  by  night,  keep  down  the  enemy's  fire  as  far  as 
possible,  and  watch  for  an  opportunity  to  co-operate  with 
Benham  by  way  of  Montgomery's  Ferry.1  Benham's  bri 
gade  was  temporarily  increased  by  1500  picked  men 
from  the  posts  between  Kanawha  Falls  and  Charles 
ton.  He  was  expected  to  march  up  Loup  Creek  and  cut 
off  Floyd's  retreat  by  way  of  Raleigh  C.  H.,  whilst 
Schenck  should  co-operate  from  Townsend's  Ferry.  On 

1  o.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  254. 


138          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  5th  the  preparations  had  been  made,  and  Benham  was 
ordered  to  cross  the  Kanawha.  He  did  so  on  the  night 
of  the  6th,  but  except  sending  scouting  parties  up  Loup 
Creek,  he  did  nothing,  as  a  sudden  rise  in  New  River 
made  Rosecrans  suspend  the  concerted  movement,  and 
matters  remained  as  they  we're,  awaiting  the  fall  of  the 
river,  till  the  loth. 

For  a  week  after  the  ist,  Floyd's  battery  on  Cotton 
Mountain  fired  on  very  slight  provocation,  and  caution 
was  necessary  in  riding  or  moving  about  the  camp.  The 
houses  of  the  hamlet  were  not  purposely  injured,  for 
Floyd  would  naturally  be  unwilling  to  destroy  the  prop 
erty  of  West  Virginians,  and  it  was  a  safe  presumption 
that  we  had  removed  the  government  property  from  build 
ings  within  range  of  fire,  as  we  had  in  fact  done.  Our 
method  of  forwarding  supplies  was  to  assemble  the  wagon 
trains  near  my  lower  camp  during  the  day,  and  push  them 
forward  to  Gauley  Mount  and  Tompkins  farm  during  the 
night.  The  ferry-boat  at  Gauley  Bridge  was  kept  out  of 
harm's  way  in  the  Gauley,  behind  the  projection  of  Gauley 
Mount,  but  the  hawser  on  which  it  ran  was  not  removed. 
At  nightfall  the  boat  would  be  manned,  dropped  down  to 
its  place,  made  fast  to  the  hawser  by  a  snatch-block,  and 
commence  its  regular  trips,  passing  over  the  wagons. 
The  ferries,  both  at  the  bridge  and  at  Montgomery's,  were 
under  the  management  of  Captain  Lane  of  the  Eleventh 
Ohio  and  his  company  of  mechanics.1  We  had  found  at 
points  along  the  Kanawha  the  gunwales  of  flatboats, 
gotten  out  by  lumbermen  in  the  woods  and  brought  to 
the  river  bank  ready  to  be  put  into  boats  for  the  coal- 
trade,  which  had  already  much  importance  in  the  valley. 
These  gunwales  were  single  sticks  of  timber,  sixty  or 
eighty  feet  long,  two  or  three  feet  wide,  and  say  six 
inches  thick.  Each  formed  the  side  of  a  boat,  which  was 
built  by  tying  two  gunwales  together  with  cross  timbers, 

1  Captain  P.  P.  Lane  of  Cincinnati,  later  colonel  of  the  regiment. 


COTTON  MOUNTAIN  139 

the  whole  being  then  planked.  Such  boats  were  three 
or  four  times  as  large  as  those  used  for  the  country  fer 
ries  upon  the  Gauley  and  New  rivers,  and  enabled  us  to 
make  these  larger  ferries  very  commodious.  Of  course 
the  enemy  knew  that  we  used  them  at  night,  and  would 
fire  an  occasional  random  shot  at  them,  but  did  us  no 
harm. 

The  enemy's  guns  on  the  mountain  were  so  masked  by 
the  forest  that  we  did  not  waste  ammunition  in  firing  at 
them,  except  as  they  opened,  when  our  guns  so  quickly 
returned  their  fire  that  they  never  ventured  upon  continu 
ous  action,  and  after  the  first  week  we  had  only  occasional 
shots  from  them.  We  had  planted  our  sharpshooters 
also  in  protected  spots  along  the  narrower  part  of  New 
River  near  the  post,  and  made  the  enemy  abandon  the 
other  margin  of  the  stream,  except  with  scattered  senti 
nels.  In  a  short  time  matters  thus  assumed  a  shape  in 
which  our  work  went  on  regularly,  and  the  only  advan 
tage  Floyd  had  attained  was  to  make  us  move  our  supply 
trains  at  night.  His  presence  on  the  mountain  overlook 
ing  our  post  was  an  irritation  under  which  we  chafed,  and 
from  Rosecrans  down,  everybody  was  disgusted  with  the 
enforced  delay  of  Benham  at  Loup  Creek.  Floyd  kept 
his  principal  camp  behind  Cotton  Mountain,  in  the  posi 
tion  I  have  already  indicated,  in  an  inaction  which 
seemed  to  invite  enterprise  on  our  part.  His  courage 
had  oozed  out  when  he  had  carried  his  little  army  into 
an  exposed  position,  and  here  as  at  Carnifex  Ferry  he 
seemed  to  be  waiting  for  his  adversary  to  take  the 
initiative. 

To  prepare  for  my  own  part  in  the  contemplated  move 
ment,  I  had  ordered  Captain  Lane  to  build  a  couple  of 
flatboats  of  a  smaller  size  than  our  large  ferry-boats,  and 
to  rig  these  with  sweeps  or  large  oars,  so  that  they  could 
be  used  to  throw  detachments  across  the  New  River  to 
the  base  of  Cotton  Mountain,  at  a  point  selected  a  little 


140          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

way  up  the  river,  where  the  stream  was  not  so  swift  and 
broken  as  in  most  places.  Many  of  our  men  had  become 
expert  in  managing  such  boats,  and  a  careful  computa 
tion  showed  that  we  could  put  over  500  men  an  hour 
with  these  small  scows. 

From  the  5th  to  the  loth  Rosecrans  had  been  waiting 
for  the  waters  to  subside,  and  pressing  Benham  to  exam 
ine  the  roads  up  Loup  Creek  so  thoroughly  that  he  could 
plant  himself  in  Floyd's  rear  as  soon  as  orders  should  be 
given.  Schenck  would  make  the  simultaneous  movement 
when  Benham  was  known  to  be  in  march,  and  McCook's 
and  my  own  brigade  would  at  least  make  demonstrations 
from  our  several  positions.1  From  my  picket  post  at 
Montgomery's  Ferry  I  had  sent  scouts  up  the  Fayette 
road,  and  by  the  Qth  had  discovered  such  symptoms  of 
weakness  in  the  enemy  that  I  thought  the  time  had  come 
to  make  an  effort  to  dislodge  the  battery  and  get  com 
mand  of  the  crest  of  Cotton  Mountain  overlooking  my 
camp.  On  the  loth  I  made  a  combined  movement  from 
both  my  upper  and  lower  camps.  Colonel  De  Villiers 
was  ordered  to  take  all  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio  fit  for  duty 
(being  only  200  men),  and  crossing  by  the  small  boats, 
make  a  vigorous  reconnoissance  over  the  New  River  face 
of  Cotton  Mountain,  reaching  the  crest  if  possible.  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Enyart  of  the  First  Kentucky  was  directed 
to  cross  below  the  falls  with  a  similar  force,  and  push  a 
reconnoissance  out  on  the  Fayette  road,  whilst  he  also 
should  try  to  co-operate  with  De  Villiers  in  clearing  the 
enemy  from  the  heights  opposite  Gauley  Bridge.  The 
place  at  which  De  Villiers  crossed  was  out  of  sight  and 
range  from  the  enemy's  battery.  His  first  boat-load  of 
forty  men  reached  the  opposite  shore  safely,  and  dividing 
into  two  parties,  one  pushed  up  the  New  River  to  a  ravine 
making  a  somewhat  easy  ascent  toward  the  crest,  whilst 
the  others  skirmished  up  the  almost  perpendicular  face 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  pp.  255,  261-265. 


COTTON  MOUNTAIN  141 

of  the  rocks  where  they  landed.  The  remainder  of  the 
men  of  the  Eleventh  were  put  over  as  fast  as  possible, 
and  joined  their  colonel  in  the  ravine  mentioned,  up 
which  they  marched  to  a  little  clearing  high  up  the  hill, 
known  as  Blake's  farm,  where  the  advanced  party  had 
found  the  enemy.  The  battery  was  withdrawn  as  soon 
as  De  Villiers'  approach  at  the  Blake  farm  was  known, 
supports  being  sent  to  the  outpost  there  to  check  our 
advance.  The  men  of  the  Eleventh,  led  by  Major  Cole- 
man,  attacked  sharply,  drove  back  the  enemy,  and  suc 
ceeded  in  extending  their  right  to  the  crest  above  the 
recent  position  of  the  battery.  They  were  of  course 
stretched  out  into  a  mere  skirmish  line,  and  I  directed 
them  to  hold  the  crest  without  advancing  further  till 
Enyart  should  be  heard  from.  He  also  found  the  enemy 
indisposed  to  be  stubborn,  and  skirmished  up  the  oppo 
site  side  of  the  mountain  till  he  joined  hands  with  De 
Villiers  on  the  top.  The  enemy  seemed  to  be  increasing 
before  them,  and  our  men  held  their  position  as  directed, 
having  relieved  us  from  the  hostile  occupation  of  ground 
commanding  our  camps.  Enyart's  reconnoitring  party 
sent  toward  Fayette  advanced  a  mile  on  that  road  and 
remained  in  observation,  finding  no  enemy.  I  reported 
our  success  to  Rosecrans,  and  doubtful  whether  he  wished 
to  press  the  enemy  in  front  till  Benham  and  Schenck 
should  be  in  his  rear,  I  asked  for  further  instructions. 
General  Rosecrans  authorized  me  to  take  over  the  rest 
of  my  available  force  and  press  the  enemy  next  day,  as 
he  was  very  confident  that  Benham  would  by  that  time 
be  in  position  to  attack  him  in  rear.  Accordingly  I 
passed  the  Second  Kentucky  regiment  over  the  river 
during  the  night  and  joined  them  in  person  on  the  crest 
at  daybreak.  The  remainder  of  the  First  Kentucky, 
under  Major  Lieper,  was  ordered  to  cross  at  Montgomery's 
Ferry  later  in  the  day,  and  advance  upon  the  Fayette 
road  as  far  as  possible.  My  climb  to  the  crest  of  Cotton 


142          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Mountain  was  a  repetition  of  the  exhausting  sort  of  work 
I  had  tried  on  Gauley  Mount  on  the  ist.  I  took  the  short 
route  straight  up  the  face  of  the  hill,  clambering  over 
rocks,  pulling  myself  up  by  clinging  to  the  laurel  bushes, 
and  often  literally  lifting  myself  from  one  great  rocky 
step  to  another.  This  work  was  harder  upon  officers  who 
were  usually  mounted  than  upon  the  men  in  the  line,  as 
we  were  not  used  to  it,  and  the  labor  of  the  whole  day 
was  thus  increased,  for  of  course  we  could  take  no  horses. 
Resuming  the  advance  along  the  mountain  crest,  the 
enemy  made  no  serious  resistance,  but  fell  back  skir 
mishing  briskly,  till  we  came  to  more  open  ground  where 
the  mountain  breaks  down  toward  some  open  farms  where 
detachments  of  Floyd's  forces  had  been  encamped.  Their 
baggage  train  was  seen  in  the  distance,  moving  off  upon 
the  Fayette  turnpike.  As  we  were  now  in  the  close 
neighborhood  of  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy,  and  those 
in  our  presence  were  quite  as  numerous  as  we,  I  halted 
the  command  on  the  wooded  heights  commanding  the  open 
ground  below,  till  we  should  hear  some  sound  from  Ben- 
ham's  column.  Toward  evening  Major  Lieper  came  up 
on  our  right  to  the  place  where  the  Fayette  road  passes 
over  a  long  spur  of  the  mountain  which  is  known  in  the 
neighborhood  as  Cotton  Hill.1  Here  he  was  halted,  and 
nothing  being  heard  from  co-operating  columns,  the  troops 
bivouacked  for  the  night. 

Rosecrans  had  informed  Benham  of  my  advance  and 
ordered  him  to  push  forward;  but  he  spent  the  day  in 
discussing  the  topography  which  he  was  supposed  to  have 
learned  before,  and  did  not  move.2  Schenck  had  not 
been  put  across  New  River  at  Townsend  's  Ferry,  because 
Rosecrans  thought  it  hazardous  to  do  this  whilst  Floyd 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  pp.  272-275,  and  map,  p.  82,  ante.     The  greater  mass  in  the 
angle  of  the  rivers  was  not  uniformly  called  Cotton  Mountain  then,  and  in 
my  report  I  spoke  of  passing  along  those  crests  toward  Cotton  Hill,  mean 
ing  this  elevation  on  the  Fayette  road. 

2  Id.,  pp.  266-268. 


COTTON  MOUNTAIN  143 

was  near  that  point  in  force,  and  he  intended  that  when 
Floyd  should  be  forced  to  attack  Benham  (whose  com 
mand  was  now  equal  to  two  brigades),  it  would  withdraw 
the  enemy  so  far  that  Schenck  would  have  room  to  oper 
ate  after  crossing.  But  as  Benham  had  not  advanced, 
toward  evening  of  the  nth  Rosecrans  sent  him  orders  to 
march  immediately  up  the  Kanawha  to  my  position  and 
follow  Major  Lieper  on  the  road  that  officer  had  opened 
to  the  top  of  Cotton  Hill,  and  as  much  further  toward 
Fayette  C.  H.  as  possible,  taking  Lieper's  detachment 
with  him;  meanwhile  I  was  ordered  to  keep  the  re 
mainder  of  my  troops  on  the  mountain  in  the  position 
already  occupied.  Benham  was  expected  to  reach  Lie 
per's  position  by  ten  o'clock  that  evening,  but  he  did  not 
reach  there  in  fact  till  three  o'clock  in  the  following  after 
noon  (12th).1  After  some  skirmishing  with  an  outpost  of 
the  enemy  at  Laurel  Creek  behind  which  Major  Lieper 
had  been  posted,  nothing  more  was  done  till  the  evening 
of  the  1 3th.  Floyd's  report  shows  that  he  retired  be 
yond  Fayette  C.  H.  on  the  I2th,  having  conceived  the 
mistaken  idea  that  Benham's  column  was  a  new  rein 
forcement  of  5000  men  from  Ohio.2  Abandoning  the 
hope  of  using  Schenck's  brigade  in  a  movement  from 
Townsend's  Ferry,  Rosecrans  now  ordered  him  to  march 
to  Gauley  Bridge  on  the  I3th,  and  joining  Benham  by  a 
night  march,  assume  command  of  the  moving  column. 
Schenck  did  so,  but  Floyd  was  now  retreating  upon  Ra 
leigh  C.  H.  and  a  slight  affair  with  his  rear-guard  was 
the  only  result.  Fayette  C.  H.  was  occupied  and  the 
campaign  ended.  It  would  appear  from  official  docu 
ments  that  Floyd  did  not  learn  of  Benham's  presence  at 
the  mouth  of  Loup  Creek  till  the  I2th,  when  he  began 
his  retreat,  and  that  at  any  time  during  the  preceding 
week  a  single  rapid  march  would  have  placed  Benham's 
brigade  without  resistance  upon  the  line  of  the  enemy's 

i  o.  R.,  vol.  v.  pp.  256, 273.  z  id.,  p.  287. 


144          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

communications.  Rosecrans  was  indignant  at  the  balk 
ing  of  his  elaborate  plans,  and  ordered  Benham  before 
a  court-martial  for  misconduct;1  but  I  believe  that 
McClellan  caused  the  proceedings  to  be  quashed  to  avoid 
scandal,  and  Benham  was  transferred  to  another  depart 
ment.  It  is  very  improbable  that  Schenck's  contem 
plated  movement  across  New  River  at  Townsend's  Ferry 
could  have  been  made  successfully;  for  his  boats  were 
few  and  small,  and  the  ferrying  would  have  been  slow 
and  tedious.  Floyd  would  pretty  surely  learn  of  it 
soon  after  it  began,  and  would  hasten  his  retreat  in 
stead  of  waiting  to  be  surrounded.  It  would  have  been 
better  to  join  Schenck  to  Benham  by  a  forced  march 
as  soon  as  the  latter  was  at  the  mouth  of  Loup  Creek, 
and  then  to  push  the  whole  to  the  Fayette  and  Raleigh 
road,  Rosecrans  leading  the  column  in  person.  As 
Floyd  seems  to  have  been  ignorant  of  what  was  going 
on  in  Loup  Creek  valley,  decisive  results  might  have  fol 
lowed  from  anticipating  him  on  his  line  of  retreat.  Cap 
turing  such  a  force,  or,  as  the  phrase  then  went,  "  bagging 
it,"  is  easier  talked  of  than  done;  but  it  is  quite  probable 
that  it  might  have  been  so  scattered  and  demoralized  as 
to  be  of  little  further  value  as  an  army,  and  considerable 
parts  of  it  might  have  been  taken  prisoners. 

Rosecrans  had  begun  the  campaign  in  August  with 
the  announced  purpose  of  marching  to  Wytheville  and 
Abingdon  in  the  Holston  valley,  and  thence  into  East 
Tennessee.  McClellan  had  cherished  the  idea  of  making 
the  Kanawha  line  the  base  of  operations  into  the  same 
region;  still  later  Fremont,  and  after  him  Halleck  did 
the  same.  Looking  only  at  the  map,  it  seemed  an  easy 
thing  to  do;  but  the  almost  wilderness  character  of  the 
intervening  country  with  its  poor  and  sparsely  scattered 
people,  the  weary  miles  of  steep  mountain-roads  becom 
ing  impassable  in  rainy  weather,  and  the  total  absence  of 
i  o.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  669. 


COTTON  MOUNTAIN  145 

forage  for  animals,  were  elements  of  the  problem  which 
they  all  ignored  or  greatly  underestimated.  It  was  easy, 
sitting  at  one's  office  table,  to  sweep  the  hand  over  a  few 
inches  of  chart  showing  next  to  nothing  of  the  topog 
raphy,  and  to  say,  "  We  will  march  from  here  to  here ; " 
but  when  the  march  was  undertaken,  the  natural  obstacles 
began  to  assert  themselves,  and  one  general  after  another 
had  to  find  apologies  for  failing  to  accomplish  what  ought 
never  to  have  been  undertaken.  After  a  year  or  two,  the 
military  advisers  of  the  War  Department  began  to  realize 
how  closely  the  movements  of  great  bodies  of  soldiers 
were  tied  to  rivers  and  railways;  but  they  seemed  to  learn 
it  only  as  the  merest  civilian  could  learn  it,  by  the  expe 
rience  of  repeated  failures  of  plans  based  on  long  lines 
of  communication  over  forest-clad  mountains,  dependent 
upon  wagons  to  carry  everything  for  man  and  beast. 

Instead  of  reaching  Wytheville  or  Abingdon,  Rosecrans 
found  that  he  could  not  supply  his  little  army  even  at  Big 
Sewell  Mountain ;  and  except  for  a  few  days,  he  occupied 
no  part  of  the  country  in  advance  of  my  positions  in 
August,  then  held  by  a  single  brigade  in  the  presence  of 
the  same  enemy.  It  was  not  Floyd's  army,  but  the  phys 
ical  obstacles  presented  by  the  country  that  chained  him 
to  Gauley  Bridge.  I  shall  have  occasion  hereafter  to 
note  how  the  same  ignoring  of  nature's  laws  came  near 
starving  Burnside's  command  in  East  Tennessee,  where 
the  attempt  to  supply  it  by  wagon  trains  from  Lexington 
in  Kentucky  or  from  Nashville  failed  so  utterly  as  to 
disappear  from  the  calculation  of  our  problem  of  exist 
ence  through  the  winter  of  1863-64. 


VOL.  I.  —  10 


CHAPTER  VIII 

WINTER-QUARTERS 

An  impracticable  country  —  Movements  suspended  —  Experienced  troops 
ordered  away  —  My  orders  from  Washington  —  Rosecrans  objects  —  A 
disappointment  —  Winter  organization  of  the  Department  —  Sifting  our 
material  —  Courts-martial  —  Regimental  schools  —  Drill  and  picket  duty 
—  A  military  execution  —  Effect  upon  the  army  —  Political  sentiments 
of  the  people  —  Rules  of  conduct  toward  them  —  Case  of  Mr.  Parks  — 
Mr.  Summers  —  Mr.  Patrick  —  Mr.  Lewis  Ruffner  —  Mr.  Doddridge  — 
Mr.  B.  F.  Smith  —  A  house  divided  against  itself  —  Major  Smith's  jour 
nal  —  The  contrabands  —  A  fugitive-slave  case  —  Embarrassments  as  to 
military  jurisdiction. 

TTLOYD'S  retreat  was  continued  to  the  vicinity  of 
Newberne  and  Dublin  Depot,  where  the  Virginia 
and  East  Tennessee  Railway  crosses  the  upper  waters  of 
New  River.  He  reported  the  country  absolutely  destitute 
of  everything  and  the  roads  so  broken  up  that  he  could 
not  supply  his  troops  at  any  distance  from  the  railroad.1 
Rosecrans  was  of  a  similar  opinion,  and  on  the  iQth  of 
November  signified  to  General  McClellan2  his  purpose  to 
hold  Gauley  Bridge,  Cheat  Mountain,  and  Romney  as  the 
frontier  of  his  department,  and  to  devote  the  winter  to 
the  instruction  and  discipline  of  his  troops,  and  the  sift 
ing  out  of  incompetent  officers.  About  the  1st  of  De 
cember  he  fixed  his  headquarters  at  Wheeling,3  assigning 
the  District  of  the  Kanawha  to  my  command,  with  head 
quarters  at  Charleston.4  This  gave  me  substantially  the 

i  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  pp.  287,  288.  2  Id.,  p.  657. 

3  Id.,  pp.  669,  685.     On  January  21   I  called  attention  to  the  anomaly 
of  bounding  the  department  by  the  Kanawha  River  on  the  south,  and  cor 
rection  was  at  once  made  by  General  McClellan.    Id.,  p.  706. 

4  Id.,  pp.  670,  691. 


WINTER-QUARTERS  147 

same   territorial  jurisdiction   I    had  in   the    summer,  but 
with  a  larger  body  of  troops. 

Before  we  left  Gauley  Bridge,  however,  I  received  orders 
direct  from  army  headquarters  at  Washington  to  take  my 
three  oldest  Ohio  regiments  and  report  to  General  Buell 
in  Kentucky.  This  was  exactly  in  accordance  with  my 
own  strong  desire  to  join  a  large  army  on  one  of  the  prin 
cipal  lines  of  operation.  I  therefore  went  joyfully  to 
Rosecrans,  supposing,  of  course,  that  he  also  had  received 
orders  to  send  me  away.  To  my  intense  chagrin  I  found 
that  he  not  only  was  without  such  orders,  but  that  he  was, 
naturally  enough,  disposed  to  take  umbrage  at  the  send 
ing  of  orders  direct  to  me.  He  protested  against  the 
irregularity,  and  insisted  that  if  his  forces  were  to  be  re 
duced,  he  should  himself  indicate  those  which  were  to  go. 
He  carried  his  point  on  the  matter,  and  was  directed  to 
send  eight  regiments  to  Buell.1  He  insisted  that  I  should 
stay,  and  whilst  the  reasons  he  gave  were  sufficiently  com 
plimentary,  it  was  none  the  less  a  great  disappointment  to 
have  to  abandon  the  hope  of  service  in  a  more  important 
field.2  There  was  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  summon 
philosophy  to  my  aid,  and  to  hope  that  all  would  turn 
out  for  the  best.  Before  Rosecrans  left  Gauley  Bridge 
four  more  regiments  were  added  to  the  eight  already 
ordered  away,  together  with  four  batteries  of  artillery. 
Some  new  regiments  had  joined  us,  and  the  aggregate  of 
troops  remaining  was  perhaps  not  much  below  the  num 
ber  present  when  Rosecrans  reached  Carnifex  Ferry  in 
September;  but  most  of  them  were  freshly  organized 
regiments,  with  whom  the  work  of  drill  and  discipline 
had  to  begin  at  first  lessons.  Three  of  the  batteries  taken 
away  were  regulars,  and  the  other  was  Loomis's  Michigan 
battery,  one  of  the  oldest  and  best  instructed  of  our 
volunteer  batteries.  The  places  of  these  were  not  sup 
plied.  The  good  policy  of  these  reductions  is  not  to  be 

i  o.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  671.  2  Id.,  pp.  259,  657. 


148          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

questioned;  for  it  was  agreed  that  nothing  aggressive 
could  be  done  in  the  mountains  during  the  winter,  and 
it  was  wise  to  use  part  of  the  forces  elsewhere.  Yet  for 
those  of  us  who  had  hoped  to  go  with  the  troops,  and  now 
found  ourselves  condemned  to  the  apparently  insignificant 
duty  of  garrisoning  West  Virginia,  the  effect  was,  for  the 
time,  a  very  depressing  one. 

General  Schenck  had  left  us  on  account  of  sickness,  and 
did  not  return.  His  brigade  was  again  commanded  by 
Colonel  Scammon,  as  it  had  been  at  Carnifex  Ferry,  and 
was  stationed  at  Fayette  C.  H.  One  regiment  was  at 
Tompkins  farm,  another  at  Gauley  Bridge,  two  others 
at  intervals  between  that  post  and  Charleston,  where  were 
three  regiments  out  of  what  had  been  my  own  brigade. 
Three  partially  organized  West  Virginia  regiments  of  in 
fantry  and  one  of  cavalry  were  placed  at  recruiting  stations 
in  the  rear,  and  one  Ohio  regiment  was  posted  at  Barbours- 
ville.  The  chain  of  posts  which  had  been  established  in 
the  summer  between  Weston  and  Cross  Lanes  was  not 
kept  up ;  but  the  Thirty-sixth  Ohio,  Colonel  George 
Crook,  was  stationed  at  Cross  Lanes,  reporting  to  me,  as 
did  all  the  other  troops  enumerated  above. 

The  Cheat  Mountain  district  continued  in  command  of 
General  Milroy,  his  principal  posts  being  at  Beverly  and 
Huttonsville,  with  small  garrisons  holding  the  mountain 
passes.  General  Kelley  remained  also  in  command  of  the 
railroad  district  covering  the  communication  with  Wash 
ington  by  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.  General  J.  J . 
Reynolds  was  assigned  to  command  a  new  division  organ 
izing  at  Romney,  but  was  soon  transferred  to  another 
department. 

Such  was  the  general  organization  of  the  department 
for  the  winter,  and  we  soon  settled  down  to  regular  work 
in  fitting  the  troops  for  the  next  campaign.  Courts- 
martial  were  organized  to  try  offenders  of  all  grades,  and 
under  charges  of  conduct  prejudicial  to  good  order  and 


WINTER-QUARTERS  149 

military  discipline,  worthless  officers  were  driven  from 
the  service  and  negligent  ones  disciplined.  Regimental 
schools  were  opened,  and  strenuous  efforts  were  made  to 
increase  the  military  knowledge  and  skill  of  the  whole 
command.  Careful  drill  was  enforced,  and  picket  and 
outpost  duty  systematically  taught.  Each  post  became 
a  busy  camp  of  instruction,  and  the  regiments  repeated 
under  more  favorable  circumstances  the  work  of  the 
original  camp  in  Ohio. 

The  work  of  the  military  courts  gave  me  one  very  un 
pleasant  duty  to  perform,  which,  happily,  was  of  rare 
occurrence  and  never  again  fell  to  my  lot  except  on  a 
single  occasion  in  North  Carolina  near  the  close  of  the 
war.  A  soldier  of  the  First  Kentucky  Volunteers  was 
condemned  to  death  for  desertion,  mutiny,  and  a  mur 
derous  assault  upon  another  soldier.  The  circumstances 
were  a  little  peculiar,  and  gave  rise  to  fears  that  his  regi 
ment  might  resist  the  execution.  I  have  already  men 
tioned  the  affair  of  Captain  Gibbs, 1  who  had  shot  down  a 
mutinous  man  of  the  Second  Kentucky  at  Gauley  Bridge 
in  the  summer,  and  who  had  been  acquitted  by  a  court- 
martial.  The  camp  is  very  like  a  city  in  which  popular 
impressions  and  rumors  have  quick  circulation  and  large 
influence.  The  two  Kentucky  regiments  were  so  closely 
related  as  to  be  almost  one,  and  were  subject  to  the  same 
influences.  A  bitter  feeling  toward  Captain  Gibbs  pre 
vailed  in  them  both,  and  camp  demagogues  busied  them 
selves  in  trying  to  make  mischief  by  commenting  on  the 
fact  that  the  officer  was  acquitted  whilst  the  private  was 
condemned.  There  was  not  a  particle  of  justice  in  this, 
for  the  one  had  simply  suppressed  a  mutiny,  whereas  the 
other  was  inciting  one.  But  it  is  not  necessary  for  com 
plaints  to  be  just  among  those  who  are  very  imperfectly 
informed  in  regard  to  the  facts,  and  very  unpleasant  re- 

1  Appointed  Captain  and  Assistant  Commissary  of  Subsistence,  U.  S. 
Vols.,  October  i. 


150          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ports  were  received  as  to  the  condition  of  things  in  the 
regiment  to  which  the  condemned  man  belonged. 

It  is  the  military  custom,  in  executions  by  shooting,  to 
select  the  firing  party  from  the  regiment  to  which  the 
condemned  man  belongs.  To  have  changed  the  rule 
would  have  looked  like  timidity,  and  I  determined  that 
it  must  not  be  done,  but  resolved  upon  an  order  of  pro 
cedure  which  would  provide,  as  far  as  possible,  against 
the  chances  of  interference.  On  such  occasions  the  troops 
are  usually  paraded  upon  three  sides  of  a  hollow  square, 
without  arms,  the  place  of  execution  being  in  the  middle 
of  the  open  side,  where  the  prisoner  kneels  upon  his  coffin. 
The  place  chosen  was  in  the  meadows  on  the  lower  side 
of  the  Elk  River,  opposite  Charleston,  a  short  distance 
from  the  regimental  camp.  The  camps  of  two  other 
regiments  at  the  post  were  half  a  mile  from  the  place  of 
execution.  These  regiments  were,  therefore,  marched  to 
the  field  with  their  arms.  That  to  which  the  prisoner 
belonged  was  marched  without  arms  to  its  position  as  the 
centre  of  the  parade,  and  the  others  were  formed  on  their 
right  and  left  at  right  angles,  thus  forming  the  three  sides 
of  the  enclosure.  The  arms  of  these  last  regiments  were 
stacked  immediately  behind  them  where  they  could  be 
seized  in  a  moment,  but  the  parade  was  formed  without 
muskets.  Captain  Gibbs  was  on  duty  as  commissary  at 
my  headquarters,  and  his  appearance  with  the  staff  would 
have  been  unpleasant  to  himself  as  well  as  a  possible  cause 
of  excitement  in  the  Kentucky  regiment.  To  solve  the 
difficulty  without  making  a  significant  exception,  I  ordered 
only  the  personal  staff  and  the  adjutant-general  with  the 
chief  surgeon  to  accompany  me,  leaving  out  the  adminis 
trative  officers  of  both  quartermaster's  and  commissary's 
departments. 

When  the  parade  was  formed,  I  took  my  place  with  my 
staff  at  the  right  of  the  line,  and,  as  upon  a  review,  rode 
slowly  down  the  whole  line,  on  the  inside  of  the  square. 


WINTER-QUARTERS  151 

In  going  along  the  front  of  the  First  Kentucky,  I  took 
especial  pains  to  meet  the  eyes  of  the  men  as  they  were 
turned  to  me  in  passing,  desirous  of  impressing  them  with 
my  own  feeling  that  it  was  a  solemn  but  inevitable  duty. 
Immediately  after  we  returned  to  our  places,  the  music  of 
the  dead-march  was  heard,  and  an  ambulance  was  seen  ap 
proaching  from  the  camp,  escorted  by  the  provost-marshal 
and  the  execution  party  with  the  music.  The  solemn 
strains,  the  slow  funereal  step  of  the  soldiers,  the  closed 
ambulance,  the  statue-like  stillness  of  the  paraded  troops 
made  an  impression  deeper  and  more  awful  than  a  battle 
scene,  because  the  excitement  was  hushed  and  repressed. 
The  ambulance  stopped,  the  man  was  helped  out  at  the 
back,  and  led  by  the  provost-marshal  to  his  place  upon 
the  coffin,  where  he  was  blindfolded.  The  firing  party 
silently  took  its  place.  The  muskets  were  cocked  and 
aimed,  while  the  noise  of  the  retiring  ambulance  covered 
the  sound.  The  provost-marshal,  with  a  merciful  deception, 
told  the  prisoner  he  must  wait  a  moment  and  he  would 
return  to  him  before  the  final  order,  but  stepping  quickly 
out  of  the  range  of  the  muskets,  he  gave  the  signal  with 
his  handkerchief,  and  the  man  fell  dead  at  the  volley, 
which  sounded  like  a  single  discharge.  The  detail  of 
soldiers  for  the  firing  had  been  carefully  instructed  that 
steadiness  and  accuracy  made  the  most  merciful  way  of 
doing  their  unwelcome  duty.  The  surgeon  made  his 
official  inspection  of  the  body,  which  was  placed  in  the 
coffin  and  removed  in  the  ambulance.  The  drums  and 
fifes  broke  the  spell  with  quick  marching  music,  the  regi 
ments  took  their  arms,  sharp  words  of  command  rattled 
along  the  lines,  which  broke  by  platoons  into  column  and 
moved  rapidly  off  the  field. 

I  confess  it  was  a  relief  to  have  the  painful  task  ended, 
and  especially  to  have  it  ended  in  the  most  perfect  order 
and  discipline.  The  moral  effect  was  very  great,  for  our 
men  were  so  intelligent  that  they  fully  appreciated  the 


I  $2          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

judicial  character  of  the  act,  and  the  imposing  solemnity 
of  the  parade  and  execution  made  the  impression  all  the 
more  profound.  As  it  was  accompanied  and  followed  by 
a  searching  test  of  the  capacity  and  character  of  their 
officers,  of  which  they  daily  saw  the  effects  in  the  retire 
ment  of  some  from  the  service  and  in  the  increased  indus 
try  and  studious  devotion  to  duty  of  all,  it  gave  a  new  tone 
to  the  whole  command.  I  spared  no  effort  to  make  the 
feeling  pervade  every  regiment  and  company,  that  the 
cause  of  the  country,  their  own  success  and  honor,  and 
even  their  own  personal  safety  depended  upon  their  enter 
ing  the  next  campaign  with  such  improved  discipline  and 
instruction  as  should  make  them  always  superior  to  an 
equal  number  of  the  enemy.  Leaves  of  absence  and  fur 
loughs  were  limited  as  closely  as  possible,  and  I  set  the 
example  of  remaining  without  interruption  on  duty,  though 
there  were  many  reasons  why  a  visit  home  was  very  desir 
able.  My  wife  made  me  a  visit  at  Charleston  in  mid 
winter,  and  this  naturally  brought  me  into  more  frequent 
social  relations  to  the  people,  and  led  me  to  observe  more 
closely  their  attitude  to  the  government  and  its  cause. 

Before  the  secession  of  Virginia  a  very  large  majority 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Kanawha  valley  were  Unionists ; 
but  the  attachment  to  the  state  organization  had  become 
so  exaggerated  in  all  slave-holding  communities,  that  most 
of  the  well-to-do  people  yielded  to  the  plea  that  they  must 
"  go  with  their  State."  The  same  state  pride  led  this  class 
of  people  to  oppose  the  division  of  Virginia  and  the 
forming  of  the  new  State  on  the  west  of  the  mountains. 
The  better  class  of  society  in  Charleston,  therefore,  as  in 
other  towns,  was  found  to  be  disloyal,  and  in  sympathy 
with  the  rebellion.  The  young  men  were  very  generally 
in  the  Confederate  army;  the  young  women  were  full  of 
the  most  romantic  devotion  to  their  absent  brothers  and 
friends,  and  made  it  a  point  of  honor  to  avow  their  senti 
ments.  The  older  people  were  less  demonstrative,  and 


WINTER-QUARTERS  1 5  3 

the  men  who  had  a  stake  in  the  country  generally  pro 
fessed  acquiescence  in  the  position  of  West  Virginia  within 
the  Union,  and  a  desire  to  bring  back  their  sons  from  the 
Confederate  service.  The  necessity  of  strict  watch  upon 
the  communications  sent  through  the  lines  brought  to  my 
notice  a  great  deal  of  family  history  full  of  suffering  and 
anxiety,  and  showed  that  that  was  indeed  a  fearful  situa 
tion  for  a  family  when  its  young  men  were  not  only  sepa 
rated  from  them  by  military  service  in  the  field,  but  could 
only  be  heard  from  by  the  infrequent  chances  of  com 
munication  under  flags  of  truce,  and  with  all  the  restric 
tions  and  reserves  necessary  to  the  method.  The  rule  I 
adopted  in  dealing  personally  with  non-combatants  of 
either  sex  was  to  avoid  all  controversy  or  discussion,  to 
state  with  perfect  frankness  but  courteously  my  own  atti 
tude  and  sense  of  duty,  and  to  apply  all  such  stringent 
rules  as  a  state  of  war  compels  with  an  evenness  of  temper 
and  tone  of  dispassionate  government  which  should  make 
as  little  chafing  as  possible.  Most  intelligent  people,  when 
they  are  not  doited,  are  disposed  to  recognize  the  obli 
gations  imposed  upon  a  military  officer  in  such  circum 
stances,  and  it  was  rarely  the  case  that  any  unpleasant 
collisions  occurred. 

The  following  incident  will  illustrate  some  of  the  embar 
rassments  likely  to  occur.  When  I  reached  Charleston  in 
July  previous,  I  was  visited  by  the  wife  of  a  gentleman 
named  Parks,  who  told  me  that  her  husband  had  left  the 
valley  with  General  Wise,  but  not  in  any  military  capacity, 
being  fearful  that  he  might  suffer  arrest  at  our  hands  on 
account  of  his  sympathy  with  the  Confederates.  I  told 
her,  what  I  had  told  to  a  formal  deputation  of  citizens, 
that  I  did  not  propose  to  meddle  with  non-combatants 
if  they  in  good  faith  remained  at  home,  minding  their  own 
business,  and  carefully  abstaining  from  giving  aid  or  infor 
mation  to  the  enemy.  I  had,  on  general  principles,  a  dis 
like  for  test  oaths,  and  preferred  to  make  conduct  the  test, 


154          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

and  to  base  my  treatment  of  people  on  that,  rather  than 
on  oaths  which  the  most  unscrupulous  would  be  first  to 
take.  Had  her  husband  known  this,  she  said,  he  would 
not  have  left  home,  and  begged  that  she  might  be  allowed 
to  send  an  open  letter  through  the  lines  to  him  to  bring 
him  back.  I  allowed  her  to  do  so  at  the  first  proper 
opportunity,  and  Mr.  Parks  at  once  returned.  In  the 
latter  part  of  September,  however,  Governor  Peirpoint  of 
West  Virginia  thought  it  necessary  to  arrest  some  promi 
nent  citizens,  known  as  Secessionists,  and  hold  them  as 
hostages  for  Union  men  that  the  Confederate  troops  had 
seized  and  sent  to  Richmond.  It  happened  that  Mr. 
Parks  was  arrested  as  one  of  these  hostages,  without  any 
knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  civil  authorities  of  the  cir 
cumstances  under  which  he  had  returned  home.  I  was 
ignorant  of  his  arrest  till  I  received  a  letter  from  the  lady, 
complaining  bitterly  of  what  seemed  to  her  a  breach  of 
faith.  I  was  at  Sewell  Mountain  at  the  time,  but  lost  no 
time  in  writing  her  a  careful  explanation  of  the  complete 
disconnection  between  his  arrest  by  the  civil  authorities  as 
a  hostage,  and  a  promise  of  non-interference  with  him  on 
my  part  as  an  officer  of  the  United  States  army.  I  also 
showed  her  that  the  arrest  of  non-combatant  Union  men  by 
the  Confederate  forces  was  the  real  cause  of  her  husband's 
unpleasant  predicament.  In  view  of  the  circumstances, 
however,  I  thought  it  right  to  request  the  Governor  to 
substitute  some  other  hostage  for  Mr.  Parks,  so  that  there 
might  not  be  the  least  question  whether  the  letter  or  the 
spirit  of  my  military  safeguard  had  been  broken,  and  the 
result  was  that  the  gentleman  was  very  soon  at  home  again. 
The  most  prominent  citizen  of  the  valley  was  the  Hon. 
George  Summers,  who  had  represented  it  in  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States,  and  had  opposed  secession  in  the 
Virginia  Convention  with  a  vigor  that  had  brought  him 
into  personal  peril.  When,  however,  secession  was  an 
accomplished  fact,  his  ideas  of  allegiance  to  his  State  so 


WINTER-QUARTERS  155 

far  influenced  him  that  he  was  unwilling  to  take  active 
part  in  public  affairs,  and  sought  absolute  retirement  at 
his  pleasant  home  a  little  below  Charleston  on  the  Kanawha. 
His  house  was  on  a  hill  overlooking  the  beautiful  valley, 
broad  enough  at  this  point  to  give  room  for  ample  fields  in 
the  rich  bottom  lands.  I  had  called  upon  him,  as  I  passed 
with  my  troops  when  I  went  up  the  valley.  He  was  a  dig 
nified  and  able  man,  just  past  middle  life,  but  in  full 
physical  and  mental  force,  and  capable  of  exerting  a  very 
great  influence  if  he  could  have  thrown  himself  heartily 
into  public  activity.  But  he  was  utterly  saddened  and  de 
pressed  by  the  outbreak  of  civil  war,  and  deliberately  chose 
the  part  of  suffering  in  seclusion  whatever  it  might  bring, 
unable  to  rouse  himself  to  a  combative  part.  As  a  slave 
holder,  he  was  bitter  against  the  anti-slavery  movement, 
and  as  a  Unionist  he  condemned  the  Secessionists.  He 
was  very  glad  to  have  the  Kanawha  valley  in  the  posses 
sion  of  the  National  troops,  now  that  Wise  had  made  the 
effort  to  occupy  it  for  the  Confederacy;  though  he  had 
tried  to  procure  the  adoption  of  a  policy  which  should 
leave  it  neutral  ground,  —  a  policy  as  impossible  here  as  in 
Kentucky.  The  result  was  that  he  was  distrusted  by  both 
sides,  for  in  civil  war  each  acts  upon  the  maxim  that  "  he 
that  is  not  for  us  is  against  us."  I  renewed  my  acquaint 
ance  with  him  in  the  winter,  making  his  house  the  limit  of 
an  occasional  ride  for  exercise.  I  appreciated  his  feelings, 
and  respected  his  desire  to  set  an  example  of  obedient 
private  citizenship  with  renunciation  of  all  other  or  more 
active  influence. 

There  were  other  men  of  social  prominence  who  had 
less  hesitation  in  throwing  themselves  actively  upon  the 
National  side.  Mr.  Patrick  was  an  elderly  man,  of  con 
siderable  wealth,  whose  home  was  a  very  similar  one 
to  Mr.  Summers',  a  little  nearer  to  Charleston  upon 
the  same  road.  His  wife  was  of  old  Virginia  stock, 
a  relative  of  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  and  a  pronounced 


156          REMINISCENCES   OF   THE    CWIL    WAR 

Southern  woman,  though  too  good  a  wife  to  make  her 
sympathies  give  annoyance  to  her  husband  or  his  guests. 
Lewis  Ruffner  was  also  a  prominent  Union  man,  and 
among  the  leaders  of  the  movement  to  make  West  Vir 
ginia  a  separate  State.  Mr.  Doddridge,  long  the  cashier 
and  manager  of  the  Bank  at  Charleston,  whose  family 
was  an  old  and  well-known  one,  was  an  outspoken  Union 
ist,  and  in  the  next  year,  when  the  war  put  an  end  for 
the  time  to  banking  in  the  valley,  he  became  a  paymaster 
in  the  National  army.  Colonel  Benjamin  F.  Smith  was 
a  noteworthy  character  also.  He  was  a  leading  lawyer, 
a  man  of  vigorous  and  aggressive  character,  and  of  tough 
fibre  both  physically  and  mentally.  He  shared  the  wish 
of  Summers  to  keep  West  Virginia  out  of  the  conflict  if 
possible,  but  when  we  had  driven  Wise  out  of  the  valley, 
he  took  a  pronounced  position  in  favor  of  the  new  state 
movement.  A  little  afterward  he  was  appointed  District 
Attorney  for  the  United  States.  Although  the  loyal 
people  had  such  competent  leaders,  the  majority  of  the 
men  of  wealth  and  of  the  families  recognized  as  socially 
eminent  were  avowed  Secessionists.  They  were  a  small 
minority  of  the  whole  people,  but  in  all  slave-holding 
communities  social  rank  is  so  powerful  that  their  influence 
was  out  of  proportion  to  their  numbers.  Even  the  lead 
ers  of  the  Unionists  found  their  own  "  house  divided 
against  itself,"  for  scarce  one  of  them  but  had  a  son  in 
Wise's  legion,  and  the  Twenty-second  Virginia  Regiment 
was  largely  composed  of  the  young  men  of  Charleston 
and  the  vicinity.  I  have  already  referred  to  the  journal 
of  Major  Smith  which  fell  into  my  hands  as  "  captured 
rebel  mail,"  and  its  pages  are  full  of  pathetic  evidence 
of  the  conflicting  emotions  which  such  a  situation  excited. 
He  was  the  son  of  B.  F.  Smith,  whom  I  have  just  men 
tioned,  and  whilst  in  Floyd's  camp  in  front  of  us  at 
Sewell  Mountain  he  wrote :  "  My  source  of  constant 
trouble  is  that  my  father  will  be  in  danger.  Wicked  and 


WINTER-QUARTERS  157 

unscrupulous  men,  with  whom  he  has  lived  in  friendship 
for  years,  absolutely  thirst  for  his  blood,  as  I  truly  be 
lieve.  He  and  Summers,  as  one  of  their  friends  remarked 
to  me  to-day,  are  especial  objects  of  hatred  and  aversion 
to  men  here.  I  am  actually  leading  a  set  of  men  one 
of  whose  avowed  objects  is  the  arrest  and  the  judicial 
or  lynch  murder  of  my  father !  "  In  the  next  month  he 
heard  "  the  startling  news "  that  his  father  had  fully 
identified  himself  with  the  new  state  movement,  and 
writes :  "  Those  with  whom  I  was  connected,  call  and 
curse  him  as  a  traitor,  —  and  he  knew  it  would  be  so ! 
Why  my  dear  father  has  chosen  to  place  me  in  this 
terrible  situation  is  beyond  my  comprehension.  I  have 
been  shocked  beyond  description  in  contemplating  the 
awful  consequences  to  the  peace,  safety,  and  happiness 
of  both  of  us !  "  The  family  distress  and  grief  revealed 
by  accident  in  this  case  is  only  an  example  of  what  was 
common  in  all  the  families  of  prominent  Union  men. 
In  some  cases,  as  in  that  of  Major  Smith,  the  young  men 
resigned  their  commissions  and  made  their  way  home, 
finding  the  mental  and  moral  strain  too  great  to  bear; 
but  in  many  more,  pride  and  the  influence  of  comrades 
kept  them  in  the  Confederate  service  with  the  enlisted 
men  who  could  not  resign,  and  with  hearts  sorely  torn 
by  conflicting  duties,  they  fought  it  out  to  the  end. 

The  slavery  question  was  the  vexed  one  which  troubled 
the  relations  of  the  army  and  the  people  in  all  the  border 
States.  My  own  position  was  that  of  the  party  which 
had  elected  Mr.  Lincoln.  We  disclaimed  any  purpose 
of  meddling  with  the  institution  in  the  States  which  re 
mained  loyal  to  the  Union,  whilst  we  held  it  to  be  within 
the  war  powers  of  the  government  to  abolish  it  in  the 
rebellious  States.  We  also  took  satisfaction  in  enforc 
ing  the  law  which  freed  the  "  contrabands "  who  were 
employed  by  their  masters  in  any  service  within  the 
Confederate  armies.  These  principles  were  generally 


158          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

understood  and  acquiesced  in  by  the  West  Virginians; 
but  it  was  impossible  to  come  to  any  agreement  in 
regard  to  fugitive  slaves  who  took  refuge  in  our  camps. 
The  soldiers  and  many  of  the  officers  would  encourage 
the  negroes  to  assert  their  freedom,  and  would  resist 
attempts  to  recapture  them.  The  owners,  if  Union  men, 
would  insist  that  the  fugitives  should  be  apprehended 
and  restored  to  them  by  military  authority.  This  was 
simply  impossible,  for  the  public  sentiment  of  the  army 
as  a  whole  was  so  completely  with  the  slaves  that  any 
such  order  would  have  been  evaded  and  made  a  farcical 
dead  letter.  The  commanders  who  made  such  orders 
uniformly  suffered  from  doing  it;  for  the  temper  of  the 
volunteer  army  was  such  that  the  orders  were  looked  upon 
as  evidence  of  sympathy  with  the  rebellion,  and  destroyed 
the  usefulness  of  the  general  by  creating  an  incurable 
distrust  of  him  among  his  own  men.  Yet  nearly  all  the 
department  commanders  felt  obliged  at  first,  by  what 
they  regarded  as  the  letter  of  the  law,  to  order  that  fugi 
tive  slaves  claimed  by  loyal  citizens  should  be  arrested, 
if  within  the  camps,  and  delivered  up. 

Within  the  district  of  the  Kanawha  I  tried  to  avoid 
the  difficulty  by  stringent  orders  that  slaves  should  be 
kept  out  of  the  camps;  but  I  declined  to  order  the 
troops  to  arrest  and  return  them.  I  had  two  little  con 
troversies  on  the  subject,  and  in  both  of  them  I  had  to 
come  in  collision  with  Colonel  Benjamin  Smith.  After 
they  were  over  we  became  good  friends,  but  the  facts 
are  too  important  an  illustration  of  the  war-time  and  its 
troubles  to  be  omitted. 

The  first  raised  the  question  of  "  contraband."  A 
negro  man  was  brought  into  my  camp  by  my  advance- 
guard  as  we  were  following  Floyd  to  Sewell  Mountain  in 
September.  He  was  the  body-servant  of  Major  Smith, 
and  had  deserted  the  major,  with  the  intention  of  getting 
back  to  his  family  at  Charleston.  In  our  camp  he  soon 


WINTER-QUARTERS  159 

learned  that  he  was  free,  under  the  Act  of  Congress,  and 
he  remained  with  us,  the  servants  about  headquarters 
giving  him  food.  When  I  returned  to  Gauley  Bridge, 
Mr.  Smith  appeared  and  demanded  the  return  of  the 
man  to  him,  claiming  him  as  his  slave.  He,  however, 
admitted  that  he  had  been  servant  to  Major  Smith  in 
the  rebel  army  with  his  consent.  The  man  refused  to 
go  with  him,  and  I  refused  to  use  compulsion,  inform 
ing  Mr.  Smith  that  the  Act  of  Congress  made  him  free. 
The  claimant  then  went  to  General  Rosecrans,  and  I  was 
surprised  by  the  receipt,  shortly  after,  of  a  note  from 
headquarters  directing  the  giving  up  of  the  man.1  On 
my  stating  the  facts  the  matter  was  dropped,  and  I 
heard  no  more  of  it  for  a  month,  the  man  meanwhile 
disappearing.  Soon  after  my  headquarters  were  moved 
to  Charleston,  in  December,  I  received  another  note  from 
headquarters,  again  directing  the  delivery  of  the  fugitive.2 
Again  I  gave  a  temperate  and  clear  statement  of  the 
facts,  adding  that  I  had  reason  to  believe  the  man  had 
now  taken  advantage  of  his  liberty  to  go  to  Ohio.  Mr. 
Smith's  case  thus  ended,  but  it  left  him  with  a  good 
deal  of  irritation  at  what  he  thought  a  wrong  done  to 
him  as  well  as  insubordination  on  my  part. 

In  March  following,  another  case  arose,  and  I  received 
a  paper  from  headquarters  containing  an  alleged  state 
ment  of  the  facts,  and  referred  to  me  in  usual  course 
for  report.  I  had  been  absent  from  Charleston  when 
the  incidents  occurred,  but  made  careful  inquiry  satis 
fying  myself  of  the  truth,  and  perhaps  cannot  give  an 
intelligent  explanation  better  than  by  quoting  the  report 
itself,  for  its  tone  shows  the  sort  of  annoyance  I  felt, 
and  it  exhibits  some  of  the  conditions  of  an  army  com 
mand  involving  administrative  duties  that  were  far  from 
pleasant. 

1  Letter  of  Major  Darr,  acting  A.  A.  G.,  November  18. 

2  Letter  of  Captain  Hartsuff,  A.  A.  G.,  December  13. 


160          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

I  said :  "  The  document  is  in  the  handwriting  of 
B.  F.  Smith,  Esq.,  U.  S.  District  Attorney,  residing  here, 
though  signed  only  by  John  Slack,  Jr.,  and  William 
Kelly;  the  former  an  acting  deputy  U.  S.  marshal,  the 
latter  the  jailer  at  the  county  jail.  Its  composition  is  so 
peculiar  that  it  is  difficult  to  tell  what  part  of  the  statement 
is  Slack's  or  Kelly's  and  what  is  Colonel  Smith's,  and 
therefore  I  do  not  know  whom  to  hold  responsible  for  the 
mis-statements  contained  in  it. 

"  Mr.  Slack  is  a  respectable  young  man,  who  I  believe 
would  do  his  duty  as  far  as  he  understands  it,  but  who  has 
not  energy  enough  to  keep  him  from  being  the  tool  of 
others.  Mr.  Kelly,  the  jailer,  is  sufficiently  described  when 
I  state  the  fact  that  he  has  attempted  to  add  to  his  profits 
as  turnkey  by  selling  bad  whisky  to  soldiers  put  in  his 
calaboose,  at  the  rate  of  five  dollars  per  pint  bottle.  Mr. 
Smith,  the  District  Attorney,  has  lost  no  opportunity  of 
being  annoying  to  the  military  officers  here,  since  the 
controversy  about  the  negro  man  captured  from  his 
son,  Major  Isaac  Smith  of  the  rebel  army.  This  refer 
ence  to  the  parties  concerned  is  necessary  to  enable  the 
commanding  general  to  understand  the  animus  of  their 
complaints. 

"The  facts  are  substantially  as  follows:  Henry  H. 
Hopkins  is  a  notorious  Secessionist  living  near  Coal  River, 
and  a  man  of  considerable  property.  Some  time  before 
his  arrest  he  sent  the  negro  man  mentioned  in  the  com 
plaint  South,  in  charge  of  some  Logan  County  '  bush 
whackers.'  On  his  way  and  in  McDowell  County  the 
man  managed  to  escape  and  returned  into  Hopkins's 
neighborhood,  near  Boone  C.  H.,  where  he  took  his  wife 
and  three  children  alleged  to  have  been  the  property  of 
a  woman  named  Smoot,  and  brought  them  to  this  post. 
Upon  his  representation  that  he  had  escaped  from  armed 
rebels  in  McDowell  County,  and  without  further  knowl 
edge  of  the  facts,  the  Post  Quartermaster  set  him  at  work. 


WINTER-QUARTERS  l6l 

About  the  iQth  of  February  Hopkins  came  to  town  with 
Mrs.  Smoot,  and  without  notice  to  the  quartermaster 
or  any  color  of  authority  by  any  civil  process,  procured 
the  aid  of  Kelly,  the  jailer,  seized  the  negro  and  took  him 
to  Wright's  hotel.  The  provost-marshal,  knowing  that 
Hopkins  was  an  active  Secessionist  and  that  he  had  been 
personally  engaged  in  the  combat  at  Boone  C.  H.  last  fall, 
ordered  his  arrest.  Shortly  after,  he  was  waited  upon  by 
B.  F.  Smith,  Esq.,  U.  S.  District  Attorney,  who  stated 
that  he  had  known  Mr.  Hopkins  for  a  good  many  years 
and  was  confident  he  was  a  good  Union  man,  although  in 
fact  the  deputy-marshal  at  the  very  time  held  a  warrant 
for  the  arrest  of  Hopkins  for  treason  and  conspiracy, 
under  an  indictment  found  in  the  U.  S.  Court,  of  which, 
to  say  the  least  of  it,  it  is  very  strange  Mr.  Smith  should 
have  been  ignorant.  At  the  request  of  the  provost- 
marshal,  the  warrant  was  served  on  Hopkins,  who  was 
admitted  to  bail  in  the  sum  of  $2000,  which  is  most  inad 
equate  security  for  the  appearance  of  a  man  of  Hopkins's 
wealth  and  influence,  accused  of  such  a  crime.  After  the 
arrest  of  Hopkins,  the  negro  being  left  to  himself  returned 
to  his  quarters,  but  sometime  during  the  night  stole  a 
skiff  and  attempted  to  escape  with  his  family  down  the 
Kanawha  River.  The  circumstances  of  his  accident  in  the 
river,  the  drowning  of  his  family  and  his  subsequent  cap 
ture,  I  have  not  been  able  to  investigate  fully. 

"  The  only  matter  of  controversy  now  is  in  regard  to 
the  horse.  The  bar-keeper  at  the  tavern  denies  that  he 
has  said  it  was  taken  by  Wagon-master  West  (a  man  who 
has  since  been  discharged  by  the  Post  Quartermaster), 
and  I  have  been  unable  to  trace  it,  although  every  effort 
has  been  made  in  perfect  good  faith  to  do  so.  The  man 
West  was  put  under  arrest,  to  see  if  that  would  make  him 
admit  anything  with  regard  to  it,  but  without  effect.  I 
advised  Slack  to  procure  some  one  who  knew  the  horse 
to  pass  through  the  government  stables  and  teams,  and  if 

VOL.  I.  —  II 


1 62          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

he  recognized  the  animal  to  let  me  know  at  once,  and  I 
would  give  an  order  to  him  to  obtain  it.  The  statement 
that  '  Slack  says  he  told  Cox  he  could  not  find  him,  that 
a  soldier  or  employee  in  his  command  got  him,  and  if 
proper  measures  were  taken  he  could  be  had,'  is  both 
impudent  and  false,  and  I  respectfully  submit  that  it  is 
not,  in  matter  or  manner,  such  a  complaint  as  the  Com 
manding  General  should  call  upon  me  to  reply  to. 

"The  statement  of  these  civil  officials  at  once  gives  me 
the  opportunity  and  makes  it  my  duty  to  state  to  the 
Commanding  General  that  the  only  occasions  on  which 
these  gentlemen  show  any  vitality,  is  when  some  Seces 
sionist's  runaway  negroes  are  to  be  caught.  For  any  pur 
pose  of  ordinary  municipal  magistracy  they  seem  utterly 
incompetent.  I  have  urged  the  organization  of  the  county 
and  of  the  town,  but  to  no  effect.  Every  street  that  is 
mended,  every  bridge  that  is  repaired,  or  wharf  that  is 
put  in  order,  must  be  done  by  the  army  at  the  expense 
of  the  U.  S.  government.  They  will  not  elect  officers  to 
look  after  the  poor,  but  leave  us  to  feed  the  starving  near 
our  camps.  They  will  establish  no  police,  and  by  force 
of  public  opinion  keep  suitors  out  of  the  courts  ordered 
to  be  held  by  Governor  Peirpoint.  Yet  a  U.  S.  Commis 
sioner,  without  any  warrant  or  even  pretended  jurisdiction, 
will  stop  any  vagrant  negro,  drive  him  through  the  streets 
in  person,  and  say  that  he  does  it  as  a  U.  S.  officer !  Of 
course  we  simply  look  on  and  have  had  no  controversy 
with  them,  unless  driven  to  it  by  direct  efforts  on  their 
part  to  interfere  with  our  necessary  regulations. 

"  The  simple  fact  is  that  a  few  men  of  property  who  are 
avowed  Secessionists  control  the  town  and  make  its  public 
sentiment.  By  this  means  they  practically  control  these 
officers  also.  Many  of  the  negroes  employed  at  the  salt 
works,  and  under  hire  in  other  capacities  in  the  vicin 
ity,  are  the  slaves  of  rebels  who  are  either  in  the  rebel 
army  or  fled  with  ft  from  the  valley.  The  great  problem 


WINTER-QUARTERS  163 

upon  which  the  Secessionists  remaining  here  are  exercis 
ing  their  ingenuity  is  to  find  the  means  of  using  the  U.  S. 
Commissioner  and  Marshal  to  secure  to  them  the  services 
of  these  persons  without  cost  or  legitimate  contract  of 
hiring,  for  the  present  profit  of  these  gentlemen  here, 
and  the  future  advantage  of  their  compatriots  across  the 
lines. 

"  Colonel  Smith  and  Mr.  Slack  say  that  they  made 
the  statement  at  the  express  request  of  Major  Darr  of  the 
Commanding  General's  staff.  A  simple  inquiry  by  the 
Major  would  have  saved  me  the  necessity  of  writing  this 
long  letter." 

It  is  due  to  General  Rosecrans  to  say  that  although  he 
had  been  anything  but  an  anti-slavery  man  before  the 
war,  he  made  no  pressure  upon  me  to  violate  my  own 
sense  of  right  in  these  or  similar  cases,  and  they  ended 
with  my  reports  of  the  facts  and  of  my  reasons  for  the 
course  I  pursued.  The  side  lights  thrown  upon  the  situa 
tion  by  the  letter  last  quoted  will  be  more  instructive  than 
any  analysis  I  could  now  give,  and  the  spice  of  flavor 
which  my  evident  annoyance  gave  it  only  helps  to  revive 
more  perfectly  the  local  color  of  the  time.  In  the  case 
of  Mr.  Smith's  "  negro  boy  Mike,"  I  had  the  satisfaction 
of  finding  in  the  intercepted  correspondence  of  his  son 
the  major,  the  express  recognition  of  the  man's  right  to 
liberty  by  reason  of  his  use  in  the  enemy's  service,  and 
could  not  deny  myself  the  pleasure  of  calling  attention 
to  it  in  my  letters  to  headquarters. 

My  experience  during  the  winter  begot  in  me  a  rooted 
dislike  for  the  military  administration  of  the  border  dis 
tricts,  and  strengthened  my  wish  to  be  in  the  most  active 
work  at  the  front,  where  the  problems  were  the  strictly 
military  ones  of  attack  and  defence  in  the  presence  of  the 
armed  enemy.1  Not  that  the  winter  was  without  compen- 

1  I  did  not  lack  evidence  that  a  steady  rule,  based  on  principles  frankly 
avowed  and  easily  understood,  was  rapidly  bringing  the  people  to  be  content 


1 64          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

sating  pleasures,  for  we  were  recipients  of  much  social 
attention  of  a  very  kindly  and  agreeable  sort,  and  carried 
away  cherished  memories  of  refined  family  circles  in  which 
the  collision  of  opinions  and  the  chafing  of  official  rela 
tions  were  forgotten  in  hearty  efforts  to  please.  With  the 
unconditionally  loyal  people  our  sympathies  were  very 
deep,  for  we  found  them  greatly  torn  and  disturbed  in  the 
conflict  of  duties  and  divided  affections,  where  scarce  a 
single  household  stood  as  a  unit  in  devotion  to  the  cause, 
and  where  the  triumph  of  either  side  must  necessarily 
bring  affliction  to  some  of  them. 

to  be  in  the  Union,  even  those  most  inclined  to  secession.  This  result  I  am 
gratified  to  find  attested  by  General  Lee  and  General  Floyd,  who  in  dis 
patches  very  lately  printed  confessed  the  effect  my  administration  had  in 
quieting  the  valley  during  the  first  months  of  my  occupation.  O.  R.,  vol.  li. 
pt.  ii.  pp.  220,  225. 


CHAPTER  IX 

VOLUNTEERS   AND    REGULARS 

High  quality  of  first  volunteers  —  Discipline  milder  than  that  of  the  regulars 

—  Reasons  for  the  difference — Practical  efficiency  of  the  men—  Neces 
sity  for  sifting  the  officers  —  Analysis  of  their  defects  —  What  is  military 
aptitude  ?  —  Diminution  of  number  in  ascending  scale  —  Effect  of  age  — 
Of  former  life  and  occupation  —  Embarrassments  of  a  new  business  — 
Quick  progress  of  the  right  class  of  young  men  —  Political  appointments 

—  Professional  men  —  Political  leaders  naturally  prominent  in  a  civil  war 

—  "  Cutting  and  trying  "  —  Dishonest  methods  —  An  excellent  army  at 
the  end  of  a  year  —  The   regulars  in  1861 —  Entrance  examinations  for 
West  Point  —  The  curriculum  there  —  Drill  and  experience — Its  limita 
tions  —  Problems   peculiar   to   the  vast   increase  of  the  army  —  Ultra- 
conservatism  —  Attitude  toward  the  Lincoln  administration  —  "  Point  de 
zele  "  —  Lack  of  initiative  —  Civil  work  of  army  engineers  —  What  is 
military  art  ?  —  Opinions  of  experts  —  Military  history  —  European  armies 
in  the  Crimean  War  —  True  generalship  —  Anomaly  of  a  double  army 
organization. 

THE  work  of  sifting  the  material  for  an  army  which 
went  on  through  the  winter  of  1861-62,  naturally 
suggests  an  analysis  of  the  classes  of  men  who  composed 
both  parts  of  the  military  force  of  the  nation,  — the  vol 
unteers  and  the  regulars.  I  need  add  nothing  to  what  I 
have  already  said  of  the  unexampled  excellence  of  the 
rank  and  file  in  the  regiments  raised  by  the  first  volun 
teering.  Later  in  the  war,  when  "bounty  jumping"  and 
substitution  for  conscripts  came  into  play,  the  character 
of  the  material,  especially  that  recruited  in  the  great 
cities  and  seaports,  was  much  lower.  I  think,  however, 
that  the  volunteers  were  always  better  men,  man  for  man, 
than  the  average  of  those  recruited  for  the  regular  army. 
The  rigidity  of  discipline  did  not  differ  so  much  between 
good  volunteer  regiments  and  regulars,  as  the  mode  of 


1 66        REMINISCENCES   OF  THE    CIVIL    IV A  R 

enforcing  it.  There  were  plenty  of  volunteer  regiments 
that  could  not  be  excelled  in  drill,  in  the  performance  of 
camp  duty,  or  in  the  finish  and  exactness  of  all  the  forms 
of  parades  and  of  routine.  But  it  was  generally  brought 
about  by  much  milder  methods  of  discipline.  A  captain 
of  volunteers  was  usually  followed  by  his  neighbors  and 
relatives.  The  patriotic  zeal  of  the  men  of  the  company 
as  well  as  their  self-respect  made  them  easily  amenable 
to  military  rule  so  far  as  it  tended  to  fit  them  better  to 
do  the  noble  work  they  had  volunteered  for,  and  on  which 
their  hearts  were  as  fully  set  as  the  hearts  of  their  colo 
nels  or  generals.  In  the  regular  army,  officers  and  men 
belonged  to  different  castes,  and  a  practically  impassable 
barrier  was  between  them.  Most  of  the  men  who  had 
enlisted  in  the  long  years  of  domestic  peace  were,  for 
one  cause  or  another,  outcasts,  to  whom  life  had  been  a 
failure  and  who  followed  the  recruiting  sergeant  as  a  last 
desperate  resource  when  every  other  door  to  a  livelihood 
was  shut.1  The  war  made  some  change  in  this,  but  the 
habits  and  methods  of  the  officers  had  been  formed  before 
that  time  and  under  the  old  surroundings.  The  rule  was 
arbitrary,  despotic,  often  tyrannical,  and  it  was  notorious 
that  the  official  bearing  and  the  language  used  toward  the 
regular  soldiers  was  out  of  the  question  in  a  volunteer 
organization.  Exceptions  could  be  found  in  both  parts 
of  the  service,  but  there  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  cus 
tom  and  the  rule.  To  know  how  to  command  volunteers 
was  explicitly  recognized  by  our  leading  generals  as  a 
quality  not  found  in  many  regular  officers,  and  worth 
noting  when  found.  A  volunteer  regiment  might  have  a 
"free  and  easy"  look  to  the  eye  of  a  regular  drill  ser 
geant,  but  in  every  essential  for  good  conduct  and  ready 

?•  Since  inducements  to  enlist  have  been  increased  by  offering  the  chance 
to  win  a  commission,  I  believe  the  quality  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  regu 
lars  has  been  much  improved,  and  as  a  natural  consequence  the  officers  have 
found  it  easy  to  enforce  discipline  by  less  arbitrary  methods. 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS  1 67 

manoeuvre  on  the  field  of  battle,  or  for  heroic  efforts  in 
the  crisis  of  a  desperate  engagement,  it  could  not  be 
excelled  if  its  officers  had  been  reasonably  competent  and 
faithful.  There  was  inevitable  loss  of  time  in  the  organ 
ization  and  instruction  of  a  new  army  of  volunteers;  but 
after  the  first  year  in  the  field,  in  every  quality  which 
tends  to  give  victory  in  battle  to  a  popular  cause,  the 
volunteer  regiment  was,  in  my  judgment,  unquestionably 
superior.  It  is  necessary  to  say  this,  because  there  has 
been  a  fashion  of  speaking  of  regular  regiments  or  bri 
gades  in  the  civil  war  as  though  they  were  capable  of 
accomplishing  more  in  proportion  to  their  numbers  or 
on  some  occasion  of  peculiar  peril  than  the  volunteers. 
I  did  not  find  it  so. 

The  material  in  the  line,  then,  was  as  good  as  could 
be ;  the  weakness  was  in  the  officers,  and  it  was  here  that 
the  sifting  was  necessary.  Most  of  these  officers  had 
themselves  enlisted  as  privates,  and  their  patriotic  zeal 
was  not  to  be  questioned.  They  had  been  chosen  to  be 
lieutenants,  captains,  and  even  colonels  by  their  men 
because  of  faith  in  their  ability  to  lead,  or  to  recognize 
their  influence  in  raising  the  troops.  Yet  a  consider 
able  part  of  them  proved  incompetent  to  command.  The 
disqualifications  were  various.  Some  lacked  physical 
strength  and  stamina.  Some  had  or  quickly  developed 
intemperate  habits.  Some  lacked  the  education  and  in 
telligence  needful  for  official  responsibility.  Some  were 
too  indolent  to  apply  themselves  to  the  work  of  disciplin 
ing  themselves  or  their  men.  Fitness  for  command  is  a 
very  general  term,  yet  it  implies  a  set  of  qualities  which 
intelligent  people  easily  understand  and  attach  to  the 
phrase.  Self-command  is  proverbially  one  of  the  chief. 
Courage  and  presence  of  mind  are  indispensable.  Abil 
ity  to  decide  and  firmness  to  stick  to  a  decision  are 
necessary.  Intelligence  enough  to  understand  the  duties 
demanded  of  him  and  to  instruct  his  subordinates  in 


1 68          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

theirs  is  another  requisite.  But  beside  all  these,  there 
is  a  constitution  of  body  and  mind  for  which  we  can  find 
no  better  name  than  military  aptitude.  For  lack  of  it 
many  estimable,  intelligent,  and  brave  men  failed  as  offi 
cers.  Again,  not  every  good  captain  made  a  good  colonel, 
and  not  every  good  brigade  commander  was  fit  for  a 
division  or  a  larger  command.  There  was  a  constantly 
widening  test  of  capacity,  and  a  rapid  thinning  of  the 
numbers  found  fit  for  great  responsibilities  until  the 
command  of  great  armies  was  reached,  when  two  or  three 
names  are  all  that  we  can  enumerate  as  having  been 
proven  during  the  four  years  of  our  civil  strife  to  be  fully 
equal  to  the  task. 

Besides  the  indications  of  unfitness  for  the  subordinate 
commands  which  I  have  mentioned,  another  classifica 
tion  may  be  made.  In  an  agricultural  community  (and 
the  greater  part  of  our  population  was  and  is  agricul 
tural),  a  middle-aged  farmer  who  had  been  thrifty  in 
business  and  had  been  a  country  magistrate  or  a  repre 
sentative  in  the  legislature,  would  be  the  natural  leader 
in  his  town  or  county,  and  if  his  patriotism  prompted 
him  to  set  the  example  of  enlisting,  he  would  probably 
be  chosen  to  a  company  office,  and  perhaps  to  a  field 
office  in  the  regiment.  Absolutely  ignorant  of  tactics, 
he  would  find  that  his  habits  of  mind  and  body  were  too 
fixed,  and  that  he  could  not  learn  the  new  business  into 
which  he  had  plunged.  He  would  be  abashed  at  the 
very  thought  of  standing  before  a  company  and  shouting 
the  word  of  command.  The  tactical  lessons  conned  in 
his  tent  would  vanish  in  a  sort  of  stage-fright  when  he 
tried  to  practise  them  in  public.  Some  would  overcome 
the  difficulty  by  perseverance,  others  would  give  it  up  in 
despair  and  resign,  still  others  would  hold  on  from  pride 
or  shame,  until  some  pressure  from  above  or  below  would 
force  them  to  retire.  Some  men  of  this  stamp  had  per 
sonal  fighting  qualities  which  kept  them  in  the  service  in 


VOLUNTEERS  AND   REGULARS  169 

spite  of  their  tactical  ignorance,  like  brave  old  Wolford 
of  Kentucky,  of  whom  it  used  to  be  jocosely  said,  that 
the  command  by  which  he  rallied  his  cavalry  regiment 
was  "Huddle  on  the  Hill,  boys!" 

A  man  wholly  without  business  training  would  always 
be  in  embarrassment,  though  his  other  qualifications  for 
military  life  were  good.  Even  a  company  has  a  good 
deal  of  administrative  business  to  do.  Accounts  are  to 
be  kept,  rations,  clothing,  arms,  accoutrements,  and  am 
munition  are  to  be  receipted  and  accounted  for.  Returns 
of  various  kinds  are  to  be  made,  applications  for  furlough, 
musters,  rolls,  and  the  like  make  a  good  deal  of  clerical 
work,  and  though  most  of  it  may  fall  on  the  first  ser 
geant,  the  captain  and  commissioned  officers  must  know 
how  it  should  be  done  and  when  it  is  well  done,  or  they 
are  sure  to  get  into  trouble.  It  was  a  very  rare  thing  for 
a  man  of  middle  age  to  make  a  good  company  officer.  A 
good  many  who  tried  it  at  the  beginning  had  to  be  elimi 
nated  from  the  service  in  one  way  or  another.  In  a  less 
degree  the  same  was  found  to  hold  true  of  the  regimental 
field  officers.  Some  men  retain  flexibility  of  mind  and 
body  longer  than  others,  and  could  more  easily  adapt 
themselves  to  new  circumstances  and  a  new  occupation. 
Of  course  such  would  succeed  best.  But  it  is  also  true 
that  in  the  larger  and  broader  commands  solidity  of 
judgment  and  weight  of  character  were  more  essential 
than  in  the  company,  and  the  experience  of  older  men 
was  a  more  valuable  quality.  Such  reasons  will  account 
for  the  fact  that  youth  seemed  to  be  an  almost  essential 
requisite  for  a  company  officer,  whilst  it  was  not  so  in 
the  same  degree  in  the  higher  positions. 

It  was  astonishing  to  see  the  rapidity  with  which  well- 
educated  and  earnest  young  men  progressed  as  officers. 
They  were  alert  in  both  mind  and  body.  They  quickly 
grasped  the  principles  of  their  new  profession,  and  with 
very  little  instruction  made  themselves  masters  of  tactics 


1 70          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

and  of  administrative  routine.  Add  to  this,  bravery  of 
the  highest  type  and  a  burning  zeal  in  the  cause  they 
were  fighting  for,  and  a  campaign  or  two  made  them  the 
peers  of  any  officers  of  their  grade  in  our  own  or  any 
other  army. 

Another  class  which  cannot  be  omitted  and  which  is 
yet  very  hard  to  define  accurately,  is  that  of  the  "  politi 
cal  appointments." 

Of  the  learned  professions,  the  lawyers  were  of  course 
most  strongly  represented  among  officers  of  the  line. 
The  medical  men  were  so  greatly  needed  in  their  own 
professional  department  that  it  was  hard  to  find  a  suf 
ficient  number  of  suitable  age  and  proper  skill  to  sup 
ply  the  regiments  with  surgeons  and  the  hospitals  with 
a  proper  staff.  The  clergy  were  non-combatants  by 
profession,  and  a  few  only  were  found  in  other  than 
chaplain's  duty.  Civil  engineers,  railroad  contractors, 
architects,  and  manufacturers  were  well  represented  and 
were  valuable  men.  Scarce  any  single  qualification  was 
more  useful  in  organizing  the  army  than  that  of  using 
and  handling  considerable  bodies  of  men  such  as  me 
chanics  and  railway  employees. 

The  profession  of  the  law  is  in  our  country  so  closely 
allied  to  political  activity  that  the  lawyers  who  put  on 
the  uniform  were  most  likely  to  be  classed  among  politi 
cal  appointments.  The  term  was  first  applied  to  men 
like  Banks,  Butler,  Baker,  Logan,  and  Blair,  most  of 
whom  left  seats  in  Congress  to  serve  in  the  army.  If 
they  had  not  done  so,  it  would  have  been  easy  for  critics 
to  say  that  the  prominent  politicians  took  care  to  keep 
their  own  bodies  out  of  harm's  way.  Most  of  them  won 
hard-earned  and  well-deserved  fame  as  able  soldiers  be 
fore  the  war  was  over.  In  an  armed  struggle  which  grew 
out  of  a  great  political  contest,  it  was  inevitable  that 
eager  political  partisans  should  be  among  the  most  active 
in  the  new  volunteer  organizations.  They  called  meet- 


VOLUNTEERS  AND   REGULARS  I/I 

ings,  addressed  the  people  to  rouse  their  enthusiasm, 
urged  enlistments,  and  often  set  the  example  by  enrolling 
their  own  names  first.  It  must  be  kept  constantly  in 
mind  that  we  had  no  militia  organization  that  bore  any 
appreciable  proportion  to  the  greatness  of  the  country's 
need,  and  that  at  any  rate  the  policy  of  relying  upon 
volunteering  at  the  beginning  was  adopted  by  the  gov 
ernment.  It  was  a  foregone  conclusion  that  popular 
leaders  of  all  grades  must  largely  officer  the  new  troops. 
Such  men  might  be  national  leaders  or  leaders  of  country 
neighborhoods;  but  big  or  little,  they  were  the  necessity 
of  the  time.  It  was  the  application  of  the  old  Yankee 
story,  "  If  the  Lord  will  have  a  church  in  Paxton,  he 
must  take  seek  as  tlier  be  for  deacons." 

I  have,  in  a  former  chapter,  given  my  opinion  that  the 
government  made  a  mistake  in  following  General  Scott's 
advice  to  keep  its  regular  army  intact  and  forbid  its  offi 
cers  from  joining  volunteer  regiments;  but  good  or  bad, 
that  advice  was  followed  at  the  beginning,  and  the  only 
possible  thing  to  do  next  was  to  let  popular  selection 
and  natural  leadership  of  any  sort  determine  the  company 
organizations.  The  governors  of  States  generally  fol 
lowed  a  similar  rule  in  the  choice  of  field  officers,  and 
selected  the  general  officers  from  those  in  the  state 
militia,  or  from  former  officers  of  the  army  retired  to 
civil-  life.  In  one  sense,  therefore,  the  whole  organiza 
tion  of  the  volunteer  force  might  be  said  to  be  political, 
though  we  heard  more  of  "political  generals"  than  we 
did  of  political  captains  or  lieutenants.  When  the 
organization  of  the  United  States  Volunteers  took  the 
place  of  the  state  contingents  which  formed  the  "three 
months'  service,"  the  appointments  by  the  President  were 
usually  selections  from  those  acting  already  under  state 
appointment.  The  National  Government  was  more  con 
servative  than  the  Confederacy  in  this  respect.  Our  ser 
vice  was  always  full  of  colonels  doing  duty  as  brigadiers 


1/2          REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

and  brigadiers  doing  duty  as  major-generals,  whilst  the 
Southern  army  usually  had  a  brigadier  for  every  brigade 
and  a  major-general  for  every  division,  with  lieutenant- 
generals  and  generals  for  the  highest  commands.  If 
some  rigid  method  had  been  adopted  for  mustering  out 
all  officers  whom  the  government,  after  a  fair  trial,  was 
unwilling  to  trust  with  the  command  appropriate  to  their 
grade,  there  would  have  been  little  to  complain  of;  but 
an  evil  which  grew  very  great  was  that  men  in  high  rank 
were  kept  upon  the  roster  after  it  was  proven  that  they 
were  incompetent,  and  when  no  army  commander  would 
willingly  receive  them  as  his  subordinates.  Nominal 
commands  at  the  rear  or  of  a  merely  administrative  kind 
were  multiplied,  and  still  many  passed  no  small  part  of 
the  war  "waiting  orders."  As  the  total  number  of  gen 
eral  officers  was  limited  by  law,  it  followed,  of  course, 
that  promotion  had  to  be  withheld  from  many  who  had 
won  it  by  service  in  the  field.  This  evil,  however,  was 
not  peculiar  to  the  class  of  appointments  from  civil  life. 
The  faults  in  the  first  appointments  were  such  as  were 
almost  necessarily  connected  with  the  sudden  creation  of 
a  vast  army.  The  failure  to  provide  for  a  thorough  test 
and  sifting  of  the  material  was  a  governmental  error.  It 
was  palliated  by  the  necessity  of  conciliating  influential 
men,  and  of  avoiding  antagonisms  when  the  fate  of  the 
nation  trembled  in  the  balance;  but  this  was  a  political 
motive,  and  the  evil  was  probably  endured  in  spite  of  its 
well-known  tendency  to  weaken  the  military  service. 

A  few  months'  campaigning  in  the  field  got  us  rid  of 
most  of  the  "town-meeting  style"  of  conducting  military 
affairs  in  the  army  itself,  though  nothing  could  cure  the 
practice  on  the  part  of  unscrupulous  men  of  seeking  repu 
tation  with  the  general  public  by  dishonest  means.  The 
newspapers  were  used  to  give  fictitious  credit  to  some 
and  to  injure  others.  If  the  regular  correspondents  of 
the  press  had  been  excluded  from  the  camps,  there  would 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS  173 

no  doubt  have  been  surreptitious  correspondence  which 
would  have  found  its  way  into  print  through  private  and 
roundabout  channels.  But  this  again  was  not  a  vice 
peculiar  to  officers  appointed  from  civil  life.  It  should 
be  always  remembered  that  honorable  conduct  and  de 
voted  patriotism  was  the  rule,  and  self-seeking  vanity 
and  ambition  the  exception ;  yet  a  few  exceptions  would 
be  enough  to  disturb  the  comfort  of  a  large  command. 
To  sum  up,  the  only  fair  way  to  estimate  the  volunteer 
army  is  by  its  work  and  its  fitness  for  work  after  the 
formative  period  was  passed,  and  when  the  inevitable 
mistakes  and  the  necessary  faults  of  its  first  organization 
had  been  measurably  cured.  My  settled  judgment  is 
that  it  took  the  field  in  the  spring  of  1862  as  well  fitted 
for  its  work  as  any  army  in  the  world,  its  superior  excel 
lences  in  the  most  essential  points  fully  balancing  the 
defects  which  were  incident  to  its  composition. 

This  opinion  is  not  the  offspring  of  partiality  toward 
the  volunteer  army  on  the  part  of  one  himself  a  volunteer. 
It  was  shared  by  the  most  active  officers  in  the  field  who 
came  from  the  regular  service.  In  their  testimony  given 
in  various  ways  during  the  war,  in  their  official  reports, 
and  in  their  practical  conduct  in  the  field  which  showed 
best  of  all  where  their  reliance  was  placed,  these  officers 
showed  their  full  faith  in  and  admiration  for  the  volun 
teer  regiments.  Such  an  opinion  was  called  out  by  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  in  its  examination 
of  General  Gibbon  in  regard  to  the  Gettysburg  campaign, 
and  his  judgment  may  fairly  be  taken  as  that  of  the  bet 
ter  class  of  the  regular  officers.  He  declared  of  some  of 
these  regiments  in  his  division,  that  they  were  as  well 
disciplined  as  any  men  he  ever  wished  to  see;  that 
their  officers  had  shown  practical  military  talent ;  that  a 
young  captain  from  civil  life,  whom  he  instanced,  was 
worthy  to  be  made  a  general.  He  named  regiments  of 
volunteers  which  he  said  were  among  the  finest  regi- 


174          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ments  that  ever  fought  on  any  field,  and  in  which  every 
officer  was  appointed  from  civil  life.1  He  added  the 
criticism  which  I  have  above  made,  that  no  proper 
method  of  getting  rid  of  incompetent  officers  and  of 
securing  the  promotion  of  the  meritorious  had  been 
adopted;  but  this  in  no  way  diminishes  the  force  of  his 
testimony  that  every  kind  of  military  ability  was  abun 
dantly  found  in  our  volunteer  forces  and  needed  only 
recognition  and  encouragement.  It  would  be  easy  to 
multiply  evidence  on  this  subject.  General  Grant  is  a 
witness  whose  opinion  alone  may  be  treated  as  conclu 
sive.  In  his  Personal  Memoirs2  he  explicitly  and  un 
qualifiedly  says  that  at  the  close  of  the  Vicksburg 
campaign  his  troops  fulfilled  every  requirement  of  an 
army,  and  his  volunteer  officers  were  equal  to  any  duty, 
some  of  them  being  in  his  judgment  competent  to  com 
mand  an  independent  army  in  the  field.  Sherman  fully 
shared  this  opinion.3 

In  trying  to  form  a  just  estimate  of  the  officers  of  the 
regular  army  in  1861,  we  have  to  consider  not  only  their 
education,  but  the  character  of  their  military  life  and 
experience  up  to  that  time.  It  is,  on  the  whole,  a  salu 
tary  popular  notion  that  "  professionals  "  in  any  depart 
ment  of  work  are  more  likely  to  succeed  than  amateurs. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War  our  only  professional 
soldiers  were  the  officers  of  our  little  regular  army, 
nearly  all  of  whom  were  graduates  of  the  West  Point 
Military  Academy.  Since  the  Mexican  War  of  1848, 
petty  conflicts  with  Indians  on  the  frontier  had  been 
their  only  warlike  experience.  The  army  was  hardly 
larger  than  a  single  division,  and  its  posts  along  the 
front  of  the  advancing  wave  of  civilization  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  to  the  Canada  border  were  so 

1  Report  of  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  iv.  pp.  444-446. 

2  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant,  vol.  i.  p.  573. 

3  Letter  to  Halleck,  O.  R.,  vol.  xxxix.  pt.  iii.  p.  413. 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS  175 

numerous  that  it  was  a  rare  thing  to  see  more  than  two 
or  three  companies  of  soldiers  together.  To  most  of  the 
officers  their  parade  of  the  battalion  of  cadets  at  West 
Point  was  the  largest  military  assemblage  they  had  ever 
seen.  Promotion  had  been  so  slow  that  the  field  officers 
were  generally  superannuated,  and  very  few  who  had  a 
rank  higher  than  that  of  captain  at  the  close  of  1860  did 
any  active  field  work  on  either  side  during  the  Civil 
War.  The  total  number  of  captains  and  lieutenants  of 
the  line  would  hardly  have  furnished  colonels  for  the  vol 
unteer  regiments  of  the  single  State  of  New  York  as  they 
were  finally  mustered  into  the  National  service  during 
the  war;  and  they  would  have  fallen  far  short  of  it  when 
their  own  numbers  were  divided  by  the  rebellion  itself. 

Our  available  professional  soldiers,  then,  were  cap 
tains  and  subalterns  whose  experience  was  confined  to 
company  duty  at  frontier  posts  hundreds  of  miles  from 
civilization,  except  in  the  case  of  the  engineers,  the 
staff  corps,  and  some  of  the  artillery  in  sea-coast  forts. 
With  the  same  exceptions,  the  opportunities  for  enlarg 
ing  their  theoretic  knowledge  had  been  small.  It  was 
before  the  days  of  post  libraries,  and  books  of  any  sort 
were  a  rarity  at  the  garrisons.  In  the  first  year  of  the 
war,  I  expressed  to  General  Gordon  Granger  my  surprise 
at  finding  how  little  most  line  officers  had  added  to  the 
theoretic  reading  they  got  at  the  academy.  "What 
could  you  expect,"  he  said  in  his  sweeping  way,  "of 
men  who  have  had  to  spend  their  lives  at  a  two-company 
post,  where  there  was  nothing  to  do  when  off  duty  but 
play  draw-poker  and  drink  whiskey  at  the  sutler's  shop? " 
This  was,  of  course,  meant  to  be  picturesquely  extrava 
gant,  but  it  hit  the  nail  on  the  head,  after  all.  Some  of 
the  officers  of  the  old  regime  did  not  conceal  their  con 
tempt  for  books.  It  was  a  stock  story  in  the  army  that 
when  the  Utah  expedition  was  fitting  out  in  1856,  Gen 
eral  Henry  Hunt,  chief  of  artillery  of  the  army  of  the 


1/6          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Potomac,  then  a  young  artillery  officer,  applied  to  Gen 
eral  Twiggs,  from  whose  command  part  of  the  expedition 
was  making  up,  for  leave  to  take  a  little  box  of  military 
books.  "No,  sir,"  was  the  peremptory  response;  "no 
room  in  the  train  for  such  nonsense."  Hunt  retired 
chop-fallen;  but  soon  after  another  officer  came  in,  with 
"  General,  our  mess  has  a  keg  of  very  nice  whiskey  we 
don't  want  to  lose;  won't  you  direct  the  quartermaster 
to  let  it  go  in  the  wagons  ? "  "  Oh  yes,  sir.  Oh  yes, 
anything  in  reason!"  If  not  true,  the  story  is  good 
enough  to  be  true,  as  its  currency  attests;  but  whether 
true  or  no,  the  "fable  teaches"  that  post-graduate  study 
in  the  old  army  was  done  under  difficulties. 

The  course  of  study  at  West  Point  had  narrower  limi 
tations  than  most  people  think,  and  it  would  be  easy  to 
be  unfair  by  demanding  too  much  of  the  graduates  of 
that  military  college.  The  course  of  study  was  of  four 
years,  but  the  law  forbade  any  entrance  examinations  on 
subjects  outside  of  the  usual  work  done  in  the  rural  com 
mon  schools.  The  biographies  of  Grant,  of  Sherman,  of 
Sheridan,  of  Ormsby  Mitchell,  and  of  others  show  that 
they  in  fact  had  little  or  no  other  preparatory  education 
than  that  of  the  common  country  school.1  The  course  of 
study  and  amount  of  education  given  must  necessarily  be 
limited,  therefore,  to  what  boys  of  average  ability  and 
such  preparation  could  accomplish  in  the  four  years. 
They  were  no  further  advanced,  on  entering,  than  they 
would  have  to  be  to  enter  any  ordinary  fitting  school  for 
one  of  our  first-class  colleges,  or  the  high  schools  in  the 
graded  systems  of  public  schools  in  our  cities.  Three 
years  of  study  would  put  them  abreast  of  students  enter- 

i  Grant,  in  his  Personal  Memoirs  (vol.  i.  p.  24),  says  of  the  school  in  his 
early  Ohio  home,  that  the  highest  branches  taught  there  were  "  the  three 
R's,  —  Reading,  'Kiting,  and  'Rithmetic.  I  never  saw,"  he  says,  "  an  algebra 
or  other  mathematical  work  higher  than  the  arithmetic,  in  Georgetown,  until 
after  I  was  appointed  to  West  Point.  I  then  bought  a  work  on  algebra  in 
Cincinnati,  but  having  no  teacher  it  was  Greek  to  me." 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS  1 7? 

ing  college  elsewhere,  and  four  years  would  carry  them 
about  as  far  as  the  end  of  the  Freshman  year  in  Yale, 
Harvard,  or  Princeton.  The  corps  of  professors  and 
teachers  at  West  Point  has  always  deservedly  ranked 
high  as  instructors,  but  there  is  no  "royal  road"  to 
knowledge,  and  it  cannot  be  claimed  that  three  or  four 
years  at  the  Military  Academy  would  count  for  more,  as 
general  education,  than  the  same  period  spent  in  any 
other  good  school.  A  very  few  men  of  high  standing  in 
the  classes  supplemented  their  education  by  obtaining 
appointments  as  temporary  instructors  in  the  academy 
after  graduating,  but  most  of  them  left  their  books  be 
hind  them  and  began  at  once  the  subaltern's  life  at  the 
distant  frontier  post. 

If  we  analyze  the  course  of  study  they  pursued,  we  find 
that  it  covered  two  years'  work  in  mathematics,  one  in 
physics  and  chemistry,  and  one  in  construction  of  fortifi 
cations.  This  was  the  scientific  part,  and  was  the  heav 
iest  part  of  the  curriculum.  Then,  besides  a  little 
English,  mental  philosophy,  moral  philosophy,  and  ele 
mentary  law,  there  were  two  years'  study  of  the  French 
and  one  of  Spanish.  This  was  the  only  linguistic  study, 
and  began  with  the  simplest  elements.  At  the  close  of 
the  war  there  was  no  instruction  in  strategy  or  grand 
tactics,  in  military  history,  or  in  what  is  called  the  Art 
of  War.  The  little  book  by  Mahan  on  Out-post  Duty  was 
the  only  text-book  in  Theory,  outside  the  engineering 
proper.  At  an  earlier  day  they  had  used  Jomini's  intro 
duction  to  his  "Grandes  Operations  Militaires,"  and  I 
am  unable  to  say  when  its  use  was  dropped.  It  is  not 
my  wish  to  criticise  the  course  of  study;  on  the  other 
hand,  I  doubt  if  it  could  be  much  improved  for  boys  who 
had  only  the  preparation  required  by  the  law.  But  since 
we  are  trying  to  estimate  its  completeness  as  professional 
education  fitting  men  to  command  armies  in  the  field,  it 
is  absolutely  necessary  to  note  the  fact  that  it  did  not 

VOL.  I.  —  12 


1 78          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

pretend  to  include  the  military  art  in  that  sense.  Its 
scientific  side  was  in  the  line  of  engineering  and  that 
only.  Its  prize-men  became  engineers,  and  success  at 
the  academy  was  gauged  by  the  student's  approach  to 
that  coveted  result. 

That  the  French  which  was  learned  was  not  enough  to 
open  easily  to  the  young  lieutenant  the  military  litera 
ture  which  was  then  found  most  abundantly  in  that  lan 
guage,    would   seem    to    be    indicated   by   the   following 
incident.      In  my  first  campaign   I   was  talking  with  a 
regular  officer  doing  staff  duty  though  belonging  in  the 
line,   and  the   conversation   turned   on   his   West   Point 
studies.      The  little  work  of   Jomini's  mentioned  above 
being  casually  referred  to  as  having  been  in  his  course, 
I  asked  him  if  he  had   continued  his  reading  into  the 
History  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  of  Frederick  the  Great, 
to  which  it  was  the  introduction.     He  said  no,  and  added 
frankly  that  he  had  not  read  even  the  Introduction  in  the 
French,  which  he  had  found  unpleasantly  hard  reading, 
but  in  the  English  translation  published  under  the  title 
of  the  Art  of  War.     This  officer  was  a  thoroughly  esti 
mable,   modest,  and  intelligent    man,   and  seemed  in   no 
way  inferior  to  other  line  officers  of  his  age  and  grade. 
It  would  of  course  be  true  that  some  men  would   build 
industriously  upon  the  foundation  laid  at  the  academy, 
and  perfect  themselves  in  those  things  of  which  they  had 
only   acquired    the   elements;    but   the    surroundings    of 
frontier  life  at  a  post  were  so  unfavorable  that  I  believe 
few  in  fact  did  so.     The  officers  of  the  engineer  corps 
and  the  ordnance  were  specifically  devoted  to  scientific 
careers,   and  could  go  steadily  forward  to  expertness  in 
their  specialties.     Those  who  were  permanently  attached 
to  the  staff  corps  or  to  bureaus  at  Washington  had  also 
opportunity  to  enlarge  their  professional  knowledge  by 
study  if  they  were  so  inclined.     But  all  these  were  ex 
ceptionally  situated,  and  do  not  help  us  answer  the  ques- 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS  179 

tion  What  kind  and  amount  of  military  education  was 
implied  in  the  fact  that  a  man  had  graduated  at  West 
Point  and  been  sent  to  serve  in  the  line?  I  have  pur 
posely  omitted  for  the  present  to  consider  the  physical 
training  and  the  practical  instruction  in  tactics  by  means 
of  drill,  because  the  question  is  in  terms  one  of  science, 
not  of  practice;  that  will  come  later.  The  conclusion  is 
that  the  intellectual  education  at  the  Military  Academy 
was  essentially  the  same,  as  far  as  it  went,  as  that  of  any 
polytechnic  school,  the  peculiarly  military  part  of  it 
being  in  the  line  of  engineering.  In  actual  warfare,  the 
laying  out  and  construction  of  regular  forts  or  the  con 
duct  of  a  regular  siege  is  committed  to  professional  en 
gineers.  For  field  work  with  an  army,  therefore,  the 
mental  furnishing  of  the  West  Point  man  was  not  supe 
rior  to  that  of  any  other  liberally  educated  man.  In 
some  of  our  volunteer  regiments  we  had  whole  companies 
of  private  soldiers  who  would  not  have  shunned  a  com 
petitive  examination  with  sWest  Point  classes  on  the 
studies  of  the  Military  Academy,  excepting  the  technical 
engineering  of  fortifications.1 

Let  us  look  now  at  the  physical  and  practical  training 
of  the  cadet.  The  whole  period  of  his  student  life  at 
West  Point  had  more  or  less  of  this.  He  was  taken  as 
a  raw  recruit  would  be,  taught  the  school  of  the  soldier 
in  marching,  in  the  manual  of  arms,  and  in  personal  car 
riage.  He  passed  on  to  the  drill  of  the  squad,  the  pla 
toon,  the  company.  The  tactics  of  the  battalion  came 
last,  and  the  cadet  might  become  a  corporal,  sergeant, 
lieutenant,  or  captain  in  the  corps  if  he  showed  aptitude 

1  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  my  criticisms  are  strictly  confined  to  the 
condition  of  military  education  in  our  Civil  War  period.  Since  that  time 
some  excellent  work  has  been  done  in  post-graduate  schools  for  the  different 
arms  of  the  service,  and  field  manoeuvres  have  been  practised  on  a  scale  never 
known  in  our  army  prior  to  1861.  A  good  beginning  has  also  been  made, 
both  here  and  in  England,  toward  giving  the  young  soldier  a  military  library 
of  English  books. 


180         REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

for  drill  and  tactics.  It  is  noticeable,  however,  that 
Grant  and  Sheridan  remained  privates  during  their  whole 
cadetship,  and  Sherman,  though  once  he  became  ser 
geant,  was  put  back  in  the  ranks.  The  fair  conclusion 
is  that  this  part  of  the  cadet  discipline  is  not  very  closely 
connected  with  generalship,  though  it  is  important  as 
preparation  for  the  ready  handling  of  a  company  or  a 
battalion.  Sherman  tells  us,  in  his  Memoirs,  that  he 
studied  evolutions  of  the  line  out  of  the  books,  as  a  new 
subject,  when  he  was  in  camp  in  front  of  Washington, 
after  the  first  battle  of  Bull  Run.1  The  tactical  educa 
tion  of  the  cadet  stopped  at  the  evolutions  of  the  bat 
talion,  and  for  nearly  all  of  them  it  was,  even  in  that 
respect,  the  education  of  the  soldier  in  the  ranks  and  not 
of  the  officer,  since  a  very  small  proportion  became  offi 
cers  in  the  cadet  corps. 

This  practical  drill  was,  of  course,  the  same  as  that 
which  was  used  in  organized  militia  regiments,  and  the 
famous  Ellsworth  Zouaves  of  Chicago,  the  New  York 
Seventh  Regiment,  with  a  number  of  other  militia  regi 
ments  in  different  States,  were  sufficient  proof  that  this 
training  could  be  made  as  exact  outside  of  the  cadet 
corps  as  in  it.  It  certainly  was  enough  for  the  practical 
handling  of  the  company  and  the  regiment  under  the 
simplified  tactics  which  not  only  prevailed  during  the 
war  itself,  but,  with  Upton's  Manual  as  a  basis,  has  been 
authoritatively  adopted  as  an  improvement  upon  the  older 
and  more  complicated  methods.  It  must  not  be  forgot 
ten  that  although  our  militia  system  had  fallen  into  scan 
dalous  neglect,  the  voluntary  efforts  of  citizen  soldiers 
had  kept  many  good  independent  companies  organized 
everywhere,  as  well  as  full  regiments  in  most  of  the  older 
States;  so  that  there  were  in  fact  more  well-drilled  regi 
ments  in  the  militia  than  there  were  in  the  little  regular 
army.  It  was  the  small  ratio  all  these,  of  both  classes, 

1  Memoirs,  vol.  i.  p.  220. 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS  l8l 

bore  to  the  demands  of  the  gigantic  war  that  was  upon 
us,  which  made  the  problem  so  troublesome.  The  offi 
cers  of  the  organized  militia  regiments,  before  the  end  of 
the  three  months'  service,  did  what  I  have  said  it  was 
desirable  that  those  of  the  regular  regiments  should  have 
done,  —  they  scattered  from  their  original  commands  and 
were  active  in  organizing  the  new  volunteer  regiments. 
General  De  Trobriand,  who  went  out  as  Colonel  of  the 
Fifty-fifth  New  York,  says  that  the  New  York  Seventh 
Regiment  furnished  three  hundred  officers  to  volunteer 
regiments.1  In  a  similar  way,  though  not  to  the  same 
extent,  the  other  organized  and  disciplined  militia,  in 
both  Eastern  and  Western  States,  furnished  the  skeletons 
of  numerous  new  regiments. 

The  really  distinguishing  feature  in  the  experience  of 
the  regular  officers  of  the  line  was  their  life  in  garrison 
at  their  posts,  and  their  active  work  in  guarding  the  fron 
tier.  Here  they  had  become  familiar  with  duty  of  the 
limited  kind  which  such  posts  would  afford.  This  in 
time  became  a  second  nature  to  them,  and  to  the  extent 
it  reached,  was,  as  other  men's  employments  are,  their 
business.  They  necessarily  had  to  learn  pretty  thor 
oughly  the  army  regulations,  with  the  methods  and  forms 
of  making  returns  and  conducting  business  with  the  ad 
jutant-general's  office,  with  the  ordnance  office,  the  quar 
termaster's  and  subsistence  departments,  etc.  In  this 
ready  knowledge  of  the  army  organization  and  its  methods 
their  advantage  over  the  new  volunteer  officers  was  more 
marked,  as  it  seemed  to  me,  than  in  any  and  all  other 
things.  The  routine  of  army  business  and  the  routine  of 
drill  had  to  be  learned  by  every  army  officer.  The  regu 
lar  officer  of  some  years'  standing  already  knew,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  what  a  new  volunteer  officer  must  spend 
some  time  in  learning.  There  is  something  of  value  also 
in  the  habit  of  mind  formed  in  actual  service,  even  if 

i  De  Trobriand,  Four  Years  with  Potomac  Army,  p.  64. 


1 82          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  service  is  in  subaltern  grades  and  on  a  petty  scale. 
Familiarity  with  danger  and  with  the  expectation  of  danger 
is  acquired,  both  by  the  Indian  wars  of  the  frontier  and  by 
the  hunting  and  field  sports  which  fill  more  or  less  of  the 
leisure  of  garrison  life. 

But  there  were  some  drawbacks  upon  the  value  of  the 
preparation  for  war  which  these  officers  possessed.  There 
was  a  marked  conservatism  as  to  military  methods  and 
arms,  and  an  almost  slavish  reverence  for  things  which 
were  sanctioned  by  European  authority,  especially  that  of 
the  second  French  Empire.  American  invention  was 
never  more  fruitful  than  when  applied  to  military  weap 
ons.  Repeating  and  magazine  small  arms,  breach-load 
ing  cannon,  and  Gatling  guns  with  other  repeating 
artillery,  were  brought  out  or  improved  with  wonderful 
variety  of  form  and  of  demonstrable  excellence.  The 
regular  army  influence  was  generally  against  such  inno 
vations.  Not  once,  but  frequently,  regular  army  officers 
argued  to  me  that  the  old  smooth-bore  musket  with 
"buck  and  ball "  cartridge  was  the  best  weapon  our  troops 
could  desire.  We  went  through  the  war  with  a  muzzle- 
loading  musket,  the  utmost  that  any  commander  could  do 
being  to  secure  repeating  rifles  for  two  or  three  infantry 
regiments  in  a  whole  army.  Even  to  the  end  the  "  regu 
lar  "  chiefs  of  artillery  insisted  that  the  Napoleon  gun, 
a  light  smooth-bore  twelve-pounder  cannon,  was  our  best 
field-piece,  and  at  a  time  when  a  great  campaign  had  re 
duced  our  forces  so  that  a  reduction  of  artillery  was  advis 
able,  I  received  an  order  to  send  to  the  rear  my  three-inch 
rifled  ordnance  guns  and  retain  my  Napoleons.  The 
order  was  issued  by  a  regular  officer  of  much  experience, 
but  I  procured  its  suspension  in  my  own  command  by  a 
direct  appeal  to  the  army  commander.  There  was  no 
more  doubt  then  than  there  is  to-day  of  the  superiority 
of  rifled  guns,  either  for  long-range  practice  with  shells 
or  in  close  work  with  canister.  They  were  so  much 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS  183 

lighter  that  we  could  jump  them  across  a  rough  country 
where  the  teams  could  hardly  move  a  Napoleon.  We 
could  subdue  our  adversaries'  fire  with  them,  when  their 
smooth-bores  could  not  reach  us.  Yet  we  were  ordered 
to  throw  away  our  advantages  and  reduce  ourselves  to 
our  enemy's  condition  upon  the  obstinate  prejudice  of  a 
worthy  man  who  had  had  all  flexibility  drilled  out  of 
him  by  routine.  Models  of  automatic  rapid-fire  and  re 
peating  field-pieces  were  familiar  objects  "at  the  rear," 
but  I  saw  none  of  them  in  action  in  any  army  in  which 
I  served.  The  conservatism  of  the  old  army  must  be  held 
responsible  for  this. 

The  question  of  zeal  and  devotion  to  the  cause  for 
which  we  fought  cannot  be  ignored  in  such  a  war  as  ours 
was.  It  is  notorious  that  comparatively  few  of  the  regu 
lar  officers  were  political  friends  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  admin 
istration  at  the  beginning.  Of  those  who  did  not  "go 
with  the  South  "  but  remained  true  to  the  National  flag, 
some  were  full  of  earnest  patriotism,  like  the  young  offi 
cers  whom  I  have  mentioned  as  volunteering  to  assist  the 
governors  of  States  in  organizing  their  contingents  and 
as  seeking  places  in  volunteer  regiments.  There  were 
others  who  meant  to  do  their  duty,  but  began  with  little 
hopefulness  or  zeal.  There  were  still  others  who  did  not 
hesitate  to  predict  defeat  and  to  avow  that  it  was  only  for 
professional  honor  or  advancement  that  they  continued  to 
serve  under  the  National  flag.  These  last  were  con 
fessedly  soldiers  of  fortune.  The  war  was  an  education 
for  all  who  were  in  it,  and  many  a  man  began  with  reluc 
tance  and  half-heartedness  who  was  abundantly  radical 
before  the  conflict  was  over.  There  was,  however,  a  con 
siderable  class  who  practised  on  Talleyrand's  diplomatic 
motto,  "point  de  zele,"  and  limited  their  efforts  to  the 
strict  requirement  of  duty.  Such  men  would  see  disaster 
occur  for  lack  of  a  little  spontaneity  on  their  part,  and 
yet  be  able  to  show  that  they  literally  obeyed  every  order 


1 84          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    W 'A R 

received.  I  was  once  ordered  to  support  with  my  com 
mand  a  movement  to  be  made  by  another.  It  was  an 
important  juncture  in  a  campaign.  Wondering  at  delay, 
I  rode  forward  and  found  the  general  officer  I  was  to  sup 
port.  I  told  him  I  was  ordered  to  support  him  in  doing 
what  we  both  saw  was  needing  to  be  done;  but  he  had  no 
explicit  orders  to  begin  the  movement.  I  said  that  my 
orders  to  support  him  were  sufficient  to  authorize  his 
action,  and  it  was  plain  that  it  would  be  unfortunate 
if  the  thing  were  not  done  at  once.  He  answered 
cynically,  "If  you  had  been  in  the  army  as  long  as  I 
have,  you  would  be  content  to  do  the  things  that  are 
ordered,  without  hunting  up  others."  The  English 
regulars,  also,  have  a  saying,  "Volunteering  brings  bad 
luck." 

There  was  altogether  too  much  of  this  spirit  in  the 
army,  and  one  who  can  read  between  the  lines  will  see 
it  in  the  history  of  many  a  campaign.  It  did  not  neces 
sarily  mean  wavering  loyalty.  It  was  sometimes  the 
mental  indecision  or  timidity  which  shrinks  from  respon 
sibility.  It  was  sometimes  also  the  result  of  education 
in  an  army  on  the  peace  establishment,  where  any  spon 
taneity  was  snubbed  as  an  impertinence  or  tyrannically 
crushed  as  a  breach  of  discipline.  I  would  not  be  under 
stood  to  make  more  of  these  things  than  is  necessary  to 
a  just  estimate  of  the  situation,  but  it  seems  to  me  an 
entirely  fair  conclusion  that  with  us  in  1861  as  with 
the  first  French  republic,  the  infusion  of  the  patriotic 
enthusiasm  of  a  volunteer  organization  was  a  necessity, 
and  that  this  fully  made  up  for  lack  of  instruction  at  the 
start.  This  hasty  analysis  of  what  the  actual  preparation 
for  war  was  in  the  case  of  the  average  line  officer  of  the 
regular  army  will  show,  to  some  extent,  the  basis  of  my 
judgment  that  there  was  nothing  in  it  which  a  new  vol 
unteer  officer,  having  what  I  have  called  military  apti 
tude,  should  not  learn  in  his  first  campaign. 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS  185 

How  far  the  officers  of  the  engineers  and  of  the  staff 
corps  applied  themselves  to  general  military  study, 
would  depend  upon  their  taste  and  their  leisure.  Their 
opportunities  for  doing  so  were  much  better  than  those 
of  line  officers,  but  there  was  also  a  tendency  to  immerse 
themselves  in  the  studies  of  their  special  department  of 
work.  Very  eminent  officers  of  engineers  have  told  me 
since  the  war  that  the  pressure  of  their  special  profes 
sional  work  was  such  that  they  had  found  no  time  to  read 
even  the  more  noteworthy  publications  concerning  the 
history  of  our  own  great  struggle.  The  surveys  of  the 
great  lakes  and  the  coast,  the  engineering  problems  of 
our  great  rivers,  etc.,  have  both  formerly  and  in  recent 
years  absorbed  their  time  and  their  strength.  The  ord 
nance  and  the  staff  corps,  also,  had  abundant  special 
duties.  Still  it  may  reasonably  be  assumed  that  officers 
of  the  classes  mentioned  have  usually  made  themselves 
somewhat  familiar  with  the  best  writings  on  military  art. 
If  we  had  in  the  country  in  1861  a  class  of  men  who 
could  be  called  educated  soldiers  in  the  scientific  sense, 
we  certainly  should  find  them  in  the  several  corps  just 
referred  to. 

Here,  however,  we  have  to  meet  the  question  What  is 
military  art  as  applied  to  the  problem  of  winning  battles 
or  campaigns?  We  are  obliged  to  answer  that  outside  of 
the  business  administration  and  supply  of  an  army,  and 
apart  from  the  technical  knowledge  of  engineering  and 
the  construction  of  fire-arms  and  ammunition,  it  consists 
in  the  tactical  handling  of  bodies  of  men  in  accordance 
with  very  few  and  very  simple  principles  of  strategy. 
The  literature  of  the  subject  is  found  in  the  history  of 
wars  analyzed  by  competent  men  like  Napoleon,  Jomini, 
the  Archduke  Charles,  Sir  William  Napier,  Clausewitz, 
Moltke,  Hamley,  and  others ;  but  it  may  be  broadly  said 
that  the  principles  of  this  criticism  and  analysis  may  be 
so  briefly  stated  as  to  be  printed  on  the  back  of  a  visiting- 


1 86          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

card.1  To  trace  the  campaigns  of  great  soldiers  under 
the  guidance  of  such  a  critic  as  Jomini  is  full  of  interest 
to  any  intelligent  person,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the 
subject  of  the  slightest  difficulty  of  comprehension  if  full 
and  authentic  topographical  maps  are  before  the  reader. 
To  make  much  instructive  use  of  military  history  in  this 
way  demands  a  good  deal  of  voluminous  reading  and  the 
command  of  charts  and  maps  extensive  enough  to  allow 
the  presentation  of  the  face  of  a  country  on  a  large  scale. 
With  these  advantages  all  wars,  both  ancient  and  modern, 
are  full  of  instructive  examples  of  the  application  of  the 
simple  principles  of  strategy  under  innumerable  varying 
circumstances  and  situations;  and  this  union  of  simple 
theory  in  ever-changing  practical  application  is  what 
constitutes  the  theoretic  knowledge  of  the  general  as  dis 
tinguished  from  the  tactical  and  administrative  duties  of 
the  subordinate.2  It  was  the  very  simplicity  of  the 
principles  that  made  many  successful  generals  question 
whether  there  was  any  art  in  the  matter,  except  to  use 
courage  and  natural  sagacity  in  the  actual  situation  in 
which  the  commander  found  himself  and  the  enemy. 
Marshal  Saxe  asserted  in  his  "Reveries"  that  down  to 
his  time  there  had  been  no  formulation  of  principles,  and 
that  if  any  had  been  recognized  as  such  in  the  minds  of 
commanders  of  armies,  they  had  not  made  it  known.3 

1  Prince  Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen,  in  his  admirable  "  Letters  on  Strategy," 
states  them  in  five  brief  primary  axioms.     Letters  on  Strategy,  vol.  i.  pp. 
9,  10. 

2  Jomini  expresses  it  thus  :  "  J'en  conclus  que  1'histoire  militaire  raisonnee 
de  plusieurs  campagnes,  seront  la  meilleure  Ecole  pour  apprendre  et  par  con 
sequent  pour  enseigner  la  grande  guerre  :  la  science  des generaux"     Grandes 
Operations  Militaires,  vol.  i.  p.  7. 

8  Jomini,  in  the  work  already  cited,  quotes  Marshal  Saxe  thus:  "Que 
toutes  les  sciences  avaient  des  principes,  mais  que  la  guerre  seule  n'en  avait 
point  encore  :  si  ces  principes  ont  existe  dans  la  tete  de  quelques  generaux, 
nulle  part  ils  n'ont  ete  indiques  ou  developpes."  The  same  idea  has  been 
put  quite  as  trenchantly  by  one  of  the  most  recent  writers  of  the  English 
Army,  Colonel  J.  F.  Maurice,  R.  A.  Professor  in  the  Farnborough  Staff  Col- 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS  187 

It  was  precisely  in  this  department  of  military  history 
"raisonnee"  that  frontier  garrison  life  shut  the  young 
army  officer  out  from  the  opportunities  of  profiting  by  his 
leisure.  The  valuable  books  were  all  foreign  publica 
tions  in  costly  form  with  folio  atlases,  and  were  neither 
easy  to  procure  nor  easily  carried  about  with  the  limited 
means  and  the  rigid  economy  of  transportation  which 
marked  army  life  in  the  far  West.  That  this  was  true 
even  in  the  artillery  is  indicated  by  General  Gibbon  be 
fore  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  when  ques 
tioned  in  reference  to  the  relative  amount  of  artillery 
used  at  Gettysburg  as  compared  with  great  European 
battles;  that  distinguished  officer  having  himself  been  in 
the  artillery  when  the  Civil  War  began.1 

If  then  the  officers  of  the  regular  army,  as  a  body,  were 
not  in  fact  deeply  read  in  what,  as  we  have  seen,  Jomini 
calls  "the  science  of  generals,"  their  advantage  over 
equally  well-educated  civilians  is  reduced  to  a  practical 
knowledge  of  the  duties  of  the  company  and  the  petty 
post,  and  in  comparison  with  the  officers  of  well-drilled 

lege.  In  the  able  article  on  "  War  "  in  the  last  edition  of  the  "  Encyclopaedia 
Britannica,"  he  says,  "  it  must  be  emphatically  asserted  that  there  does  not 
exist,  and  never  except  by  pedants  of  whom  the  most  careful  students  of  war 
are  more  impatient  than  other  soldiers,  has  there  ever  been  supposed  to 
exist,  an  'art  of  war'  which  was  something  other  than  the  methodic  study 
of  military  history." 

1  "  Question.  You  have  studied  the  history  of  battles  a  great  deal :  Now, 
in  the  battles  of  Napoleon,  had  they  at  any  time  half  as  many  artillery  en 
gaged  as  there  were  at  Gettysburg  ?  Answer.  I  am  not  sufficiently  conver 
sant  with  military  history  to  tell  you  that.  I  think  it  very  doubtful  whether 
more  guns  were  ever  used  in  any  one  battle  before.  I  do  not  believe 
Napoleon  ever  had  a  worse  artillery  fire."  Testimony  of  General  John 
Gibbon,  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War,  vol.  iv.  p.  444.  At  Gettysburg 
the  whole  number  of  cannon  employed  was  about  two  hundred.  Compare 
this  with  Leipzig,  for  instance,  the  "  battle  of  the  giants,"  where  two  thou 
sand  were  employed  !  Thiers  says,  "  de  Leipzig  a  Schonfeld  au  nord,  de 
Schonfeld  a  Probstheyda  a  Test,  de  Probstheyda  a  Connevvitz  au  sud,  une 
cannonade  de  deux  mille  bouches  a  feu  termina  cette  bataille  dit  des  geants, 
et  jusqu'ici  la  plus  grande,  certainement,  de  tous  les  siecles."  Thiers,  Con- 
•sulat  et  1'Empire,  vol.  xvi.  p.  607. 


1 88          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

militia  companies  it  amounted  to  little  more  than. a  bet 
ter  knowledge  of  the  army  regulations  and  the  adminis 
trative  processes.  It  is  no  reproach  to  them  that  this 
was  so,  for  it  resulted  from  the  operation  of  law  in  the 
course  of  education  at  the  Military  Academy  and  the 
insignificant  size  of  our  army  in  times  of  peace.  It  had 
been  the  peculiar  blessing  of  our  country  that  a  great 
standing  army  was  unnecessary,  and  it  would  be  foolish 
to  regret  that  our  little  army  could  not  have  the  experi 
ence  with  great  bodies  of  troops  and  the  advantages  of 
theoretical  instruction  which  are  part  of  the  life  of  officers 
in  the  immense  establishments  of  Continental  Europe. 
My  only  purpose  is  to  make  an  approximately  true  bal 
ance  sheet  of  the  actual  advantages  of  the  two  parts  of 
our  National  army  in  1861.  Whilst  on  the  subject,  how 
ever,  I  will  go  a  little  further  and  say  that  prior  to  our 
Civil  War,  the  history  of  European  conflicts  proves  that 
there  also  the  theoretic  preparation  of  military  men  had 
not,  up  to  that  time,  saved  them  from  the  necessity  of 
learning  both  generalship  and  army  administration  in 
the  terrible  school  of  experience,  during  their  first  year 
in  the  field  when  a  new  war  broke  out  after  a  long  inter 
val  of  peace. 

The  first  volume  of  Kinglake's  "Crimean  War"  ap 
peared  in  1863,  and  I  immediately  and  eagerly  devoured 
it  for  the  purpose  of  learning  the  lesson  it  could  teach. 
It  was  one  of  the  memorable  sensations  of  a  lifetime,  to 
find  that  the  regular  armies  of  England,  of  France,  and 
of  Russia  had  had  to  learn  their  lesson  anew  when  they 
faced  each  other  on  the  shore  of  the  Euxine,  and  that, 
whether  in  matters  of  transportation,  of  subsistence,  of 
the  hospital,  of  grand  tactics,  or  of  generalship,  they 
had  no  advantage  over  our  army  of  volunteers  fresh  from 
their  peaceful  pursuits.  The  photographic  fidelity  to 
detail  on  the  part  of  the  historian,  anS  his  apparent  un 
consciousness  of  the  sweeping  conclusions  to  be  drawn 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS  189 

from  his  pictures,  made  the  lesson  all  the  more  telling. 
I  drew  a  long  breath  of  relief,  and  nothing  which  hap 
pened  to  me  in  the  whole  war  so  encouraged  me  to  hope 
ful  confidence  in  the  outcome  of  it,  as  the  evidence  I  saw 
that  our  blunders  at  the  beginning  had  been  no  greater 
than  those  of  old  standing  armies,  and  that  our  capacity 
to  learn  was  at  least  as  quick  as  theirs.  Their  experi 
ence,  like  ours,  showed  that  the  personal  qualities  of  a 
commanding  officer  counted  for  much  more  than  his  theo 
retic  equipment,  and  that  a  bold  heart,  a  cool  head,  and 
practical  common-sense  were  of  much  more  importance 
than  anything*  taught  at  school.  With  these,  a  brief  ex 
perience  would  enable  an  intelligent  man  to  fill  nearly 
any  subordinate  position  with  fair  success;  without  them 
any  responsibility  of  a  warlike  kind  would  prove  too 
heavy  for  him.  The  supreme  qualification  of  a  general- 
in-chief  is  the  power  to  estimate  truly  and  grasp  clearly 
the  situation  on  a  field  of  operations  too  large  to  be  seen 
by  the  physical  eye  at  once,1  and  the  undaunted  temper 
of  will  which  enables  him  to  execute  with  persistent 
vigor  the  plan  which  his  intellect  approves.  To  act  upon 
uncertainties  as  if  they  were  sure,  and  to  do  it  in  the 
midst  of  carnage  and  death  when  immeasurable  results 
hang  upon  it,  —  this  is  the  supreme  presence  of  mind 
which  marks  a  great  commander,  and  which  is  among 
the  rarest  gifts  even  of  men  who  are  physically  brave. 
The  problem  itself  is  usually  simple.  It  is  the  confus 
ing  and  overwhelming  situation  under  which  it  must  be 
solved  that  causes  timidity  or  dismay.  It  is  the  thought 
of  the  fearful  consequences  of  the  action  that  begets  a 
nervous  state  of  hesitation  and  mental  timidity  in  most 
men,  and  paralyzes  the  will.  No  education  will  ensure 
this  greatest  and  most  essential  quality.  It  is  born  in  a 
man,  not  communicated.  With  it  his  acquired  knowl- 

1  Wellington  said  the  great  task  of  his  military  life  was  "trying  to  make 
out  what  was  behind  the  hill." 


190          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

edge  will  be  doubly  useful,  but  without  it  an  illiterate 
slave-trader  like  Forrest  may  far  outshine  him  as  a  sol 
dier.  Nor  does  success  as  a  subordinate  give  any  certain 
assurance  of  fitness  for  supreme  command.  Napoleon's 
marshals  generally  failed  when  trusted  with  an  independ 
ent  command,  as  Hooker  did  with  us;  and  I  do  not  doubt 
that  many  men,  like  McClellan,  who  failed  as  generals- 
in-chief,  would  have  made  brave  and  good -subordinates. 
The  test  of  quality  is  different  in  kind,  and,  as  I  have 
said,  the  only  proof  of  its  possession  is  in  the  actual 
trial.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  a  timid  subordinate  will  not 
be  a  good  commander,  but  it  cannot  be  affirmed  that  a 
bold  one  will,  though  there  are  more  chances  in  his 
favor. 

The  education  of  peril  is  so  powerful  in  bringing  out 
the  qualities  that  can  master  it,  and  for  any  one  who  has 
true  military  courage  the  acquirement  of  skill  in  the 
more  mechanical  part  of  his  duty  in  war  is  so  rapid,  that 
my  experience  has  led  me  to  reckon  low,  in  the  compari 
son,  the  value  of  the  knowledge  a  soldier  gains  in  times 
of  peace.  I  say  "  in  the  comparison."  Tactics  are  essen 
tial  to  the  handling  of  large  bodies  of  men,  and  must  be 
learned.  But  the  zealous  young  soldier  with  aptitude  for 
his  work  will  learn  this  part  of  his  duty  so  fast  that  a 
single  campaign  will  find  him  abreast  of  any.  At  the 
beginning  of  a  great  war  and  in  the  organization  of  a 
great  army,  the  knowledge  of  routine  and  of  details  un 
doubtedly  saves  time  and  saves  cost  both  of  treasure  and 
of  life.  I  am  therefore  far  from  arguing  that  the  knowl 
edge  which  was  found  in  the  regular  army  should  not  be 
made  the  most  of.  I  have  already  said  that  it  should 
have  been  scattered  through  the  whole  volunteer  organi 
zation.  So  I  also  say  that  it  was  quite  right  to  look  for 
the  higher  qualities  for  command  in  those  who  had  the 
technical  information  and  skill.  But  I  reckon  patriotic 
zeal  and  devotion  so  high  that  I  have  no  hesitation  in 


VOLUNTEERS  AND  REGULARS 


adding,  that  our  army  as  a  whole  would  have  been  im 
proved  if  the  distinction  between  regular  and  volunteer 
had  been  abolished,  and,  after  the  first  beginnings,  a 
freer  competition  for  even  the  highest  commands  had 
been  open  to  all.  To  keep  up  the  regular  army  organi 
zation  was  practically  to  say  that  a  captaincy  in  it  was 
equivalent  to  a  brigade  command  in  the  volunteers,  and 
to  be  a  brigadier  in  it  was  a  reward  which  regular  officers 
looked  forward  to  as  a  result  of  the  successful  conduct  of 
a  great  campaign  as  general-in-chief  of  an  army.  The 
actual  command  in  war  was  thus  ridiculously  belittled  in 
the  official  scale  in  comparison  with  grades  of  a  petty 
peace  establishment,  and  the  climax  of  absurdity  was 
reached  when,  at  the  close  of  hostilities,  men  who  had 
worthily  commanded  divisions  and  corps  found  them 
selves  reduced  to  subordinate  places  in  regiments,  whilst 
others  who  had  vegetated  without  important  activity  in 
the  great  struggle  were  outranking  them  by  virtue  of 
seniority  in  the  little  army  which  had  existed  before  the 
Rebellion  ! 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  —  SPRING  CAMPAIGN 

Rosecrans's  plan  of  campaign  —  Approved  by  McClellan  with  modification 

—  Wagons  or  pack-mules  —  Final  form  of  plan  —  Changes  in  commands 

—  McClellan  limited  to  Army  of  the  Potomac  —  Halleck's  Department 
of    the     Mississippi  —  Fremont's    Mountain     Department  —  Rosecrans 
superseded  —  Preparations  in  the  Kanawha  District  —  Batteaux  to  sup 
plement   steamboats  —  Light    wagons   for  mountain  work  —  Fremont's 
plan  —  East  Tennessee  as  an  objective —  The  supply  question  —  Banks 
in  the  Shenandoah  valley  —  Milroy's  advance  —  Combat  at  McDowell  — 
Banks  defeated  —  Fremont's  plans  deranged  —  Operations  in  the  Kan 
awha   valley  —  Organization  of  brigades  —  Brigade   commanders  —  Ad 
vance  to  Narrows  of  New  River  —  The  field  telegraph  —  Concentration 
of  the  enemy  —  Affair  at  Princeton  —  Position  at  Flat-top  Mountain. 

AS  the  spring  of  1862  approached,  the  discussion  of 
plans  for  the  opening  of  a  new  campaign  was  re 
sumed.  Rosecrans  had  suggested,  early  in  February, 
that  he  would  prefer  to  attempt  reaching  the  Virginia 
and  East  Tennessee  Railroad  by  two  columns  moving 
simultaneously  upon  Abingdon  in  the  Holston  valley. 
One  of  these  would  start  from  Gauley  Bridge  and  go  by 
way  of  Fayette,  Raleigh,  and  Princeton ;  the  other  would 
leave  some  point  in  the  Big-Sandy  valley  on  the  common 
boundary  of  Kentucky  and  Virginia,  and  march  by  most 
direct  route  to  Abingdon.1  If  this  plan  were  approved, 
he  asked  that  the  west  side  of  the  Big-Sandy  valley  be 
added  to  his  department.  He  proposed  to  depend  largely 
upon  pack-mule  trains  in  place  of  wagons,  to  substitute 
the  French  shelter  tent  for  the  larger  tents  still  in  use, 
and  to  carry  hand-mills  by  which  the  soldiers  might 
grind  into  meal  the  Indian  corn  to  be  found  in  the  coun- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  721. 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  193 

try.  McClellan,  as  general -in-chief,  gave  his  approval, 
suggesting  a  modification  in  regard  to  the  column  to 
move  from  the  Big-Sandy  valley.  His  information  led 
him  to  believe  that  the  Big-Sandy  River  could  be  relied 
upon  as  navigable  to  Prestonburg,  which  was  seventy 
miles  from  Abingdon  by  what  was  supposed  to  be  a  good 
road.  He  thought,  therefore,  that  it  would  be  easier  to 
make  Prestonburg  the  base  and  to  use  wagons.1  On  in 
vestigation  Rosecrans  reported  that  the  most  feasible 
route  in  that  region  was  by  steamboat  transportation  to 
Pikeville,  twenty-five  miles  above  Prestonburg,  in  the 
Big-Sandy  valley,  and  thence  up  the  Louisa  Fork  of  the 
Big-Sandy  by  way  of  Pound  Gap  to  the  Holston  valley; 
but  there  would  still  be  eighty-eight  miles  of  marching 
after  leaving  the  steamboats,  and  navigation  on  the  Big- 
Sandy  was  limited  to  brief  and  infrequent  periods  of  high 
water. 

On  the  I2th  of  March  he  submitted  his  modified  plan 
to  the  adjutant-general  of  the  army.2  It  had  grown  more 
complex  with  the  passage  of  time.  The  eastern  line  of 
the  department  had  been  moved  forward  so  as  to  bring 
the  South  Branch  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Cow-pasture 
branch  of  the  James  River  under  Rosecrans's  command. 
He  now  planned  four  separate  columns.  The  first  was 
to  move  up  the  south  branch  of  the  Potomac  with  a  view 
to  turn  and  to  capture  the  enemy's  position  at  Alleghany 
Summit  or  Monterey  on  the  Staunton  turnpike.  The 
second  and  third  were  to  be  in  my  district,  and  to  move 
toward  the  Virginia  and  Tennessee  Railroad  on  the  two 
sides  of  New  River.  The  fourth  should  march  from  the 
Big-Sandy  valley  on  the  line  indicated  above.  Rose 
crans  seems  to  have  limited  his  plan  to  the  occupation 
of  the  mountain  valleys  as  far  east  as  the  Blue  Ridge,  and 
did  not  submit  any  scheme  for  uniting  his  columns  for 
further  work.  He  asked  for  reinforcements  to  the  extent 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  722.  2  Id.,  p.  744. 

VOL.  i.  — 13 


194          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 


of  six  regiments  of  infantry,  one  of  cavalry,  and  two 
field  batteries  to  enable  him  to  perform  his  task.  The 
use  of  pack  trains  was  given  up,  as  they  required  a 
greater  number  of  animals  than  could  be  procured.  In 
fact,  it  was  never  found  to  be  an  economical  use  of  mule 
power,  and  important  movements  were  always  confined  to 
lines  upon  which  wheel  vehicles  could  be  used.  A  rapid 
cavalry  raid  could  be  thus  supplied,  but  heavy  columns  of 
infantry  and  artillery  demanded  wagon  trains. 

The  weakness  of  Rosecrans's  scheme  is  found  in  the 
wide  separation  of  parallel  columns,  which  could  never 
have  co-operated  with  success,  and  which  had  no  common 
object  had  success  been  possible.  To  be  sure,  it  was 
presumed  that  McClellan  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  Banks  in  the  Shenandoah  valley,  would  be  operating 
in  eastern  Virginia;  but  as  McClellan  was  already  bent 
on  making  Chesapeake  Bay  his  base,  and  keeping  as  far 
as  possible  from  the  mountains,  there  was  no  real  con 
nection  or  correlation  between  his  purposed  campaign 
and  that  of  the  others.  Indeed,  had  he  succeeded  in 
driving  Lee  from  Richmond  toward  the  west,  as  Grant 
did  three  years  later,  the  feeble  columns  of  National 
troops  coming  from  West  Virginia  would  necessarily 
have  fallen  back  again  before  the  enemy.  If  the  general 
scheme  had  been  planned  by  Lee  himself,  it  could  not 
have  secured  for  him  more  perfectly  the  advantage  of 
interior  lines.  Yet  it  was  in  substance  that  which  was 
tried  when  the  spring  opened. 

When  Rosecrans's  letter,  enclosing  his  final  plan, 
reached  Washington,  McClellan  had  taken  the  field,  and 
President  Lincoln  had  made  use  of  the  occasion  to  re 
lieve  him  from  the  direction  of  all  other  forces,  so  that 
he  might  give  undivided  attention  to  his  campaign  with 
the  Potomac  army.  This  was  done  by  an  executive 
order  on  March  n,1  which  assigned  General  Halleck  to 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  v.  p.  54. 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  195 

the  command  of  everything  west  of  a  line  drawn  north 
and  south  through  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  and  formed  the 
Mountain  Department  from  the  territory  between  Halleck 
and  McClellan.  This  last  department  was  put  under  the 
command  of  Major-General  John  C.  Fremont.  General 
Banks  was  commanding  in  the  Shenandoah  valley,  but 
he  was  at  this  time  subordinate  to  McClellan.  These 
changes  were  unexpected  to  both  McClellan  and  Rose- 
crans.  The  change  in  McClellan's  relations  to  the 
whole  army  was  the  natural  result  of  his  inactivity  dur 
ing  the  autumn  of  1861,  and  the  consequent  loss  of 
confidence  in  him.  The  union  of  Buell's  and  Halleck's 
commands  in  the  west  was  the  natural  counterpart  to  the 
concentration  of  Confederate  armies  under  A.  S.  John 
ston  at  Corinth,  Miss.,  and  was  a  step  in  the  right  direc 
tion.  There  was,  however,  a  little  too  much  sentiment 
and  too  little  practical  war  in  the  construction  of  the 
Mountain  Department  out  of  five  hundred  miles  of  moun 
tain  ranges,  and  the  appointment  of  the  "  path-finder  "  to 
command  it  was  consistent  with  the  romantic  character 
of  the  whole.  The  mountains  formed  a  natural  and 
admirable  barrier,  at  which  comparatively  small  bodies 
of  troops  could  cover  and  protect  the  Ohio  valley  behind 
them ;  but,  for  reasons  which  I  have  already  pointed  out, 
extensive  military  operations  across  and  beyond  the  Alle- 
ghanies  from  west  or  east  were  impracticable,  because  a 
wilderness  a  hundred  miles  wide,  crossed  by  few  and 
most  difficult  roads,  rendered  it  impossible  to  supply 
troops  from  depots  on  either  side. 

Such  assurances  of  other  satisfactory  employment  seem 
to  have  been  given  Rosecrans  that  he  acquiesced  without 
open  complaint,  and  prepared  to  turn  over  his  command 
to  Fremont  when  the  latter  should  arrive  in  West  Vir 
ginia.  Political  motives  had,  no  doubt,  much  to  do 
with  Fremont's  appointment.  The  President  had  lost 
faith  in  his  military  capacity  as  well  as  in  his  adminis- 


196          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

trative  ability,  but  the  party  which  elected  Mr.  Lincoln 
had  not.  The  Republicans  of  the  Northern  States  had 
a  warm  side  for  the  man  they  had  nominated  for  the 
Presidency  in  1856,  and  there  was  a  general  feeling 
among  them  that  Fremont  should  have  at  least  another 
opportunity  to  show  what  he  could  do  in  the  field.  I 
myself  shared  that  feeling,  and  reported  to  him  as  my 
immediate  superior  with  earnest  cordiality.1 

In  my  own  district,  preparations  had  been  made  dur 
ing  the  winter  for  the  expected  advance  in  the  spring. 
I  had  visited  Rosecrans  at  Wheeling,  and  he  had  con 
versed  freely  upon  his  plans  for  the  new  campaign. 
Under  his  directions  the  old  piers  of  the  turnpike  bridge 
across  the  Gauley  had  been  used  for  a  new  superstruc 
ture.  This  was  a  wire  suspension  bridge,  hung  from 
framed  towers  of  timber  built  upon  the  piers.  Instead 
of  suspending  the  roadway  from  the  wire  cables  by  the 
ordinary  connecting  rods,  and  giving  stiffness  to  it  by  a 
trussed  railing,  a  latticed  framing  of  wood  hung  directly 
from  the  cables,  and  the  timbers  of  the  roadway  being 
fastened  to  this  by  stirrups,  the  wooden  lattice  served 
both  to  suspend  and  to  stiffen  the  road.  It  was  a  ser 
viceable  and  cheap  structure,  built  in  two  weeks,  and 
answered  our  purposes  well  till  it  was  burned  in  the  next 
autumn,  when  Colonel  Lightburn  retreated  before  a 
Confederate  invasion.1 

The  variable  position  of  the  head  of  steamboat  naviga 
tion  on  the  Kanawha  made  it  impossible  to  fix  a  perma 
nent  depot  as  a  terminus  for  our  wagon  trains  in  the 
upper  valley.  My  own  judgment  was  in  favor  of  placing 
it  at  Kanawha  Falls,  a  mile  below  Gauley  Bridge,  and 
within  the  limits  of  that  post.  To  connect  this  with 
the  steamboats  wherever  the  shoaling  water  might  force 
them  to  stop,  I  recommended  the  use  of  batteaux  or  keel- 
boats,  a  craft  which  a  natural  evolution  had  brought  into 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  35.  2  Id.,  p.  99. 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  197 

use  in  the  changeable  mountain  rivers.  They  were  a 
canoe-shaped  open  boat,  sixty  feet  long  by  eight  wide, 
and  were  pushed  up  the  stream  by  quants  or  poles.  They 
required  a  crew  of  five  men,  — four  to  do  the  poling,  and 
a  steersman.  In  the  swiftest  "chutes"  they  carried  a 
line  ashore  and  made  fast  to  a  tree,  then  warped  the  boat 
up  to  quieter  water  and  resumed  the  poling.  Each  boat 
would  carry  eight  tons,  and,  compared  with  teaming  over 
roads  of  which  the  "bottom  had  dropped  out,"  it  proved 
a  most  economical  mode  of  transport.  The  batteaux 
dropped  alongside  the  steamer  wherever  she  had  to  stop, 
the  freight  was  transferred  to  them  directly,  covered  with 
tarpaulins,  and  the  boats  pushed  off.  The  number  of 
hands  was  no  greater  than  for  teaming,  and  the  whole 
cost  of  the  teams  and  their  forage  was  saved.  I  had 
built  two  of  these  early  in  the  winter  and  they  were  in 
successful  operation.  Two  more  were  partly  done  when 
Fremont  assumed  command,  and  I  urgently  recommended 
a  fleet  of  fifteen  or  twenty  as  an  auxiliary  to  our  trans 
portation  when  active  operations  should  be  resumed.  By 
their  use  Gauley  Bridge  could  be  made  the  practical 
depot  of  supply,  and  from  ten  to  twenty  miles  of  wretched 
and  costly  wagoning  be  saved.1 

I  became  satisfied,  also,  that  the  regulation  army 
wagon  was  too  heavy  for  the  difficult  mountain  roads, 
and  recommended  a  strong  but  much  lighter  farm  wagon, 
in  which  four  mules  could  draw  nearly  or  quite  as  much 
as  six  usually  drew  in  the  heavier  wagon.  This  became 
a  matter  of  great  consequence  in  a  country  where  forage 
could  not  be  found,  and  where  the  wagon  had  to  be 
loaded  with  the  food  for  the  team  as  well  as  the  rations 
and  ordnance  stores  for  the  men. 

It  had  already  been  determined  to  substitute  the  shel 
ter  tent  for  other  forms  in  the  principal  armies,  and  the 
change  soon  became  general.  We,  however,  had  to  wait 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  45-48 


198         REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

our  turn  after  more  important  columns  were  supplied, 
and  our  turn  did  not  come  till  the  campaign  was  over. 
Even  our  requisitions  for  ammunition  were  not  filled, 
our  artillery  was  not  reduced  to  uniformity,  and  we  could 
not  secure  muskets  enough  of  any  one  calibre  for  a  single 
regiment.  We  made  the  best  of  the  situation,  and  whilst 
keeping  "headquarters  "  informed  of  our  lack,  were  ready 
to  do  our  best  with  the  means  we  had.  No  attention 
was  paid,  perhaps  none  could  be  paid,  to  our  recom 
mendations  for  any  special  supplies  or  means  adapted  to 
the  peculiar  character  of  our  work.  We  received,  in 
driblets,  small  supplies  of  the  regulation  wagons,  some 
droves  of  unbroken  mules,  some  ordnance  stores,  and  a  fair 
amount  of  clothing.  Subsistence  stores  had  never  been 
lacking,  and  the  energy  of  the  district  quartermaster 
and  commissary  kept  our  little  army  always  well  fed. 

The  formal  change  in  department  commanders  took 
place  on  the  2Qth  of  March,  Fremont  having  reached 
Wheeling  the  day  before.1  Mr.  Lincoln's  desire  by 
some  means  to  free  the  loyal  people  of  East  Tennessee 
from  the  oppressive  sway  of  the  Confederates  showed 
itself  in  the  instructions  given  to  all  the  military  officers 
in  the  West.  He  had  been  pressing  the  point  from  the 
beginning.  It  had  entered  into  McClellan's  and  Rose- 
crans's  plans  of  the  last  campaign.  It  had  been  the 
object  of  General  George  H.  Thomas's  organization  of 
troops  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson  in  Kentucky.  For  it 
General  Ormsby  Mitchell  had  labored  to  prepare  a 
column  at  Cincinnati.  It  was  not  accomplished  till  the 
autumn  of  1863,  when  Rosecrans  occupied  Chattanooga 
and  Burnside  reached  Knoxville;  but  there  had  never 
been  a  day's  cessation  of  the  President's  urgency  to  have 
it  accomplished.  It  was  prominent  in  his  mind  when  he 
organized  the  Mountain  Department,  and  Fremont  was 
called  upon  to  suggest  a  plan  to  this  end  as  soon  as  he 

1  0.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  i.  p.  4. 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  199 

was  appointed.  His  choice  was  to  assemble  the  forces 
of  his  department  in  Kentucky  at  the  southern  terminus 
of  the  Central  Kentucky  Railroad,  at  Nicholasville,  and 
to  march  southward  directly  to  Knoxville,  upon  what  was 
substantially  the  line  taken  by  Burnside  a  year  and  a 
half  later.1  Fremont  was  mistaken,  however,  in  saying 
that  from  Nicholasville  to  Knoxville  supplies  could  be 
"transported  over  level  and  good  roads."  General  Buell 
had,  on  the  1st  of  February,2  reported  that  line  to  be 
some  two  hundred  miles  long  from  the  end  of  the  railway 
to  Knoxville,  the  whole  of  it  mountainous,  and  the  roads 
bad.  He  estimated  a  train  of  a  thousand  wagons,  con 
stantly  going  and  returning,  as  needful  to  supply  ten 
thousand  men  at  Knoxville  after  allowance  was  made  for 
what  could  be  gathered  from  the  country.  General  Buell 
was  unquestionably  correct  in  his  view  of  the  matter,  but 
the  strong  political  reasons  for  liberating  East  Tennessee 
made  the  President  unwilling  to  be  convinced  that  it  was 
then  impracticable.  He,  however,  could  not  furnish  the 
transportation  required  for  the  movement  proposed  by 
Fremont,  and  hesitated  to  interfere  further  with  the  con 
duct  of  military  affairs  within  Buell's  territorial  limits. 
Besides  this,  Rosecrans's  plan  had  found  such  favor  with 
the  Secretary  of  War  that  it  was  laid  before  Fremont 
with  official  approval.3  The  stripping  of  West  Virginia 
of  troops  to  make  a  column  in  Kentucky  seemed  too 
hazardous  to  the  government,  and  Fremont  changed 
his  plan  so  as  to  adopt  that  of  Rosecrans  with  some 
modifications. 

He  proposed  to  leave  General  Kelley  with  sufficient 
troops  to  protect  the  line  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad,  and  with  Blenker's  division  (which  was  taken 
from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  given  to  him)  to 
advance  from  Romney  in  the  valley  of  the  South  Branch 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  i.  p.  7.  2  Id,,  vol.  vii.  p.  931. 

8  Id.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  8. 


200          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

of  the  Potomac,  ascending  this  valley  toward  the  south, 
picking  up  Schenck's  and  Milroy's  brigades  in  turn,  the 
latter  joining  the  column  at  Monterey  on  the  great 
watershed  by  way  of  the  Cheat  Mountain  pass.  From 
Monterey  Fremont  purposed  to  move  upon  Staunton,  and 
thence,  following  the  southwestern  trend  of  the  valleys, 
to  the  New  River  near  Christiansburg.  Here  he  would 
come  into  communication  with  me,  whose  task  it  would 
have  been  to  advance  from  Gauley  Bridge  on  two  lines, 
the  principal  one  by  Fayette  and  Raleigh  C.  H.  over 
Flat-top  Mountain  to  Princeton  and  the  Narrows  of 
New  River,  and  a  subordinate  one  on  the  turnpike  to 
Lewisburg.  His  plan  looked  to  continuing  the  march 
with  the  whole  column  to  the  southwest,  down  the  Hol- 
ston  valley,  till  Knoxville  should  be  reached,  the  last 
additions  to  the  force  to  be  from  the  troops  in  the  Big- 
Sandy  valley.1 

General  Garfield  (then  colonel  of  the  Forty-second 
Ohio)  had  already  been  sent  by  General  Buell  with  a  bri 
gade  into  the  Big-Sandy  valley,  and  General  George  W. 
Morgan  was  soon  to  be  sent  with  a  division  to  Cumber 
land  Gap.  Although  these  were  in  Fremont's  depart 
ment,  the  War  Department  issued  an  order  that  they 
should  continue  under  General  Buell's  command  at  least 
until  Fremont  should  by  his  operations  come  into  their 
vicinity  and  field  of  work.2  They  would,  of  course, 
co-operate  with  him  actively  if  he  should  reach  the  Hol- 
ston  valley.  When  he  should  form  his  junction  with 
me,  he  expected  to  supply  the  whole  column  from  my 
depots  in  the  Kanawha  valley,  and  when  he  reached 
Knoxville  he  would  make  his  base  on  the  Ohio  River, 
using  the  line  of  supply  he  first  suggested,  by  way  of 
central  Kentucky. 

The  plan  was  an  improvement  upon  Rosecrans's  in 
arranging  for  a  progressive  concentration  of  his  forces 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  i.  p.  7.  2  Id.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  14,  119. 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  2OI 

into  one  column  led  by  himself;  but  it  would  probably 
have  failed,  first,  from  the  impossibility  of  supplying  the 
army  on  the  route,  and  second,  because  the  railroads  east 
of  the  mountains  ran  on  routes  specially  well  adapted  to 
enable  the  enemy  quickly  to  concentrate  any  needed 
force  at  Staunton,  at  Lynchburg,  at  Christiansburg,  or 
at  Wytheville,  to  overpower  the  column.  The  Union 
army  would  be  committed  to  a  whole  season  of  marching 
in  the  mountains,  while  the  Confederates  could  concen 
trate  the  needed  force  and  quickly  return  it  to  Richmond 
when  its  work  was  done,  making  but  a  brief  episode  in 
a  larger  campaign.  But  the  plan  was  not  destined  to  be 
thoroughly  tried.  Stonewall  Jackson,  after  his  defeat  by 
Kimball  at  Kernstown,  March  23d,  had  retired  to  the 
Upper  Shenandoah  valley  with  his  division,  numbering 
about  10,000  men;  Ewell,  with  his  division,  was  wait 
ing  to  co-operate  with  him  at  the  gaps  of  the  Blue  Ridge 
on  the  east,  and  Edward  Johnson  was  near  Staunton  with 
a  similar  force  facing  Milroy.  In  April  General  N.  P. 
Banks,  commanding  the  National  forces  in  the  Shenan 
doah  valley,  had  ascended  it  as  far  as  Harrisonburg,  and 
Jackson  observed  him  from  Swift-Run  Gap  in  the  Blue 
Ridge,  on  the  road  from  Harrisonburg  to  Gordonsville. 
Milroy  also  pushed  eastward  from  Cheat  Mountain  summit, 
in  which  high  region  winter  still  lingered,  and  had  made 
his  way  through  snows  and  rains  to  McDowell,  ten  miles 
east  of  Monterey,  at  the  crossing  of  Bull-Pasture  River, 
where  he  threatened  Staunton.  But  Banks  was  thought 
to  be  in  too  exposed  a  position,  and  was  directed  by  the 
War  Department  to  fall  back  to  Strasburg.  On  the  5th 
of  May  he  had  retired  in  that  direction  as  far  as  New- 
Market.  Blenker's  division  had  not  yet  reached  Fremont, 
who  was  waiting  for  it  in  Hardy  County  at  Petersburg. 
Jackson  saw  his  opportunity  and  determined  to  join  Gen 
eral  Johnson  by  a  rapid  march  to  Staunton,  to  overwhelm 
Milroy  first,  and  then  return  to  his  own  operations  in  the 


202  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Shenandoah.  Moving  with  great  celerity,  he  attacked 
Milroy  at  McDowell  on  the  8th,  the  latter  calling  upon 
Fremont  for  help.  Schenck  was  sent  forward  to  support 
him,  and  reached  McDowell  after  marching  thirty-four 
miles  in  twenty-four  hours.  Jackson  had  not  fully  con 
centrated  his  forces,  and  the  Union  generals  held  their 
ground  and  delivered  a  sharp  combat  in  which  their 
casualties  of  all  kinds  numbered  256,  while  the  Con 
federate  loss  was  498,  General  Johnson  being  among  the 
wounded.  Schenck,  as  senior,  assumed  the  command, 
and  on  the  gth  began  his  retreat  to  Franklin,  abandoning 
the  Cheat  Mountain  road.  Franklin  was  reached  on  the 
nth,  but  Jackson  approached  cautiously,  and  did  not 
reach  there  till  the  I2th,  when,  finding  that  Fremont 
had  united  his  forces,  he  did  not  attack,  but  returned  to 
McDowell,  whence  he  took  the  direct  road  to  Harrison- 
burg,  and  then  marched  to  attack  Banks  at  Strasburg, 
Ewell  meeting  and  joining  him  in  this  movement. 

Fremont  resumed  preparations  for  his  original  cam 
paign,  but  Banks's  defeat  deranged  all  plans,  and  those 
of  the  Mountain  Department  were  abandoned.  A  month 
passed  in  efforts  to  destroy  Jackson  by  concentration  of 
McDowell's,  Banks's,  and  Fremont's  troops;  but  it  was 
too  late  to  remedy  the  ill  effects  of  the  division  of  com 
mands  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign.  On  the  26th 
of  June  General  John  Pope  was  assigned  to  command  all 
the  troops  in  northern  Virginia,  Fremont  was  relieved  at 
his  own  request,  and  the  Mountain  Department  ceased  to 
exist. 

My  own  operations  in  the  Kanawha  valley  had  kept 
pace  with  those  in  the  northern  portion  of  the  depart 
ment.  The  early  days  of  April  were  spent  by  Fremont 
in  obtaining  reports  of  the  condition  of  the  several  parts 
of  his  command.  My  report  of  the  condition  of  affairs 
in  the  Kanawha  valley  was  made  on  the  $th  of  April.1 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  45. 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  203 

In  it  I  called  attention  to  the  necessities  of  my  troops 
and  to  the  equipment  necessary  for  any  extended  cam 
paigning.  Requisitions  for  supplies  and  transportation 
had  been  sent  to  the  proper  staff  departments  during  the 
winter,  but  had  not  yet  been  filled.  My  forces  consisted 
of  eleven  regiments  of  Ohio  infantry,  three  new  and 
incomplete  regiments  of  West  Virginia  infantry,  one 
regiment  of  cavalry  (the  Second  West  Virginia)  with 
three  separate  cavalry  troops  from  other  commands,  and, 
nominally,  three  batteries  of  artillery.  One  of  the  bat 
teries  was  of  mountain  howitzers,  and  the  other  two  of 
mixed  smooth-bore  and  rifled  guns  of  different  calibres. 
My  force  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign  numbered 
8500  present  for  duty.1  Detachments  were  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Big-Sandy  River,  at  Guyandotte,  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Kanawha  on  the  Ohio  River,  at  several  points  in 
the  Kanawha  valley  below  Gauley  Bridge,  at  Summers- 
ville  on  the  upper  Gauley,  at  Gauley  Bridge,  at  Gauley 
Mount  or  Tompkins  farm  on  New  River,  and  at  Fayette 
C.  H.  The  last-named  post  had  the  only  brigade  organi 
zation  which  had  been  retained  in  winter  quarters,  and 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  121.  The  regiments  of  the  command  were  the 
nth,  1 2th,  234  28th,  3oth,  34th,  36th,  37th,  44th,  47th  Ohio,  the  4th,  8th, 
9th  West  Virginia,  the  2d  West  Virginia  Cavalry.  Of  these  the  nth  Ohio 
had  only  nine  companies  and  did  not  get  the  tenth  till  the  autumn  following. 
The  8th  West  Virginia  passed  from  the  command  before  active  operations. 
The  batteries  were  McMullin's  Ohio  battery,  Simmonds's  Kentucky  battery, 
and  a  battery  of  mountain  howitzers  at  Gauley  Mount,  manned  by  a  detach 
ment  of  the  47th  Ohio  Infantry.  Simmonds's  company  was  originally  of  the 
ist  Kentucky  Infantry  assigned  by  me  to  man  the  guns  I  first  took  into  the 
Kanawha  valley,  and  subsequently  transferred  to  the  artillery  service  by 
the  Secretary  of  War.  The  guns  were  two  2O-pounder  Parrott  rifles,  five 
lo-pounder  Parrotts,  two  bronze  ic-pounder  rifles  altered  from  6-pounder 
smooth-bores,  three  bronze  and  one  iron  6-pounder  smooth-bores,  and  ten 
mountain  howitzers  to  be  packed  on  mules.  Some  of  these  guns  were  left 
in  position  at  posts,  and  three  small  field  batteries  were  organized  for  the 
marching  columns.  Besides  the  regiment  of  freshly  recruited  West  Virginia 
cavalry,  there  were  Schambeck's  Independent  troop  of  Illinois  cavalry,  and 
Smith's  (originally  Pfau's)  Independent  troop  of  Ohio  cavalry,  both  German 
troops. 


204          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

was  commanded  by  Colonel  Scammon  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Ohio.  The  post  at  Summersville  had  been  brought 
into  my  command  for  the  winter,  and  was  garrisoned  by 
the  Thirty-sixth  Ohio  under  Colonel  George  Crook.  At 
Gauley  Bridge  was  the  Twenty-eighth  Ohio  (a  German 
regiment),  under  Colonel  August  Moor. 

When  the  decision  of  General  Fremont  to  have  my 
command  advance  on  both  sides  of  the  New  River  was 
received,  I  immediately  submitted  my  plan  of  organiza 
tion  to  that  end.1  I  proposed  to  leave  the  West  Virginia 
Infantry  regiments  with  half  the  Second  West  Virginia 
Cavalry  to  guard  the  Kanawha  valley  and  our  depots  of 
supply,  with  Colonel  J.  A.  J.  Lightburn  of  the  Fourth 
West  Virginia  in  command.  The  Ohio  regiments  were 
to  be  moved  forward  so  that  the  Eleventh,  Forty-fourth, 
and  Forty-seventh  could  be  quickly  concentrated  on  the 
Lewisburg  turnpike  in  front  of  Gauley  Bridge,  where 
Colonel  Crook  could  join  them  with  the  Thirty-sixth  by 
a  diagonal  road  and  take  command  of  this  column.  I 
assigned  to  him  a  mixed  battery  of  field-pieces  and 
mountain  howitzers.  Colonel  Scammon's  brigade  was  to 
advance  from  Fayette  C.  H.  to  Flat-top  Mountain  as 
soon  as  the  weather  would  permit,  and  thus  secure  the 
barrier  covering  our  further  movement  southward.  The 
brigade  consisted  of  the  Twelfth,  Twenty-third,  and 
Thirtieth  Ohio,  with  McMullin's  battery,  and  one  half 
the  Second  Virginia  Cavalry.  When  Scammon  advanced, 
the  remaining  Ohio  regiments  (Twenty-eighth,  Thirty- 
fourth,  and  Thirty-seventh),  with  Simmonds's  battery 
should  concentrate  at  Fayette  C.  H.  and  form  a  new 
brigade  under  Colonel  Moor.  This  organization  was 
approved  by  Fremont,  and  the  preliminary  steps  were 
quietly  taken.  By  the  2Oth  of  April  Scammon's  brigade 
was  at  Raleigh,  only  awaiting  the  settling  of  the  roads  to 
advance  to  Flat-top.  A  week  later  he  held  the  passes 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  127. 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  205 

of  the  mountain,  with  a  detachment  on  the  New  River 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Blue-stone,  where  he  communicated 
with  the  right  of  Crook's  brigade.  The  front  was  thus 
covered  from  Summersville  to  Flat-top  Mountain,  and 
the  regiments  in  rear  were  moving  into  their  assigned 
positions. 

My  brigade  commanders  were  all  men  of  marked  char 
acter.  Colonel  Moor  was  a  German  of  portly  presence 
and  grave  demeanor,  a  gentleman  of  dignity  of  character 
as  well  as  of  bearing,  and  a  brave,  resolute  man.  He 
had  been  long  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  and  had,  as 
a  young  man,  seen  some  military  service,  as  was  reported, 
in  the  Seminole  War  in  Florida.  He  was  a  rigid  dis 
ciplinarian,  and  his  own  regiment  was  a  model  of  accuracy 
in  drill  and  neatness  in  the  performance  of  all  camp 
duties.  He  was  greatly  respected  by  his  brother  officers, 
and  his  square  head,  with  dark,  smooth-shaven  face,  and 
rather  stern  expression,  inspired  his  troops  with  some 
thing  very  like  awe,  insuring  prompt  obedience  to  his 
commands.  At  home,  in  Cincinnati,  he  was  a  man  of 
influence  among  the  German  residents,  and  his  daughter 
was  the  wife  of  General  Godfrey  Weitzel  of  the  regular 
army.  My  association  with  him  was  every  way  agreeable 
and  satisfactory. 

Colonel  Crook  was  an  officer  of  the  regular  army  who 
had  taken  early  advantage  of  the  relaxation  of  the  rule 
preventing  such  from  accepting  a  volunteer  appointment. 
A  man  of  medium  size,  with  light  hair  and  sandy  beard, 
his  manner  was  rather  diffident  and  shy,  and  his  whole 
style  quiet  and  reticent.  His  voice  was  light,  rather 
than  heavy,  and  he  was  so  laconic  of  speech  that  this, 
with  his  other  characteristics,  caused  it  to  be  commonly 
said  of  him  that  he  had  been  so  long  fighting  Indians  on 
the  frontier  that  he  had  acquired  some  of  their  traits  and 
habits.  His  system  of  discipline  was  based  on  these 
peculiarities.  He  aimed  at  a  stoical  command  of  himself 


206          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

as  the  means  of  commanding  others,  and  avoided  noisy 
bluster  of  every  sort,  going,  perhaps,  to  an  excess  in 
brevity  of  speech  and  in  enforcing  his  orders  by  the  con 
sequences  of  any  disobedience.  His  subordinates  recog 
nized  his  purpose  to  be  just,  and  soon  learned  to  have  the 
greatest  confidence  in  him  as  a  military  officer.  Unless 
common  fame  did  him  injustice,  he  was  one  of  those 
officers  who  had,  at  the  beginning,  no  deep  sympathy 
with  the  National  cause,  and  had  no  personal  objection 
to  the  success  of  the  Rebellion.  But  he  was  a  Northern 
man,  and  an  ambitious  professional  soldier  who  did  not 
mean  to  let  political  opinions  stand  in  the  way  of  mili 
tary  success.1  In  his  case,  as  in  many  others,  I  believe 
this  attitude  was  modified  by  his  service  under  the  flag, 
and  that  in  1864  he  voted  for  Mr.  Lincoln's  re-election; 
he,  with  General  Sheridan,  casting  at  the  improvised 
army  ballot-box,  what  was  understood  to  be  their  first 
vote  ever  cast  in  a  civil  election. 

Colonel  Lightburn  was  one  of  the  loyal  West  Vir 
ginians  whose  standing  and  intelligence  made  him  natu 
rally  prominent  among  his  people.  He  was  a  worthy 
man  and  an  honorable  officer,  whose  knowledge  of  the 
country  and  of  the  people  made  him  a  fit  selection  to 
preserve  the  peace  and  protect  our  communications  in 
the  valley  during  our  forward  movement.  As  his  duties 
thus  separated  him  from  the  principal  columns,  I  saw 
less  of  him  than  of  the  other  brigade  commanders.  The 

1  A  romantic  story  is  told  of  his  experience  a  little  later.  He  was  in 
command  on  the  Upper  Potomac  with  headquarters  at  Cumberland,  where  he 
fell  in  love  with  the  daughter  of  the  proprietor  of  the  hotel  at  which  he  had 
his  headquarters,  and  whom  he  subsequently  made  his  wife.  The  family 
was  of  secession  proclivities,  and  the  son  of  the  house  was  in  the  Confederate 
army.  This  young  man  led  a  party  of  the  enemy  who  were  able,  by  his 
knowledge  of  the  surroundings  of  his  home,  to  capture  General  Crook  in 
the  night,  and  to  carry  him  away  a  prisoner  without  any  serious  collision 
with  the  troops  encamped  about.  Crook  was  soon  exchanged,  and  in  the 
latter  part  of  the  war  served  with  distinction  as  division  commander  undei 
Sheridan. 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  2O/ 

two  West  Virginia  regiments  which  remained  in  the 
district  were  freshly  organized,  and  were  distributed  in 
camps  where  they  could  practise  company  drill  and 
instruction  whilst  they  kept  the  country  in  order.  Of 
Colonel  Scammon,  my  senior  brigade  commander,  I  have 
already  spoken  in  a  former  chapter.1 

Fremont  limited  our  advance  to  the  line  of  Flat-top 
Mountain  until  he  should  himself  be  ready  to  open  the 
campaign  in  the  north.2  Blenker's  division  had  been 
given  to  him  from  the  Potomac  army  when  McClellan 
began  his  movement  to  the  peninsula,  but  on  the  I2th 
of  April  it  had  only  reached  Salem,  a  station  on  the 
Manassas  Gap  Railway  between  the  Bull-Run  Mountains 
and  the  Blue  Ridge.3  The  War  Department  now  sent 
General  Rosecrans  to  conduct  the  division  with  speed  to 
Frdmont,  but  extraordinary  delays  still  occurred,  and  the 
command  did  not  reach  Fremont  at  Petersburg  till  the 
nth  of  May,  when  he  immediately  moved  forward  with 
it  to  the  support  of  Schenck  and  Milroy  at  Franklin.4 
This  delay  was  one  of  a  series  of  misfortunes;  for  could 
Fremont  have  been  at  McDowell  with  this  strong  rein 
forcement  added  to  Schenck's  and  Milroy's  brigades, 
there  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  Jackson's  attack, 
if  delivered  at  all,  would  have  proven  a  disaster  for  the 
Confederates.  This,  however,  would  not  have  ensured 
success  for  the  general  campaign,  for  Banks  might  still 
have  been  driven  back  in  the  Shenandoah  valley,  and 
Fremont's  position  would  have  been  compromised.  Noth 
ing  but  a  union  of  the  two  columns  would  have  met  the 
situation. 

At  the  beginning  of  May,  the  additional  transporta 
tion  necessary  for  my  advance  beyond  Flat-top  had  not 
arrived,  but  we  did  not  wait  for  it.5  The  regiments  were 

1  Ante,  pp.  1 10,  in.  2  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  89,  108. 

z  Id.,  p.  71.  4  Id.,  pp.  1 68,  177,  pt.  i.  pp.  8,  9. 

5  Id.,  pt.  iii.  pp.  108,  112,  114,  127. 


208          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ordered  to  leave  tents  behind,  and  to  bivouac  without 
shelter  except  such  as  they  could  make  with  "brush,"  for 
the  expected  shelter  tents  also  were  lacking.  The  whole 
distance  from  the  head  of  navigation  to  the  railroad  at 
Newberne  was  one  hundred  and  forty  miles.  Flat-top 
Mountain  and  Lewisburg  were,  respectively,  about  half 
way  on  the  two  routes  assigned  to  us.  Some  two  thou 
sand  of  the  enemy's  militia  were  holding  the  mountain 
passes  in  front  of  us,  and  a  concentration  of  the  regular 
Confederate  troops  was  going  on  behind  them.  These 
last  consisted  of  two  brigades  under  General  Henry  Heth, 
as  well  as  J.  S.  Williams's  and  Marshall's  brigades,  under 
General  Humphrey  Marshall,  with  the  Eighth  Virginia 
Cavalry.  General  Marshall  appears  to  have  been  senior 
when  the  commands  were  united.  Looking  south  from 
Flat-top  Mountain  we  see  the  basin  of  the  Blue-stone 
River,  which  flows  northeastward  into  New  River.  This 
basin,  with  that  of  the  Greenbrier  on  the  other  side  of 
New  River,  forms  the  broadest  stretch  of  cultivated  land 
found  between  the  mountain  ranges,  though  the  whole 
country  is  rough  and  broken  even  here.  The  crest  of 
Flat-top  Mountain  curves  southward  around  the  head 
waters  of  the  Blue-stone,  and  joins  the  more  regular 
ranges  in  Tazewell  County.  The  straight  ridge  of  East- 
River  Mountain  forms  a  barrier  on  the  southern  side  of 
the  basin,  more  than  thirty  miles  away  from  the  summit 
of  Flat-top  where  Scammon's  camp  was  placed  on  the 
road  from  Raleigh  C.  H.  to  Princeton,  the  county-seat 
of  Mercer.  The  Narrows  of  New  River  were  where 
that  stream  breaks  through  the  mountain  barrier  I  have 
described,  and  the  road  from  Princeton  to  Giles  C.  H. 
passes  through  the  defile.  Only  one  other  outlet  from 
the  basin  goes  southward,  and  that  is  where  the  road 
from  Princeton  to  Wytheville  passes  through  Rocky  Gap, 
a  gorge  of  the  wildest  character,  some  thirty  miles  south- 
westward  from  the  Narrows.  These  passes  were  held  by 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  2OQ 


Confederate  forces,  whilst  their  cavalry,  under  Colonel 
W.  H.  Jenifer,  occupied  Princeton  and  presented  a  skir 
mishing  resistance  to  our  advance-guard. 

On  the  ist  of  May  a  small  party  of  the  Twenty -third 
Ohio  met  the  enemy's  horse  at  Camp  Creek,  a  branch 
of  the  Blue-stone,  six  miles  from  the  crest  of  Flat-top, 
and  had  a  lively  engagement,  repulsing  greatly  superior 
numbers.  On  hearing  of  this,  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  B. 
Hayes  marched  with  part  of  the  Twenty-third  Ohio  and 
part  of  the  West  Virginia  cavalry,  and  followed  up  the 
enemy  with  such  vigor  that  Jenifer  was  driven  through 
Princeton  too  rapidly  to  permit  him  to  remove  the  stores 
collected  there.1  To  avoid  their  falling  into  our  hands, 
Jenifer  set  fire  to  the  town.  Hayes  succeeded  in  sav 
ing  six  or  eight  houses,  but  the  rest  were  destroyed. 
Jenifer  retreated  on  the  Wytheville  road,  expecting  us 
to  follow  by  that  route;  but  Hayes,  learning  that  the 
Narrows  were  not  strongly  held,  and  being  now  rein 
forced  by  the  rest  of  his  regiment  (the  Twenty-third), 
marched  on  the  6th  to  the  Narrows  which  he  held,2 
whilst  he  sent  Major  Comly  with  a  detachment  into 
Pearisburg,  the  county-seat  of  Giles.  The  affair  at 
Camp  Creek  had  cost  Jenifer  some  twenty  in  killed  and 
wounded,  and  an  equal  number  were  captured  in  the 
advance  on  Giles  C.  H.  Our  casualties  were  i  killed 
and  20  wounded.  Our  line,  however,  was  getting  too 
extended,  and  the  utmost  exertions  were  needed  to  sup 
ply  the  troops  in  their  present  positions.  Princeton, 
being  at  the  forking  of  the  roads  to  Pearisburg  and 
Wytheville,  was  too  important  a  point  to  be  left  un 
guarded,  and  I  at  once  sent  forward  Colonel  Scammon 
with  the  Thirtieth  Ohio  to  hold  it.4  On  the  Qth  of  May 

1  O  R  ,  vol.  xii.  pt.  i.  pp.  449,  450. 

2  Id.,  pt.  iii.  p.  140. 

8  James  M.  Comly,  later  Brevet  Brigadier-General,  and  since  the  war  at 
one  time  United  States  minister  to  the  Sandwich  Islands. 
4  Id.,  p   148. 
VOL.  I.  —  14 


210          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  Twelfth  Ohio  was  put  in  march  from  Raleigh  to  join 
him,  and  Moor's  brigade  was  approaching  the  last-named 
place  where  my  headquarters  were,  that  being  the  ter 
minus,  for  the  time,  of  the  telegraph  line  which  kept  me 
in  communication  with  Fremont.1  The  same  day  the 
department  commander  informed  me  of  the  attack  by 
Jackson  on  Milroy  on  the  /th,  and  ordered  me  to  suspend 
movements  in  advance  until  my  forces  should  be  concen 
trated.2  The  weather  was  rainy,  and  the  roads  suffered 
badly  from  cutting  up  by  the  wagons,  but  I  had  hoped  to 
push  forward  a  strong  advanced  guard  to  the  great  rail 
way  bridge  near  Newberne,  and  destroy  it  before  the 
enemy  had  time  to  concentrate  there.  This  made  it  neces 
sary  to  take  some  risk,  for  it  was  not  possible  to  move 
the  whole  command  till  some  supplies  could  be  accumu 
lated  at  Raleigh  and  at  Flat-top  Mountain. 

As  fast  as  the  supplies  would  permit,  Moor  went  for 
ward,  taking  no  tents  beyond  Raleigh,  and  all  of  the 
troops  on  this  line  now  faced  the  continuing  rains  with 
out  shelter.  Guerilla  parties  were  set  actively  at  work 
by  the  Confederates  in  the  region  of  the  Guyandotte  and 
at  other  points  in  our  rear.  Colonel  Lightburn  was 
directed  to  keep  his  forces  actively  moving  to  suppress 
these  outbreaks,  and  the  forward  movement  was  pressed. 
On  the  loth  of  May  Heth's  two  brigades  of  the  enemy 
attacked  our  advance-guard  at  Pearisburg,  and  these, 
after  destroying  the  enemy's  stores,  which  they  had  cap 
tured  there,  retired  skirmishing,  till  they  joined  Scam- 
mon,  who  had  advanced  from  Princeton  to  their  support.3 
Scammon's  brigade  was  now  together,  a  mile  below  the 
Narrows  of  New  River,  with  the  East  River  in  front  of 
him,  making  a  strong,  defensible  position.  The  tele 
graph  reached  Flat-top  Mountain  on  the  I3th,4  even  this 
being  delayed  because  wagons  to  carry  the  wire  could 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p,  157.  2  Id.,  p.  158. 

3  Id.,  p.  176.  4  Id.,  p.  184. 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  211 

not  be  spared  from  the  task  of  supplying  the  troops  with 
food.  I  moved  my  headquarters  to  Princeton  on  this 
day,  and  pressed  forward  Moor's  brigade  in  the  hope  of 
being  able  to  push  again  beyond  the  barrier  at  the  Nar 
rows  of  New  River,  where  Heth's  brigades  had  now 
taken  position.1  Neither  Scammon  nor  Moor  was  able 
to  take  with  him  ammunition  enough  for  more  than  a 
slight  engagement,  nor  was  any  accumulation  of  food 
possible.  We  were  living  "from  hand  to  mouth,"  no 
additional  transportation  had  reached  us,  and  every 
wagon  and  pack-mule  was  doing  its  best.  As  fast  as 
Moor's  regiments  reached  Princeton  they  were  hurried 
forward  to  French's  Mill,  five  miles  in  rear  of  Scammon, 
oft  the  road  running  up  East  River,  and  intersecting  the 
Wytheville  road  so  as  to  form  a  triangle  with  the  two 
going  from  Princeton.  During  the  I4th  and  I5th  Moor's 
regiments  arrived,  and  were  pushed  on  to  their  position, 
except  one  half  regiment  (detachments  of  the  Thirty-fourth 
and  Thirty-seventh  Ohio),  under  Major  F.  E.  Franklin, 
and  one  troop  of  cavalry,  which  were  kept  at  Princeton  as 
a  guard  against  any  effort  on  the  enemy's  part  to  inter 
rupt  our  communications.  Moor  was  ordered  to  send  a 
detachment  up  the  East  River  to  the  crossing  of  the 
Wytheville  road,  so  as  to  give  early  warning  of  any 
attempt  of  the  enemy  to  come  in  upon  our  flank  from 
that  direction.2  My  purpose  was  to  attack  Heth  with 
Scammon' s  and  Moor's  brigades,  drive  him  away  from 
the  Narrows  of  New  River,  and  prevent  him,  if  pos 
sible,  from  uniting  with  Marshall's  command,  which  was 
understood  to  be  somewhere  between  Jeffersonville 
(Tazewell  C.  H.)  and  Wytheville.  If  we  succeeded  in 
beating  Heth,  we  could  then  turn  upon  Marshall.3 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  i$th   Moor  threw  a  detach 
ment   of    two    companies    over    East    River    Mountain 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  188.  2  Id.,  pt.  ii.  p.  505. 

8  Id.,  pt.  iii.  pp.  197-199. 


212  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

as  a  reconnoissance  to  learn  whether  the  roads  in 
that  direction  were  practicable  for  a  movement  to  turn 
the  left  of  Heth.  It  attacked  and  handsomely  routed  a 
post  of  the  enemy  on  Wolf  Creek.1  The  few  wagons 
and  pack-mules  were  hurrying  forward  some  rations  and 
ammunition;  but  the  i;th  would  be  the  earliest  possible 
moment  at  which  I  could  lead  a  general  advance.  The 
telegraph  wire  would  reach  Princeton  by  the  evening  of 
that  day,  and  I  waited  there  for  the  purpose  of  exchang 
ing  messages  with  Fremont  before  pushing  toward  New- 
berne,  the  expected  rendezvous  with  the  other  troops  of 
the  department.  But  all  our  efforts  could  not  give  us 
the  needed  time  to  anticipate  the  enemy.  They  had  rail 
way  communication  behind  a  mountain  wall  which  had 
few  and  difficult  passes.  Marshall  and  Williams  were 
already  marching  from  Tazewell  C.  H.  to  strike  our  line 
of  communications  at  Princeton,  and  were  far  on  the 
way.2 

About  noon  of  the  i6th  Colonel  Moor  reported  that 
his  detachment  on  the  Wytheville  road  was  attacked  by 
a  force  of  the  enemy  estimated  at  I5OO.3  This  seems  to 
have  been  the  command  of  Colonel  Wharton,  marching 
to  join  Marshall,  who  was  coming  from  the  west  by  a 
road  down  the  head-waters  of  East  River.  Of  this,  how 
ever,  we  were  ignorant.  I  ordered  Moor  to  take  the 
remainder  of  his  command  (leaving  half  a  regiment  only 
at  French's)  to  drive  off  the  force  at  the  cross-roads,  and 
if  he  were  overpowered  to  retreat  directly  upon  Princeton 
by  the  western  side  of  the  triangle  of  roads,  of  which 
each  side  was  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  long.  Colonel 
Scammon  reported  no  change  in  Heth's  positions  or  force 
in  front  of  him.  Patrols  were  sent  out  on  all  the  roads 
west  and  south  of  Princeton,  our  little  force  of  horsemen 
being  limited  to  Smith's  troop  of  Ohio  cavalry  which  was 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  p.  505.  2  Id.,  pt.  iii.  p.  199. 

3  Id.,  pt.  ii.  pp.  505,  509. 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  213 

acting  as  headquarters  escort.  About  two  o'clock  the 
patrol  on  the  Wyoming  road,  five  miles  out  of  Princeton, 
was  fired  upon  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  came  rapidly 
in  with  the  report.  The  four  companies  of  infantry 
under  Majors  Franklin  and  Ankele  were  moved  out  on 
that  road,  and  soon  developed  the  infantry  of  Marshall's 
command.1  He  and  Williams  had  marched  across  from 
the  Tazewell  to  the  Wyoming  road,  and  were  coming  in 
upon  our  flank  and  rear.  I  reconnoitred  them  personally 
with  care,  and  satisfied  myself  of  their  overwhelming 
superiority  to  the  little  detachment  I  had  in  hand. 
Franklin  and  Ankele  were  ordered  to  deploy  their  whole 
force  as  skirmishers  and  to  hold  the  enemy  back  as  long 
as  possible.  Some  of  our  troopers  were  shown  on  the 
flanks,  and  so  imposing  a  show  was  made  that  Marshall 
advanced  cautiously.  Our  men  behaved  beautifully, 
holding  every  tree  and  rock,  delaying  the  enemy  for 
more  than  three  hours  from  reaching  the  crests  of  the 
hills  looking  down  upon  the  town.  I  had  sent  orderlies 
to  stop  and  turn  back  our  wagon  trains  on  the  way  from 
Flat-top,  and  had  directed  headquarters  baggage  and  the 
few  stores  in  Princeton  to  be  loaded  and  sent  on  the 
road  toward  Moor  and  Scammon.  Our  only  tents  were 
three  or  four  wall  tents  for  headquarters  (the  adjutant- 
general's,  quartermaster's,  and  commissary's  offices),  and 
these  I  ordered  to  be  left  standing  to  impose  upon  the 
enemy  the  idea  that  we  did  not  mean  to  retire.  As  even 
ing  approached,  the  hostile  force  occupied  the  summits 
of  surrounding  hills,  and  directing  the  infantry  slowly 
to  fall  back  and  follow  me,  I  galloped  with  my  staff  to 
bring  back  Scammon  and  restore  our  broken  communi 
cations.  At  French's,  twelve  miles  from  Princeton,  I 
found  that  Moor  had  not  had  time  to  execute  the  orders 
of  the  afternoon,  and  that  ten  companies  from  the 
Twenty-eighth  and  Thirty-seventh  Ohio  were  all  that 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  p.  506. 


214          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

he  had  been  able  to  send  to  Wytheville  road  crossing. 
These,  we  learned  later  in  the  night,  had  succeeded  in 
re-occupying  the  cross-roads.  They  were  ordered  to 
hold  fast  till  morning,  and  if  the  enemy  still  appeared 
to  be  mainly  at  Princeton,  to  march  in  that  direction  and 
attack  them  from  the  rear.  Scammon  was  ordered  to 
send  half  a  regiment  to  occupy  Moor's  position  at 
French's  during  the  night,  and  to  march  his  whole 
command  at  daybreak  toward  Princeton.  There  was  but 
one  and  a  half  regiments  now  with  Moor,  and  these  were 
roused  and  ordered  to  accompany  me  at  once  on  our 
return  to  Princeton.  It  was  a  dark  and  muddy  march, 
and  as  we  approached  the  town  we  deployed  skirmishers 
in  front,  though  they  were  obliged  to  move  slowly  in  the 
darkness.  Day  was  just  breaking  as  we  came  out  of  the 
forest  upon  the  clearing,  line  of  battle  was  formed,  and 
the  troops  went  forward  cheering.  The  enemy  made  no 
stubborn  resistance,  but  retired  gradually  to  a  strong 
position  on  rough  wooded  hills  about  a  mile  from  the 
village,  where  they  covered  both  the  Wytheville  and  the 
Wyoming  road.  They  had  artillery  on  both  flanks,  and 
could  only  be  reached  over  open  and  exposed  ground. 
We  recovered  our  headquarters  tents,  standing  as  we 
had  left  them.  We  had  captured  a  few  prisoners  and 
learned  that  Marshall  and  Williams  were  both  before 
us.  Whilst  pushing  them  back,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Von 
Blessingh  with  the  ten  companies  of  Moor's  brigade 
approached  on  the  Wytheville  road  and  attacked;  but  the 
enemy  was  aware  of  their  approach  and  repulsed  them, 
having  placed  a  detachment  in  a  very  strong  position  to 
meet  them.  Von  Blessingh  withdrew  his  men,  and  later 
joined  the  command  by  a  considerable  detour.  With 
less  than  two  regiments  in  hand,  and  with  the  certainty 
of  the  enemy's  great  superiority,  there  was  nothing  for 
it  but  to  take  the  best  position  we  could  and  await 
Scammon 's  arrival.  We  made  as  strong  a  show  of  force 


THE  MOUNTAIN  DEPARTMENT  21$ 

as  possible,  and  by  skirmishing  advances  tempted  the 
enemy  to  come  down  to  attack ;  but  he  also  was  expect 
ing  reinforcements,  and  a  little  artillery  firing  was  the 
only  response  we  provoked.1  As  some  evidence  of  the 
physical  exhaustion  from  the  continuous  exertions  of 
the  preceding  day  and  night,  I  may  mention  the  fact 
that  during  the  artillery  firing  I  threw  myself  for  a  little 
rest  on  the  ground,  close  beside  the  guns;  and  though 
these  were  firing  at  frequent  intervals,  I  fell  asleep  and 
had  a  short  but  refreshing  nap  almost  within  arm's 
length  of  the  wheels  of  a  gun-carriage. 

Toward  evening  Scammon  arrived  with  his  brigade, 
reporting  that  Heth's  force  had  followed  his  retiring 
movement  as  far  as  French's,  and  confirming  the  infor 
mation  that  four  brigades  of  the  enemy  were  before  us. 
Shortly  after  dark  the  officer  of  the  day,  on  the  right,  re 
ported  the  noise  of  artillery  marching  around  that  flank. 
Our  last  day's  rations  had  been  issued,  and  our  animals 
were  without  forage.  Small  parties  of  the  enemy  had 
gone  far  to  our  rear  and  cut  the  telegraph,  so  that  we 
had  had  no  news  from  the  Kanawha  valley  for  two  days. 
The  interruption  was  likely  to  create  disturbance  there 
and  derange  all  our  plans  for  supply.  It  was  plain  that 
we  should  have  to  be  content  with  having  foiled  the 
enemy's  plan  to  inflict  a  severe  blow  upon  us,  and  that 
we  might  congratulate  ourselves  that  with  two  brigades 
against  four  we  had  regained  our  line  without  serious 
loss.  I  therefore  ordered  that  the  troops  be  allowed  to 
rest  till  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  i8th,  and 
that  the  column  then  retire  behind  the  Blue-stone  River. 
The  movement  was  made  without  interruption,  and  a 
camp  on  Flat-top  Mountain  was  selected,  from  which  the 
roads  on  every  side  were  well  guarded,  and  which  was 
almost  impregnable  in  itself.2  Our  casualties  of  all 
kinds  in  the  affairs  about  Princeton  had  been  only  113, 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  506,  507.  2  Id.,  pt.  iii.  p.  209. 


2l6          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

as  the  enemy  had  not  delivered  any  serious  attack,  and 
the  contest  on  our  side  had  been  one  of  manoeuvre  in 
which  our  only  chance  of  important  results  was  in  attack 
ing  either  Heth  or  Marshall  when  they  were  so  far  sepa 
rated  that  they  could  not  unite  against  us  on  the  field  of 
battle.  After  the  I5th  this  chance  did  not  exist,  and 
wisdom  dictated  that  we  should  retire  to  a  safe  point 
from  which  we  could  watch  for  contingencies  which 
might  give  us  a  better  opportunity.  Our  experience 
proved  what  I  have  before  stated,  that  the  facility  for 
railway  concentration  of  the  enemy  in  our  front  made  this 
line  a  useless  one  for  aggressive  movements,  as  they 
could  always  concentrate  a  superior  force  after  they  re 
ceived  the  news  of  our  being  in  motion.  It  also  showed 
the  error  of  dividing  my  forces  on  two  lines,  for  had 
Crook's  brigade  been  with  me,  or  my  two  brigades  with 
him,  we  should  have  felt  strong  enough  to  cope  with  the 
force  which  was  actually  in  our  front,  and  would  at  least 
have  made  it  necessary  for  the  enemy  to  detach  still 
more  troops  from  other  movements  to  meet  us.  Our  cam 
paign,  though  a  little  one,  very  well  illustrates  the  char 
acter  of  the  subordinate  movements  so  often  attempted 
during  the  war,  and  shows  that  the  same  principles  of 
strategy  are  found  operating  as  in  great  movements. 
The  scale  is  a  reduced  one,  but  cause  and  effect  are 
linked  by  the  same  necessity  as  on  a  broader  theatre  of 
warfare. 


CHAPTER  XI 

POPE  IN  COMMAND  —  TRANSFER  TO  WASHINGTON 

A  key  position  —  Crook's  engagement  at  Lewisburg  —  Watching  and  scout 
ing —  Mountain  work  —  Pope  in  command  —  Consolidation  of  Depart 
ments  —  Suggestions  of  our  transfer  to  the  East  —  Pope's  Order  No.  n 
and  Address  to  the  Army — Orders  to  march  across  the  mountains  — 
Discussion  of  them  — Changed  to  route  by  water  and  rail  —  Ninety-mile 
march — Logistics  —  Arriving  in  Washington  —  Two  regiments  reach 
Pope  —  Two  sent  to  Manassas  —  Jackson  captures  Manassas  —  Railway 
broken — McClellan  at  Alexandria  —  Engagement  at  Bull  Run  Bridge  — 
Ordered  to  Upton's  Hill  —  Covering  Washington — Listening  to  the 
Bull  Run  battle  —  111  news  travels  fast. 

OUR  retreat  to  Flat-top  Mountain  had  been  made 
without  loss  of  material,  except  one  baggage- 
wagon,  which  broke  down  irreparably,  and  was  burned 
by  my  order.  At  the  crossing  of  Blue-stone  River  we 
were  beyond  the  junction  of  roads  by  which  our  flank 
could  be  turned,  and  we  halted  there  as  the  end  of  the 
first  march.  As  the  men  forded  the  stream,  the  sun 
broke  through  the  clouds,  which  had  been  pretty  stead 
ily  raining  upon  us,  the  brass  band  with  the  leading 
brigade  struck  up  the  popular  tune,  "  Are  n't  you  glad  to 
get  out  of  the  wilderness?"  and  the  soldiers,  quick 
to  see  the  humorous  application  of  any  such  incident, 
greeted  it  with  cheers  and  laughter.  All  felt  that  we 
were  again  masters  of  the  situation.  Next  day  we  moved 
leisurely  to  the  mountain  summit,  a  broad  undulating 
table-land  with  some  cultivated  farms,  where  our  camp 
was  perfectly  hidden  from  sight,  whilst  we  commanded  a 
most  extensive  view  of  the  country  in  front.  Outposts 
at  the  crossing  of  the  Blue-stone  and  at  Pack's  Ferry 
on  New  River,  with  active  scouting-parties  and  patrols 


218          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

scouring  the  country  far  and  wide,  kept  me  fully  informed 
of  everything  occurring  near  us.  We  had  time  to  organ 
ize  the  new  wagon-trains  which  were  beginning  to  reach 
us,  and,  while  waiting  till  Fremont  could  plan  new 
co-operative  movements,  to  prepare  for  our  part  in  such 
work. 

The  camp  on  Flat-top  Mountain  deserved  the  name  of 
a  "key  point"  to  the  country  in  front  as  well,  perhaps, 
as  that  much  abused  phrase  ever  is  deserved.1  The  name 
of  the  mountain  indicates  its  character.  The  northern 
slope  is  gentle,  so  that  the  approach  from  Raleigh  C.  H. 
is  not  difficult,  whilst  the  southern  declivity  falls  off 
rapidly  to  the  Blue-stone  valley.  The  broad  ridge  at  the 
summit  is  broken  into  rounded  hills  which  covered  the 
camp  from  view,  whilst  they  still  permitted  manoeuvre  to 
meet  any  hostile  approach.  The  mountain  abutted  on  the 
gorge  of  the  New  River  on  the  northeast,  and  stretched 
also  southwestward  into  the  impracticable  wilderness 
about  the  headwaters  of  the  Guyandotte  and  the  Tug 
Fork  of  Sandy.  The  position  was  practically  unassail 
able  in  front  by  any  force  less  than  double  our  own,  and 
whilst  we  occupied  it  the  enemy  never  ventured  in  force 
beyond  the  passes  of  East  River  Mountain.  We  built 
a  flying-bridge  ferry  at  Pack's,  on  New  River,  near  the 
mouth  of  the  Blue-stone,  where  a  passable  road  up  the 
valley  of  the  Greenbrier  connected  us  with  Colonel 
Crook's  position  at  Lewisburg.  The  post  at  Pack's 
Ferry  was  held  by  a  detachment  from  Scammon's  brigade 
in  command  of  Major  Comly  of  the  Twenty-third  Ohio. 
On  the  6th  of  August  a  detachment  of  the  enemy  con 
sisting  of  three  regiments  and  a  section  of  artillery 
under  Colonel  Wharton  made  an  effort  to  break  up  the 

1  Clausewitz  says  of  the  phrases  "  covering  position,''  "  key  of  the  coun 
try,"  etc.,  that  they  are  for  the  most  part  mere  words  without  sense  when  they 
indicate  only  the  material  advantage  which  is  given  by  the  elevation  of  the 
land.  "  On  War,"  part  ii.  chap.  xvii. 


POPE  IN  COMMAND  219 

ferry  by  an  attack  from  the  east  side,  but  they  accom 
plished  nothing.  Major  Comly  was  quickly  supported 
by  reinforcements  from  Scammon's  brigade,  and  drove  off 
his  assailants.1 

I  have  not  yet  spoken  of  the  movements  of  Colonel 
Crook's  brigade  on  the  Lewisburg  route,  because  circum 
stances  so  delayed  his  advance  that  it  had  no  immediate 
relation  to  our  movements  upon  Pearisburg  and  Prince 
ton.  As  the  march  of  my  own  column  was  beginning, 
General  Fremont,  upon  information  of  guerilla  raids 
north  of  Summersville,  directed  that  Crook  be  sent  into 
Webster  County  to  co-operate  with  troops  sent  south 
ward  from  Weston  to  destroy  the  lawless  parties.  This 
involved  a  march  of  more  than  seventy  miles  each  way, 
and  unforeseen  delays  of  various  kinds.  Two  of  the 
guerillas  captured  were  tried  and  convicted  of  murder, 
and  Colonel  Crook  was  obliged  to  remain  in  that  region 
to  protect  the  administration  of  justice  till  the  execution 
of  the  murderers  and  the  dispersion  of  the  guerilla 
bands.2  The  organization  and  movement  of  his  brigade 
upon  Lewisburg  was  by  this  means  put  back  so  far  that 
his  column  could  not  get  within  supporting  distance  of 
mine.  He  reached  Lewisburg  on  the  day  of  our  affair  at 
Princeton.  He  had  been  energetic  in  all  his  movements, 
but  the  diversion  of  parts  of  his  command  to  so  distant 
an  enterprise  as  that  into  Webster  County  had  been  fatal 
to  co-operation.  The  Confederate  General  Heth  had 
been  able  to  neglect  the  Lewisburg  route  and  to  carry 
his  brigade  to  the  assistance  of  Marshall  in  his  opposi 
tion  to  my  advance.  As  it  turned  out,  I  should  have 
done  better  to  have  waited  at  Flat-top  Mountain  till  I 
knew  that  Crook  was  at  Lewisburg,  and  then  to  have 
made  a  fresh  combination  of  movements.  Our  experi 
ence  only  added  another  to  the  numerous  proofs  the 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  p.  127  ;  pt.  iii.  pp.  541,  542. 

2  Id.,  pp.  127,  159. 


220          REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

whole  campaign  furnished,  of  the  futility  of  such  com 
bined  operations  from  distant  bases. 

Major-General  Loring  took  command  of  all  the  Con 
federate  forces  in  southwestern  Virginia  on  the  iQth  or 
2Oth  of  May,  and  Heth  was  already  in  march  to  oppose 
Crook's  forward  movement.  On  the  23d  Heth,  with 
some  3000  men,  including  three  batteries  of  artillery, 
attacked  Crook  at  Lewisburg,  soon  after  daybreak  in  the 
morning.  Crook  met  him  in  front  of  the  town,  and  after 
a  sharp  engagement  routed  him,  capturing  four  cannon, 
some  200  stand  of  arms  and  100  prisoners.  His  own  loss 
was  13  killed  and  53  wounded,  with  7  missing.  He  did 
not  think  it  wise  to  follow  up  the  retreating  enemy,  but 
held  a  strong  position  near  Lewisburg,  where  his  commu 
nications  were  well  covered,  and  where  he  was  upon  the 
same  range  of  highlands  on  which  we  were  at  Flat-top, 
though  fifty  miles  of  broken  country  intervened.1  Mean 
while  Fremont  had  been  ordered  to  Banks' s  relief,  and 
had  been  obliged  to  telegraph  me  that  we  must  be  left 
to  ourselves  till  the  results  of  the  Shenandoah  cam 
paign  were  tested.2  Rumors  were  rife  that  after  Jackson 
retired  from  Fremont's  front  at  Franklin,  Johnson's 
division  was  ordered  to  march  into  our  part  of  West 
Virginia.  We  were  thus  thrown,  necessarily,  into  an 
expectant  attitude,  awaiting  the  outcome  of  Fremont's 
eastward  movement  and  the  resumption  of  his  plans. 
Our  men  were  kept  busy  in  marching  and  scouting  by 
detachments,  putting  down  guerilla  bands  and  punishing 
disorders.  They  thus  acquired  a  power  of  sustained  exer 
tion  on  foot  which  proved  afterward  of  great  value. 

There  was,  in  a  way,  a  resemblance  in  our  situation 
and  in  our  work  to  that  of  feudal  chiefs  in  the  middle 
ages.  We  held  a  lofty  and  almost  impregnable  position, 
overlooking  the  country  in  every  direction.  The  distant 
ridges  of  the  Alleghanies  rose  before  us,  the  higher 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  804-813.  2  Id.,  pt.  iii.  p.  264. 


POPE  IN  COMMAND  221 

peaks  standing  out  in  the  blue  distance,  so  that  we 
seemed  to  watch  the  mountain  passes  fifty  miles  away 
without  stirring  from  our  post.  The  loyal  people  about 
us  formed  relations  to  us  not  unlike  those  of  the  feudal 
retainers  of  old.  They  worked  their  farms,  but  every 
man  had  his  rifle  hung  upon  his  chimney-piece,  and  by 
day  or  by  night  was  ready  to  shoulder  it  and  thread  his 
way  by  paths  known  only  to  the  natives,  to  bring  us 
news  of  open  movement  or  of  secret  plots  among  the 
Secessionists.  They  were  organized,  also,  in  their  own 
fashion,  and  every  neighborhood  could  muster  its  com 
pany  or  its  squad  of  home-guards  to  join  in  quelling 
seditious  outbreaks  or  in  strengthening  a  little  column 
sent  against  any  of  the  enemy's  outposts.  No  consider 
able  hostile  movement  was  possible  within  a  range  of 
thirty  miles  without  our  having  timely  notice  of  it. 
The  smoke  from  the  camp-fires  of  a  single  troop  of  horse 
could  be  seen  rising  from  the  ravines,  and  detachments 
of  our  regiments  guided  by  the  native  scouts  would  be 
on  the  way  to  reconnoitre  within  an  hour.  Officers  as 
well  as  men  went  on  foot,  for  they  followed  ridges  where 
there  was  not  even  a  bridle-path,  and  depended  for  safety, 
in  no  small  degree,  on  their  ability  to  take  to  the  thickets 
of  the  forest-clad  hillside  if  they  found  themselves  in  the 
presence  of  a  body  of  the  Confederate  cavalry.  Thirty 
miles  a  day  was  an  easy  march  for  them  after  they  had 
become  hardened  to  their  work,  and  taking  several  days 
together  they  could  outmarch  any  cavalry,  especially 
when  they  could  take  "  short  cuts  "  over  hills  and  away 
from  travelled  roads.  They  knew  at  what  farms  they 
could  find  "rations,"  and  where  were  the  hostile  neigh 
borhoods  from  which  equally  enterprising  scouts  would 
glide  away  to  carry  news  of  their  movements  to  the 
enemy.  At  headquarters  there  was  a  constant  going 
and  coming.  Groups  of  home-guards  were  nearly  always 
about,  as  picturesque  in  their  homely  costume  as  Leather- 


222  REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

stocking  himself,  and  many  of  our  officers  and  men  were 
hardly  less  expert  as  woodsmen.  Constant  activity  was 
the  order  of  the  day,  and  the  whole  command  grew  hardy 
and  self-reliant  with  great  rapidity. 

General  Pope  was,  on  the  26th  of  June,  assigned  to 
command  the  Army  of  Virginia,  including  the  forces 
under  McDowell  and  Banks  as  well  as  those  in  the 
Mountain  Department.1  Fremont  was  relieved  from 
command  at  his  own  request,  and  the  Mountain  Depart 
ment  ceased  to  exist.2  Pope  very  wisely  determined  to 
unite  in  one  army  under  his  own  command  as  many  as 
possible  of  the  troops  reporting  to  him,  and  meanwhile 
directed  us  to  remain  on  the  defensive.3  I  ventured  on 
the  3d  of  July  to  suggest  by  telegraph  that  my  division 
would  make  a  useful  reinforcement  to  his  active  army 
in  the  field,  and  reiterated  it  on  the  5th,  with  some  ex 
planation  of  my  views.4  I  indicated  Fayetteville  and 
Hawk's  Nest  as  points  in  front  of  Gauley  Bridge  where 
moderate  garrisons  could  cover  the  valley  defensively,  as 
I  had  done  in  the  preceding  year.  Getting  no  answer, 
I  returned  to  the  subject  on  the  I3th.6  Pope,  however, 
did  not  issue  his  address  upon  assuming  active  command 
till  the  I4th,  when  his  much  ridiculed  manifesto  to  the 
army  appeared.6  Since  the  war  General  Pope  has  him 
self  told  me  that  this,  as  well  as  the  other  orders  issued 
at  that  time  and  which  were  much  criticised,  were 
drafted  under  the  dictation,  in  substance,  of  Mr.  Stanton, 
the  Secretary  of  War.  He  admitted  that  some  things 
in  them  were  not  quite  in  good  taste;  but  the  feeling 
was  that  it  was  desirable  to  infuse  vigor  into  the  army 
by  stirring  words,  which  would  by  implication  condemn 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  435.  2  Id,,  p.  437. 

8  Id.,  p.  471-  4  M-,  PP-  45T>  457- 

6  /</.,  p.  471. 

6  He  had  announced  his  assignment  and  his  headquarters  at  Washington 
on  June  27  (Id.,  p.  436),  but  he  now  issued  the  address  as  he  was  about  to 
take  the  field  (Id.,  p.  473). 


POPE  IN  COMMAND  22$ 

McClellan's  policy  of  over-caution  in  military  matters, 
and  over-tenderness  toward  rebel  sympathizers  and  their 
property.  The  Secretary,  as  he  said,  urged  such  public 
declarations  so  strongly  that  he  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to 
resist.  They  were  unfairly  criticised,  and  were  made 
the  occasion  of  a  bitter  and  lasting  enmity  toward  Pope 
on  the  part  of  most  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Potomac 
Army.  It  seems  that  Mr.  Lincoln  hesitated  to  approve 
the  one  relating  to  the  arrest  of  disloyal  persons  within 
the  lines  of  the  army,  and  it  was  not  till  Pope  repeated 
his  sense  of  the  need  of  it  that  the  President  yielded,  on 
condition  that  it  should  be  applied  in  exceptional  cases 
only.  It  was  probably  intended  more  to  terrify  citizens 
from  playing  the  part  of  spies  than  to  be  literally 
enforced,  which  would,  indeed,  have  been  hardly  pos 
sible.  No  real  severity  was  used  under  it,  but  the  Con 
federate  government  made  it  the  occasion  of  a  sort  of 
outlawry  against  Pope  and  his  army.1  Only  two  days 
later  he  issued  an  order  against  pillaging  or  molestation 
of  persons  and  dwellings,  as  stringent  as  any  one  could 
wish.2 

On  the  5th  of  August  Pope  suggested  to  Halleck  that 
I  should  be  ordered  to  leave  about  2500  men  intrenched 
near  Gauley  Bridge,  and  march  with  the  remainder  of 
my  command  (say  nine  regiments)  by  way  of  Lewisburg, 
Covington,  Staunton,  and  Harrisonburg  to  join  him. 
Halleck  replied  that  it  was  too  much  exposed,  and 
directed  him  to  select  one  more  in  the  rear.  Pope  very 

1  It  is  only  fair  to  recollect  that  in  the  following  year  Halleck  found  it 
necessary  to  repeat  in  substance  Pope's  much  abused  orders,  and  Meade, 
who  then  commanded  the  Potomac  Army,  issued  a  proclamation  in  accord 
ance  with  them.     (O.  R.,  voL  xxvii.  pt.  i.  p.  102;  pt.  iii.  p.  786.)     For  Pope's 
submission  of  Order  No.  II  to  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  limitation  placed  on  it, 
see  Id.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  500,  540.     For  general  military  law  on  the  subject, 
see  Birkhimer's  "  Military  Government  and  Martial  Law,"  chap.  viii.     For 
the  practice  of  the  Confederates,  see  the  treatment  of  the  Hon.  George  Sum 
mers,  chap.  xix.  post. 

2  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  573. 


224          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

rightly  answered  that  there  was  no  other  route  which 
would  not  make  a  great  circuit  to  the  rear.  Halleck  saw 
that  Jackson's  army  near  Charlottesville  with  a  probable 
purpose  of  turning  Pope's  right  flank  might  make  a 
junction  impossible  for  me,  and  stated  the  objection, 
but  concluded  with  authority  to  Pope  to  order  as  he 
deemed  best,  "but  with  caution."1 

On  the  8th  of  August  Pope  telegraphed  me,  accord 
ingly,  to  march  by  way  of  Lewisburg,  Covington,  Warm 
Springs,  and  Augusta  Springs  to  Harrisonburg,  and  there 
join  him  by  shortest  route.  He  indicated  Winchester  or 
Romney  as  my  secondary  aim  if  I  should  find  the  junc 
tion  with  him  barred.2  This  route  avoided  Staunton, 
but  by  so  short  a  distance  that  it  was  scarcely  safer,  and 
the  roads  to  be  travelled  were  much  harder  and  longer. 
At  this  time  several  detachments  of  considerable  size 
were  out,  chasing  guerilla  parties  and  small  bodies  of 
Confederate  troops,  and  assisting  in  the  organization  or 
enlistment  of  Union  men.  The  movement  ordered  could 
not  begin  for  several  days,  and  I  took  advantage  of  the 
interval  to  lay  before  General  Pope,  by  telegraph,  the 
proof  that  the  march  would  take  fifteen  days  of  uninter 
rupted  travel  through  a  mountainous  region,  most  of  it 
a  wilderness  destitute  of  supplies,  and  with  the  enemy 
upon  the  flank.  Besides  this  there  was  the  very  serious 
question  whether  the  Army  of  Virginia  would  be  at 
Charlottesville  when  I  should  approach  that  place.  On 
the  other  hand,  my  calculation  was  that  we  could  reach 
Washington  in  ten  days  or  less,  by  way  of  the  Kanawha 
and  Ohio  rivers  to  Parkersburg,  and  thence  by  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  to  the  capital.3  My  dis 
patches  were  submitted  to  General  Halleck,  and  on  the 
nth  of  August  General  Pope  telegraphed  a  modified 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  534,  540,  543. 

2  Id.,  pp.  460,  462,  551. 

8  Id.,  vol.  xiii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  555,  559. 


POPE  IN  COMMAND  22$ 

assent  to  my  suggestions.  He  directed  that  5000  men 
should  remain  in  West  Virginia  under  my  command, 
and  the  remainder  proceed  to  Washington  by  river  and 
rail.1  An  incursion  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  into  Logan 
County  on  my  right  and  rear  was  at  the  moment  in 
progress,  and  we  used  great  activity  in  disposing  of  it, 
so  that  the  change  in  our  dispositions  might  not  be  too 
quickly  known  to  our  adversaries  nor  have  the  appearance 
of  retreat.2 

It  is  a  natural  wish  of  every  soldier  to  serve  with  the 
largest  army  in  the  most  important  campaign.  The 
order  to  remain  with  a  diminished  command  in  West 
Virginia  was  a  great  disappointment  to  me,  against 
which  I  made  haste  to  protest.  On  the  I3th  I  was 
rejoiced  by  permission  to  accompany  my  command  to  the 
East.3  Preliminary  orders  had  already  been  given  for 
making  Fayetteville  and  Hawk's  Nest  the  principal 
advanced  posts  in  the  contracted  operations  of  the  dis 
trict,  with  Gauley  Bridge  for  their  common  depot  of 
supply  and  point  of  concentration  in  case  of  an  advance 
of  the  enemy  in  force.  I  organized  two  small  brigades 
and  two  batteries  of  artillery  for  the  movement  to  Wash 
ington.  Colonels  Scammon  and  Moor,  who  were  my 
senior  colonels,  were  already  in  command  of  brigades,  and 
Colonel  Lightburn  was  in  command  of  the  lower  valley. 
The  arrangement  already  existing  practically  controlled. 
Scammon' s  brigade  was  unchanged,  and  in  Moor's  the 
Thirty-sixth  Ohio  under  Crook  and  the  Eleventh  were 
substituted  for  the  Thirty-seventh  and  Thirty-fourth. 
The  organization  therefore  was  as  follows ;  namely,  First 
Brigade,  Colonel  Scammon  commanding,  consisted  of 
the  Twelfth,  Twenty-third,  and  Thirtieth  Ohio  and 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xiii.  pt.  iii.  p.  560. 

2  I  at  one  time  supposed  that  the  orders  to  march  across  the  country 
originated  with  General  Halleck,  but  the  Official  Records  of  the  War  fix  the 
history  of  the  matter  as  is  above  stated. 

3  Id.,  pp.  567,  570. 

VOL.  I. —  15 


226          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

McMullin's  Ohio  Battery;  Second  Brigade,  Colonel  Moor 
commanding,  consisted  of  the  Eleventh,  Twenty-eighth, 
and  Thirty-sixth  Ohio  and  Simmonds's  Kentucky  Battery. 
One  troop  of  horse  for  orderlies  and  headquarters  escort, 
and  another  for  similar  service,  with  the  brigades,  also 
accompanied  us.  The  regiments  left  in  the  Kanawha 
district  were  the  Thirty-fourth,  Thirty-seventh,  Forty- 
fourth,  and  Forty-seventh  Ohio,  the  Fourth  and  Ninth 
West  Virginia  Infantry,  the  Second  West  Virginia  Cav 
alry,  a  battery,  and  some  incomplete  local  organizations. 
Colonel  J.  A.  J.  Lightburn  of  the  Fourth  West  Virginia 
was  in  command  as  senior  officer  within  the  district.1 

Portions  of  the  troops  were  put  in  motion  on  the  I4th 
of  August,  and  a  systematic  itinerary  was  prepared  for 
them  in  advance.2  They  marched  fifty  minutes,  and  then 
rested  the  remaining  ten  minutes  of  each  hour.  The 
day's  work  was  divided  into  two  stages  of  fifteen  miles 
each,  with  a  long  rest  at  noon,  and  with  a  half  day's 
interval  between  the  brigades.  The  weather  was  warm, 
but  by  starting  at  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  heat 
of  the  day  was  reserved  for  rest,  and  they  made  their 
prescribed  distance  without  distress  and  without  strag 
gling.  They  went  by  Raleigh  C.  H.  and  Fayetteville 
to  Gauley  Bridge,  thence  down  the  right  bank  of  the 
Kanawha  to  Camp  Piatt,  thirteen  miles  above  Charleston. 
The  whole  distance  was  ninety  miles,  and  was  covered 
easily  in  the  three  days  and  a  half  allotted  to  it.3  The 
fleet  of  light-draft  steamboats  which  supplied  the  district 
with  military  stores  was  at  my  command,  and  I  gave 
them  rendezvous  at  Camp  Piatt,  where  they  were  in 
readiness  to  meet  the  troops  when  the  detachments 
began  to  arrive  on  the  I7th.  In  the  evening  of  the  I4th 
I  left  the  camp  at  Flat-top  with  my  staff  and  rode  to 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  567,  570;  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  pp.  738,  742,  754. 

2  Id,,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  738. 

8  Id.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  629. 


TRANSFER   TO    WASHINGTON  227 

Raleigh  C.  H.  On  the  I5th  we  completed  the  rest  of 
the  sixty  miles  to  Gauley  Bridge.  From  that  point  j 
was  able  to  telegraph  General  Meigs,  the  Quartermaster- 
General  at  Washington,  that  I  should  reach  Parkersburg, 
the  Ohio  River  terminus  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad,  on  the  evening  of  the  2Oth,  and  should  need 
railway  transportation  for  5000  men,  two  batteries  of  six 
guns  each,  noo  horses,  270  wagons,  with  camp  equipage 
and  regimental  trains  complete,  according  to  the  army 
regulations  then  in  force.1 

At  Gauley  Bridge  I  met  Colonel  Lightburn,  to  whom 
I  turned  over  the  command  of  the  district,  and  spent  the 
time,  whilst  the  troops  were  on  the  march,  in  complet 
ing  the  arrangements  both  for  our  transportation  and  for 
the  best  disposition  of  the  troops  which  were  to  remain. 
The  movement  of  the  division  was  the  first  in  which 
there  had  been  a  carefully  prepared  effort  to  move  a  con 
siderable  body  of  troops  with  wagons  and  animals  over  a 
long  distance  within  a  definitely  fixed  time,  and  it  was 
made  the  basis  of  the  calculations  for  the  movement  of 
General  Hooker  and  his  two  corps  from  Washington  to 
Tennessee  in  the  next  year.  It  thus  obtained  some 
importance  in  the  logistics  of  the  war.  The  president 
of  the  railway  put  the  matter  unreservedly  into  the  hands 
of  W.  P.  Smith,  the  master  of  transportation ;  Mr.  P.  H. 
Watson,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  represented  the 
army  in  the  management  of  the  transfer,  and  by  thus 
concentrating  responsibility  and  power,  the  business  was 
simplified,  and  what  was  then  regarded  as  a  noteworthy 
success  was  secured.  The  command  could  have  moved 
more  rapidly,  perhaps,  without  its  wagons  and  animals, 
but  a  constant  supply  of  these  was  needed  for  the  eastern 
army,  and  it  was  wise  to  take  them,  for  they  were  organ 
ized  into  trains  with  drivers  used  to  their  teams  and 
feeling  a  personal  interest  in  them.  It  turned  out  that 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  577,  619,  629;  vol.  li.  p.  754. 


228          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

our  having  them  was  a  most  fortunate  thing,  for  not  only 
were  the  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  greatly 
crippled  for  lack  of  transportation  on  their  return  from 
the  peninsula,  but  we  were  able  to  give  rations  to  the 
Ninth  Army  Corps  after  the  battle  of  Antietam,  when 
the  transportation  of  the  other  divisions  proved  entirely 
insufficient  to  keep  up  the  supply  of  food. 

From  the  head  of  navigation  on  the  Kanawha  to  Parkers- 
burg  on  the  Ohio  was  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles; 
but  the  rivers  were  so  low  that  the  steamboats  proceeded 
slowly,  delayed  by  various  obstacles  and  impediments. 
At  Letart's  Falls,  on  the  Ohio,  the  water  was  a  broken 
rapid,  up  which  the  boats  had  to  be  warped  one  at  a 
time,  by  means  of  a  heavy  warp-line  made  fast  to  the 
bank  and  carried  to  the  steam-capstan  on  the  steamer. 
At  the  foot  of  Blennerhassett's  Island  there  was  only 
two  feet  of  water  in  the  channel,  and  the  boats  dragged 
themselves  over  the  bottom  by  "  sparring,"  a  process  some 
what  like  an  invalid's  pushing  his  wheel-chair  along  by 
a  pair  of  crutches.  But  everybody  worked  with  a  will, 
and  on  the  2ist  the  advanced  regiments  were  transferred 
to  the  railway  cars  at  Parkersburg,  according  to  pro 
gramme,  and  pulled  out  for  Washington.1  These  were 
the  Thirty-sixth  Ohio,  Colonel  Crook,  and  the  Thirtieth 
Ohio,  Colonel  Ewing.  They  passed  through  Washing 
ton  to  Alexandria,  and  thence,  without  stopping,  to 
Warrenton,  Virginia,  where  they  reported  at  General 
Pope's  headquarters.2  The  Eleventh  Ohio  (Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Coleman)  and  Twelfth  (Colonel  White),  with 
Colonel  Scammon  commanding  brigade,  left  Parkersburg 
on  the  22d,  reaching  Washington  on  the  24th.  One 
of  them  passed  on  to  Alexandria,  but  the  other  (Eleventh 
Ohio)  was  stopped  in  Washington  by  reason  of  a  break 
in  Long  Bridge  across  the  Potomac,  and  marched  to 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  619,  629. 

2  Id.,  pp.  636,  637,  668,  676. 


TRANSFER   TO   WASHINGTON  22Q 

Alexandria  the  next  day.1  The  last  of  the  regiments 
(Twenty-eighth  Ohio,  Colonel  Moor,  and  Twenty-third, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Hayes),  with  the  artillery  and  cavalry 
followed,  and  on  the  26th  all  the  men  had  reached  Wash 
ington,  though  the  wagons  and  animals  were  a  day  or  two 
later  in  arriving.2 

In  Washington  I  reported  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
and  was  received  with  a  cordiality  that  went  far  to  remove 
from  my  mind  the  impression  I  had  got  from  others,  that 
Mr.  Stanton  was  abrupt  and  unpleasant  to  approach. 
Both  on  this  occasion  and  later,  he  was  as  affable  as 
could  be  expected  of  a  man  driven  with  incessant  and 
importunate  duties  of  state.  In  the  intervals  of  my  con 
stant  visits  to  the  railway  offices  (for  getting  my  troops 
and  my  wagons  together  was  the  absorbing  duty)  I  found 
time  for  a  hurried  visit  to  Secretary  Chase,  and  found 
also  my  friend  Governor  Dennison  in  the  city,  mediat 
ing  between  the  President  and  General  McClellan  with 
the  good-will  and  diplomatic  wisdom  which  peculiarly 
marked  his  character.  I  had  expected  to  go  forward 
with  three  regiments  to  join  General  Pope  on  the  even 
ing  of  the  26th;  but  Colonel  Haupt,  the  military  superin 
tendent  of  railways  at  Alexandria,  was  unable  to  furnish 
the  transportation  by  reason  of  the  detention  of  trains  at 
the  front.3  Lee's  flank  movement  against  Pope's  army 
had  begun,  and  as  the  latter  retreated  all  the  railway  cars 
which  could  be  procured  were  needed  to  move  his  stores 
back  toward  Washington.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  26th, 
however,  arrangements  had  been  made  for  moving  the 
regiments  at  Alexandria  early  next  morning.4  The 
wagons  and  animals  were  near  at  hand,  and  I  ordered 
Colonel  Moor  with  the  Twenty-eighth  Ohio  to  march 
with  them  to  Manassas  as  soon  as  they  should  be  un 
loaded  from  the  railway  trains.  But  during  the  night 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  650,  677.  a  /</.,  p-  698. 

3  Id.,  pp.  625,  677.  4  Ibid,  and  pp.  678,  679. 


230  REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

occurred  a  startling  change  in  the  character  of  the  cam 
paign  which  upset  all  our  plans  and  gave  a  wholly  un 
expected  turn  to  my  own  part  in  it. 

About  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening  Colonel  Haupt 
received  at  Alexandria  the  information  that  the  enemy's 
cavalry  had  attacked  our  great  depot  of  supplies  at 
Manassas  Junction.  The  telegrapher  had  barely  time  to 
send  a  message,  break  the  connection  of  the  wires,  and 
hurry  away  to  escape  capture.1  It  was  naturally  sup 
posed  to  be  only  a  cavalry  raid,  but  the  interruption  of 
communication  with  Pope  in  that  crisis  was  in  itself  a 
serious  mishap.  The  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  push 
forward  any  troops  at  hand  to  protect  the  railway  bridge 
over  .Bull  Run,  and  by  authority  of  the  War  Department 
Colonel  Haupt  was  authorized  to  send  forward,  under 
Colonel  Scammon,  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Ohio  with 
out  waiting  to  communicate  with  me.  They  were  started 
very  early  in  the  morning  of  the  2/th,  going  to  support 
a  New  Jersey  brigade  under  General  George  W.  Taylor 
which  had  been  ordered  to  protect  the  Bull  Run  bridge.2 
Ignorant  of  all  this,  I  was  busy  on  Wednesday  morning 
(27th),  trying  to  learn  the  whereabout  of  the  trains  with 
my  wagon  teams,  which  had  not  yet  reached  Washing 
ton,  and  reported  the  situation  as  to  my  command  to  the 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Watson.3  I  then 
learned  of  Scammon 's  sudden  movement  to  the  front, 
and  of  the  serious  character  of  the  enemy's  movement 
upon  Manassas.  I  marched  at  once  with  the  two  regi 
ments  still  in  Washington,  expecting  to  follow  the  rest 
of  the  command  by  rail  as  soon  as  we  should  reach  Alex 
andria.  Arriving  there,  I  hastened  to  the  telegraph 
office  at  the  railway  station,  where  I  found  not  only 
Colonel  Haupt,  but  General  McClellan,  who  had  come 
from  Fortress  Monroe  the  night  before.  Of  the  Army  of 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  680.  2  C.  W.,  vol.  i.  pp.  379,  381. 

3  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  698. 


TRANSFER   TO   WASHINGTON  231 

the  Potomac,  Heintzelman's  and  Porter's  corps  were 
already  with  Pope,  Franklin's  was  at  Alexandria,  and 
Sumner's  was  beginning  to  arrive.  As  soon  as  it  was 
known  at  the  War  Department  that  McClellan  was  pres 
ent,  General  Halleck's  correspondence  was  of  course 
with  him,  and  we  passed  under  his  orders.1  It  had 
already  been  learned  that  '  Stonewall '  Jackson  was  with 
infantry  as  well  as  cavalry  at  Manassas,  and  that  the  Bull 
Run  bridge  had  been  burned,  our  troops  being  driven 
back  three  or  four  miles  from  it.  McClellan  thought  it 
necessary  to  organize  the  two  corps  at  Alexandria  and 
such  other  troops  as  were  there,  including  mine,  first  to 
cover  that  place  and  Washington  in  the  possible  contin 
gency  that  Lee's  whole  army  had  interposed  between 
General  Pope  and  the  capital,  and,  second,  to  open  com 
munication  with  Pope  as  soon  as  the  situation  of  the 
latter  could  be  learned.  Couch's  division  was  still  at 
Yorktown,  and  orders  had  been  issued  by  Halleck  to 
ship  5000  new  troops  there  to  relieve  Couch  and  allow  his 
veteran  division  to  join  the  Potomac  Army.2 

McClellan  directed  me  to  take  the  two  regiments  with 
me  into  camp  with  Franklin's  corps  at  Annandale,  three 
miles  in  front  of  Alexandria,  and  to  obey  Franklin's 
orders  if  any  emergency  should  occur.3  I  found,  at  the 
post-quartermaster's  office,  an  officer  who  had  served  in 
West  Virginia  a  year  before,  and  by  his  hearty  and  effi 
cient  good-will  secured  some  supplies  for  the  regiments 
with  me  during  the  days  that  were  yet  to  pass  before  we 
got  our  own  trains  and  could  feel  that  we  had  an  assured 
means  of  living  and  moving  in  an  independent  way.  We 
bivouacked  by  the  roadside  without  shelter  of  any  sort, 
enveloped  in  dense  clouds  of  dust  from  the  marching 
columns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  their  artillery  and 
wagons,  as  they  passed  and  went  into  camp  just  in  front 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  688,  689,  691.  2  Id.,  p.  689. 

8  Id.,  p.  692. 


232        REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

of  us.  About  noon,  on  Thursday  (28th),  Colonel  Scam- 
mon  joined  me  with  the  two  regiments  he  had  taken 
toward  Manassas,  and  we  learned  the  particulars  of  the 
sharp  engagement  he  had  at  the  railway  bridge. 

The  train  carrying  the  troops  approached  the  bridge 
over  Bull  Run  about  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  on 
Wednesday,  and  Colonel  Scammon  immediately  pushed 
forward  the  Twelfth  Ohio  (Colonel  White)  to  the  bridge 
itself  and  the  bank  of  the  stream.  He  met  the  New 
Jersey  brigade  of  four  regiments  coming  back  in  confu 
sion  and  panic.  The  commander,  General  Taylor,  had 
taken  position  on  the  west  side  of  the  creek,  covering 
the  bridge;  but  he  had  no  artillery,  and  though  his 
advance  was  made  with  great  spirit  (as  Jackson  recog 
nized  in  his  report1),  his  lines  had  been  subjected  to  a 
heavy  artillery  fire  from  the  batteries  of  A.  P.  Hill's  and 
Jackson's  own  divisions,  and  broke,  retreating  in  dis 
order  to  the  eastern  side  of  the  stream.  General  Taylor 
himself  fell  severely  wounded  whilst  trying  to  rally 
them.  It  was  at  this  moment  that  Scammon  reached 
the  field  with  the  Twelfth  Ohio.  He  had  heard  the 
artillery  fire,  but  little  or  no  musketry,  and  was  aston 
ished  at  seeing  the  retreat.  He  sent  his  adjutant-gen 
eral,  Lieutenant  Robert  P.  Kennedy,2  to  communicate 
with  General  Taylor  and  to  try  to  rally  the  fugitives. 
Meanwhile  he  ordered  Colonel  White  to  line  the  bank 
of  the  creek  with  his  men  and  try  to  protect  the  bridge 
structure.  Kennedy  found  General  Taylor  in  a  litter 
being  carried  to  the  rear,  and  the  general,  though  in 
anguish  from  his  wound,  was  in  great  mental  distress  at 
the  rout  of  his  men.  He  begged  every  one  to  rally  the 
flying  troops  if  possible,  and  sent  his  own  adjutant- 
general,  Captain  Dunham,  to  turn  over  the  general 
command  to  Scammon.  All  efforts  to  rally  the  panic- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  p.  644. 

2  Member  of  Congress  (1890),  and  recently  Lieutenant-Governor  of  Ohio. 


TRANSFER    TO    WASHINGTON  233 

stricken  brigade  were  fruitless,  and  Scammon  resisted 
the  advance  of  Hill's  division  through  nearly  a  whole 
day  with  the  two  regiments  alone.  A  Lieutenant 
Wright  of  the  Fourth  New  Jersey,  with  ten  men,  re 
ported  to  Colonel  Scammon  and  begged  assignment  in 
the  line.  Their  names  are  honorably  enrolled  in  Scam- 
mon's  report,1  and  these,  with  Captain  Dunham,  did 
heroic  service,  but  were  all  of  the  brigade  that  took  any 
further  part  in  the  fight.  Dunham  succeeded  in  rallying 
a  portion  of  the  brigade  later  in  the  day,  but  too  late  to 
enter  the  engagement. 

Taking  advantage  of  the  bridges  near  the  stream, 
Scammon  kept  his  men  covered  from  the  artillery  fire  as 
well  as  possible,  driving  back  with  his  volleys  every 
effort  to  pass  by  the  bridge  or  to  ford  the  stream  in  his 
front.  Hill  moved  brigades  considerably  to  right  and 
left,  and  attempted  to  surround  White  and  the  Twelfth 
Ohio.  But  Coleman,  with  the  Eleventh,  had  come  up 
in  support,  and  Scammon  ordered  him  to  charge  on  the 
enemy's  right,  which  was  passing  White's  left  flank. 
Coleman  did  so  in  splendid  style,  driving  his  foe 
before  him,  and  crossing  the  bridge  to  the  west  side. 
The  odds,  however,  were  far  too  great  where  a  brigade 
could  attack  each  regiment  of  ours  and  others  pass  be 
yond  them,  so  that  Scammon,  having  fully  developed 
the  enemy's  force,  had  to  limit  himself  to  delaying  their 
advance,  retiring  his  little  command  in  echelon  from  one 
ridge  to  another,  as  his  wings  were  threatened.  This 
he  did  with  perfect  coolness  and  order,  maintaining  the 
unequal  struggle  without  assistance  till  about  half-past 
three  in  the  afternoon.  The  enemy's  efforts  now  re 
laxed,  and  Scammon  withdrew  at  leisure  to  a  position 
some  three  miles  from  the  bridge.  Hill  still  showed  a 
disposition  to  surround  the  detachment  by  manoeuvres, 
and  Scammon  retired  toward  Annandale  in  the  night. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  p.  407. 


234         REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

He  himself  underestimated  the  enemy's  force  in  infan 
try,  which  Jackson's  report  puts  at  "several  brigades."1 
His  loss  in  the  two  Ohio  regiments  was  106  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing.2  Those  of  the  New  Jersey  bri 
gade  are  not  reported.  The  combat  was  a  most  instruc 
tive  military  lesson,  teaching  what  audacity  and  skill 
may  do  with  a  very  small  force  in  delaying  and  mystify 
ing  a  much  larger  one,  which  was  imposed  upon  by  its 
firm  front  and  its  able  handling. 

Some  of  Scammon's  wounded  being  too  badly  hurt  to 
be  removed,  he  detailed  a  surgeon  to  remain  with  them 
and  care  for  them  till  they  should  be  exchanged  or  other 
wise  brought  within  our  lines.  This  surgeon  was  taken 
to  Jackson's  headquarters,  where  he  was  questioned  as  to 
the  troops  which  had  held  the  Confederates  at  bay.  Gen 
eral  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  was  with  Jackson,  and  on  the  sur 
geon's  stating  that  the  fighting  during  most  of  the  day 
had  been  by  the  two  Ohio  regiments  alone,  Stuart's  racy 
expressions  of  admiration  were  doubly  complimentary  as 
coming  from  such  an  adversary,  and,  when  repeated,  were 
more  prized  by  the  officers  and  men  than  any  praise  from 
their  own  people.3 

Toward  evening  on  Thursday,  a  thunderstorm  and  gale 
of  wind  came  up,  adding  greatly  to  the  wretched  discom 
fort  of  the  troops  for  the  moment,  but  making  the  air 
clearer  and  laying  the  dust  for  a  day  or  two.  I  found 
partial  shelter  with  my  staff,  on  the  veranda  of  a  small 
house  which  was  occupied  by  ladies  of  the  families  of 
some  general  officers  of  the  Potomac  Army,  who  had 
seized  the  passing  opportunity  to  see  their  husbands  in 
the  interval  of  the  campaign.  We  thought  ourselves 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  p.  644.  2  Id.,  p.  262. 

8  The  history  of  this  engagement  was  currently  published  with  curious 
inaccuracies.  Even  Mr.  Ropes  in  his  "  Campaign  under  Pope  "  does  not 
seem  to  have  seen  the  official  reports  on  our  side,  and  supposed  that  Taylor's 
brigade  was  all  that  was  engaged.  See  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  405-411 ; 
also  pt.  iii.  pp.  698,  699;  also  C.  W.,  vol.  i.  pp.  379-382. 


TRANSFER    TO    WASHINGTON 


235 


fortunate  in  getting  even  the  shelter  of  the  veranda  roof 
for  the  night.  On  Friday  morning  (2Qth),  Captain  Fitch, 
my  quartermaster,  was  able  to  report  his  train  and  bag 
gage  safe  at  Alexandria,  and  we  were  ready  for  any  ser 
vice.  Orders  came  from  General  McClellan  during  the 
forenoon  to  move  the  four  regiments  now  with  me  into 


Toote  _  Scale  of  Miles  t 

0       1        2. 


Forts  Ramsey  and  Buffalo,  on  Upton's  and  Munson's 
hills,  covering  Washington  on  the  direct  road  to  Cen- 
treville  by  Aqueduct  Bridge,  Ball's  Cross-Roads,  and 
Fairfax  C.  H.1  General  McClellan  had  established  his 
headquarters  on  Seminary  Ridge  beyond  the  northern 
outskirts  of  Alexandria,  and  after  putting  my  command 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  712,  726.     For  this  he  had  Halleck's  authority, 
in  view  of  the  danger  of  cavalry  raids  into  the  city.    Id.,  p.  722. 


236          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

in  motion  I  rode  there  to  get  fuller  instructions  from 
him  as  to  the  duty  assigned  me.  His  tents  were  pitched 
in  a  high  airy  situation  looking  toward  the  Potomac  on 
the  east;  indeed  he  had  found  them  a  little  too  airy  in 
the  thunder-squall  of  the  previous  evening  which  had 
demolished  part  of  the  canvas  village.  It  must  have 
been  about  noon  when  I  dismounted  at  his  tent.  The 
distant  pounding  of  artillery  had  been  in  our  ears  as 
we  rode.  It  was  Pope's  battle  with  Jackson  along  the 
turnpike  between  Bull  Run  and  Gainesville  and  on  the 
heights  above  Groveton,  thirty  miles  away. 

General  Franklin  had  ridden  over  from  Annandale  and 
was  with  McClellan  receiving  his  parting  directions 
under  the  imperative  orders  which  Halleck  had  sent 
to  push  that  corps  out  to  Pope.  McClellan' s  words  I 
was  not  likely  to  forget.  "Go,"  he  said,  "and  whatever 
may  happen,  don't  allow  it  to  be  said  that  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  failed  to  do  its  utmost  for  the  country." 
McClellan  then  explained  to  me  the  importance  of  the 
position  to  which  I  was  ordered.  The  heights  were  the 
outer  line  of  defence  of  Washington  on  the  west,  which 
had  been  held  at  one  time,  a  year  before,  by  the  Con 
federates,  who  had  an  earthwork  there,  notorious  for 
a  while  under  the  camp  name  of  "Fort  Skedaddle." 
From  them  the  unfinished  dome  of  the  Capitol  was  to  be 
seen,  and  the  rebel  flag  had  flaunted  there,  easily  distin 
guishable  by  the  telescopes  which  were  daily  pointed  at 
it  from  the  city.  McClellan  had  little  expectation  that 
Pope  would  escape  defeat,  and  impressed  upon  me  the 
necessity  of  being  prepared  to  cover  a  perhaps  disorderly 
retreat  within  the  lines.  Some  heavy  artillery  troops 
(Fourth  New  York  Heavy  Artillery)  were  in  garrison  at 
one  of  the  forts,  and  these  with  the  forces  at  Falls 
Church  were  ordered  to  report  to  me.1  Assuring  me  that 
he  would  soon  visit  me  in  my  new  quarters,  McClellan 

1  O.  R-,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  726. 


TRANSFER   TO    WASHINGTON  237 

dismissed  me,  and  I  galloped  forward  to  overtake  my 
troops. 

I  found  the  position  of  the  forts  a  most  commanding 
one,  overlooking  the  country  in  every  direction.  West 
ward  the  ground  sloped  away  from  us  toward  Fairfax 
Court  House  and  Centreville.  Northward,  in  a  pretty 
valley,  lay  the  village  of  Falls  Church,  and  beyond  it  a 
wooded  ridge  over  which  a  turnpike  road  ran  to  Vienna 
and  on  to  Leesburg.  Behind  us  was  the  rolling  country 
skirting  the  Potomac,  and  from  Ball's  Cross-Roads,  a 
mile  or  two  in  rear,  a  northward  road  led  to  the  chain- 
bridge  above  Georgetown,  whilst  the  principal  way  went 
directly  to  the  city  by  the  Aqueduct  Bridge.  Three 
knolls  grouped  so  as  to  command  these  different  direc 
tions  had  been  crowned  with  forts  of  strong  profile.  The 
largest  of  these,  Fort  Ramsey,  on  Upton's  Hill  was 
arrried  with  twenty-pounder  Parrott  rifles,  and  the  heavy- 
artillery  troops  occupied  this  work.  I  had  a  pair  of 
guns  of  the  same  kind  and  calibre  in  my  mixed  battery, 
and  these  with  my  other  field  artillery  were  put  in  the 
other  forts.  Lines  of  infantry  trench  connected  the 
works  and  extended  right  and  left,  and  my  four  regiments 
occupied  these.1  A  regiment  of  cavalry  (Eighth  Illinois, 
joined  later  by  the  Eighth  Pennsylvania)  was  ordered  to 
report  to  me,  and  this,  with  Schambeck's  squadron  which 
had  come  with  me,  made  a  cavalry  camp  in  front  of 
Falls  Church  and  picketed  and  patrolled  the  front.2 

We  pitched  our  headquarters  tents  on  Upton's  Hill, 
just  in  rear  of  Fort  Ramsey,  and  had  a  sense  of  luxury 
in  "setting  our  house  in  order"  after  the  uncomfortable 
experience  of  our  long  journey  from  West  Virginia.  The 
hurry  of  startling  events  in  the  past  few  days  made  our 
late  campaign  in  the  mountains  seem  as  far  away  in  time 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  pp.  777,  779 ;  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  176. 

2  See  my  order  assigning  garrisons  to  the  forts.     O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i. 
p.  771. 


238          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

as  it  was  in  space.  We  were  now  in  the  very  centre  of 
excitement,  and  had  become  a  very  small  part  of  a  great 
army.  The  isolation  and  the  separate  responsibility  of 
the  past  few  months  seemed  like  another  existence  in 
definitely  far  away.  I  lost  no  time  in  making  a  rapid 
ride  about  my  position,  studying  its  approaches  in  the 
gathering  twilight  and  trying  to  fix  in  mind  the  leading 
features  of  the  topography  with  their  relation  to  the  pos 
sible  retreat  of  our  army  and  advance  of  the  enemy. 
And  all  the  while  the  rapid  though  muffled  thumping  of 
the  distant  cannon  was  in  our  ears,  coming  from  the 
field  in  front  of  Groveton,  where  Lee,  having  now  united 
his  whole  army  against  Pope,  was  sending  part  of  Long- 
street's  divisions  against  McDowell's  corps  along  the 
Warrenton  turnpike. 

On  Saturday  the  3Oth  ambulances  began  coming 
through  our  lines  with  wounded  men,  and  some  on  foot 
with  an  arm  in  a  sling  or  bandages  upon  the  head  were 
wearily  finding  their  way  into  the  city.  All  such  were 
systematically  questioned,  their  information  was  collated 
and  corrected,  and  reports  were  made  to  General  Halleck 
and  General  McClellan.1  The  general  impression  of  all 
undoubtedly  was  that  the  engagement  of  Friday  had  been 
victorious  for  our  army,  and  that  the  enemy  was  probably 
retreating  at  dark.  During  the  day  the  cannonade  con 
tinued  with  occasional  lulls.  It  seemed  more  distant 
and  fainter,  requiring  attentive  listening  to  hear  it. 
This  was  no  doubt  due  to  some  change  in  the  condition 
of  the  atmosphere;  but  we  naturally  interpreted  it  accord 
ing  to  our  wishes,  and  believed  that  the  success  of  Friday 
was  followed  by  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  About  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  distant  firing  became  much 
more  rapid;  at  times  the  separate  shots  could  not  be 
counted.  I  telegraphed  to  McClellan  the  fact  which  in- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  p.  405;  pt.  iii.  pp.  748,  789;  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  170; 
vol.li.  pt.  i.  p.  777. 


TRANSFER   TO    WASHINGTON  239 

dicated  a  crisis  in  the  battle.1  It  was  the  fierce  artillery 
duel  which  preceded  the  decisive  advance  of  Longstreet 
against  Pope's  left  wing.  This  was  the  decisive  turning- 
point  in  the  engagement,  and  Pope  was  forced  to  retreat 
upon  Centreville. 

Early  in  the  evening  all  doubt  was  removed  about  the 
result  of  the  battle.  Ill  news  travels  fast,  and  the  retreat 
toward  us  shortened  the  distance  to  be  travelled.  But  as 
Sumner's  and  Franklin's  corps  had  gone  forward  and 
would  report  to  Pope  at  Centreville,  we  were  assured 
that  Pope  was  "out  of  his  scrape  "  (to  use  the  words  of 
McClellan's  too  famous  dispatch  to  the  President2),  and 
that  the  worst  that  could  now  happen  would  be  the  con 
tinuance  of  the  retreat  within  our  lines.  The  combat  at 
Chantilly  on  the  evening  of  September  ist  was  the  last 
of  Pope's  long  series  of  bloody  engagements,  and  though 
the  enemy  was  repulsed,  the  loss  of  Generals  Kearny 
and  Stevens  made  it  seem  to  us  like  another  disaster. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  748.  2  Id.,  vol.  xi.  pt.  i.  p.  98. 


CHAPTER  XII 

RETREAT  WITHIN  THE   LINES  —  REORGANIZATION  — 
HALLECK  AND   HIS   SUBORDINATES 

McClellan's  visits  to  my  position  —  Riding  the  lines  —  Discussing  the  past 
campaign — The  withdrawal  from  the  James  —  Prophecy — McClellan 
and  the  soldiers  —  He  is  in  command  of  the  defences  —  Intricacy  of  offi 
cial  relations  —  Reorganization  begun  —  Pope's  army  marches  through 
our  works  —  Meeting  of  McClellan  and  Pope  —  Pope's  characteristics  — 
Undue  depreciation  of  him  —  The  situation  when  Halleck  was  made 
General-in-Chief  —  Pope's  part  in  it  —  Reasons  for  dislike  on  the  part  of 
the  Potomac  Army — McClellan's  secret  service  —  Deceptive  informa 
tion  of  the  enemy's  force  —  Information  from  prisoners  and  citizens  — 
Effects  of  McClellan's  illusion  as  to  Lee's  strength  —  Halleck's  previous 
career  —  Did  he  intend  to  take  command  in  the  field  ? —  His  abdication 
of  the  field  command  —  The  necessity  for  a  union  of  forces  in  Virginia  — 
McClellan's  inaction  was  Lee's  opportunity —  Slow  transfer  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  —  Halleck  burdened  with  subordinate's  work  —  Burnside 
twice  declines  the  command  —  It  is  given  to  McClellan  —  Pope  relieved 
—  Other  changes  in  organization  —  Consolidation  —  New  campaign 
begun. 

ON  Sunday,  the  3ist,  McClellan  rode  over  to  Upton's 
Hill  and  spent  most  of  the  day  with  me.  He 
brought  me  a  copy  of  the  McDowell  map  of  the  country 
about  Washington,  the  compilation  of  which  had  been 
that  officer's  first  work  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities. 
It  covered  the  region  to  and  beyond  the  Bull  Run  battle 
field,  and  although  not  wholly  accurate,  it  was  approxi 
mately  so,  and  was  the  only  authority  relied  upon  for 
topographical  details  of  the  region.  McClellan's  primary 
purpose  was  to  instruct  me  as  to  the  responsibilities  that 
might  fall  upon  me  if  the  army  should  be  driven  in.  A 
day  or  two  later  I  received  formal  orders  to  prepare  to 
destroy  buildings  in  front  within  my  lines  of  artillery 


RETREAT  WITHIN  THE  LINES  241 

fire,   and  to  be  ready  to  cover  the  retreat  of  our  army 
should  any  part  be  driven  back  near  my  position.1     All 
this,  however,  had  been  discussed  with  McClellan  him 
self.     We  rode  together  over  all  the  principal  points  in 
the  neighborhood,  and  he  pointed  out  their  relation  to 
each  other  and  to  positions  on  the  map  which  we  did  not 
visit.     The  discussion  of  the  topography  led  to  reminis 
cences  of  the  preceding  year,  —  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  enemy  had  originally  occupied   these   hills,   and   of 
their  withdrawal   from   them,  —  of  the  subsequent  con 
struction  of  the  forts  and  connecting  lines,  who  occupied 
them  all,  and  the  system  of  mutual  support,  of  telegraphic 
communication,  and  of  plans  for  defence  in  case  of  attack. 
McClellan  had  received  me  at  Alexandria  on  the  2/th 
with  all  his  old  cordiality,  and  had  put  me  at  once  upon 
our  accustomed  footing  of  personal  friendship.      On  my 
part,    there  was    naturally  a    little  watchfulness   not   to 
overstep  the  proper  line  of  subordination   or  to  be  in 
quisitive  about   things   he  did  not  choose  to  confide  to 
me;  but,  this  being  assumed,  I  found  myself  in  a  circle 
where  he  seemed  to  unbosom  himself  with  freedom.      I 
saw  no  interruption  in  this  while  I  remained  in  the  Poto 
mac  Army.      He  was,  at  this  time,  a  little  depressed  in 
manner,  feeling  keenly  his  loss  of  power  and  command, 
but  maintaining  a  quiet  dignity  that  became  him  better 
than  any  show  of  carelessness   would  have  done.      He 
used  no  bitter  or  harsh   language   in  criticising  others. 
Pope  and  McDowell  he  plainly  disliked,  and  rated  them 
low  as  to  capacity  for  command;  but  he  spoke  of  them 
without  discourtesy  or  vilification.      I  think  it  necessary 
to  say  this  because  of  the  curious  sidelight  thrown  on  his 
character  by  the  private  letters  to  his  wife  which  have 
since  been  published  in  his  "Own  Story,"  and  of  which 
I  shall  have  more  to  say.     Their  inconsistency  with  his 
expressions  and  manner  in  conversation,  or  at  least  their 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  802,  805. 


242          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

great  exaggeration  of  what  he  conveyed  in  familiar  talk, 
has  struck  me  very  forcibly  and  unpleasantly. 

He  discussed  his  campaign  of  the  peninsula  with  ap 
parent  unreserve.  He  condemned  the  decision  to  recall 
him  from  Harrison's  Landing,  arguing  that  the  one  thing 
to  do  in  that  emergency  was  to  reinforce  his  army  there 
and  make  it  strong  enough  to  go  on  with  its  work  and 
capture  Richmond.  He  said  that  if  the  government  had 
lost  confidence  in  his  ability  to  conduct  the  campaign  to 
a  successful  end,  still  it  was  unwise  to  think  of  anything 
else  except  to  strengthen  that  army  and  give  it  to  some 
one  they  could  trust.  He  added  explicitly,  "  If  Pope  was 
the  man  they  had  faith  in,  then  Pope  should  have  been 
sent  to  Harrison's  Landing  to  take  command,  and  how 
ever  bitter  it  would  have  been,  I  should  have  had  no  just 
reason  to  complain."  He  predicted  that  they  would  yet 
be  put  to  the  cost  of  much  life  and  treasure  to  get  back 
to  the  position  left  by  him. 

On  Monday,  September  ist,  he  visited  me  again,  and  we 
renewed  our  riding  and  our  conversation.  The  road  from 
his  headquarters  encampment  near  Alexandria  to  Upton's 
Hill  was  a  pleasant  one  for  his  "constitutional "  ride,  and 
my  position  was  nearest  the  army  in  front  where  news 
from  it  would  most  likely  be  first  found.  The  Army 
of  the  Potomac  had  all  passed  to  the  front  from  Alexan 
dria,  and  according  to  the  letter  of  the  orders  issued,  he 
was  wholly  without  command;  though  Halleck  person 
ally  directed  him  to  exercise  supervision  over  all  detach 
ments  about  the  works  and  lines.  He  came  almost  alone 
on  these  visits,  an  aide  and  an  orderly  or  two  being  his 
only  escort.  Colonel  Colburn  of  his  staff  was  usually 
his  companion.  He  wore  a  blue  flannel  hunting-shirt 
quite  different  from  the  common  army  blouse.  It  was 
made  with  a  broad  yoke  at  the  neck,  and  belt  at  the 
waist,  the  body  in  plaits.  He  was  without  sash  or  side 
arms,  or  any  insignia  of  rank  except  inconspicuous  shoul- 


RETREAT   WITHIN  THE  LINES  243 

der-straps.  On  this  day  he  was  going  into  Washington, 
and  I  rode  down  with  him  to  the  bridge.  Bodies  of 
troops  of  the  new  levies  were  encamped  at  different  points 
near  the  river.  In  these  there  seemed  to  be  always  some 
veterans  or  officers  who  knew  the  general,  and  the  men 
quickly  gathered  in  groups  and  cheered  him.  He  had  a 
taking  way  of  returning  such  salutations.  He  went  be 
yond  the  formal  military  salute,  and  gave  his  cap  a  little 
twirl,  which  with  his  bow  and  smile  seemed  to  carry  a 
little  of  personal  good  fellowship  even  to  the  humblest 
private  soldier.  If  the  cheer  was  repeated,  he  would 
turn  in  his  saddle  and  repeat  the  salute.  It  was  very 
plain  that  these  little  attentions  to  the  troops  took  well, 
and  had  no  doubt  some  influence  in  establishing  a  sort 
of  comradeship  between  him  and  them.  They  were  part 
of  an  attractive  and  winning  deportment  which  adapted 
itself  to  all  sorts  and  ranks  of  men. 

On  Tuesday  he  came  a  little  later  in  the  day,  and  I 
noticed  at  once  a  change  in  his  appearance.  He  wore 
his  yellow  sash  with  sword  and  belt  buckled  over  it,  and 
his  face  was  animated  as  he  greeted  me  with  "Well,  Gen 
eral,  I  am  in  command  again !  "  I  congratulated  him 
with  hearty  earnestness,  for  I  was  personally  rejoiced  at 
it.  I  was  really  attached  to  him,  believed  him  to  be,  on 
the  whole,  the  most  accomplished  officer  I  knew,  and  was 
warmly  disposed  to  give  him  loyal  friendship  and  ser 
vice.  He  told  me  of  his  cordial  interview  with  Presi 
dent  Lincoln,  and  that  the  latter  had  said  he  believed 
him  to  be  the  only  man  who  could  bring  organized  shape 
out  of  the  chaos  in  which  everything  seemed  then  to  be. 
The  form  of  his  new  assignment  to  duty  was  that  he  was 
to  "have  command  of  the  fortifications  of  Washington, 
and  of  all  the  troops  for  the  defence  of  the  capital."1 
The  order  was  made  by  the  personal  direction  of  the 
President,  and  McClellan  knew  that  Secretary  Stanton 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  807. 


244          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

did  not  approve  of  it.  General  Halleck  seemed  glad  to 
be  rid  of  a  great  responsibility,  and  accepted  the  Presi 
dent's  action  with  entire  cordiality.  Still,  he  was  no 
doubt  accurate  in  writing  to  Pope  later  that  the  action 
was  that  of  the  President  alone  without  any  advice  from 
him.1  McClellan  was  evidently  and  entirely  happy  in 
his  personal  relation  to  things.  He  had  not  been  re 
lieved  from  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
though  the  troops  had  passed  temporarily  to  Pope's  army. 
As  commandant  of  all  within  the  defences,  his  own  army 
reported  to  him  directly  when  they  came  within  our 
lines.  Pope's  army  of  northern  Virginia  would,  of 
course,  report  through  its  commander,  and  Burnside's 
in  a  similar  way.  The  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  get 
the  army  in  good  condition,  to  strengthen  its  corps  by 
the  new  regiments  which  were  swarming  toward  the 
capital,  and  to  prepare  it  for  a  new  campaign.  McClellan 
seemed  quite  willing  to  postpone  the  question  who  would 
command  when  it  took  the  field.  Of  the  present  he  was 
sure.  It  was  in  his  own  hands,  and  the  work  of  reorgani 
zation  was  that  in  which  his  prestige  was  almost  sure  to 
increase.  This  attitude  was  plainly  shown  in  all  he  said 
and  in  all  he  hinted  at  without  fully  saying  it. 

Halleck  had  already  directed  Pope  to  bring  the  army 
within  the  fortifications,  though  the  latter  had  vainly 
tried  to  induce  him  to  ride  out  toward  Centreville,  to 
see  the  troops  and  have  a  consultation  there  before  de 
termining  what  to  do.2  We  were  therefore  expecting  the 
head  of  column  to  approach  my  lines,  and  I  arranged  that 
we  should  be  notified  when  they  came  near.  McClellan 
had  already  determined  to  put  the  corps  and  divisions  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  works,  at  positions  sub 
stantially  the  same  as  they  had  occupied  a  year  before, — 
Porter  near  Chain  Bridge,  Sumner  next,  Franklin  near 
Alexandria,  etc.  I  was  directed  to  continue  in  the  posi- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  820.  2  Id.,  p.  796. 


RETREAT  WITHIN   THE   LINES  24$ 

tion  I  already  occupied,  to  be  supported  by  part  of 
McDowell's  corps. 

About  four  o'clock  McClellan  rode  forward,  and  I 
accompanied  him.  We  halted  at  the  brow  of  the  hill 
looking  down  the  Fairfax  road.  The  head  of  the  column 
was  in  sight,  and  rising  dust  showed  its  position  far  be 
yond.  Pope  and  McDowell,  with  the  staff,  rode  at  the 
head.  Their  uniform  and  that  of  all  the  party  was  cov 
ered  with  dust,  their  beards  were  powdered  with  it ;  they 
looked  worn  and  serious,  but  alert  and  self-possessed. 
When  we  met,  after  brief  salutations,  McClellan  an 
nounced  that  he  had  been  ordered  to  assume  command 
within  the  fortifications,  and  named  to  General  Pope  the 
positions  the  several  corps  would  occupy.  This  done, 
both  parties  bowed,  and  the  cavalcade  moved  on.  King's 
division  of  McDowell's  corps  was  the  leading  one,  Gen 
eral  Hatch,  the  senior  brigadier,  being  in  command  by 
reason  of  King's  illness.  Hatch  was  present,  near  Pope, 
when  McClellan  assumed  command,  and  instantly  turn 
ing  rode  a  few  paces  to  the  head  of  his  column  and 
shouted,  "Boys,  McClellan  is  in  command  again;  three 
cheers ! "  The  cheers  were  given  with  wild  delight,  and 
were  taken  up  and  passed  toward  the  rear  of  the  column. 
Warm  friend  of  McClellan  as  I  was,  I  felt  my  flesh 
cringe  at  the  unnecessary  affront  to  the  unfortunate  com 
mander  of  that  army.  But  no  word  was  spoken.  Pope 
lifted  his  hat  in  a  parting  salute  to  McClellan  and  rode 
quietly  on  with  his  escort.1 

McClellan  remained  for  a  time,  warmly  greeted  by  the 
passing  troops.  He  then  left  me,  and  rode  off  toward 
Vienna,  northward.  According  to  my  recollection,  Colo- 

1  General  Hatch  had  been  in  command  of  the  cavalry  of  Banks's  corps 
up  to  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  when  he  was  relieved  by  Pope's  order 
by  reason  of  dissatisfaction  with  his  handling  of  that  arm  of  the  service. 
His  assignment  to  a  brigade  of  infantry  in  King's  division  was  such  a  reduc 
tion  of  his  prominence  as  an  officer  that  it  would  not  be  strange  if  it  chafed 
him. 


246          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

nel  Colburn  was  the  only  member  of  his  staff  with  him; 
they  had  a  small  cavalry  escort.  My  understanding  also 
was  that  they  proposed  to  return  by  Chain  Bridge,  avoid 
ing  the  crowding  of  the  road  on  which  they  had  come 
out,  and  on  which  McDowell's  corps  was  now  moving. 
In  his  "  Own  Story  "  McClellan  speaks  of  going  in  that 
direction  to  see  the  situation  of  Sumner's  troops,  sup 
posed  to  be  attacked,  and  intimates  a  neglect  on  Pope's 
part  of  a  duty  in  that  direction.  I  am  confident  he  is 
mistaken  as  to  this,  and  that  I  have  given  the  whole  in 
terview  between  him  and  Pope.  The  telegraphic  connec 
tion  with  my  headquarters  was  such  that  he  could  learn 
the  situation  in  front  of  any  part  of  the  line  much  more 
promptly  there  than  by  riding  in  person.  Lee  did  not 
pursue,  in  fact,  beyond  Fairfax  C.  H.  and  Centreville, 
and  nothing  more  than  small  bodies  of  cavalry  were  in  our 
vicinity.  I  had  kept  scouting-parties  of  our  own  cavalry 
active  in  our  front,  and  had  also  collected  news  from 
other  sources.  On  the  ist  of  September  I  had  been  able 
to  send  to  army  headquarters  authentic  information  of  the 
expectation  of  the  Confederate  army  to  move  into  Mary 
land,  and  every  day  thereafter  added  to  the  evidence  of 
that  purpose,  until  they  actually  crossed  the  Potomac  on 
the  5th.1 

Hatch's  division  was  put  into  the  lines  on  my  left  with 
orders  to  report  to  me  in  case  of  attack.  Patrick's  bri 
gade  of  that  division  was  next  day  placed  near  Falls 
Church  in  support  of  my  cavalry,  reporting  directly  to 
me.  My  two  regiments  which  had  been  with  Pope  re 
joined  the  division,  and  made  it  complete  again.  The 
night  of  the  2d  was  one  in  which  I  was  on  the  alert  all 
night,  as  it  was  probable  the  enemy  would  disturb  us 
then  if  ever;  but  it  passed  quietly.  A  skirmish  in  our 
front  on  the  Vienna  road  on  the  4th  was  the  only  enliv- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  404,  405;  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  170;  vol.  li.  pt.  L 
P-  777- 


REORGANIZATION  247 

ening  event  till  we  began  the  campaign  of  South  Moun 
tain  and  Antietam  on  the  6th. 

Pope's  proposed  reorganization  of  his  army,1  which 
would  have  put  me  with  most  of  Sigel's  corps  under 
Hooker,  was  prevented  by  a  larger  change  which  relieved 
him  of  command  and  consolidated  his  army  with  that  of 
the  Potomac  on  September  5th.2  I  had  a  very  slight 
acquaintance  with  Pope  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  but 
no  opportunity  of  increasing  it  till  he  assumed  command 
in  Virginia  and  I  reported  to  him  as  a  subordinate. 
The  events  just  sketched  had  once  more  interfered  with 
my  expected  association  with  him,  and  I  did  not  meet 
him  again  till  long  afterward.  Then  I  came  to  know 
him  well.  His  wife  and  the  wife  of  my  intimate  friend 
General  Force  were  sisters,  and  in  Force's  house  we  often 
met.  He  was  then  broken  in  health  and  softened  by 
personal  afflictions.3  His  reputation  in  1861  was  that  of 
an  able  and  energetic  man,  vehement  and  positive  in 
character,  apt  to  be  choleric  and  even  violent  toward 
those  who  displeased  him.  I  remember  well  that  I 
shrunk  a  little  from  coming  under  his  immediate  orders 
through  fear  of  some  chafing,  though  I  learned  in  the 
army  that  choleric  commanders,  if  they  have  ability,  are 
often  warmly  appreciative  of  those  who  serve  them  with 
soldierly  spirit  and  faithfulness.  No  one  who  had  any 
right  to  judge  questioned  Pope's  ability  or  his  zeal  in 
the  National  cause.  His  military  career  in  the  West  had 
been  a  brilliant  one.  The  necessity  for  uniting  the  col 
umns  in  northern  Virginia  into  one  army  was  palpable; 
but  it  was  a  delicate  question  to  decide  who  should  com- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  810.  2  Id.,  p.  813. 

8  Mrs.  Pope  and  Mrs.  Force  were  daughters  of  the  Hon.  V.  B.  Horton, 
of  Pomeroy,  Ohio,  a  public  man  of  solid  influence  and  character,  and  prom 
inent  in  the  development  of  the  coal  and  salt  industries  of  the  Ohio  valley. 
I  leave  the  text  as  I  wrote  it  some  years  before  General  Pope's  death. 
Since  he  died,  the  friendship  of  our  families  has  culminated  in  a  marriage 
between  our  children. 


248         REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

mand  them.  It  seems  to  have  been  assumed  by  Mr.  Lin 
coln  that  the  commander  must  be  a  new  man,  —  neither 
Fremont,  McDowell,  nor  Banks.  The  reasons  were  prob 
ably  much  the  same  as  those  which  later  brought  Grant 
and  Sheridan  from  the  West. 

Pope's  introduction  to  the  Eastern  army,  which  I  have 
already  mentioned,  was  an  unfortunate  one;  but  neither 
he  nor  any  one  else  could  have  imagined  the  heat  of  par 
tisan  spirit  or  the  lengths  it  would  run.  No  personal 
vilification  was  too  absurd  to  be  credited,  and  no  charac 
terization  was  too  ridiculous  to  be  received  as  true  to  the 
life.  It  was  assumed  that  he  had  pledged  himself  to  take 
Richmond  with  an  army  of  40,000  men  when  McClellan 
had  failed  to  do  so  with  100,000.  His  defeat  by  Lee 
was  taken  to  prove  him  contemptible  as  a  commander, 
by  the  very  men  who  lauded  McClellan  for  having 
escaped  destruction  from  the  same  army.  There  was 
neither  intelligence  nor  consistency  in  the  vituperation 
with  which  he  was  covered ;  but  there  was  abundant  proof 
that  the  wounded  amour  propre  of  the  officers  and  men  of 
the  Potomac  Army  made  them  practically  a  unit  in  in 
tense  dislike  and  distrust  of  him.  It  may  be  that  this 
condition  of  things  destroyed  his  possibility  of  useful 
ness  at  the  East;  but  it  would  be  asking  too  much  of 
human  nature  (certainly  too  much  of  Pope's  impetuous 
nature)  to  ask  him  to  take  meekly  the  office  of  scapegoat 
for  the  disastrous  result  of  the  whole  campaign.  His 
demand  on  Halleck  that  he  should  publish  the  approval 
he  had  personally  given  to  the  several  steps  of  the  move 
ments  and  combats  from  Cedar  Mountain  to  Chantilly 
was  just,  but  it  was  imprudent.1  Halleck  was  irritated, 
and  made  more  ready  to  sacrifice  his  subordinate.  Mr. 
Lincoln  was  saddened  and  embarrassed ;  but  being  per 
suaded  that  Pope's  usefulness  was  spoiled,  he  swallowed 
his  own  pride  and  sense  of  justice,  and  turned  again 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  812,  821. 


REORGANIZA  TION  249 

to  McClellan  as  the  resource  in  the  emergency  of  the 
moment. 

Pope  seems  to  me  entirely  right  in  claiming  that  Jack 
son's  raid  to  Manassas  was  a  thing  which  should  have 
resulted  in  the  destruction  of  that  column.  He  seems 
to  have  kept  his  head,  and  to  have  prepared  his  combina 
tions  skilfully  for  making  Jackson  pay  the  penalty  of  his 
audacity.  There  were  a  few  hours  of  apparent  hesitation 
on  August  28th,  but  champions  of  McClellan  should  be  the 
last  to  urge  that  against  him.  His  plans  were  deranged 
on  that  day  by  the  accident  of  McDowell's  absence  from 
his  own  command.  This  happened  through  an  excess  of 
zeal  on  McDowell's  part  to  find  his  commander  and  give 
him  the  benefit  of  his  knowledge  of  the  topography  of 
the  country;  yet  it  proved  a  serious  misfortune,  and  shows 
how  perilous  it  is  for  any  officer  to  be  away  from  his 
troops,  no  matter  for  what  reason.  Many  still  think 
Porter's  inaction  on  the  2Qth  prevented  the  advantage 
over  Jackson  from  becoming  a  victory.1  But  after  all, 
when  the  army  was  united  within  our  lines,  the  injuries 
it  had  inflicted  on  the  enemy  so  nearly  balanced  those 
it  had  received  that  if  Grant  or  Sherman  had  been  in 
Halleck's  place,  Lee  would  never  have  crossed  the  Poto 
mac  into  Maryland.  McClellan,  Pope,  and  Burnside 
would  have  commanded  the  centre  and  wings  of  the 
united  and  reinforced  army,  and  under  a  competent  head 
it  would  have  marched  back  to  the  Rappahannock  with 
scarcely  a  halt. 

That  Halleck  was  in  command  was,  in  no  small  meas 
ure,  Pope's  own  work.  He  reminded  Halleck  of  this  in 
his  letter  of  September  3Oth,  written  when  he  was  chafing 
under  the  first  effects  of  his  removal.2  "If  you  desire/' 
said  he,  "to  know  the  personal  obligation  to  which  I  refer, 

1  I  have  treated  this  subject  at  large  in  "The  Second  Battle  of  Bull  Run 
as  connected  with  the  Fitz-John  Porter  Case." 

2  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  816,  etc. 


250          REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

I  commend  you  to  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  or 
any  other  member  of  the  administration.  Any  of  these  can 
satisfy  your  inquiries."  This  means  that  he  had,  before 
the  President  and  the  cabinet,  advocated  putting  Halleck 
in  supreme  command  over  himself  and  McClellan  to  give 
unity  to  a  campaign  that  would  else  be  hopelessly  broken 
down.  McClellan  was  then  at  Harrison's  Landing,  be 
lieving  Lee's  army  to  be  200,000  strong,  and  refusing  to 
listen  to  any  suggestion  except  that  enormous  reinforce 
ments  should  be  sent  to  him  there.  He  had  taught  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  believe  implicitly  that  the  Con 
federate  army  was  more  than  twice  as  numerous  as  it  was 
in  fact.  With  this  conviction  it  was  natural  that  they 
should  admire  the  generalship  which  had  saved  them 
from  annihilation.  They  accepted  with  equal  faith  the 
lessons  which  came  to  them  from  headquarters  teaching 
that  the  "radicals  "  at  Washington  were  trying  for  politi 
cal  ends  to  destroy  their  general  and  them.  In  regard  to 
the  facts  there  were  varying  degrees  of  intelligence  among 
officers  and  men;  but  there  was  a  common  opinion  that 
they  and  he  were  willingly  sacrificed,  and  that  Pope,  the 
radical,  was  to  succeed  him.  This  made  them  hate  Pope, 
for  the  time,  with  holy  hatred.  If  the  army  could  at  that 
time  have  compared  authentic  tables  of  strength  of  Lee's 
army  and  their  own,  the  whole  theory  would  have  col 
lapsed  at  once,  and  McClellan's  reputation  and  popular 
ity  with  it.  They  did  not  have  the  authentic  tables,  and 
fought  for  a  year  under  the  awful  cloud  created  by  a 
blundering  spy-system. 

The  fiction  as  to  Lee's  forces  is  the  most  remarkable 
in  the  history  of  modern  wars.  Whether  McClellan  was 
the  victim  or  the  accomplice  of  the  inventions  of  his 
"secret  service,"  we  cannot  tell.  It  is  almost  incredible 
that  he  should  be  deceived,  except  willingly.  I  confess 
to  a  contempt  for  all  organizations  of  spies  and  detec 
tives,  which  is  the  result  of  my  military  experience. 


REORGA  NIZA  TION  2  5  I 

The  only  spies  who  long  escape  are  those  who  work  for 
both  sides.  They  sell  to  each  what  it  wants,  and  suit 
their  wares  to  the  demand.  Pinkerton's  man  in  the 
rebel  commissariat  at  Yorktown  who  reported  119,000 
rations  issued  daily,  laughed  well  in  his  sleeve  as  he 
pocketed  the  secret  service  money.1 

A  great  deal  of  valuable  information  may  be  got  from 
a  hostile  population,  for  few  men  or  women  know  how  to 
hold  their  tongues,  though  they  try  never  so  honestly.  A 
friendly  population  overdoes  its  information,  as  a  rule.  I 
had  an  excellent  example  of  this  in  the  Kanawha  valley. 
After  I  had  first  advanced  to  Gauley  Bridge,  the  Seces 
sionists  behind  me  were  busy  sending  to  the  enemy  all 
they  could  learn  of  my  force.  We  intercepted,  among 
others,  a  letter  from  an  intelligent  woman  who  had  tried 
hard  to  keep  her  attention  upon  the  organization  of  my 
command  as  it  passed  her  house.  In  counting  my  can 
non,  she  had  evidently  taken  the  teams  as  the  easiest 
units  to  count,  and  had  set  down  every  caisson  as  a  gun, 
with  the  battery-forge  thrown  in  for  an  extra  one.  In  a 
similar  way,  every  accidental  break  in  the  marching  col 
umn  was  counted  as  the  head  of  a  new  regiment.  She 
thus,  in  perfect  good  faith,  doubled  my  force,  and  taught 
me  that  such  information  to  the  enemy  did  them  more 
harm  than  good. 

As  to  the  enemy's  organization  and  numbers,  the  only 
information  I  ever  found  trustworthy  is  that  got  by  con 
tact  with  him.  No  day  should  pass  without  having  some 
prisoners  got  by  "feeling  the  lines."  These,  to  secure 
treatment  as  regular  prisoners  of  war,  must  always  tell 
the  company  and  regiment  to  which  they  belong. 
Rightly  questioned,  they  rarely  stop  there,  and  it  is  not 
difficult  to  get  the  brigade,  division,  etc.  The  reaction 
from  the  dangers  with  which  the  imagination  had  in 
vested  capture,  to  the  commonly  good-humored  hospi- 

1  For  Pinkerton's  reports,  see  O.  R.,  vol.  xi.  pt.  i.  pp.  264-272. 


252          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

tality  of  the  captors,  makes  men  garrulous  of  whom  one 
would  not  expect  it.  General  Pope's  chief  quartermas 
ter,  of  the  rank  of  colonel,  was  captured  by  Stuart's  cav 
alry  in  this  very  campaign ;  and  since  the  war  I  have  read 
with  amazement  General  Lee's  letters  to  President  Davis, 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  at  Richmond,  and  to  General 
Loring  in  West  Virginia,  dated  August  23d,  in  which  he 
says:1  "General  Stuart  reports  that  General  Pope's  chief 
quartermaster,  who  was  captured  last  night,  positively 
asserts  that  Cox's  troops  are  being  withdrawn  by  the  way 
of  Wheeling."  Of  course  Lee  suggests  the  importance 
of  "  pushing  things "  in  the  Kanawha  valley,  Stuart 
thus  knew  my  movement  on  the  day  I  left  Parkersburg. 

Even  when  the  captured  person  tells  nothing  he  is 
bound  to  conceal,  enough  is  necessarily  known  to  enable 
a  diligent  provost-marshal  to  construct  a  reasonably 
complete  roster  of  the  enemy  in  a  short  time.  In  the 
Atlanta  campaign  I  always  carried  a  memorandum  book 
in  which  I  noted  and  corrected  all  the  information  of 
this  sort  which  came  to  me,  and  by  comparing  this  with 
others  and  with  the  lists  at  General  Sherman's  headquar 
ters,  there  was  no  difficulty  in  keeping  well  up  in  the 
enemy's  organization.  It  may  therefore  be  said  that 
every  commanding  officer  ought  to  know  the  divisions 
and  brigades  of  his  enemy.  The  strength  of  a  brigade 
is  fairly  estimated  from  the  average  of  our  own,  for  in 
people  of  similar  race  and  education,  the  models  of 
organization  are  essentially  the  same,  and  subject  to  the 
same  causes  of  diminution  during  a  campaign.  Such 
considerations  as  these  leave  no  escape  from  the  conclu 
sion  that  McClellan's  estimates  of  Lee's  army  were  abso 
lutely  destructive  of  all  chances  of  success,  and  made  it 
impossible  for  the  President  or  for  General  Halleck  to 
deal  with  the  military  problem  before  them.  That  he 
had  continued  this  erroneous  counting  for  more  than  a 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  940-941. 


REORGANIZA  TION  253 

year,  and  through  an  active  campaign  in  the  field,  de 
stroyed  every  hope  of  correcting  it.  The  reports  of  the 
peninsular  campaign  reveal,  at  times,  the  difficulty  there 
was  in  keeping  up  the  illusion.  The  known  divisions  in 
the  Confederate  army  would  not  account  for  the  numbers 
attributed  to  them,  and  so  these  divisions  occasionally 
figure  in  our  reports  as  "grand  divisions."1  That  the 
false  estimate  was  unnecessary  is  proven  by  the  fact  that 
General  Meigs,  in  Washington,  on  July  28th,  made  up  an 
estimate  from  the  regiments,  brigades,  etc.,  mentioned 
in  the  newspapers  that  got  through  the  lines,  which  was 
reasonably  accurate.  But  McClellan  held  Meigs  for  an 
enemy.2  When  I  joined  McClellan  at  Washington,  I  had 
no  personal  knowledge  of  either  army  except  as  I  had 
learned  it  from  the  newspapers.  My  predilections  in 
favor  of  McClellan  made  me  assume  that  his  facts  were 
well  based,  as  they  ought  to  have  been.  I  therefore 
accepted  the  general  judgment  of  himself  and  his  inti 
mate  friends  as  to  his  late  campaign  and  Pope's,  and 
believed  that  his  restoration  to  command  was  an  act  of 
justice  to  him  and  of  advantage  to  the  country.  I  did 
not  stay  long  enough  with  that  army  to  apply  any  test  of 
my  own  to  the  question  of  relative  numbers,  and  have 
had  to  correct  my  opinions  of  the  men  and  the  cam 
paigns  by  knowledge  gained  long  afterward.  I  how 
ever  used  whatever  influence  I  had  to  combat  the  ideas 

1  In  his  dispatch  to  Halleck  on  the  morning  after  South  Mountain  (Sep 
tember  15),  D.  H.   Hill's  division  is  called  a  corps.     O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii. 
p.  294. 

2  General    Meigs  found  ninety  regiments    of   infantry,  one   regiment   of 
cavalry,  and  five  batteries  of  artillery  designated  by  name  in  the  "  Confed 
erate"  newspaper  reports  of  the  seven  days'  battles.     Comparing  this  with 
other  information  from  similar  sources,  he  concluded  that  Lee  had  about 
one  hundred  and  fifty  regiments.     These,  at  700  men  each,  would  make 
105,000,  or  at  400  (which  he  found  a  full  average)  the  gross  of  the  infantry 
would  be  60,000.     General  Webb,  with  official  documents  before  him,  puts 
it  at  70,000  to  80,000.     Does  one  need  better  evidence  how  much  worse  than 
useless  was  McClellan's  secret  service  ?     See  O.  R.,  vol.  xi.  pt.  iii.  p.  340. 


254          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

in  McClellan's  mind  that  the  administration  meant  to  do 
him  any  wrong,  or  had  any  end  but  the  restoration  of 
National  unity  in  view. 

Whether  Halleck  was  appointed  on  Pope's  urgent  rec 
ommendation  or  no,  his  campaign  in  the  West  was  the 
ground  of  his  promotion.  The  advance  from  the  Ohio  to 
Fort  Donelson,  to  Nashville,  to  Shiloh,  and  to  Corinth 
had  been  under  his  command,  and  he  deservedly  had 
credit  for  movements  which  had  brought  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  within  the  Union  lines.  He  had  gone  in  per 
son  to  the  front  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  and  though 
much  just  criticism  had  been  made  of  his  slow  digging 
the  way  to  Corinth  by  a  species  of  siege  operations,  he 
had  at  any  rate  got  there.  Mr.  Lincoln  was  willing  to 
compromise  upon  a  slow  advance  upon  Richmond,  pro 
vided  it  were  sure  and  steady.  Halleck's  age  and  stand 
ing  in  the  army  were  such  that  McClellan  himself  could 
find  no  fault  with  his  appointment,  if  any  one  were  to  be 
put  over  him. 

Everything  points  to  the  expectation,  at  the  time  of 
his  appointment,  that  Halleck  would  assume  the  per 
sonal  command  in  the  field.  He  visited  McClellan  at 
Harrison's  Landing  on  July  25th,  however,  and  promised 
him  that  if  the  armies  should  be  promptly  reunited,  he 
(McClellan)  should  command  the  whole,  with  Burnside 
and  Pope  as  his  subordinates.1  That  he  did  not  inform 
Pope  of  this  abdication  of  his  generalship  in  the  field  is 
plain  from  Pope's  correspondence  during  the  campaign. 
It  is  made  indisputably  clear  by  Pope's  letter  to  him  of 
the  25th  of  August.2  He  probably  did  not  tell  the  Presi 
dent  or  Mr.  Stanton  of  it.  He  seems  to  have  waited 
for  the  union  of  the  parts  of  the  army,  and  when  that 
came  his  prestige  was  forever  gone,  and  he  had  become, 
what  he  remained  to  the  close  of  the  war,  a  bureau  officer 

1  McC.  Own  Story,  p.  474;  O.  R.,  vol.  xi.  pt.  iii.  p.  360. 

2  /</.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  65,  66. 


HALLECK  AND  HIS  SUBORDINATES          2$$ 

in  Washington.  He  had  ordered  the  transfer  of  the 
Potomac  Army  from  the  James  to  Acquia  Creek,  intend 
ing  to  unite  it  with  Burnside's  at  Falmouth,  opposite 
Fredericksburg,  and  thus  begin  a  fresh  advance  from  the 
line  of  the  Rappahannock.1  He  believed,  and  apparently 
with  reason,  that  ten  days  was  sufficient  to  complete  this 
transfer  with  the  means  at  McClellan's  disposal,  but  at 
the  end  of  ten  days  the  movement  had  not  yet  begun.2 
He  was  right  in  thinking  that  the  whole  army  should  be 
united.  McClellan  thought  the  same.  The  question 
was  where  and  how.  McClellan  said,  "Send  Pope's  men 
to  me."  Halleck  replied  that  it  would  not  do  to  thus 
uncover  Washington.  McClellan  had  said  that  vigorous 
advance  upon  the  enemy  by  his  army  and  a  victory  would 
best  protect  the  capital.3  Again  he  was  right,  but  he 
seemed  incapable  of  a  vigorous  advance.  Had  he  made 
it  when  he  knew  (on  July  30)  that  Jackson  had  gone 
northward  with  thirty  thousand  men  to  resist  Pope's 
advance,  his  army  would  not  have  been  withdrawn.4  He 
was  then  nearly  twice  as  strong  as  Lee,  but  he  did  not 
venture  even  upon  a  forced  reconnoissance.  The  situa 
tion  of  the  previous  year  was  repeated.  He  was  allowing 
himself  to  be  besieged  by  a  fraction  of  his  own  force. 
Grant  would  have  put  himself  into  the  relation  to 
McClellan  which  he  sustained  to  Meade  in  1864,  and 
would  have  infused  his  own  energy  into  the  army. 
Halleck  did  not  do  this.  It  would  seem  that  he  had 
become  conscious  of  his  own  lack  of  nerve  in  the  actual 
presence  of  an  enemy,  and  looked  back  upon  his  work  at 
St.  Louis  in  administering  his  department,  whilst  Grant 
and  Buell  took  the  field,  with  more  satisfaction  than  upon 
his  own  advance  from  Shiloh  to  Corinth.  He  seemed 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  p.  5 ;  vol.  xi.  pt.  i.  pp.  80-84;  Id.,  P*-  *«•  P-  337- 

2  The  order  was  given  August  3;  the  movement  began  August  14.     Id., 
pt.  i.  pp.  80,  89. 

8  Id.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  9,  10.  4  Id.,  vol.  xi.  pt.  iii.  p.  342. 


256          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

already  determined  to  manage  the  armies  from  his  office 
in  Washington  and  assume  no  responsibility  for  their 
actual  leadership. 

When  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  arriving  at  Alex 
andria,  another  crisis  occurred  in  which  a  single  respon 
sible  head  in  the  field  was  a  necessity.  McClellan  had 
been  giving  a  continuous  demonstration,  since  August 
4th,  how  easy  it  is  to  thwart  and  hinder  any  movement 
whilst  professing  to  be  accomplishing  everything  that  is 
possible.  No  maxim  in  war  is  better  founded  in  experi 
ence  than  that  a  man  who  believes  that  a  plan  is  sure  to 
fail  should  never  be  set  to  conduct  it.  McClellan  had 
written  that  Pope  would  be  beaten  before  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  could  be  transferred  to  him,  and  Pope  was 
beaten.1  The  only  chance  for  any  other  result  was  for 
Halleck  himself  to  conduct  the  transfer.  If  Halleck 
meant  that  Franklin  should  have  pushed  out  to  Manassas 
on  the  2/th  of  August,  he  should  have  taken  the  field 
and  gone  with  the  corps.  He  did  not  know  and  could 
not  know  how  good  or  bad  McClellan's  excuses  were, 
and  nothing  but  his  own  presence,  with  supreme  power, 
could  certainly  remove  the  causes  for  delay.  He  wrote 
to  Pope  that  he  could  not  leave  Washington,  when  he 
ought  not  to  have  been  in  Washington.2  He  worked 
and  worried  himself  ill  trying  to  make  McClellan  do 
what  he  should  have  done  himself,  and  then,  over 
whelmed  with  details  he  should  never  have  burdened 
himself  with,  besought  his  subordinate  to  relieve  him  of 
the  strain  by  practically  taking  command.3 

As  soon  as  McClellan  began  the  movement  down  the 
James,  Lee  took  Longstreet's  corps  to  Jackson,  leaving 
only  D.  H.  Hill's  at  Richmond.4  From  that  moment 
McClellan  could  have  marched  anywhere.  He  could 

1  Halleck  to  McClellan,  August  10  and  12,  and  McClellan's  reply  :  O.  R., 
vol.  xi.  pt.  i.  pp.  86-88.     See  also  O.  S.,  p.  466. 

2  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  797.  3  Id.,  p.  691 ;  vol.  xi.  pt.  i.  p.  103. 
4  M;  Pt.  ii.  pp.  177,  552- 


HALLECK  AND  HIS  SUBORDINATES          257 

have  marched  to  Fredericksburg  and  joined  Pope,  and 
Halleck  could  have  met  them  with  Burnside's  troops. 
But  the  vast  imaginary  army  of  the  Confederacy  para 
lyzed  everything,  and  the  ponderous  task  of  moving  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  and  its  enormous  material  by  water 
to  Washington  went  on.  The  lifeless  and  deliberate 
way  in  which  it  went  on  made  it  the  ist  of  September 
when  Sumner  and  Franklin  reached  Centreville,  and  the 
second  battle  of  Bull  Run  had  ended  in  defeat  on  the 
evening  before. 

But  the  army  was  at  last  reunited,  within  the  fortifica 
tions  of  Washington,  it  is  true,  and  not  on  the  James  or 
on  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock.  There  was  another 
opportunity  given  to  Halleck  to  put  himself  at  its  head, 
with  McClellan,  Pope,  and  Burnside  for  his  three  lieu 
tenants.  Again  he  was  unequal  to  his  responsibility. 
Mr.  Lincoln  saw  his  feebleness,  and  does  not  seem  to 
have  urged  him.  Halleck  was  definitely  judged  in  the 
President's  mind,  though  the  latter  seems  to  have  clung 
to  the  idea  that  he  might  be  useful  by  allowing  him  to 
assume  the  role  he  chose,  and  confine  himself  to  mere 
suggestions  and  to  purely  routine  work.  Pope's  unpopu 
larity  with  the  army  was  adopted  by  popular  clamor, 
which  always  finds  a  defeated  general  in  the  wrong.  The 
President,  in  real  perplexity,  compromised  by  assigning 
McClellan  to  command  for  the  purpose  of  organizing,  a 
work  in  which  he  was  admitted  by  all  to  be  able.  The 
command  in  the  field  was  a  second  time  offered  to  Burn- 
side,  who  declined  it,  warmly  advocating  McClellan's 
claims  and  proving  his  most  efficient  friend.1  Within 
three  days  from  the  time  I  had  ridden  with  McClellan 
to  meet  the  retreating  army,  the  enemy  had  crossed  the 
Potomac,  and  decision  could  not  be  postponed.  The 
President  met  McClellan,  and  told  him  in  person  that  he 
was  assigned  to  command  in  the  field.2 

1  C.  W.,  vol.  i.  p.  650.  2  Id.,  p.  453 ;  °-  R->  vol.  xi.  pt.  i.  p.  103. 

VOL.  I.  —  17 


258          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

On  the  5th  of  September  Halleck  had  sent  to  McClellan 
a  confidential  note,  telling  of  the  President's  action  reliev 
ing  Pope,  and  anticipating  the  issue  of  formal  orders:1 
"The  President  has  directed  that  General  Pope  be  re 
lieved  and  report  to  the  War  Department;  that  Hooker 
be  assigned  to  command  of  Porter's  corps,  and  that 
Franklin's  corps  be  temporarily  attached  to  Heintzel- 
man's.  The  orders  will  be  issued  this  afternoon.  Gen 
erals  Porter  and  Franklin  are  to  be  relieved  from  duty 
till  the  charges  against  them  are  examined.  I  give  you 
this  memorandum  in  advance  of  orders,  so  that  you  may 
act  accordingly  in  putting  forces  in  the  field."  Later  in 
the  same  day  Halleck  sent  to  McClellan  the  opinion  that 
the  enemy  was  without  doubt  crossing  the  Potomac, 
and  said,  "If  you  agree  with  me,  let  our  troops  move 
immediately."  The  formal  order  to  Pope  was:  "The 
armies  of  the  Potomac  and  Virginia  being  consolidated, 
you  will  report  for  orders  to  the  Secretary  of  War."2 
Pope  had  caused  charges  to  be  preferred  against  Porter 
and  Franklin,  and  had  accused  McClellan  of  wilfully 
delaying  reinforcements  and  so  causing  his  defeat.  His 
indignation  that  the  interpretation  of  affairs  given  by 
McClellan  and  his  friends  should  be  made  into  public 
opinion  by  the  apparent  acquiescence  of  Halleck  and  the 
administration  overcame  his  prudence.  Had  he  con 
trolled  his  feelings  and  schooled  himself  into  patience, 
he  would  hardly  have  been  relieved  from  active  service, 
and  his  turn  would  probably  have  come  again.  As  it 
stood,  the  President  saw  that  McClellan  and  Pope  could 
not  work  together,  and  the  natural  outcome  was  that  he 
retired  Pope,  so  that  McClellan  should  not  have  it 
to  say  that  he  was  thwarted  by  a  hostile  subordinate. 
McClellan  himself  was  so  manifestly  responsible  for 
Franklin's  movements  from  the  27th  to  the  3Oth  of 
August,  that  it  was  a  matter  of  course  that  when  the 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  182.  2  Id.,  p.  183. 


HALLECK  AND  HIS  SUBORDINATES          259 

chief  was  assigned  to  command  the  condonation  should 
cover  the  subordinate,  and  at  McClellan's  request  Frank 
lin  was  allowed  to  take  the  field  at  once.1  A  few  days 
later  he  urged  the  same  action  in  Porter's  case,  and  it 
was  done.  Porter  joined  the  army  at  South  Mountain 
on  the  I4th  of  September.2  The  same  principle  de 
manded  that  McDowell,  who  was  obnoxious  to  McClellan, 
should  be  relieved,  and  this  was  also  done.  As  an  osten 
sible  reason  for  the  public,  McDowell's  request  for  a 
Court  of  Inquiry  upon  his  own  conduct  was  assumed  to 
imply  a  desire  to  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  his 
corps.3  But  the  court  was  not  assembled  till  the  next 
winter.  McDowell  had  been  maligned  almost  as  un 
scrupulously  as  Pope.  A  total  abstainer  from  intoxicat 
ing  drinks,  he  was  persistently  described  as  a  drunkard, 
drunken  upon  the  field  of  battle.  One  of  the  most  loyal 
and  self-forgetting  of  subordinates,  he  was  treated  as  if 
a  persistent  intriguer  for  command.  A  brave  and  com 
petent  soldier,  he  was  believed  to  be  worthless  and  un 
trustworthy.  As  between  Halleck,  McClellan,  and  Pope, 
the  only  one  who  had  fought  like  a  soldier  and  manoeu 
vred  like  a  general  was  sent  to  the  northwestern  frontier 
to  watch  the  petty  Indian  tribes,  carrying  the  burden  of 
others'  sins  into  the  wilderness.  Mr.  Lincoln's  sacrifice 
of  his  sense  of  justice  to  what  seemed  the  only  expe 
dient  in  the  terrible  crisis,  was  sublime.  McClellan 
commanded  the  army,  and  Porter  and  Franklin  each 
commanded  a  corps.  If  the  country  was  to  be  saved, 
confidence  and  power  could  not  be  bestowed  by  halves. 

In  his  "  Own  Story  "  McClellan  speaks  of  the  cam 
paign  in  Maryland  as  made  "with  a  halter  round  his 
neck,"4  meaning  that  he  had  no  real  command  except  of 
the  defences  of  Washington,  and  that  he  marched  after 
Lee  without  authority,  so  that,  if  unsuccessful,  he  might 

l  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  190,  197.  2  Id.,  pp.  190,  254,  289. 

8  Id.,  pp.  188,  189,  197.  4  O.  S.,  p.  551. 


260          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

have  been  condemned  for  usurpation  of  command.  It 
would  be  incredible  that  he  adopted  such  a  mere  illu 
sion,  if  he  had  not  himself  said  it.  It  proves  that  some 
at  least  of  the  strange  additions  to  history  which  he 
thus  published  had  their  birth  in  his  own  imagination 
brooding  over  the  past,  and  are  completely  contra 
dicted  by  the  official  records.1  The  consolidation  of  the 
armies  under  him  was,  in  fact,  a  promotion,  since  it 
enlarged  his  authority  and  committed  to  him  the  task 
that  properly  belonged  to  Halleck  as  general-in-chief. 
For  a  few  days,  beginning  September  ist,  McClellan's 
orders  and  correspondence  were  dated  "  Headquarters, 
Washington,"  because  no  formal  designation  had  been 
given  to  the  assembled  forces  at  the  capital.  When  he 
took  the  field  at  Rockville  on  the  8th  of  September,  he 
assumed,  as  he  had  the  right  to  do  in  the  absence  of 
other  direction  from  the  War  Department,  that  Burn- 
side's  and  Pope's  smaller  armies  were  lost  in  the  larger 
Army  of  the  Potomac  by  the  consolidation,  and  resumed 
the  custom  of  dating  his  orders  and  dispatches  from 
"Headquarters,  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  from  the  com 
mand  of  which  he  had  never  been  removed,  even  when  its 
divisions  were  temporarily  separated  from  him.2  The 
defences  of  Washington  were  now  entrusted  to  Major- 
General  Banks,  strictly  in  subordination,  however,  to 
iiimself.3  The  official  record  of  authority  and  command 

1  This  illusion,  at  least,  is  shown  to  be  of  later  origin  by  his  telegram  to 
his  wife  of  September  7.     "  I  leave  here  this  afternoon,"  he  says,  "  to  take 
command  of  the  troops  in  the  field.     The  feeling  of  the  government  towards 
me,  I  am  sure,  is  kind  and  trusting.     I  hope,  with  God's  blessing,  to  justify 
the  great  confidence  they  now  repose  in  me,  and  will  bury  the  past  in 
oblivion."     O.  S.,  p.  567. 

2  On  August  3ist  Halleck  had  written  to  him,  "  You  will  retain  the  com 
mand   of  everything  in   this  vicinity  not  temporarily  belonging  to  Pope's 
army  in  the  field ; "  and  in  the  general  order  issued  August  30,  McClellan's 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  affirmed.     O.  R.,  vol.  xi.  pt.  i. 
p.  103;  Id.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  775. 

8  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  202,  214. 


HALLECK  AND  HIS  SUBORDINATES  26l 

is  consistent  and  perfect,  and  his  notion  in  his  later 
years,  that  there  was  anything  informal  about  it,  is 
proven  to  be  imaginary.1  Halleck's  direction,  which  I 
have  quoted,  to  "let  our  troops  move  immediately," 
would  be  absurd  as  addressed  to  the  commandant  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  into  which  the  Army  of  Virginia 
was  consolidated,  unless  that  commandant  was  to  take 
the  field,  or  a  formal  order  relieved  him  of  command  as 
Pope  was  relieved.  Certainly  no  other  commander  was 
designated,  and  I  saw  enough  of  him  in  those  days  to 
say  with  confidence  that  he  betrayed  no  doubt  that 
the  order  to  "move  immediately"  included  himself. 
McClellan's  popularity  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
had  seemed  to  Mr.  Lincoln  the  only  power  sufficient  to 
ensure  its  prompt  and  earnest  action  against  the  Con 
federate  invasion.  His  leadership  of  it,  to  be  success 
ful,  had  to  be  accompanied  with  plenary  powers,  even  if 
the  stultification  of  the  government  itself  were  the  con 
sequence.  When  the  patriotism  of  the  President  yielded 
to  this,  the  suggestion  of  McClellan  twenty  years  after 
ward,  that  it  had  all  been  a  pitfall  prepared  for  him, 
would  be  revolting  if,  in  view  of  the  records,  the  absurd 
ity  of  it  did  not  prove  that  its  origin  was  in  a  morbid 
imagination.  It  is  far  more  difficult  to  deal  leniently 
with  the  exhibition  of  character  in  his  private  letters, 
which  were  injudiciously  added  to  his  "  Own  Story  "  by 
his  literary  executor.  In  them  his  vanity  and  his  ill-will 
toward  rivals  and  superiors  are  shockingly  naked;  and 
since  no  historian  can  doubt  that  at  every  moment  from 
September,  1861,  to  September,  1862,  his  army  greatly 
outnumbered  his  enemy,  whilst  in  equipment  and  supply 
there  was  no  comparison,  his  persistent  outcry  that  he 
was  sacrificed  by  his  government  destroys  even  that 
character  for  dignity  and  that  reputation  for  military 
intelligence  which  we  fondly  attributed  to  him. 

1  Ante,  p.  257. 


262          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

The  general  arrangement  of  the  campaign  seems  to 
have  been  settled  between  Halleck  and  McClellan  on 
the  5th  of  September.  General  Sumner  with  the  Second 
and  Twelfth  corps  moved  up  the  Potomac  by  way  of 
Tenallytown,  Burnside  with  the  First  and  Ninth  corps 
moved  to  Leesboro  with  a  view  to  covering  Baltimore, 
the  front  was  explored  by  the  cavalry  under  Pleasonton, 
and  the  Sixth  Corps,  under  Franklin,  constituted  a 
reserve.1  The  preliminary  movements  occupied  the  5th 
and  6th,  but  on  the  /th  the  positions  were  as  I  have 
stated  them.  The  principal  bodies  were  designated, 
respectively,  as  right  and  left  wings  instead  of  armies. 
The  two  corps  from  the  Army  of  Virginia  were  sepa 
rated,  one  being  assigned  to  the  right  wing  under  Burn- 
side,  and  the  other  to  the  left  under  Sumner. 

1  Confusion  in  the  numbers  of  the  First  and  Twelfth  corps  is  found  in 
the  records  and  dispatches,  owing  to  the  fact  that  in  the  Army  of  Virginia 
the  corps  numbers  were  not  those  given  them  by  the  War  Department. 
Sigel's,  properly  the  Eleventh  Corps,  had  been  called  First  of  that  army. 
Banks's,  properly  Twelfth,  had  been  called  Second,  and  McDowell's,  properly 
First,  had  been  called  Third.  In  the  Maryland  campaign  Hooker  was 
assigned  to  McDowell's,  and  it  sometimes  figures  as  First,  sometimes  as 
Third  ;  Mansfield  was  assigned  to  Banks's.  The  proper  designations  after 
the  consolidation  were  First  and  Twelfth.  Reno  had  been  assigned  to  the 
First,  but  McClellan  got  authority  to  change  it,  and  gave  it  to  Hooker,  send 
ing  Reno  back  to  the  Ninth.  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  197,  198,  279,  349. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

SOUTH    MOUNTAIN 

March  through  Washington  —  Reporting  to  Burnside  —  The  Ninth  Corps  — 
Burnside's  personal  qualities  —  To  Leesboro  —  Straggling — Lee's  army 
at  Frederick  —  Our  deliberate  advance  —  Reno  at  New  Market  —  The 
march  past  —  Reno  and  Hayes  —  Camp  gossip  —  Occupation  of  Fred 
erick —  Affair  with  Hampton's  cavalry —  Crossing  Catoctin  Mountain  — 
The  valley  and  South  Mountain  —  Lee's  order  found  —  Division  of  his 
army  —  Jackson  at  Harper's  Ferry  —  Supporting  Pleasonton's  recon- 
noissance  —  Meeting  Colonel  Moor  —  An  involuntary  warning  — 
Kanawha  Division's  advance  —  Opening  of  the  battle  —  Carrying  the 
mountain  crest  —  The  morning  fight  —  Lull  at  noon  —  Arrival  of 
supports  —  Battle  renewed  —  Final  success  —  Death  of  Reno  —  Hooker's 
battle  on  the  right  —  His  report  —  Burnside's  comments  —  Franklin's 
engagement  at  Crampton's  Gap. 

LATE  in  the  night  of  the  5th  I  received  orders  from 
McClellan's  headquarters  to  march  from  my  posi 
tion  on  Upton's  Hill  through  Washington  toward  Lees 
boro,1  as  soon  as  my  pickets  could  be  relieved  by  troops 
of  McDowell's  corps.2  My  route  was  designated  as  by 
the  road  which  was  a  continuation  northward  of  Seventh 
Street,  and  I  was  directed  to  report  to  General  Ambrose 
E.  Burnside,  commanding  right  wing,  whose  headquar 
ters  were  in  the  suburbs  of  the  city  on  that  road.  This 
was  in  accordance  with  my  wish,  expressed  to  McClellan 
that  I  might  have  active  field  work.  For  two  or  three 
days  we  were  not  attached  to  a  corps,  but  as  the  organi 
zation  of  the  army  became  settled  we  were  temporarily 
assigned  to  the  Ninth,  which  had  been  Burnside's,  and 

1  Leesboro,  a  village  of  Maryland  eight  or  ten  miles  north  of  Washing 
ton,  must  be  distinguished  from  Leesburg  in  Virginia. 

2  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  183;  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  789. 


264          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

had  been  with  him  in  North  Carolina.  During  this  cam 
paign  it  was  commanded  by  Major-General  Jesse  L. 
Reno,  who  had  long  had  a  division  in  it,  and  had  led  the 
corps  in  the  recent  battle.  We  marched  from  Upton's 
Hill  at  daybreak  of  the  6th,  taking  the  road  to  George 
town  by  Ball's  Cross-Roads.  In  Georgetown  we  turned 
eastward  through  Washington  to  Seventh  Street,  and 
thence  northward  to  the  Leesboro  road.  As  we  passed 
General  Burnside's  quarters,  I  sent  a  staff  officer  to  report 
our  progress.  It  was  about  ten  o'clock,  and  Burnside 
had  gone  to  the  White  House  to  meet  the  President  and 
cabinet  by  invitation.  His  chief  of  staff,  General  J.  G. 
Parke,  sent  a  polite  note,  saying  we  had  not  been  ex 
pected  so  soon,  and  directed  us  to  halt  and  bivouac  for 
the  present  in  some  fields  by  the  roadside,  near  where 
the  Howard  University  now  is.  In  the  afternoon  I  met 
Burnside  for  the  first  time,  and  was  warmly  attracted  by 
him,  as  everybody  was.  He  was  pre-eminently  a  manly 
man,  as  I  expressed  it  in  writing  home.  His  large,  fine 
eyes,  his  winning  smile  and  cordial  manners,  bespoke  a 
frank,  sincere,  and  honorable  character,  and  these  indica 
tions  were  never  belied  by  more  intimate  acquaintance. 
The  friendship  then  begun  lasted  as  long  as  he  lived.  I 
learned  to  understand  the  limitations  of  his  powers  and 
the  points  in  which  he  fell  short  of  being  a  great  com 
mander;  but  as  I  knew  him  better  I  estimated  more  and 
more  highly  his  sincerity  and  truthfulness,  his  unselfish 
generosity,  and  his  devoted  patriotism.  In  everything 
which  makes  up  an  honorable  and  lovable  personal  char 
acter  he  had  no  superior.  I  shall  have  occasion  to  speak 
frequently  of  his  peculiarities  and  his  special  traits,  but 
shall  never  have  need  to  say  a  word  in  derogation  of  the 
solid  virtues  I  have  attributed  to  him.  His  chief-of-staff, 
General  Parke,  was  an  officer  of  the  Engineers,  and  one 
of  the  best  instructed  of  that  corps.  He  had  served  with 
distinction  under  Burnside  in  North  Carolina,  in  com- 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  26$ 

mand  of  a  brigade  and  division.  I  always  thought  that 
he  preferred  staff  duty,  especially  with  Burnside,  whose 
confidence  in  him  was  complete,  and  who  would  leave  to 
him  almost  untrammelled  control  of  the  administrative 
work  of  the  command. 

On  September  /th  I  was  ordered  to  take  the  advance  of 
the  Ninth  Corps  in  the  march  to  Leesboro,  following 
Hooker's  corps.  It  was  my  first  march  with  troops  of 
this  army,  and  I  was  shocked  at  the  straggling  I  wit 
nessed.  The  "roadside  brigade,"  as  we  called  it,  was 
often  as  numerous,  by  careful  estimate,  as  our  own  column 
moving  in  the  middle  of  the  road.  I  could  say  of  the 
men  of  the  Kanawha  division,  as  Richard  Taylor  said  of 
his  Louisiana  brigade  with  Stonewall  Jackson,  that  they 
had  not  yet  learned 'to  straggle.1  I  tried  to  prevent  their 
learning  it.  We  had  a  roll-call  immediately  upon  halt 
ing  after  the  march,  and  another  half  an  hour  later,  with 
prompt  reports  of  the  result.  I  also  assigned  a  field 
officer  and  medical  officer  to  duty  at  the  rear  of  the 
column,  with  ambulances  for  those  who  became  ill  and 
with  punishments  for  the  rest.  The  result  was  that,  in 
spite  of  the  example  of  others,  the  division  had  no  strag 
glers,  the  first  roll-call  rarely  showing  more  than  twenty 
or  thirty  not  answering  to  their  names,  and  the  second 
often  proving  every  man  to  be  present.2  In  both  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
the  evil  had  become  a  most  serious  one.  After  the  battle 
of  Antietam,  for  the  express  purpose  of  remedying  it, 
McClellan  appointed  General  Patrick  Provost-Marshal 
with  a  strong  provost-guard,  giving  him  very  extended 
powers,  and  permitting  nobody,  of  whatever  rank,  to 
interfere  with  him.  Patrick  was  a  man  of  vigor,  of 

1  See  Taylor's  "  Destruction  and  Reconstruction,"  p.  50,  for  a  curious 
interview  with  Jackson. 

2  See   letters  of    General    R.   B.   Hayes   and   General   George  Crook, 
Appendix  B. 


266          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

conscience,  and  of  system,  and  though  he  was  greatly 
desirous  of  keeping  a  field  command,  proved  so  useful, 
indeed  so  necessary  a  part  of  the  organization,  that  he 
was  retained  in  it  against  his  wishes,  to  the  end  of  the 
war,  each  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in 
turn  finding  that  he  was  indispensable.1 

The  Confederate  army  suffered  from  straggling  quite 
as  much,  perhaps,  as  ours,  but  in  a  somewhat  different 
way.  At  the  close  of  the  Antietam  campaign  General 
Lee  made  bitter  complaints  in  regard  to  it,  and  asked 
the  Confederate  government  for  legislation  which  would 
authorize  him  to  apply  the  severest  punishments.  As 
the  Confederate  stragglers  were  generally  in  the  midst 
of  friends,  where  they  could  sleep  under  shelter  and  get 
food  of  better  quality  than  the  army  ration,  this  grew  to 
be  the  regular  mode  of  life  with  many  even  of  those 
who  would  join  their  comrades  in  an  engagement.  They 
were  not  reported  in  the  return  of  "  effectives  "  made  by 
their  officers,  but  that  they  often  made  part  of  the  killed, 
wounded,  and  captured  I  have  little  doubt.  In  this  way 
a  rational  explanation  may  be  found  of  the  larger  dis 
crepancies  between  the  Confederate  reports  of  casualties 
and  ours  of  their  dead  buried  and  prisoners  taken. 

The  weather  during  this  brief  campaign  was  as  lovely 
as  possible,  and  the  contrast  between  the  rich  farming 
country  in  which  we  now  were,  and  the  forest -covered 
mountains  of  West  Virginia  to  which  we  had  been  ac 
customed,  was  very  striking.  An  evening  march,  under 
a  brilliant  moon,  over  a  park-like  landscape  with  alterna 
tions  of  groves  and  meadows  which  could  not  have  been 
more  beautifully  composed  by  a  master  artist,  remains 
in  my  memory  as  a  page  out  of  a  lovely  romance. 
On  the  day  that  we  marched  to  Leesboro,  Lee's  army 
was  concentrated  near  Frederick,  behind  the  Monocacy 

1  I  have  discussed  this  subject  also  in  a  review  of  Henderson's  Stonewall 
Jackson,  "The  Nation,"  Nov.  24,  1898,  p.  396. 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  267 

River,  having  begun  the  crossing  of  the  Potomac  on  the 
4th.  There  was  a  singular  dearth  of  trustworthy  infor 
mation  on  the  subject  at  our  army  headquarters.  We 
moved  forward  by  very  short  marches  of  six  or  eight 
miles,  feeling  our  way  so  cautiously  that  Lee's  reports 
speak  of  it  as  an  unexpectedly  slow  approach.  The 
Comte  de  Paris  excuses  it  on  the  ground  of  the  dis 
organized  condition  of  McClellan's  army  after  the  recent 
battle.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  Sumner's 
corps  and  Franklin's  had  not  been  at  the  second  Bull 
Run,  and  were  veterans  of  the  Potomac  Army.  The 
Twelfth  Corps  had  been  Banks' s,  and  it  too  had  not 
been  engaged  at  the  second  Bull  Run,  its  work  having 
been  to  cover  the  trains  of  Pope's  army  on  the  retrograde 
movement  from  Warrenton  Junction.  Although  new 
regiments  had  been  added  to  these  corps,  it  is  hardly 
proper  to  say  that  the  army  as  a  whole  was  not  one  which 
could  be  rapidly  manoeuvred.  I  see  no  good  reason  why 
it  might  not  have  advanced  at  once  to  the  left  bank  of 
the  Monocacy,  covering  thus  both  Washington  and 
Baltimore,  and  hastening  by  some  days  Lee's  movement 
across  the  Blue  Ridge.  We  should  at  least  have  known 
where  the  enemy  was  by  being  in  contact  with  him, 
instead  of  being  the  sport  of  all  sorts  of  vague  rumors 
and  wild  reports.1 

The  Kanawha  division  took  the  advance  of  the  right 
wing  when  we  left  Leesboro  on  the  8th,  and  marched  to 
Brookville.  On  the  gth  it  reached  Goshen,  where  it  lay 
on  the  loth,  and  on  the  nth  reached  Ridgeville  on  the 
railroad.  The  rest  of  the  Ninth  Corps  was  an  easy  march 
behind  us.  Hooker  had  been  ordered  further  to  the 
right  on  the  strength  of  rumors  that  Lee  was  making  a 
circuit  towards  Baltimore,  and  his  corps  reached  Cooks- 

1  McClellan  was  not  wholly  responsible  for  this  tardiness,  for  Halleck 
was  very  timid  about  uncovering  Washington,  and  his  dispatches  tended  to 
increase  McClellan's  natural  indecision.  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  280. 


268  REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ville  and  the  railroad  some  ten  miles  east  of  my  position. 
The  extreme  left  of  the  army  was  at  Poolesville,  near  the 
Potomac,  making  a  spread  of  thirty  miles  across  the 
whole  front.  The  cavalry  did  not  succeed  in  getting  far 
in  advance  of  the  infantry,  and  very  little  valuable  infor 
mation  was  obtained.  At  Ridgeville,  however,  we  got 
reliable  evidence  that  Lee  had  evacuated  Frederick  the 
day  before,  and  that  only  cavalry  was  east  of  the  Catoctin 
Mountains.  Hooker  got  similar  information  at  about 
the  same  time.  It  was  now  determined  to  move  more 
rapidly,  and  early  in  the  morning  of  the  I2th  I  was 
ordered  to  march  to  New  Market  and  thence  to  Frederick. 
At  New  Market  I  was  overtaken  by  General  Reno,  with 
several  officers  of  rank  from  the  other  divisions  of  the 
corps,  and  they  dismounted  at  a  little  tavern  by  the  road 
side  to  see  the  Kanawha  division  go  by.  Up  to  this 
time  they  had  seen  nothing  of  us  whatever.  The  men 
had  been  so  long  in  the  West  Virginia  mountains  at  hard 
service,  involving  long  and  rapid  marches,  that  they  had 
much  the  same  strength  of  legs  and  ease  in  marching 
which  was  afterward  so  much  talked  of  when  seen  in 
Sherman's  army  at  the  review  in  Washington  at  the 
close  of  the  war.  I  stood  a  little  behind  Reno  and 
the  rest,  and  had  the  pleasure  of  hearing  their  involun 
tary  exclamations  of  admiration  at  the  marching  of  the 
men.  The  easy  swinging  step,  the  graceful  poise  of  the 
musket  on  the  shoulder,  as  if  it  were  a  toy  and  not  a 
burden,  and  the  compactness  of  the  column  were  all 
noticed  and  praised  with  a  heartiness  which  was  very 
grateful  to  my  ears.  I  no  longer  felt  any  doubt  that  the 
division  stood  well  in  the  opinion  of  my  associates. 

I  enjoyed  this  the  more  because,  the  evening  before,  a 
little  incident  had  occurred  which  had  threatened  to 
result  in  some  ill-feeling.  It  had  been  thought  that  we 
were  likely  to  be  attacked  at  Ridgeville,  and  on  reaching 
the  village  I  disposed  the  division  so  as  to  cover  the 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  269 

place  and  to  be  ready  for  an  engagement.  I  ordered  the 
brigades  to  bivouac  in  line  of  battle,  covering  the  front 
with  outposts  and  with  cavalry  vedettes  from  the  Sixth 
New  York  Cavalry  (Colonel  Devin),  which  had  been 
attached  to  the  division  during  the  advance.  The  men 
were  without  tents,  and  to  make  beds  had  helped  them 
selves  to  some  straw  from  stacks  in  the  vicinity.  Toward 
evening  General  Reno  rode  up,  and  happening  first  to 
meet  Lieutenant-Colonel  Rutherford  B.  Hayes,  command 
ing  the  Twenty  third  Ohio,  he  rather  sharply  inquired 
why  the  troops  were  not  bivouacking  "  closed  in  mass," 
and  also  blamed  the  taking  of  the  straw.  Colonel  Hayes 
referred  him  to  me  as  the  proper  person  to  account  for 
the  disposition  of  the  troops,  and  quietly  said  he  thought 
the  quartermaster's  department  could  settle  for  the  straw 
if  the  owner  was  loyal.  A  few  minutes  later  the  general 
came  to  my  own  position,  but  was  now  quite  over  his 
irritation.  I,  of  course,  knew  nothing  of  his  interview 
with  Hayes,  and  when  he  said  that  it  was  the  policy  in 
Maryland  to  make  the  troops  bivouac  in  compact  mass, 
so  as  to  do  as  little  damage  to  property  as  possible,  I 
cordially  assented,  but  urged  that  such  a  rule  would  not 
apply  to  the  advance-guard  when  supposed  to  be  in  pres 
ence  of  the  enemy ;  we  needed  to  have  the  men  already 
in  line  if  an  alarm  should  be  given  in  the  night.  To 
this  he  agreed,  and  a  pleasant  conversation  followed. 
Nothing  was  said  to  me  about  the  straw  taken  for  bed 
ding,  and  when  I  heard  of  the  little  passage-at-arms 
with  Colonel  Hayes,  I  saw  that  it  was  a  momentary  dis 
turbance  which  had  no  real  significance.  Camp  gossip, 
however,  is  as  bad  as  village  gossip,  and  in  a  fine  volume 
of  the  "History  of  the  Twenty-first  Massachusetts  Regi 
ment,"  I  find  it  stated  that  the  Kanawha  division  coming 
fresh  from  the  West  was  disposed  to  plunder  and  pillage, 
giving  an  exaggerated  version  of  the  foregoing  story  as 
evidence  of  it.  This  makes  it  a  duty  to  tell  what  was 


2/0          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  small  foundation  for  the  charge,  and  to  say  that  I 
believe  no  regiments  in  the  army  were  less  obnoxious  to 
any  just  accusation  of  such  a  sort.  The  gossip  would 
never  have  survived  the  war  at  all  but  for  the  fact  that 
Colonel  Hayes  became  President  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  supposed  incident  of  his  army  life  thus  acquired 
a  new  interest.1 

1  This  incident  gives  me  the  opportunity  to  say  that  after  reading  a  good 
many  regimental  histories,  I  am  struck  with  the  fact  that  with  the  really 
invaluable  material  they  contain  when  giving  the  actual  experiences  of  the 
regiments  themselves,  they  also  embody  a  great  deal  of  mere  gossip.  As  a 
rule,  their  value  is  confined  to  what  strictly  belongs  to  the  regiment ;  and 
the  criticisms,  whether  of  other  organizations  or  of  commanders,  are  likely 
to  be  the  expression  of  the  local  and  temporary  prejudices  and  misconcep 
tions  which  are  notoriously  current  in  time  of  war.  They  need  to  be  read 
with  due  allowance  for  this.  The  volume  referred  to  is  a  favorable  example 
of  its  class,  but  its  references  to  the  Kanawha  division  (which  was  in  the 
Ninth  Corps  only  a  month)  illustrate  the  tendency  I  have  mentioned.  It 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Kanawha  men  had  the  position  of  advance- 
guard,  and  I  believe  did  not  camp  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  other  divisions 
in  a  single  instance  from  the  time  we  left  Leesboro  till  the  battle  of  South 
Mountain.  What  is  said  of  them,  therefore,  is  not  from  observation.  The 
incident  between  Reno  and  Hayes  occurred  in  the  camp  of  the  latter,  and 
could  not  possibly  be  known  to  the  author  of  the  regimental  history  but  by 
hearsay.  Yet  he  affirms  as  a  fact  that  the  Kanawha  division  "  plundered 
the  country  unmercifully,"  for  which  Reno  "  took  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hayes 
severely  though  justly  to  task."  He  also  asserts  that  the  division  set  a  "  very 
bad  example  "  in  straggling.  As  to  this,  the  truth  is  as  I  have  circumstantially 
stated  it  above.  He  has  still  further  indulged  in  a  "slant  "  at  the  "  Ohio- 
ans  "  in  a  story  of  dead  Confederates  being  put  in  a  well  at  South  Mountain, 
—  a  story  as  apocryphal  as  the  others.  Wise's  house  and  well  were  within 
the  camp  of  the  division  to  which  the  Twenty-first  Massachusetts  belonged, 
and  the  burial  party  there  would  have  been  from  that  division.  Lastly, 
the  writer  says  that  General  Cox,  the  temporary  corps  commander,  "  robs 
us  [the  Twenty-first  Massachusetts]  of  our  dearly  bought  fame  "  by  naming 
the  Fifty-first  New  York  and  Fifty-first  Pennsylvania  as  the  regiments  which 
stormed  the  bridge  at  Antietam.  He  acquits  Burnside  and  McClellan  of  the 
alleged  injustice,  saying  they  "  follow  the  corps  report  in  this  respect."  Yet 
mention  is  not  made  of  the  fact  that  my  report  literally  copies  that  of  the 
division  commander,  who  himself  selected  the  regiments  for  the  charge  1 
The  "  Ohioan  "  had  soon  gone  west  again  with  his  division,  and  was  probably 
fair  game.  There  is  something  akin  to  provincialism  in  regimental  esprit 
de  corps,  and  such  instances  as  the  above,  which  are  all  found  within  a  few 
pages  of  the  book  referred  to,  show  that,  like  Leech's  famous  Staffordshire 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  2/1 

From  New  Market  we  sent  the  regiment  of  cavalry  off 
to  the  right  to  cover  our  flank,  and  to  investigate  reports 
that  heavy  bodies  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  were  north  of 
us.  The  infantry  pushed  rapidly  toward  Frederick.  The 
opposition  was  very  slight  till  we  reached  the  Monocacy 
River,  which  is  perhaps  half  a  mile  from  the  town. 
Here  General  Wade  Hampton,  with  his  brigade  as  rear 
guard  of  Lee's  army,  attempted  to  resist  the  crossing. 
The  highway  crosses  the  river  by  a  substantial  stone 
bridge,  and  the  ground  upon  our  bank  was  considerably 
higher  than  that  on  the  other  side.  We  engaged  the 
artillery  of  the  enemy  with  a  battery  of  our  own,  which 
had  the  advantage  of  position,  whilst  the  infantry  forced 
the  crossing  both  by  the  bridge  and  by  a  ford  a  quarter 
of  a  mile  to  the  right.  As  soon  as  Moor's  brigade  was 
over,  it  was  deployed  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  turn 
pike,  which  was  bordered  on  either  side  by  a  high  and 
strong  post-and-rail  fence.  Scammon's  was  soon  over, 
and  similarly  deployed  as  a  second  line,  with  the 
Eleventh  Ohio  in  column  in  the  road.  Moor  had  with 
him  a  troop  of  horse  and  a  single  cannon,  and  went  for 
ward  with  the  first  line,  allowing  it  to  keep  abreast  of 
him  on  right  and  left.  I  also  rode  on  the  turnpike 
between  the  two  lines,  and  only  a  few  rods  behind  Moor, 
having  with  me  my  staff  and  a  few  orderlies.  Reno  was 
upon  the  other  bank  of  the  river,  overlooking  the  move 
ment,  which  made  a  fine  military  display  as  the  lines 
advanced  at  quick-step  toward  the  city.  Hampton's 
horsemen  had  passed  out  of  our  sight,  for  the  straight 
causeway  turned  sharply  to  the  left  just  as  it  entered  the 
town,  and  we  could  not  see  beyond  the  turn.  We  were 
perhaps  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  the  city,  when  a  young 
staff  officer  from  corps  headquarters  rode  up  beside  me 

rough  in  the  Punch  cartoon,  to  be  a  "  stranger  "  is  a  sufficient  reason  to 
"  'eave  'arf  a  brick  at  un."  See  letters  of  President  Hayes  and  General 
Crook  on  the  subject,  Appendix  B. 


272          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

and  exclaimed  in  a  boisterous  way,  "Why  don't  they  go 
in  faster?  There's  nothing  there!  "  I  said  to  the  young 
man,  "Did  General  Reno  send  you  with  any  order  to 
me?"  "No,"  he  replied.  "Then,"  said  I,  "when  I 
want  your  advice  I  will  ask  it."  He  moved  off  abashed, 
and  I  did  not  notice  what  had  become  of  him,  but,  in 
fact,  he  rode  up  to  Colonel  Moor,  and  repeated  a  similar 
speech.  Moor  was  stung  by  the  impertinence  which  he 
assumed  to  be  a  criticism  upon  him  from  corps  head 
quarters,  and,  to  my  amazement,  I  saw  him  suddenly 
dash  ahead  at  a  gallop  with  his  escort  and  the  gun.  He 
soon  came  to  the  turn  of  the  road  where  it  loses  itself 
among  the  houses ;  there  was  a  quick,  sharp  rattling  of 
carbines,  and  Hampton's  cavalry  was  atop  of  the  little 
party.  There  was  one  discharge  of  the  cannon,  and 
some  of  the  brigade  staff  and  escort  came  back  in  dis 
order.  I  ordered  up  at  "double  quick"  the  Eleventh 
Ohio,  which,  as  I  have  said,  was  in  column  in  the  road, 
and  these,  with  bayonets  fixed,  dashed  into  the  town. 
The  enemy  had  not  waited  for  them,  but  retreated  out 
of  the  place  by  the  Hagerstown  road.  Moor  had  been 
ridden  down,  unhorsed,  and  captured.  The  artillery-men 
had  unlimbered  the  gun,  pointed  it,  and  the  gunner  stood 
with  the  lanyard  in  his  hand,  when  he  was  struck  by  a 
charging  horse ;  the  gun  was  fired  by  the  concussion,  but 
at  the  same  moment  it  was  capsized  into  the  ditch  by  the 
impact  of  the  cavalry  column.  The  enemy  had  no  time 
to  right  the  gun  or  carry  it  off,  nor  to  stop  for  prisoners. 
They  forced  Moor  on  another  horse,  and  turned  tail  as 
the  charging  lines  of  infantry  came  up  on  right  and  left 
as  well  as  the  column  in  the  road,  for  there  had  not  been 
a  moment's  pause  in  the  advance.  It  had  all  happened, 
and  the  gun  with  a  few  dead  and  wounded  of  both  sides 
were  in  our  hands,  in  less  time  than  it  has  taken  to 
describe  it.  Those  who  may  have  a  fancy  for  learning 
how  Munchausen  would  tell  this  story,  may  find  it  in  the 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  2/3 

narrative  of  Major  Heros  von  Borke  of  J.  E.  B.  Stuart's 
staff.1  Moor's  capture,  however,  had  consequences,  as 
we  shall  see.  The  command  of  his  brigade  passed  to 
Colonel  George  Crook  of  the  Thirty-sixth  Ohio. 

Frederick  was  a  loyal  city,  and  as  Hampton's  cavalry 
went  out  at  one  end  of  the  street  and  our  infantry  came 
in  at  the  other,  and  whilst  the  carbine  smoke  and  the 
smell  of  powder  still  lingered,  the  closed  window-shut 
ters  of  the  houses  flew  open,  the  sashes  went  up,  the 
windows  were  rilled  with  ladies  waving  their  handker 
chiefs  and  national  flags,  whilst  the  men  came  to  the 
column  with  fruits  and  refreshments  for  the  marching 
soldiers  as  they  went  by  in  the  hot  sunshine  of  the  Sep 
tember  afternoon.2  Pleasonton's  cavalry  came  in  soon 

1  Von  Borke's  account  is  so  good  an  example  of  the  way  in  which 
romance  may  be  built  up  out  of  a  little  fact  that  I  give  it  in  full.  The 
burning  of  the  stone  bridge  half  a  mile  in  rear  of  the  little  affair  was  a 
peculiarly  brilliant  idea ;  but  he  has  evidently  confused  our  advance  with 
that  on  the  Urbana  road.  He  says :  "  Toward  evening  the  enemy  arrived 
in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  Monocacy  bridge,  and  observing  only  a 
small  force  at  this  point,  advanced  very  carelessly.  A  six-pounder  gun  had 
been  placed  in  position  by  them  at  a  very  short  distance  from  the  bridge, 
which  fired  from  time  to  time  a  shot  at  our  horsemen,  while  the  foremost 
regiment  marched  along  at  their  ease,  as  if  they  believed  this  small  body  of 
cavalry  would  soon  wheel  in  flight.  This  favorable  moment  for  an  attack 
was  seized  in  splendid  style  by  Major  Butler,  who  commanded  the  two 
squadrons  of  the  Second  South  Carolina  Cavalry,  stationed  at  this  point  as 
our  rear-guard.  Like  lightning  he  darted  across  the  bridge,  taking  the  piece 
of  artillery,  which  had  scarcely  an  opportunity  of  firing  a  shot,  and  falling 
upon  the  regiment  of  infantry,  which  was  dispersed  in  a  few  seconds,  many 
of  them  being  shot  down,  and  many  others,  among  whom  was  the  colonel 
in  command,  captured.  The  colors  of  the  regiment  also  fell  into  Major 
Butler's  hands.  The  piece  of  artillery,  in  the  hurry  of  the  moment,  could 
not  be  brought  over  to  our  side  of  the  river,  as  the  enemy  instantly  sent 
forward  a  large  body  of  cavalry  at  a  gallop,  and  our  dashing  men  had  only 
time  to  spike  it  and  trot  with  their  prisoners  across  the  bridge,  which,  having 
been  already  fully  prepared  for  burning,  was  in  a  blaze  when  the  infuriated 
Yankees  arrived  at  the  water's  edge.  The  conflagration  of  the  bridge  of 
course  checked  their  onward  movement,  and  we  quietly  continued  the 
retreat."  Von  Borke,  vol.  i.  p.  203.  Stuart's  report  is  very  nearly  accurate  : 
O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  816. 

-  Although  at  the  head  of  the  column,  the  "truth  of  history  "  compels 
VOL.  I.  —  18 


274          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

after  by  the  Urbana  road,  and  during  the  evening  a  large 
part  of  the  army  drew  near  the  place.  Next  morning 
(i3th)  the  cavalry  went  forward  to  reconnoitre  the  passes 
of  Catoctin  Mountain,  Rodman's  division  of  our  corps 
being  ordered  to  support  them  and  to  proceed  toward 
Middletown  in  the  Catoctin  valley.  Through  some  mis 
understanding  Rodman  took  the  road  to  Jefferson,  lead 
ing  to  the  left,  where  Franklin's  corps  was  moving,  and 
did  not  get  upon  the  Hagerstown  road.  About  noon  I  was 
ordered  to  march  upon  the  latter  road  to  Middletown. 
McClellan  himself  met  me  as  my  column  moved  out  of 
town,  and  told  me  of  the  misunderstanding  in  Rodman's 
orders,  adding  that  if  I  found  him  on  the  march  I  should 
take  his  division  also  along  with  me.1  I  did  not  meet 
him,  but  the  other  two  divisions  of  the  corps  crossed 
Catoctin  Mountain  that  night,  whilst  Rodman  returned 
to  Frederick.  The  Kanawha  division  made  an  easy 
march,  and  as  the  cavalry  was  now  ahead  of  us,  met  no 
opposition  in  crossing  Catoctin  Mountain  or  in  the  valley 
beyond.  On  the  way  we  passed  a  house  belonging  to  a 
branch  of  the  Washington  family,  and  a  few  officers  of 
the  division  accompanied  me,  at  the  invitation  of  the 
occupant,  to  look  at  some  relics  of  the  Father  of  his 
Country  which  were  preserved  there.  We  stood  for  some 
minutes  with  uncovered  heads  before  a  case  containing  a 
uniform  he  had  worn,  and  other  articles  of  personal  use 
hallowed  by  their  association  with  him,  and  went  on  our 
way  with  our  zeal  strengthened  by  closer  contact  with 

me  to  say  that  I  saw  nothing  of  Barbara  Frietchie,  and  heard  nothing  of 
her  till  I  read  Whit  tier's  poem  in  later  years.  When,  however,  I  visited 
Frederick  with  General  Grant  in  1869,  we  were  both  presented  with  walking- 
sticks  made  from  timbers  of  Barbara's  house  which  had  been  torn  down, 
and,  of  course,  I  cannot  dispute  the  story  of  which  I  have  the  stick  as 
evidence;  for  Grant  thought  the  stick  shut  me  up  from  any  denial  and 
established  the  legend. 

1  As  is  usual  in  such  cases,  the  direction  was  later  put  in  writing  by  his 
chief  of  staff.     O.  R.,  vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  827. 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  2?$ 

souvenirs  of  the  great  patriot.  Willcox's  division  fol 
lowed  us,  and  encamped  a  mile  and  a  half  east  of  Middle- 
town.  Sturgis's  halted  not  far  from  the  western  foot  of 
the  mountain,  with  corps  headquarters  near  by.  My  own 
camp  for  the  night  was  pitched  in  front  (west)  of  the  vil 
lage  of  Middletown  along  Catoctin  Creek.  Pleasonton's 
cavalry  was  a  little  in  advance  of  us,  at  the  forks  of  the 
road  where  the  old  Sharpsburg  road  turns  off  to  the  left 
from  the  turnpike.  The  rest  of  the  army  was  camped 
about  Frederick,  except  Franklin's  corps  (Sixth),  which 
was  near  Jefferson,  ten  miles  further  south  but  also  east 
of  Catoctin  Mountain. 

The  Catoctin  or  Middletown  valley  is  beautifully  in 
cluded  between  Catoctin  Mountain  and  South  Mountain, 
two  ranges  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  running  northeast  and 
southwest.  It  is  six  or  eight  miles  wide,  watered  by 
Catoctin  Creek,  which  winds  southward  among  rich  farms 
and  enters  the  Potomac  near  Point  of  Rocks.  The  Na 
tional  road  leaving  Frederick  passes  through  Middletown 
and  crosses  South  Mountain,  as  it  goes  northwestward, 
at  a  depression  called  Turner's  Gap.  The  old  Sharps- 
burg  road  crosses  the  summit  at  another  gap,  known  as 
Fox's,  about  a  mile  south  of  Turner's.  Still  another, 
the  old  Hagerstown  road,  finds  a  passage  over  the  ridge  at 
about  an  equal  distance  north.  The  National  road,  be 
ing  of  easier  grades  and  better  engineering,  was  now  the 
principal  route,  the  others  having  degenerated  to  rough 
country  roads.  The  mountain  crests  are  from  ten  to 
thirteen  hundred  feet  above  the  Catoctin  valley,  and  the 
"gaps"  are  from  two  to  three  hundred  feet  lower  than 
the  summits  near  them.1  These  summits  are  like  scat 
tered  and  irregular  hills  upon  the  high  rounded  surface 
of  the  mountain  top.  They  are  wooded,  but  along  the 
southeasterly  slopes,  quite  near  the  top  of  the  mountain, 
are  small  farms,  with  meadows  and  cultivated  fields. 

1  These  elevations  are  from  the  official  map  of  the  U.  S.  Engineers. 


276          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

The  military  situation  had  been  cleared  up  by  the 
knowledge  of  Lee's  movements  which  McClellan  got 
from  a  copy  of  Lee's  order  of  the  day  for  the  roth. 
This  had  been  found  at  Frederick  on  the  I3th,  and  it 
tallied  so  well  with  what  was  otherwise  known  that  no 
doubt  was  left  as  to  its  authenticity.  It  showed  that 
Jackson's  corps  with  Walker's  division  were  besieging 
Harper's  Ferry  on  the  Virginia  side  of  the  Potomac, 
whilst  McLaws's  division  supported  by  Anderson's  was 
co-operating  on  Maryland  Heights.1  Longstreet,  with 
the  remainder  of  his  corps,  was  at  Boonsboro  or  near 
Hagerstown.  D.  H.  Hill's  division  was  the  rear-guard, 
and  the  cavalry  under  Stuart  covered  the  whole,  a  de 
tached  squadron  being  with  Longstreet,  Jackson,  and 
McLaws  each.  The  order  did  not  name  the  three  sepa 
rate  divisions  in  Jackson's  command  proper  (exclusive  of 
Walker),  nor  those  remaining  with  Longstreet  except 
D.  H.  Hill's;  but  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  these 
were  not  known  to  McClellan  after  his  own  and  Pope's 
contact  with  them  during  the  campaigns  of  the  spring 
and  summer.  At  any  rate,  the  order  showed  that  Lee's 
army  was  in  two  parts,  separated  by  the  Potomac  and 
thirty  or  forty  miles  of  road.  As  soon  as  Jackson  should 
reduce  Harper's  Ferry  they  would  reunite.  Friday  the 
1 2th  was  the  day  fixed  for  the  concentration  of  Jackson's 
force  for  his  attack,  and  it  was  Saturday  when  the  order 
fell  into  McClellan's  hands.  Three  days  had  already 
been  lost  in  the  slow  advance  since  Lee  had  crossed 
Catoctin  Mountain,  and  Jackson's  artillery  was  now 
heard  pounding  at  the  camp  and  earthworks  of  Harper's 
Ferry.  McLaws  had  already  driven  our  forces  from 
Maryland  Heights,  and  had  opened  upon  the  ferry  with 
his  guns  in  commanding  position  on  the  north  of  the 
Potomac.2  McClellan  telegraphed  to  the  President  that 
he  would  catch  the  rebels  "  in  their  own  trap  if  my  men 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  281,  603.  2  Id.,  p.  607. 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  277 

are  equal  to  the  emergency."1  There  was  certainly  no 
time  to  lose.  The  information  was  in  his  hands  before 
noon,  for  he  refers  to  it  in  a  dispatch  to  Mr.  Lincoln  at 
twelve.  If  his  men  had  been  ordered  to  be  at  the  top 
of  South  Mountain  before  dark,  they  could  have  been 
there;  but  less  than  one  full  corps  passed  Catoctin 
Mountain  that  day  or  night,  and  when  the  leisurely 
movement  of  the  1/j.th  began,  he  himself,  instead  of 
being  with  the  advance,  was  in  Frederick  till  after 
2  P.M.,  at  which  hour  he  sent  a  dispatch  to  Washington, 
and  then  rode  to  the  front  ten  or  twelve  miles  away. 
The  failure  to  be  "  equal  to  the  emergency "  was  not  in 
his  men.  Twenty-four  hours,  as  it  turned  out,  was  the 
whole  difference  between  saving  and  losing  Harper's 
Ferry  with  its  ten  or  twelve  thousand  men  and  its  unes- 
timated  munitions  and  stores.  It  may  be  that  the  com 
manders  of  the  garrison  were  in  fault,  and  that  a  more 
stubborn  resistance  should  have  been  made.  It  may  be 
that  Halleck  ought  to  have  ordered  the  place  to  be  evac 
uated  earlier,  as  McClellan  suggested.  Nevertheless,  at 
noon  of  the  i3th  McClellan  had  it  in  his  power  to  save 
the  place  and  interpose  his  army  between  the  two  wings 
of  the  Confederates  with  decisive  effect  on  the  campaign. 
He  saw  that  it  was  an  "emergency,"  but  did  not  call 
upon  his  men  for  any  extraordinary  exertion.  Harper's 
Ferry  surrendered,  and  Lee  united  the  wings  of  his 
army  beyond  the  Antietam  before  the  final  and  general 
engagement  was  forced  upon  him. 

At  my  camp  in  front  of  Middletown,  I  received  no 
orders  looking  to  a  general  advance  on  the  I4th;  but 
only  to  support,  by  a  detachment,  Pleasonton's  cavalry 
in  a  reconnoissance  toward  Turner's  Gap.  Pleasonton 
himself  came  to  my  tent  in  the  evening,  and  asked  that 
one  brigade  might  report  to  him  in  the  morning  for  the 
purpose.  Six  o'clock  was  the  hour  at  which  he  wished 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  281. 


2?8          REMINISCENCES  OF    THE   CIVIL    WAR 

them  to  march.  He  said  further  that  he  and  Colonel 
Crook  were  old  army  acquaintances  and  that  he  would 
like  Crook  to  have  the  detail.  I  wished  to  please  him, 
and  not  thinking  that  it  would  make  any  difference  to  my 
brigade  commanders,  intimated  that  I  would  do  so.  But 
Colonel  Scammon,  learning  what  was  intended,  protested 
that  under  our  custom  his  brigade  was  entitled  to  the 
advance  next  day,  as  the  brigades  had  taken  it  in  turn. 
I  explained  that  it  was  only  as  a  courtesy  to  Pleasonton 
and  at  his  request  that  the  change  was  proposed.  This 
did  not  better  the  matter  in  Scammon's  opinion.  He 
had  been  himself  a  regular  officer,  and  the  point  of  pro 
fessional  honor  touched  him.  I  recognized  the  justice 
of  his  demand,  and  said  he  should  have  the  duty  if  he  in 
sisted  upon  it.  Pleasonton  was  still  in  the  camp  visiting 
with  Colonel  Crook,  and  I  explained  to  him  the  reasons 
why  I  could  not  yield  to  his  wish,  but  must  assign  Scam 
mon's  brigade  to  the  duty  in  conformity  with  the  usual 
course.  There  was  in  fact  no  reason  except  the  personal 
one  for  choosing  one  brigade  more  than  the  other,  for 
they  were  equally  good.  Crook  took  the  decision  in 
good  part,  though  it  was  natural  that  he  should  wish  for 
an  opportunity  of  distinguished  service,  as  he  had  not 
been  the  regular  commandant  of  the  brigade.  Pleason 
ton  was  a  little  chafed,  and  even  intimated  that  he 
claimed  some  right  to  name  the  officer  and  command  to 
be  detailed.  This,  of  course,  I  could  not  admit,  and 
issued  the  formal  orders  at  once.  The  little  controversy 
had  put  Scammon  and  his  whole  brigade  upon  their 
mettle,  and  was  a  case  in  which  a  generous  emulation 
did  no  harm.  What  happened  in  the  morning  only  in 
creased  their  spirit  and  prepared  them  the  better  to  per 
form  what  I  have  always  regarded  as  a  very  brilliant 
exploit. 

The  morning  of  Sunday  the  I4th  of  September  was  a 
bright  one.      I  had  my  breakfast  very  early  and  was  in 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN 


279 


the  saddle  before  it  was  time  for  Scammon  to  move. 
He  was  prompt,  and  I  rode  on  with  him  to  see  in  what 
way  his  support  was  likely  to  be  used.  Two  of  the 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN. 


The  general  position  of  Hill's  division  and  the 
cavalry  in  the  morning.  Shown  thus  :  --- 

The  advance  of  the  Kanawha  division  to  the 
assault.  Shown  thus 

numbers  show  elevations. 


Ninth  Corps  batteries  (Gibson's  and  Benjamin's)  had 
accompanied  the  cavalry,  and  one  of  these  was  a  heavy 
one  of  twenty-pounder  Parrotts.  They  were  placed  upon 


280          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

a  knoll  a  little  in  front  of  the  cavalry  camp,  about  half  a 
mile  beyond  the  forks  of  the  old  Sharpsburg  road  with 
the  turnpike.  They  were  exchanging  shots  with  a  battery 
of  the  enemy  well  up  in  the  gap.  Just  as  Scammon  and  I 
crossed  Catoctin  Creek  I  was  surprised  to  see  Colonel 
Moor  standing  at  the  roadside.  With  astonishment  I 
rode  to  him  and  asked  how  he  came  there.  He  said  that 
he  had  been  taken  beyond  the  mountain  after  his  capture, 
but  had  been  paroled  the  evening  before,  and  was  now 
finding  his  way  back  to  us  on  foot.  "  But  where  are  you 
going?"  said  he.  I  answered  that  Scammon  was  going 
to  support  Pleasonton  in  a  reconnoissance  into  the  gap. 
Moor  made  an  involuntary  start,  saying,  "  My  God !  be 
careful!"  then  checking  himself,  added,  "  But  I  am  pa 
roled  !  "  and  turned  away.  I  galloped  to  Scammon  and 
told  him  that  I  should  follow  him  in  close  support  with 
Crook's  brigade,  and  as  I  went  back  along  the  column  I 
spoke  to  each  regimental  commander,  warning  them  to 
be  prepared  for  anything,  big  or  little,  —  it  might  be  a 
skirmish,  it  might  be  a  battle.  Hurrying  to  camp,  I 
ordered  Crook  to  turn  out  his  brigade  and  march  at  once. 
I  then  wrote  a  dispatch  to  General  Reno,  saying  I  sus 
pected  we  should  find  the  enemy  in  force  on  the  moun 
tain  top,  and  should  go  forward  with  both  brigades 
instead  of  sending  one.  Starting  a  courier  with  this,  I 
rode  forward  again  and  found  Pleasonton.  Scammon  had 
given  him  an  inkling  of  our  suspicions,  and  in  the  per 
sonal  interview  they  had  reached  a  mutual  good  under 
standing.  I  found  that  he  was  convinced  that  it  would 
be  unwise  to  make  an  attack  in  front,  and  had  deter 
mined  that  his  horsemen  should  merely  demonstrate  upon 
the  main  road  and  support  the  batteries,  whilst  Scammon 
should  march  by  the  old  Sharpsburg  road  and  try  to 
reach  the  flank  of  the  force  on  the  summit.  I  told  him 
that  in  view  of  my  fear  that  the  force  of  the  enemy  might 
be  too  great  for  Scammon,  I  had  determined  to  bring 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  281 

forward  Crook's  brigade  in  support.  If  it  became  neces 
sary  to  fight  with  the  whole  division,  I  should  do  so,  and 
in  that  case  I  should  assume  the  responsibility  myself  as 
his  senior  officer.  To  this  he  cordially  assented. 

One  section  of  McMullin's  six-gun  battery  was  all  that 
went  forward  with  Scammon  (and  even  these  not  till  the 
infantry  reached  the  summit),  four  guns  being  left  be 
hind,  as  the  road  was  rough  and  steep.  There  were  in 
Simmonds's  battery  two  twenty-pounder  Parrott  guns,  and  I 
ordered  these  also  to  remain  on  the  turnpike  and  to  go  into 
action  with  Benjamin's  battery  of  the  same  calibre.  It  was 
about  half-past  seven  when  Crook's  head  of  column  filed 
off  from  the  turnpike  upon  the  old  Sharpsburg  road,  and 
Scammon  had  perhaps  half  an  hour's  start.  We  had 
fully  two  miles  to  go  before  we  should  reach  the  place 
where  our  attack  was  actually  made,  and  as  it  was  a 
pretty  sharp  ascent  the  men  marched  slowly  with  fre 
quent  rests.  On  our  way  up  we  were  overtaken  by  my 
courier  who  had  returned  from  General  Reno  with  ap 
proval  of  my  action  and  the  assurance  that  the  rest  of  the 
Ninth  Corps  would  come  forward  to  my  support. 

When  Scammon  had  got  within  half  a  mile  of  Fox's 
Gap  (the  summit  of  the  old  Sharpsburg  road),1  the  enemy 
opened  upon  him  with  case-shot  from  the  edge  of  the 
timber  above  the  open  fields,  and  he  had  judiciously 
turned  off  upon  a  country  road  leading  still  further  to  the 
left,  and  nearly  parallel  to  the  ridge  above.  His  move 
ment  had  been  made  under  cover  of  the  forest,  and  he 
had  reached  the  extreme  southern  limit  of  the  open  fields 
south  of  the  gap  on  this  face  of  the  mountain.  Here  I 
overtook  him,  his  brigade  being  formed  in  line  under 
cover  of  the  timber,  facing  open  pasture  fields  having  a 

1  The  Sharpsburg  road  is  also  called  the  Braddock  road,  as  it  was  the 
way  by  which  Braddock  and  Washington  had  marched  to  Fort  Duquesne 
(Pittsburg)  in  the  old  French  war.  For  the  same  reason  the  gap  is  called 
Braddock's  Gap.  I  have  adopted  that  which  seems  to  be  in  most  common 
local  use. 


282  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

stone  wall  along  the  upper  side,  with  the  forest  again 
beyond  this.  On  his  left  was  the  Twenty-third  Ohio 
under  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  B.  Hayes,  who  had  been 
directed  to  keep  in  the  woods  beyond  the  open,  and  to 
strike  if  possible  the  flank  of  the  enemy.  His  centre 
was  the  Twelfth  Ohio  under  Colonel  Carr  B.  White, 
whose  duty  was  to  attack  the  stone  wall  in  front,  charg 
ing  over  the  broad  open  fields.  On  the  right  was  the 
Thirtieth  Ohio,  Colonel  Hugh  Ewing,  who  was  ordered 
to  advance  against  a  battery  on  the  crest  which  kept  up 
a  rapid  and  annoying  fire.  It  was  now  about  nine  o'clock, 
and  Crook's  column  had  come  into  close  support.  Bay 
onets  were  fixed,  and  at  the  word  the  line  rushed  forward 
with  loud  hurrahs.  Hayes,  being  in  the  woods,  was  not 
seen  till  he  had  passed  over  the  crest  and  turned  upon 
the  enemy's  flank  and  rear.  Here  was  a  sharp  combat, 
but  our  men  established  themselves  upon  the  summit  and 
drove  the  enemy  before  them.  White  and  Ewing  charged 
over  the  open  under  a  destructive  fire  of  musketry  and 
shrapnel.  As  Ewing  approached  the  enemy's  battery 
(Bondurant's),  it  gave  him  a  parting  salvo,  and  limbered 
rapidly  toward  the  right  along  a  road  in  the  edge  of  the 
woods  which  follows  the  summit  to  the  turnpike  near  the 
Mountain  House  at  Turner's  Gap.  White's  men  never 
flinched,  and  the  North  Carolinians  of  Garland's  brigade 
(for  it  was  they  who  held  the  ridge  at  this  point)  poured 
in  their  fire  till  the  advancing  line  of  bayonets  was  in 
their  faces  when  they  broke  away  from  the  wall.  Our 
men  fell  fast,  but  they  kept  up  their  pace,  and  the 
enemy's  centre  was  broken  by  a  heroic  charge.  Gar 
land  strove  hard  to  rally  his  men,  but  his  brigade  was 
hopelessly  broken  in  two.  He  rallied  his  right  wing  on 
the  second  ridge  a  little  in  rear  of  that  part  of  his  line, 
but  Hayes's  regiment  was  here  pushing  forward  from  our 
left.  Colonel  Ruffin  of  the  Thirteenth  North  Carolina 
held  on  to  the  ridge  road  beyond  our  right,  near  Fox's 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  283 

Gap.  The  fighting  was  now  wholly  in  the  woods,  and 
though  the  enemy's  centre  was  routed  there  was  stubborn 
resistance  on  both  flanks.  His  cavalry  dismounted  (said 
to  be  under  Colonel  Rosser1)  was  found  to  extend  beyond 
Hayes's  line,  and  supported  the  Stuart  artillery,  which 
poured  canister  into  our  advancing  troops.  I  now 
ordered  Crook  to  send  the  Eleventh  Ohio  (under  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Coleman)  beyond  Hayes's  left  to  extend 
our  line  in  that  direction,  and  to  direct  the  Thirty- 
sixth  Ohio  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Clark)  to  fill  a  gap  be 
tween  the  Twelfth  and  Thirtieth  caused  by  diverging 
lines  of  advance.  The  only  remaining  regiment  (the 
Twenty-eighth,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Becker)  was  held  in 
reserve  on  the  right.  The  Thirty-sixth  aided  by  the 
Twelfth  repulsed  a  stout  effort  of  the  enemy  to  re-estab 
lish  their  centre.  The  whole  line  again  sprung  forward. 
A  high  knoll  on  our  left  was  carried.  The  dismounted 
cavalry  was  forced  to  retreat  with  their  battery  across  the 
ravine  in  which  the  Sharpsburg  road  descends  on  the 
west  of  the  mountain,  and  took  a  new  position  on  a  sepa 
rate  hill  in  rear  of  the  heights  at  the  Mountain  House. 
There  was  considerable  open  ground  at  this  new  position, 
from  which  their  battery  had  full  play  at  a  range  of  about 
twelve  hundred  yards  upon  the  ridge  held  by  us.  But 
the  Eleventh  and  Twenty-third  stuck  stoutly  to  the  hill 
which  Hayes  had  first  carried,  and  their  line  was  nearly 
parallel  to  the  Sharpsburg  road,  facing  north.  Garland 
had  rushed  to  the  right  of  his  brigade  to  rally  them  when 
they  had  broken  before  the  onset  of  the  Twenty-third 
Ohio  upon  the  flank,  and  in  the  desperate  contest  there 
he  had  been  killed  and  the  disaster  to  his  command  made 
irreparable.  On  our  side  Colonel  Hayes  had  also  been 
disabled  by  a  severe  wound  as  he  gallantly  led  the  Ohio 
regiment, 

I  now  directed  the  centre  and  right  to  push  forward 

1  Stuart's  Report,  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  817. 


284          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

toward  Fox's  Gap.  Lieutenant  Croome  with  a  section  of 
McMullin's  battery  had  come  up,  and  he  put  his  guns  in 
action  in  the  most  gallant  manner  in  the  open  ground  near 
Wise's  house.  The  Thirtieth  and  Thirty-sixth  changed 
front  to  the  right  and  attacked  the  remnant  of  Garland's 
brigade,  now  commanded  by  Colonel  McRae,  and  drove 
it  and  two  regiments  from  G.  B.  Anderson's  brigade 
back  upon  the  wooded  hill  beyond  Wise's  farm  at  Fox's 
Gap.  The  whole  of  Anderson's  brigade  retreated  further 
along  the  crest  toward  the  Mountain  House.  Meanwhile 
the  Twelfth  Ohio,  also  changing  front,  had  thridded  its 
way  in  the  same  direction  through  laurel  thickets  on  the 
reverse  slope  of  the  mountain,  and  attacking  suddenly 
the  force  at  Wise's  as  the  other  two  regiments  charged 
it  in  front,  completed  the  rout  and  brought  off  two  hun 
dred  prisoners.  Bondurant's  battery  was  again  driven 
hurriedly  off  to  the  north.  But  the  hollow  at  the  gap 
about  Wise's  was  no  place  to  stay.  It  was  open  ground 
and  was  swept  by  the  batteries  of  the  cavalry  on  the  open 
hill  to  the  northwest,  and  by  those  of  Hill's  division 
about  the  Mountain  House  and  upon  the  highlands  north 
of  the  National  road;  for  those  hills  run  forward  like  a 
bastion  and  give  a  perfect  flanking  fire  along  our  part  of 
the  mountain.  The  gallant  Croome  with  a  number  of 
his  gunners  had  been  killed,  and  his  guns  were  brought 
back  into  the  shelter  of  the  woods,  on  the  hither  side  of 
Wise's  fields.  The  infantry  of  the  right  wing  was 
brought  to  the  same  position,  and  our  lines  were  re 
formed  along  the  curving  crests  from  that  point  which 
looks  down  into  the  gap  and  the  Sharpsburg  road, 
toward  the  left.  The  extreme  right  with  Croome's  two 
guns  was  held  by  the  Thirtieth,  with  the  Twenty-eighth 
in  second  line.  Next  came  the  Twelfth,  with  the  Thirty- 
sixth  in  second  line,  the  front  curving  toward  the  west 
with  the  form  of  the  mountain  summit.  The  left  of  the 
Twelfth  dipped  a  little  into  a  hollow,  beyond  which  the 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  285 

Twenty-third  and  Eleventh  occupied  the  next  hill  facing 
toward  the  Sharpsburg  road.  Our  front  was  hollow,  for 
the  two  wings  were  nearly  at  right  angles  to  each  other; 
but  the  flanks  were  strongly  placed,  the  right,  which  was 
most  exposed,  having  open  ground  in  front  which  it  could 
sweep  with  its  fire  and  having  the  reserve  regiments 
closely  supporting  it.  Part  of  Simmonds's  battery  which 
had  also  come  up  had  done  good  service  in  the  last  com 
bats,  and  was  now  disposed  so  as  to  check  the  fire  of  the 
enemy. 

It  was  time  to  rest.  Three  hours  of  up-hill  marching 
and  climbing  had  been  followed  by  as  long  a  period  of 
bloody  battle,  and  it  was  almost  noon.  The  troops  began 
to  feel  the  exhaustion  of  such  labor  and  struggle.  We 
had  several  hundred  prisoners  in  our  hands,  and  the  field 
was  thickly  strewn  with  dead,  in  gray  and  in  blue,  while 
our  field  hospital  a  little  down  the  mountain  side  was 
encumbered  with  hundreds  of  wounded.  We  learned 
from  our  prisoners  that  the  summit  was  held  by  D.  H. 
Hill's  division  of  five  brigades  with  Stuart's  cavalry,  and 
that  Longstreet's  corps  was  in  close  support.  I  was 
momentarily  expecting  to  hear  from  the  supporting  divi 
sions  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  thought  it  the  part  of  wis 
dom  to  hold  fast  to  our  strong  position  astride  of  the 
mountain  top  commanding  the  Sharpsburg  road  till  our 
force  should  be  increased.  The  two  Kanawha  brigades 
had  certainly  won  a  glorious  victory,  and  had  made  so 
assured  a  success  of  the  day's  work  that  it  would  be  folly 
to  imperil  it.1 

General  Hill  has  since  argued  that  only  part  of  his 
division  could  oppose  us;2  but  his  brigades  were  all  on 
the  mountain  summit  within  easy  support  of  each  other, 
and  they  had  the  day  before  them.  It  was  five  hours 
from  the  time  of  our  first  charge  to  the  arrival  of  our  first 

1  For  official  reports,  see  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  458-474. 

2  Century  War  Book,  vol.  ii.  pp.  559,  etc. 


286          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

supports,  and  it  was  not  till  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
that  Hooker's  corps  reached  the  eastern  base  of  the  moun 
tain  and  began  its  deployment  north  of  the  National  road. 
Our  effort  was  to  attack  the  weak  end  of  his  line,  and  we 
succeeded  in  putting  a  stronger  force  there  than  that 
which  opposed  us.  It  is  for  our  opponent  to  explain  how 
we  were  permitted  to  do  it.  The  two  brigades  of  the 
Kanawha  division  numbered  less  than  3000  men.  Hill's 
division  was  5000  strong,1  even  by  the  Confederate 
method  of  counting  their  effectives,  which  should  be  in 
creased  nearly  one-fifth  to  compare  properly  with  our 
reports.  In  addition  to  these  Stuart  had  the  principal 
part»of  the  Confederate  cavalry  on  this  line,  and  they 
were  not  idle  spectators.  Parts  of  Lee's  and  Hampton's 
brigades  were  certainly  there,  and  probably  the  whole  of 
Lee's.2  With  less  than  half  the  numerical  strength  which 
was  opposed  to  it,  therefore,  the  Kanawha  division  had 
carried  the  summit,  advancing  to  the  charge  for  the  most 
part  over  open  ground  in  the  storm  of  musketry  and  artil 
lery  fire,  and  held  the  crests  they  had  gained  through  the 
livelong  day,  in  spite  of  all  efforts  to  retake  them. 

In  our  mountain  camps  of  West  Virginia  I  had  felt  dis 
contented  that  our  native  Ohio  regiments  did  not  take  as 
kindly  to  the  labors  of  drill  and  camp  police  as  some  of 
German  birth,  and  I  had  warned  them  that  they  would 
feel  the  need  of  accuracy  and  mechanical  precision  when 
the  day  of  battle  came.  They  had  done  reasonably  well, 
but  suffered  in  comparison  with  some  of  the  others  on 
dress  parade  and  in  the  form  and  neatness  of  the  camp. 
When,  however,  on  the  slopes  of  South  Mountain  I  saw 
the  lines  go  forward  steadier  and  more  even  under  fire 
than  they  ever  had  done  at  drill,  their  intelligence  mak 
ing  them  perfectly  comprehend  the  advantage  of  unity  in 
their  effort  and  in  the  shock  when  they  met  the  foe  — 
when  their  bodies  seemed  to  dilate,  their  step  to  have 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  1025.  2  Id.,  p.  819. 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  287 

better  cadence  and  a  tread  as  of  giants  as  they  went 
cheering  up  the  hill,  —  I  took  back  all  my  criticisms  and 
felt  a  pride  and  glory  in  them  as  soldiers  and  comrades 
that  words  cannot  express. 

It  was  about  noon  that  the  lull  in  the  battle  occurred, 
and  it  lasted  a  couple  of  hours,  while  reinforcements 
were  approaching  the  mountain  top  from  both  sides. 
The  enemy's  artillery  kept  up  a  pretty  steady  fire,  an 
swered  occasionally  by  our  few  cannon;  but  the  infantry 
rested  on  their  arms,  the  front  covered  by  a  watchful 
line  of  skirmishers,  every  man  at  his  tree.  The  Confed 
erate  guns  had  so  perfectly  the  range  of  the  sloping  fields 
about  and  behind  us,  that  their  canister  shot  made  long 
furrows  in  the  sod  with  a  noise  like  the  cutting  of  a 
melon  rind,  and  the  shells  which  skimmed  the  crest  and 
burst  in  the  tree-tops  at  the  lower  side  of  the  fields  made 
a  sound  like  the  crashing  and  falling  of  some  brittle  sub 
stance,  instead  of  the  tough  fibre  of  oak  and  pine.  We 
had  time  to  notice  these  things  as  we  paced  the  lines 
waiting  for  the  renewal  of  the  battle. 

Willcox's  division  reported  to  me  about  two  o'clock, 
and  would  have  been  up  earlier,  but  for  a  mistake  in  the 
delivery  of  a  message  to  him.  He  had  sent  from  Mid- 
dletown  to  ask  me  where  I  desired  him  to  come,  and  find 
ing  that- the  messenger  had  no  clear  idea  of  the  roads  by 
which  he  had  travelled,  I  directed  him  to  say  that  Gen 
eral  Pleasonton  would  point  out  the  road  I  had  followed, 
if  inquired  of.  Willcox  understood  the  messenger  that  I 
wished  him  to  inquire  of  Pleasonton  where  he  had  better 
put  his  division  in,  and  on  doing  so,  the  latter  suggested 
that  he  move  against  the  crests  on  the  north  of  the 
National  road.  He  was  preparing  to  do  this  when  Burn- 
side  and  Reno  came  up  and  corrected  the  movement, 
recalling  him  from  the  north  and  sending  him  by  the  old 
Sharpsburg  road  to  my  position.  As  his  head  of  column 
came  up,  Longstreet's  corps  was  already  forming  with  its 


288          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

right  outflanking  my  left.  I  sent  two  regiments :  to  ex 
tend  my  left,  and  requested  Willcox  to  form  the  rest  of 
the  division  on  my  right  facing  the  summit.  He  was 
doing  this  when  he  received  an  order  from  General  Reno 
to  take  position  overlooking  the  National  road  facing 
northward.2  I  can  hardly  think  the  order  could  have 
been  intended  to  effect  this,  as  the  turnpike  is  deep  be 
tween  the  hills  there,  and  the  enemy  quite  distant  on  the 
other  side  of  the  gorge.  But  Willcox,  obeying  the  order 
as  he  received  it,  formed  along  the  Sharpsburg  road,  his 
left  next  to  my  right,  but  his  line  drawn  back  nearly  at 
right  angles  to  it.  He  placed  Cook's  battery  in  the 
angle,  and  this  opened  a  rapid  fire  on  one  of  the  enemy's 
which  was  on  the  bastion-like  hill  north  of  the  gorge 
already  mentioned.  Longstreet's  men  were  now  pretty 
well  up,  and  pushed  a  battery  forward  to  the  edge  of  the 
timber  beyond  Wise's  farm,  and  opened  upon  Willcox' s 
line,  enfilading  it  badly.  There  was  a  momentary  break 
there,  but  Willcox  was  able  to  check  the  confusion,  and 
to  reform  his  lines  facing  westward  as  I  had  originally 
directed;  Welch's  brigade  was  on  my  right,  closely  sup 
porting  Cook's  battery  and  Christ's  beyond  it.  The 
general  line  of  Willcox' s  division  was  at  the  eastern  edge 
of  the  wood  looking  into  the  open  ground  at  Fox's  Gap, 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Sharpsburg  road.  A  warm  skir 
mishing  fight  was  continued  along  the  whole  of  our  line, 
our  purpose  being  to  hold  fast  my  extreme  left  which  was 
well  advanced  upon  and  over  the  mountain  crest,  and  to 
swing  the  right  up  to  the  continuation  of  the  same  line 
of  hills  near  the  Mountain  House. 

At  nearly  four  o'clock  the  head  of   Sturgis's  column 
approached3     McClellan  had  arrived  on  the  field,  and  he 

1  In  my  official  report  I  said  one  regiment,  but  General  Willcox  reported 
that  he  sent  two,  and  he  is  doubtless  right.     For  his  official  report,  see 
O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  428. 

2  Ibid. 

8  Sturgis's  Report,  Id.,  pt.  i.  p.  443. 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  289 

with  Burnside  and  Reno  was  at  Pleasonton's  position  at 
the  knoll  in  the  valley,  and  from  that  point,  a  central 
one  in  the  midst  of  the  curving  hills,  they  issued  their 
orders.  They  could  see  the  firing  of  the  enemy's  battery 
from  the  woods  beyond  the  open  ground  in  front  of  Will- 
cox,  and  sent  orders  to  him  to  take  or  silence  those  guns 
at  all  hazards.  He  was  preparing  to  advance,  when  the 
Confederates  anticipated  him  (for  their  formation  had  now 
been  completed)  and  came  charging  out  of  the  woods 
across  the  open  fields.  It  was  part  of  their  general  ad 
vance  and  their  most  determined  effort  to  drive  us  from 
the  summit  we  had  gained  in  the  morning.  The  brigades 
of  Hood,  Whiting,  Drayton,  and  D.  R.  Jones  in  addition 
to  Hill's  division  (eight  brigades  in  all)  joined  in  the 
attack  on  our  side  of  the  National  road,  batteries  being 
put  in  every  available  position.1  The  fight  raged  fiercely 
along  the  whole  front,  but  the  bloodiest  struggle  was 
around  Wise's  house,  where  Dray  ton's  brigade  assaulted 
my  right  and  Willcox's  left,  coming  across  the  open 
ground.  Here  the  Sharpsburg  road  curves  around  the 
hill  held  by  us  so  that  for  a  little  way  it  was  parallel  to 
our  position.  As  the  enemy  came  down  the  hill  forming 
the  other  side  of  the  gap,  across  the  road  and  up  again  to 
our  line,  they  were  met  by  so  withering  a  fire  that  they 
were  checked  quickly,  and  even  drifted  more  to  the  right 
where  their  descent  was  continuous.  Here  Willcox's  line 
volleyed  into  them  a  destructive  fire,  followed  by  a  charge 
that  swept  them  in  confusion  back  along  the  road,  where 
the  men  of  the  Kanawha  division  took  up  the  attack  and 
completed  their  rout.  Willcox  succeeded  in  getting  a 
foothold  on  the  further  side  of  the  open  ground  and  driv 
ing  off  the  artillery  which  was  there.  Along  our  centre 
and  left  where  the  forest  was  thick,  the  enemy  was  equally 
repulsed,  but  the  cover  of  the  timber  enabled  them  to 
keep  a  footing  near  by,  whilst  they  continually  tried  to 

1  Longstreet's  Report,  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  839. 
VOL.  i. — 19 


2QO          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

extend  so  as  to  outflank  us,  moving  their  troops  along  a 
road  which  goes  diagonally  down  that  side  of  the  moun 
tain  from  Turner's  Gap  to  Rohrersville.  The  batteries 
on  the  north  of  the  National  road  had  been  annoying  to 
Willcox's  men  as  they  advanced,  but  Sturgis  sent  forward 
Durell's  battery  from  his  division  as  soon  as  he  came  up, 
and  this  gave  special  attention  to  these  hostile  guns, 
diverting  their  fire  from  the  infantry.  Hooker's  men,  of 
the  First  Corps,  were  also  by  this  time  pushing  up  the 
mountain  on  that  side  of  the  turnpike,  and  we  were  not 
again  troubled  by  artillery  on  our  right  flank. 

It  was  nearly  five  o'clock  when  the  enemy  had  disap 
peared  in  the  woods  beyond  Fox's  Gap  and  Willcox 
could  reform  his  shattered  lines.  As  the  easiest  mode 
of  getting  Sturgis's  fresh  men  into  position,  Willcox 
made  room  on  his  left  for  Ferrero's  brigade  supported  by 
Nagle's,  doubling  also  his  lines  at  the  extreme  right. 
Rodman's  division,  the  last  of  the  corps,  now  began  to 
reach  the  summit,  and  as  the  report  came  from  the  ex 
treme  left  that  the  enemy  was  stretching  beyond  our 
flank,  I  sent  Fairchild's  brigade  to  assist  our  men  there, 
whilst  Rodman  took  Harland's  to  the  support  of  Willcox. 
A  staff  officer  now  brought  word  that  McClellan  directed 
the  whole  line  to  advance.  At  the  left  this  could  only 
mean  to  clear  our  front  decisively  of  the  enemy  there, 
for  the  slopes  went  steadily  down  to  the  Rohrersville 
road.  At  the  centre  and  right,  whilst  we  held  Fox's 
Gap,  the  high  and  rocky  summit  at  the  Mountain  House 
was  still  in  the  enemy's  possession.  The  order  came  to 
me  as  senior  officer  upon  the  line,  and  the  signal  was 
given.  On  the  left  Longstreet's  men  were  pushed  down 
the  mountain  side  beyond  the  Rohrersville  and  Sharps- 
burg  roads,  and  the  contest  there  was  ended.  The  two 
hills  between  the  latter  road  and  the  turnpike  were  still 
held  by  the  enemy,  and  the  further  one  could  not  be 
reached  till  the  Mountain  House  should  be  in  our  hands. 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  291 

Sturgis  and  Willcox,  supported  by  Rodman,  again  pushed 
forward,  but  whilst  they  made  progress  they  were  baffled 
by  a  stubborn  and  concentrated  resistance. 

Reno  had  followed  Rodman's  division  up  the  mountain, 
and  came  to  me  a  little  before  sunset,  anxious  to  know 
why  the  right  could  not  get  forward  quite  to  the  summit. 
I  explained  that  the  ground  there  was  very  rough  and 
rocky,  a  fortress  in  itself  and  evidently  very  strongly 
held.  He  passed  on  to  Sturgis,  and  it  seemed  to  me  he 
was  hardly  gone  before  he  was  brought  back  upon  a 
stretcher,  dead.  He  had  gone  to  the  skirmish  line  to 
examine  for  himself  the  situation,  and  had  been  shot 
down  by  the  enemy  posted  among  the  rocks  and  trees. 
There  was  more  or  less  firing  on  that  part  of  the  field  till 
late  in  the  evening,  but  when  morning  dawned  the  Con 
federates  had  abandoned  the  last  foothold  above  Turner's 
Gap  and  retreated  by  way  of  Boonsboro  to  Sharpsburg. 
The  casualties  in  the  Ninth  Corps  had  been  889,  of 
which  356  were  in  the  Kanawha  division.  Some  600  of 
the  enemy  were  captured  by  my  division  and  sent  to  the 
rear  under  guard. 

On  the  north  of  the  National  road  the  First  Corps  under 
Hooker  had  been  opposed  by  one  of  Hill's  brigades  and 
four  of  Longstreet's,  and  had  gradually  worked  its  way 
along  the  old  Hagerstown  road,  crowning  the  heights  in 
that  direction  after  dark  in  the  evening.  Gibbon's  bri 
gade  had  also  advanced  in  the  National  road,  crowding 
up  quite  close  to  Turner's  Gap  and  engaging  the  enemy 
in  a  lively  combat.  It  is  not  my  purpose  to  give  a  de 
tailed  history  of  events  which  did  not  come  under  my 
own  eye.  It  is  due  to  General  Burnside,  however,  to 
note  Hooker's  conduct  toward  his  immediate  superior  and 
his  characteristic  efforts  to  grasp  all  the  glory  of  the 
battle  at  the  expense  of  truth  and  of  honorable  dealing 
with  his  commander  and  his  comrades.  Hooker's  offi 
cial  report  for  the  battle  of  South  Mountain  was  dated  at 


2Q2          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Washington,  November  i/th,  when  Burns ide  was  in  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  when  the  in 
trigues  of  the  former  to  obtain  the  command  for  himself 
were  notorious  and  near  their  final  success.  In  it  he 
studiously  avoided  any  recognition  of  orders  or  directions 
received  from  Burnside,  and  ignores  his  staff,  whilst  he 
assumes  that  his  orders  came  directly  from  McClellan 
and  compliments  the  staff  officers  of  the  latter,  as  if  they 
had  been  the  only  means  of  communication.  This  was 
not  only  insolent  but  a  military  offence,  had  Burnside 
chosen  to  prosecute  it.  He  also  asserts  that  the  troops 
on  our  part  of  the  line  had  been  defeated  and  were  at  the 
turnpike  at  the  base  of  the  mountain  in  retreat  when  he 
went  forward.  At  the  close  of  his  report,  after  declaring 
that  "the  forcing  of  the  passage  of  South  Mountain  will 
be  classed  among  the  most  brilliant  and  satisfactory 
achievements  of  this  army,"  he  adds,  "its  principal 
glory  will  be  awarded  to  the  First  Corps."1 

Nothing  is  more  justly  odious  in  military  conduct  than 
embodying  slanders  against  other  commands  in  an  official 
report.  It  puts  into  the  official  records  misrepresenta 
tions  which  cannot  be  met  because  they  are  unknown, 
and  it  is  a  mere  accident  if  those  who  know  the  truth  are 
able  to  neutralize  their  effect.  In  most  cases  it  will  be 
too  late  to  counteract  the  mischief  when  those  most  in 
terested  learn  of  the  slanders.  All  this  is  well  illus 
trated  in  the  present  case.  Hooker's  report  got  on  file 
months  after  the  battle,  and  it  was  not  till  the  January 
following  that  Burnside  gave  it  his  attention.  I  believe 
that  none  of  the  division  commanders  of  the  Ninth  Corps 
learned  of  it  till  long  afterward.  I  certainly  did  not  till 
1887,  a  quarter  of  a  century  after  the  battle,  when  the 
volume  of  the  official  records  containing  it  was  published. 
Burnside  had  asked  to  be  relieved  of  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  after  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  214-215. 


SOUTH  MOUNTAIN  293 

unless  Hooker  among  others  was  punished  for  insubordi 
nation.  As  in  the  preceding  August,  the  popular  senti 
ment  of  that  army  as  an  organization  was  again,  in  Mr. 
Lincoln's  estimation,  too  potent  a  factor  to  be  opposed, 
and  the  result  was  the  superseding  of  Burnside  by  Hooker 
himself,  though  the  President  declared  in  the  letter 
accompanying  the  appointment  that  the  latter' s  conduct 
had  been  blameworthy.  It  was  under  these  circum 
stances  that  Burnside  learned  of  the  false  statements  in 
Hooker's  report  of  South  Mountain,  and  put  upon  file 
his  stinging  response  to  it.  His  explicit  statement  of 
the  facts  will  settle  that  question  among  all  who  know 
the  reputation  of  the  men,  and  though  unprincipled  am 
bition  was  for  a  time  successful,  that  time  was  so  short 
and  things  were  "  set  even  "  so  soon  that  the  ultimate 
result  is  one  that  lovers  of  justice  may  find  comfort  in.1 

1  The  text  of  Burnside's  supplemental  report  is  as  follows  :  — 

"  When  I  sent  in  my  report  of  the  part  taken  by  my  command  in  the 
battle  of  South  Mountain,  General  Hooker,  who  commanded  one  of  the 
corps  of  my  command  (the  right  wing),  had  not  sent  in  his  report,  but  it  has 
since  been  sent  to  me.  I  at  first  determined  to  pass  over  its  inaccuracies  as 
harmless,  or  rather  as  harming  only  their  author ;  but  upon  reflection  I  have 
felt  it  my  duty  to  notice  two  gross  misstatements  made  with  reference  to  the 
commands  of  Generals  Reno  and  Cox,  the  former  officer  having  been  killed 
on  that  day,  and  the  latter  now  removed  with  his  command  to  the  West. 

"  General  Hooker  says  that  as  he  came  up  to  the  front,  Cox's  corps  was 
retiring  from  the  contest.  This  is  untrue.  General  Cox  did  not  command 
a  corps,  but  a  division  ;  and  that  division  was  in  action,  fighting  most  gal 
lantly,  long  before  General  Hooker  came  up,  and  remained  in  the  action  all 
day,  never  leaving  the  field  for  one  moment.  He  also  says  that  he  discovered 
that  the  attack  by  General  Reno's  corps  was  without  sequence.  This  is  also 
untrue,  and  when  said  of  an  officer  who  so  nobly  fought  and  died  on  that 
same  field,  it  partakes  of  something  worse  than  untruthfulness.  Every  offi 
cer  present  who  knew  anything  of  the  battle  knows  that  Reno  performed  a 
most  important  part  in  the  battle,  his  corps  driving  the  enemy  from  the 
heights  on  one  side  of  the  main  pike,  whilst  that  of  General  Hooker  drove 
them  from  the  heights  on  the  other  side. 

"  General  Hooker  should  remember  that  I  had  to  order  him  four  separate 
times  to  move  his  command  into  action,  and  that  I  had  to  myself  order  his 
leading  division  (Meade's)  to  start  before  he  would  go."  O.  R.,  vol.  xix. 
pt.  i.  p.  422. 


294          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

The  men  of  the  First  Corps  and  its  officers  did  their  duty 
nobly  on  that  as  on  many  another  field,  and  the  only  spot 
on  the  honor  of  the  day  is  made  by  the  personal  unscru- 
pulousness  and  vainglory  of  its  commander. 

Franklin's  corps  had  attacked  and  carried  the  ridge 
about  five  miles  further  south,  at  Crampton's  Gap,  where 
the  pass  had  been  so  stubbornly  defended  by  Mahone's 
and  Cobb's  brigades  with  artillery  and  a  detachment  of 
Hampton's  cavalry  as  to  cause  considerable  loss  to  our 
troops.  The  principal  fighting  was  at  a  stone  wall  near 
the  eastern  base  of  the  mountain,  and  when  the  enemy 
was  routed  from  this  position,  he  made  no  successful  rally 
and  the  summit  was  gained  without  much  more  fighting. 
The  attack  at  the  stone  wall  not  far  from  Burkettsville 
was  made  at  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The 
Sixth  Corps  rested  upon  the  summit  at  night. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

ANTIETAM:     PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS 

Lee's  plan  of  invasion  —  Changed  by  McClellan's  advance  —  The  position 
at  Sharpsburg  —  Our  routes  of  march  —  At  the  Antietam  —  McClellan 
reconnoitring  —  Lee  striving  to  concentrate  —  Our  delays  —  Tuesday's 
quiet  —  Hooker's  evening  march  —  The  Ninth  Corps  command  —  Chang 
ing  our  positions —  McClellan's  plan  of  battle  —  Hooker's  evening  skir 
mish  —  Mansfield  goes  to  support  Hooker  —  Confederate  positions  — 
Jackson  arrives  —  McLaws  and  Walker  reach  the  field  —  Their  places. 

BEFORE  morning  on  the  I5th  of  September  it  be 
came  evident  that  Lee  had  used  the  night  in  with 
drawing  his  army.  An  advance  of  the  pickets  at  daybreak 
confirmed  this,  and  Pleasonton's  cavalry  was  pushed  for 
ward  to  Boonsboro,  where  they  had  a  brisk  skirmish  with 
the  enemy's  rear-guard.  At  Boonsboro  a  turnpike  to 
Sharpsburg  leaves  the  National  road,  and  the  retreat  of 
the  Confederate  cavalry,  as  well  as  other  indications, 
pointed  out  the  Sharpsburg  road  as  the  line  of  Lee's 
retreat.  He  had  abandoned  his  plan  of  moving  further 
northward,  and  had  chosen  a  line  bringing  him  into  surer 
communication  with  Jackson.  His  movements  before  the 
battle  of  South  Mountain  revealed  a  purpose  of  invasion 
identical  with  that  which  he  tried  to  carry  out  in  1863 
in  the  Gettysburg  campaign.  Longstreet,  with  two  divi 
sions  and  a  brigade  (D.  R.  Jones,  Hood,  and  Evans),  had 
advanced  to  Hagerstown,  and  it  seems  that  a  large  part  of 
the  Confederate  trains  reached  there  also.  D.  H.  Hill's 
division  held  Boonsboro  and  the  passes  of  South  Moun 
tain  at  Turner's  and  Fox's  Gaps.  McLaws  invested 
our  fortifications  on  Maryland  Heights,  supported  by 


296          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

R.  H.  Anderson's  division.  Jackson,  with  four  divi 
sions  (A.  P.  Hill,  Ewell,  and  Starke  of  his  own  corps, 
with  Walker  temporarily  reporting  to  him),  was  besieg 
ing  Harper's  Ferry. 

On  Saturday,  the  I3th,  Lee  determined  to  draw  back 
Longstreet  from  his  advanced  position,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  Jackson  had  not  yet  reduced  Harper's  Ferry 
and  that  McClellan  was  marching  to  its  relief.  Long- 
street's  divisions  therefore  approached  Boonsboro  so  as 
to  support  D.  H.  Hill,  and  thus  it  happened  that  they 
took  part  in  the  battle  of  South  Mountain.  Hill  again 
occupied  the  summit  where  we  found  him  on  the  I4th. 
From  all  this  it  is  very  plain  that  if  McClellan  had  has 
tened  his  advance  on  the  I3th,  the  passes  of  South  Moun 
tain  at  Turner's  and  Fox's  gaps  would  not  have  been 
occupied  in  force  by  the  enemy,  and  the  condition  of 
things  would  have  been  what  he  believed  it  was  on  the 
morning  of  the  I4th,  when  a  single  brigade  had  been 
thought  enough  to  support  Pleasonton's  reconnoissance. 
Twenty-four  hours  had  changed  all  that. 

The  turnpike  from  Boonsboro  to  Sharpsburg  continues 
southward  a  couple  of  miles,  crossing  the  Potomac  to 
Shepherdstown,  which  lies  on  the  Virginia  side  of  the 
river.  A  bridge  which  formerly  carried  the  road  over 
the  stream  had  been  burned;  but  not  far  below  the 
ruined  piers  was  a  ford,  which  was  a  pretty  good  one  in 
the  present  stage  of  water.  Shepherdstown  was  the  natu 
ral  place  of  junction  for  Lee  and  Jackson;  but  for  Lee 
to  have  marched  there  at  once  would  have  exposed  Jack 
son  to  attack  from  the  northern  side  of  the  Potomac. 
The  precious  stores  and  supplies  captured  at  Harper's 
Ferry  must  be  got  to  a  place  of  safety,  and  this  was 
likely  to  delay  Jackson  a  day  or  two.  Lee  therefore 
ordered  McLaws  to  obstruct  Franklin's  movement  as 
much  as  he  could,  whilst  he  himself  concentrated  the 
rest  of  Longstreet 's  corps  at  Sharpsburg,  behind  the 


ANTIETAM:    PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS       297 

Antietam.  If  McClellan's  force  should  prove  over 
whelming,  the  past  experience  of  the  Confederate  general 
encouraged  him  to  believe  that  our  advance  would  not  be 
so  enterprising  that  he  could  not  make  a  safe  retreat  into 
Virginia.  He  resolved  therefore  to  halt  at  Sharpsburg, 
which  offered  an  excellent  field  for  a  defensive  battle, 
leaving  himself  free  to  resume  his  aggressive  campaign 
or  to  retreat  into  Virginia  according  to  the  result. 

McClellan  had  ordered  Richardson's  division  of  the 
Second  Corps  to  support  the  cavalry  in  the  advance,  and 
Hooker's  corps  followed  Richardson.1  It  would  seem 
most  natural  that  the  whole  of  Sumner's  wing  should 
take  the  advance  on  the  i$th,  though  the  breaking  up  of 
organizations  was  so  much  a  habit  with  McClellan  that 
perhaps  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  one  of  Sumner's 
divisions  was  thus  separated  from  the  rest,  and  that 
Burnside's  right  wing  was  also  divided.2  The  Ninth 
Corps  was  ordered  to  follow  the  old  Sharpsburg  road 
through  Fox's  Gap,  our  line  of  march  being  thus  parallel 
to  the  others  till  we  should  reach  the  road  from  Boons- 
boro  to  Sharpsburg. 

But  we  were  not  put  in  motion  early  in  the  day.  We 
were  ordered  first  to  bury  the  dead,  and  to  send  the 
wounded  and  prisoners  to  Middletown  It  was  nearly 
noon  when  we  got  orders  to  march,  and  when  the  head 
of  column  filed  into  the  road,  the  way  was  blocked  by 
Porter's  corps,  which  was  moving  to  the  front  by  the 
same  road.  As  soon  as  the  way  was  clear,  we  followed, 
leaving  a  small  detachment  to  complete  the  other  tasks 
which  had  been  assigned  us.  In  the  wooded  slope  of 
the  mountain  west  of  the  gap,  a  good  many  of  the  Con 
federate  dead  still  lay  where  they  had  fallen  in  the  fierce 

1  Hooker's  Report,  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  216. 

8  We  must  not  forget  the  fact,  however,  that  the  order  dividing  the  army 
into  wings  was  suspended  on  that  morning,  and  that  this  gives  to  the  inci 
dent  the  air  of  an  intentional  reduction  of  the  wing  commanders  to  the  con 
trol  of  a  single  corps.  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  297. 


298          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

combats  for  the  possession  of  the  crest  near  Wise's 
house.  Our  road  led  through  a  little  hamlet  called 
Springvale,  and  thence  to  another,  Porterstown,  near  the 
left  bank  of  the  Antietam,  where  it  runs  into  the  Boons- 
boro  and  Sharpsburg  turnpike.  Sumner's  two  corps  had 
taken  temporary  position  on  either  side  of  the  turnpike, 
behind  the  line  of  hills  which  there  borders  the  stream. 
Porter's  corps  was  massed  in  rear  of  Sumner,  and 
Hooker's  had  been  moved  off  to  the  right,  around 
Keedysville.  I  was  with  the  Kanawha  division,  assum 
ing  that  my  temporary  command  of  the  corps  ended  with 
the  battle  on  the  mountain.  As  we  came  up  in  rear  of 
the  troops  already  assembled,  we  received  orders  to  turn 
off  the  road  to  the  left,  and  halted  our  battalions  closed 
in  mass.  It  was  now  about  three  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon.  McClellan,  as  it  seemed,  had  just  reached  the 
field,  and  was  surrounded  by  a  group  of  his  principal 
officers,  most  of  whom  I  had  never  seen  before.  I  rode 
up  with  General  Burnside,  dismounted,  and  was  very 
cordially  greeted  by  General  McClellan.  He  and  Burn- 
side  were  evidently  on  terms  of  most  intimate  friendship 
and  familiarity.  He  introduced  me  to  the  officers  I  had 
not  known  before,  referring  pleasantly  to  my  service 
with  him  in  Ohio  and  West  Virginia,  putting  me  upon 
an  easy  footing  with  them  in  a  very  agreeable  and  genial 
way. 

We  walked  up  the  slope  of  the  ridge  before  us,  and 
looking  westward  from  its  crest,  the  whole  field  of  the 
coming  battle  was  before  us.  Immediately  in  front  the 
Antietam  wound  through  the  hollow,  the  hills  rising 
gently  on  both  sides.  In  the  background,  on  our  left, 
was  the  village  of  Sharpsburg,  with  fields  enclosed  by 
stone  fences  in  front  of  it.  At  its  right  was  a  bit  of 
wood  (since  known  as  the  West  Wood),  with  the  little 
Dunker  Church  standing  out  white  and  sharp  against  it. 
Farther  to  the  right  and  left,  the  scene  was  closed  in  by 


ANTIETAM:    PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS       299 


;  i  f^"»3iP*Vfpg 


300          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

wooded  ridges  with  open  farm  lands  between,  the  whole 
making  as  pleasing  and  prosperous  a  landscape  as  can 
easily  be  imagined. 

We  made  a  large  group  as  we  stood  upon  the  hill,  and 
it  was  not  long  before  we  attracted  the  enemy's  atten 
tion.  A  puff  of  white  smoke  from  a  knoll  on  the  right 
of  the  Sharpsburg  road  was  followed  by  the  screaming  of 
a  shell  over  our  heads.  McClellan  directed  that  all  but 
one  or  two  should  retire  behind  the  ridge,  while  he  con 
tinued  the  reconnoissance,  walking  slowly  to  the  right. 
I  think  Fitz-John  Porter  was  the  only  general  officer  who 
was  retained  as  a  companion  in  this  walk.  I  noted  with 
satisfaction  the  cool  and  business-like  air  with  which 
McClellan  made  his  examination  under  fire.  The  Con 
federate  artillery  was  answered  by  a  battery  of  ours,  and 
a  lively  cannonade  ensued  on  both  sides,  though  with 
out  any  noticeable  effect.  The  enemy's  position  was 
revealed,  and  he  was  evidently  in  force  on  both  sides  of 
the  turnpike  in  front  of  Sharpsburg,  covered  by  the 
undulations  of  the  rolling  ground  which  hid  his  infantry 
from  our  sight. 

The  examination  of  the  enemy's  position  and  the  dis 
cussion  of  it  continued  till  near  the  close  of  the  day. 
Orders  were  then  given  for  the  Ninth  Corps  to  move  to 
the  left,  keeping  off  the  road,  which  was  occupied  by 
other  troops.  We  moved  through  fields  and  farm  lands, 
an  hour's  march  in  the  dusk  of  evening,  going  into 
bivouac  about  a  mile  south  of  the  Sharpsburg  bridge,  and 
in  rear  of  the  hills  bordering  the  Antietam. 

The  village  of  Sharpsburg  is  in  the  midst  of  a  plateau 
which  is  almost  enclosed  by  the  Potomac  River  and  the 
Antietam.  The  Potomac  bounds  it  on  the  south  and 
west,  and  the  Antietam  on  the  east.  The  plateau  in 
general  outline  may  be  considered  a  parallelogram,  four 
miles  in  length  from  north  to  south,  and  two  and  a  half 
miles  in  width  inside  the  bends  of  the  river.  The 


ANTIETAM:   PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS      301 

northern  side  of  this  terrain  appears  the  narrowest,  for 
here  the  river  curves  sharply  away  to  the  west,  nearly 
doubling  the  width  of  the  field  above  and  below  the 
bend.  From  the  village  the  ground  descends  in  all 
directions,  though  a  continuous  ridge  runs  northward,  on 
which  is  the  Hagerstown  turnpike.  The  Boonsboro  turn 
pike  enters  the  village  from  the  northeast,  crossing  the 
Antietam  on  a  stone  bridge,  and  continuing  through 
Sharpsburg  to  the  southwest,  reaches  Shepherdstown  by 
the  ford  of  the  Potomac  already  mentioned.  The  Hagers 
town  turnpike  enters  the  town  from  the  north,  passing 
the  Dunker  Church  a  mile  out,  and  goes  nearly  due 
south,  crossing  the  Antietam  at  its  mouth,  and  continu 
ing  down  the  Potomac  toward  Harper's  Ferry. 

The  Antietam  is  a  deep  creek,  with  few  fords  at  an 
ordinary  stage  of  water,  and  the  principal  roads  cross  it 
upon  stone  bridges.  Of  these  there  were  three  within 
the  field  of  battle;  the  upper  one  in  front  of  Keedysville, 
the  middle  one  upon  the  Boonsboro  turnpike,  and  the 
lower  one  on  the  Sharpsburg  and  Rohrersville  road,  since 
known  as  Burnside's  bridge.  McClellan's  staff  was 
better  supplied  with  officers  of  engineers  than  the  staff 
of  most  of  our  separate  armies,  and  Captain  Duane,  his 
chief  engineer,  systematized  the  work  of  gathering  topo 
graphical  information.  This  was  communicated  to  the 
general  officers  in  connection  with  the  orders  which  were 
given  them.  In  this  way  we  were  instructed  that  the 
only  fords  of  the  Antietam  passable  at  that  time  were 
one  between  the  two  upper  bridges  named,  and  another 
about  half  a  mile  below  Burnside's  bridge,  in  a  deep 
bend  of  the  stream.  We  found,  however,  during  the 
engagement  of  the  i/th,  another  practicable  crossing  for 
infantry  a  short  distance  above  the  bridge.  This  was 
not  a  ford  in  common  use,  but  in  the  low  stage  of  water 
at  the  time  it  was  made  available  for  a  small  force. 

It  was  about  noon  of  the  i$th  of  September  that  Lee 


302  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

placed  the  forces  which  he  had  in  hand  across  the  turn 
pike  in  front  of  Sharpsburg.  D.  H.  Hill's  division  was 
on  the  north  of  the  road,  and  on  the  south  of  it  Long- 
street's  own  old  division  (now  under  General  D.  R. 
Jones),  Hood's  division,  and  Evans's  independent  bri 
gade.  Stuart's  cavalry  and  the  reserve  artillery  were 
also  present.  The  rest  of  the  army  was  with  Jackson  at 
Harper's  Ferry,  or  co-operating  with  him  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Maryland  Heights.  Out  of  forty-four  bri 
gades,  Lee  could  put  but  fourteen  or  fifteen  in  line  that 
day  to  oppose  McClellan.  He  was  very  strong  in  artil 
lery,  however,  and  his  cannon  looked  grimly  over  the 
hill-crests  behind  which  his  infantry  were  lying.  Cutts's 
and  Jones's  battalions  of  the  reserve  artillery  were 
ordered  to  report  to  Hill  for  the  protection  of  the  left 
of  the  Confederate  line,  and  gave  him  in  all  the  sixty  or 
seventy  guns  which  he  speaks  of  in  his  report,  and  which 
have  puzzled  several  writers  who  have  described  the 
battle.  Whenever  our  troops  showed  themselves  as  they 
marched  into  position,  they  were  saluted  from  shotted 
cannon,  and  the  numerous  batteries  that  were  developed 
on  the  long  line  of  hills  before  us  no  doubt  did  much  to 
impress  McClellan  with  the  belief  that  he  had  the  great 
bulk  of  Lee's  army  before  him. 

The  value  of  time  was  one  of  the  things  McClellan 
never  understood.  He  should  have  been  among  the  first 
in  the  saddle  at  every  step  in  the  campaign  after  he 
was  in  possession  of  Lee's  order  of  the  Qth,  and  should 
have  infused  energy  into  every  unit  in  his  army.  Instead 
of  making  his  reconnoissance  at  three  in  the  afternoon  of 
Monday,  it  might  have  been  made  at  ten  in  the  morning, 
and  the  battle  could  have  been  fought  before  night,  if, 
indeed,  Lee  had  not  promptly  retreated  when  support 
from  Jackson  would  thus  have  become  impossible.  Or 
if  McClellan  had  pushed  boldly  for  the  bridge  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Antietam,  nothing  but  a  precipitate  retreat 


ANTIETAM:    PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS      303 

by  Lee  could  have  prevented  the  interposition  of  the 
whole  National  army  between  the  separated  wings  of 
the  Confederates.  The  opportunity  was  still  supremely 
favorable  for  McClellan,  but  prompt  decision  was  not 
easy  for  him.  Nothing  but  reconnoitring  was  done  on 
Monday  afternoon  or  on  Tuesday,  whilst  Lee  was  strain 
ing  every  nerve  to  concentrate  his  forces  and  to  correct 
what  would  have  proven  a  fatal  blunder  in  scattering 
them,  had  his  opponent  acted  with  vigor.  The  strongest 
defence  the  eulogists  of  the  Confederate  general  have 
made  for  him  is  that  he  perfectly  understood  McClellan's 
caution  and  calculated  with  confidence  upon  it;  that  he 
would  have  been  at  liberty  to  perfect  his  combinations 
still  more  at  leisure,  but  for  the  accident  by  which  the 
copy  of  his  plan  had  fallen  into  our  hands  at  Frederick 
City. 

During  the  i6th  we  confidently  expected  a  battle,  and 
I  kept  with  my  division.  In  the  afternoon  I  saw  General 
Burnside,  and  learned  from  him  that  McClellan  had 
determined  to  let  Hooker  make  a  movement  on  our 
extreme  right  to  turn  Lee's  position.  Burnside's  man 
ner  in  speaking  of  this  implied  that  he  thought  it  was 
done  at  Hooker's  solicitation,  and  through  his  desire, 
openly  evinced,  to  be  independent  in  command.  I  urged 
Burnside  to  assume  the  immediate  command  of  the  corps 
and  allow  me  to  lead  my  own  division.  He  objected 
that  as  he  had  been  announced  as  commander  of  the 
right  wing  of  the  army,  composed  of  the  two  corps,  he 
was  unwilling  to  waive  his  precedence  or  to  assume  that 
Hooker  was  detached  for  anything  more  than  a  tempo 
rary  purpose.  I  pointed  out  that  Reno's  staff  had  been 
granted  leave  of  absence  to  take  the  body  of  their  chief 
to  Washington,  and  that  my  division  staff  was  too  small 
for  corps  duty ;  but  he  met  this  by  saying  that  he  would 
use  his  staff  for  this  purpose,  and  help  me  in  every  way 
he  could  till  the  crisis  of  the  campaign  should  be  over. 


304          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

Sympathizing  with  his  very  natural  feeling,  I  ceased 
objecting,  and  accepted  with  as  good  grace  as  I  could 
the  unsatisfactory  position  of  nominal  commander  of  the 
corps  to  which  I  was  a  comparative  stranger,  and  which, 
under  the  circumstances,  naturally  looked  to  him  as  its 
accustomed  and  real  commander.  Burnside's  intentions 
in  respect  to  myself  were  thoroughly  friendly,  as  he 
afterward  proved,  and  I  had  no  ground  for  complaint 
on  this  score;  but  the  position  of  second  in  command 
is  always  an  awkward  and  anomalous  one,  and  such  I 
felt  it. 

The  i6th  passed  without  serious  fighting,  though  we 
had  desultory  cannonading  and  picket  firing.  It  was 
hard  to  restrain  our  men  from  showing  themselves  on  the 
crest  of  the  long  ridge  in  front  of  us,  and  whenever  they 
did  so  they  drew  the  fire  from  some  of  the  enemy's  bat 
teries,  to  which  ours  would  respond.  McClellan  recon 
noitred  the  line  of  the  Antietam  near  us,  and  the  country 
immediately  on  our  left,  down  the  valley.  As  the  result 
of  this  we  were  ordered  to  change  our  positions  at  night 
fall,  staff  officers  being  sent  to  guide  each  division  to 
its  new  camp.  The  selected  positions  were  marked  by 
McClellan's  engineers,  who  then  took  members  of  Burn- 
side's  staff  to  identify  the  locations,  and  these  in  turn 
conducted  our  divisions.  There  was  far  more  routine  of 
this  sort  in  that  army  than  I  ever  saw  elsewhere.  Corps 
and  division  commanders  should  have  the  responsibility 
of  protecting  their  own  flanks  and  in  choosing  ordinary 
camps.  To  depend  upon  the  general  staff  for  this  is  to 
take  away  the  vigor  and  spontaneity  of  the  subordinate 
and  make  him  perform  his  duty  in  a  mechanical  way. 
He  should  be  told  what  is  known  of  the  enemy  and  his 
movements  so  as  to  be  put  upon  his  guard,  and  should 
then  have  freedom  of  judgment  as  to  details.  The 
changes  made  were  as  follows :  Rodman's  division  went 
half  a  mile  further  to  the  left,  where  a  country  road  led 


ANTIETAM:    PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS       305 

to  the  Antietam  ford,  half  a  mile  below  the  Burnside 
bridge.  Sturgis's  division  was  placed  on  the  sides  of 
the  road  leading  to  the  stone  bridge  just  mentioned. 
Willcox's  was  put  in  reserve  in  rear  of  Sturgis.  My 
own  was  divided,  Scammon's  brigade  going  with  Rod 
man,  and  Crook's  going  with  Sturgis.  Crook  was  ordered 
to  take  the  advance  in  crossing  the  bridge  in  case  we 
should  be  ordered  to  attack.  This  selection  was  made 
by  Burnside  himself  as  a  compliment  to  the  division  for 
the  vigor  of  its  assault  at  South  Mountain.  While  we 
were  moving  we  heard  Hooker's  guns  far  off  on  the  right 
and  front,  and  the  cannonade  continued  an  hour  or  more 
after  it  became  dark. 

What,  then,  was  the  plan  of  battle  of  which  the  first 
step  was  this  movement  of  Hooker's?  McClellan's  dis 
positions  on  the  1 5th  were  made  whilst  Franklin's  corps 
was  still  absent,  and,  under  the  orders  he  received,  was 
likely  to  be  so  for  a  day  at  least.1  Sumner's  two  corps 
had  been  treated  as  the  centre  of  the  army  in  hand,  Burn- 
side's  had  been  divided  by  putting  Hooker  on  the  extreme 
right  and  the  Ninth  Corps  on  the  extreme  left,  and 
Porter's  corps  was  in  reserve.  This  looked  as  if  a  gen 
eral  attack  in  front  with  this  organization  of  the  army 
were  intended.  But  the  more  McClellan  examined  the 
enemy's  position  the  less  inclined  he  was  to  attack  the 
centre.  He  could  cross  the  bridge  there  and  on  the  right, 
and  deploy;  but  the  gentle  slopes  rising  toward  Sharps- 
burg  were  swept  by  formidable  batteries  and  offered  no 
cover  to  advancing  troops.  The  enemy's  infantry  was 
behind  stone  fences  and  in  sunken  roads,  whilst  ours 
must  advance  over  the  open.  Lee's  right  rested  upon 
the  wooded  bluffs  above  the  Burnside  bridge,  where  it 
could  only  be  approached  by  a  small  head  of  column 
charging  along  the  narrow  roadway  under  a  concentrated 
fire  of  cannon  and  small  arms.  No  point  of  attack  on 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  29. 

VOL.  I.  —  20 


306          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  whole  field  was  so  unpromising  as  this.  Then,  as 
Jackson  was  still  at  Harper's  Ferry,  there  was  the  con 
tingency  of  an  attack  in  rear  if  anything  less  than  the 
mass  of  our  army  were  pushed  beyond  Lee's  right. 

On  our  right,  in  front  of  Hooker,  it  was  easy  to  turn 
the  Confederate  line.  The  road  from  Keedysville  through 
Smoketown  to  the  Hagerstown  turnpike  crossed  the 
Antietam  in  a  hollow,  out  of  the  line  of  fire,  and  a  march 
around  Lee's  left  flank  could  be  made  almost  wholly 
under  cover.  The  topography  of  the  field  therefore  sug 
gested  a  flank  attack  from  our  right,  if  the  National  com 
mander  rejected  the  better  strategy  of  interposing  his 
army  between  Lee  and  Jackson  as  too  daring  a  move 
ment.  This  flank  attack  McClellan  determined  to  make, 
and  some  time  after  noon  of  the  i6th  issued  his  orders 
accordingly.  In  his  preliminary  report  of  the  battle, 
made  before  he  was  relieved  from  command,  McClellan 
says : — 

"The  design  was  to  make  the  main  attack  upon  the  enemy's 
left,  —  at  least  to  create  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the  main  attack, 
with  the  hope  of  something  more,  by  assailing  the  enemy's  right,  — 
and  as  soon  as  one  or  both  of  the  flank  movements  were  fully 
successful,  to  attack  their  centre  with  any  reserve  I  might  then 
have  in  hand." l 

His  report  covering  his  whole  career  in  the  war,  dated 
August  4,  1863  (and  published  February,  1864,  after 
warm  controversies  had  arisen,  and  he  had  become  a 
political  character),  modifies  the  above  statement  in  some 
important  particulars.  It  says  :  — 

"  My  plan  for  the  impending  general  engagement  was  to  attack 
the  enemy's  left  with  the  corps  of  Hooker  and  Mansfield  supported 
by  Sumner's  and  if  necessary  by  Franklin's,  and  as  soon  as  matters 
looked  favorably  there,  to  move  the  corps  of  Burnside  against  the 
enemy's  extreme  right  upon  the  ridge  running  to  the  south  and 

1  O  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  30. 


ANTIETAM:    PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS      307 

rear  of  Sharpsburg,  and  having  carried  their  position  to  press  along 
the  crest  toward  our  right,  and  whenever  either  of  these  flank 
movements  should  be  successful,  to  advance  our  centre  with  all 
the  forces  then  disposable."  x 

The  opinion  I  got  from  Burnside  at  the  time,  as  to  the 
part  the  Ninth  Corps  was  to  take,  was  fairly  consistent 
with  the  design  first  quoted,  namely,  that  when  the  attack 
by  Sumner,  Hooker,  and  Franklin  should  be  progressing 
favorably,  we  were  "to  create  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the 
main  attack,  with  the  hope  of  something  more."  It  is 
also  probable  that  Hooker's  movement  was  at  first  in 
tended  to  be  made  by  his  corps  alone,  the  attack  to  be 
taken  up  by  Sumner 's  two  corps  as  soon  as  Hooker 
began,  and  to  be  shared  in  by  Franklin  if  he  reached  the 
field  in  time,  thus  making  a  simultaneous  oblique  attack 
from  our  right  by  the  whole  army  except  Porter's  corps, 
which  was  in  reserve,  and  the  Ninth  Corps,  which  was  to 
create  the  "diversion  "  on  our  left  and  prevent  the  enemy 
from  stripping  his  right  to  reinforce  his  left.  It  is 
hardly  disputable  that  this  would  have  been  a  better  plan 
than  the  one  actually  carried  out.  Certainly  the  assump 
tion  that  the  Ninth  Corps  could  cross  the  Antietam  alone 
at  the  only  place  on  the  field  where  the  Confederates  had 
their  line  immediately  upon  the  stream  which  must  be 
crossed  under  fire  by  two  narrow  heads  of  column,  and 
could  then  turn  to  the  right  along  the  high  ground  occu 
pied  by  the  hostile  army  before  that  army  had  been 
broken  or  seriously  shaken  elsewhere,  is  one  which  would 
hardly  be  made  till  time  had  dimmed  the  remembrance 
of  the  actual  position  of  Lee's  divisions  upon  the  field. 
It  is  also  noticeable  that  the  plan  as  given  in  the  final 
report  leaves  no  "centre"  with  which  to  "advance" 
when  either  of  the  flank  movements  should  be  successful, 
Porter's  corps  in  reserve  being  the  only  one  not  included 
in  the  movement  as  described. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  55. 


308          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Further  evidence  that  the  plan  did  not  originally  in 
clude  the  wide  separation  of  two  corps  to  the  right  to 
make  the  extended  turning  movement  is  found  in  Hooker's 
incomplete  report,  and  in  the  wide  interval  in  time  be 
tween  the  marching  of  his  corps  and  that  of  Mansfield. 
Hooker  was  ordered  to  cross  the  Antietam  at  about 
two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  i6th  by  the  bridge  in 
front  of  Keedysville  and  the  ford  below  it.  He  says  that 
after  his  troops  were  over  and  in  march,  he  rode  back  to 
McClellan,  who  told  him  that  he  might  call  for  reinforce 
ments,  and  that  when  they  came  they  should  be  under 
his  command.  Somewhat  later  McClellan  rode  forward 
with  his  staff  to  observe  the  progress  making,  and 
Hooker  again  urged  the  necessity  of  reinforcements.1 
Yet  Sumner  did  not  receive  orders  to  send  Mansfield's 
corps  to  his  support  till  evening,  and  it  marched  only 
half  an  hour  before  midnight,2  reaching  its  bivouac, 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  in  rear  of  that  of  Hooker,  at 
2  A.M.  of  the  1 7th.3 

After  crossing  the  Antietam,  Hooker  had  shaped  his 
course  to  the  westward,  aiming  to  reach  the  ridge  on 
which  the  Hagerstown  turnpike  runs,  and  which  is  the 
dominant  feature  in  the  landscape.  This  ridge  is  about 
two  miles  distant  from  the  Antietam,  and  for  the  first 
mile  of  the  way  no  resistance  was  met.  However,  his 
progress  had  been  observed  by  the  enemy,  and  Hood's 
two  brigades  were  taken  from  the  centre  and  passed  to 
the  left  of  D.  H.  Hill.  Here  they  occupied  an  open 
wood  (since  known  as  the  East  Wood)  northeast  of  the 
Dunker  Church.  Hooker  was  now  trying  to  approach 
the  Confederate  positions,  Meade's  division  of  the  Penn 
sylvania  Reserves  being  in  the  advance.  A  sharp  skir 
mishing  combat  ensued,  and  artillery  was  brought  into 
action  on  both  sides.  I  have  mentioned  our  hearing  the 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  217.  2  Id.,  p.  275 

3  Id.,  p.  475. 


ANTIETAM:    PRELIMINARY  MOVEMENTS      309 

noise  of  this  engagement  from  the  other  extremity  of 
the  field  in  the  fading  light  of  evening.  On  our  side 
Seymour's  brigade  had  been  chiefly  engaged,  and  had 
felt  the  enemy  so  vigorously  that  Hood  supposed  he  had 
repulsed  a  serious  effort  to  take  the  wood.  Hooker  was, 
however,  aiming  to  pass  quite  beyond  the  flank,  and  kept 
his  other  divisions  north  of  the  hollow  beyond  the  wood, 
and  upon  the  ridge  which  reaches  the  turnpike  near  the 
largest  re-entrant  bend  of  the  Potomac,  which  is  only 
half  a  mile  distant.  Here  he  bivouacked  upon  the  slopes 
of  the  ridge,  Doubleday's  division  resting  with  its  right 
upon  the  turnpike,  Ricketts's  division  upon  the  left  of 
Doubleday,  and  Meade  covering  the  front  of  both  with 
the  skirmishers  of  Seymour's  brigade.  Between  Meade's 
skirmishers  and  the  ridge  were  the  farmhouse  and  barn 
of  J.  Poffenberger,  on  the  east  side  of  the  road,  where 
Hooker  made  his  own  quarters  for  the  night.  Half  a 
mile  further  in  front  was  the  farm  of  D.  R.  Miller,  the 
dwelling  on  the  east,  and  the  barn  surrounded  by  stacks 
on  the  west  of  the  road.1  Mansfield's  corps  (the 
Twelfth),  marching  as  it  did  late  in  the  night,  kept 
further  to  the  right  than  Hooker's,  but  moved  on  a  nearly 
parallel  course,  and  bivouacked  on  the  farm  of  another 
J.  Poffenberger,2  near  the  road  which,  branching  from 
the  Hagerstown  turnpike  at  the  Dunker  Church,  inter 
sects  the  one  running  from  Keedysville  through  Smoke- 
town  to  the  same  turnpike  about  a  mile  north  of  Hooker's 
position.3 

On  the  Confederate  side,  Hood's  division  had  been  so 
roughly  handled  that  it  was  replaced  by  two  brigades  of 

1  Hooker's  unfinished  report  says  he  slept  in  the  barn  of  D.  R.  Miller, 
but  he  places  it  on  the  east  of  the  road,  and  the  spot  is  fully  identified  as 
Poffenberger's  by  General  Gibbon,  who  commanded  the  right  brigade,  and 
by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Rufus  R.  Dawes,  Sixth  Wisconsin  (afterward  Brevet 
Brigadier-General),  both  of  whom  subsequently  visited  the  field  and  deter 
mined  the  positions. 

2  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp  275,  475.  8  See  map,  p.  299. 


310          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Ewell's  division  (commanded  by  Lawton),  which  with 
Jackson's  own  (commanded  by  J.  R.  Jones)  had  been  led 
to  the  field  from  Harper's  Ferry  by  Jackson,  reaching 
Sharpsburg  in  the  afternoon  of  the  i6th.  These  divi 
sions  were  formed  on  the  left  of  D.  H.  Hill,  and  in 
continuation  of  his  line  along  the  turnpike,  but  with  a 
brigade  advanced  to  the  East  Wood,  which  was  held  as  a 
salient.  Hood's  division,  on  being  relieved,  was  placed 
in  reserve  near  the  Dunker  Church,  and  spent  part  of 
the  night  in  cooking  rations,  of  which  its  supply  had 
been  short  for  a  day  or  two.1  The  combatants  on  both 
sides  slept  upon  their  arms,  well  knowing  that  the  dawn 
would  bring  bloody  work. 

During  the  evening  McClellan  issued  orders  looking 
toward  the  joining  of  a  general  engagement  at  daybreak. 
McLaws's  Confederate  division,  which  had  been  oppos 
ing  Franklin,  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Maryland  Heights, 
and  marched  by  way  of  Shepherdstown,  reaching  Sharps- 
burg  on  the  morning  of  the  i/th.2  Walker's  division, 
which  had  come  from  Harper's  Ferry  on  the  i6th,  ex 
tended  Lee's  right  down  the  Antietam,  covering  the  ford 
at  which  Rodman,  on  our  side,  was  expected  to  cross.3 
A.  P.  Hill's  division  was  the  only  force  of  the  enemy 
completing  the  work  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  Franklin 
was  ordered  to  leave  Couch's  division  to  observe  Hill's 
movements  from  our  side  of  the  Potomac,  and  to  bring 
the  remainder  of  his  corps  on  the  field  early  in  the  morn 
ing.4  In  the  respite  given  him  since  Sunday,  Lee  had 
therefore  concentrated  all  his  army  but  one  division,  and 
was  better  ready  for  the  battle  than  McClellan,  for 
Franklin's  corps  could  come  upon  the  field  only  after  a 
considerable  march,  and  he  did  not,  in  fact,  reach  it  till 
ten  o'clock  or  later.  Sumner  was  ordered  to  have  the 
Second  Corps  ready  to  march  an  hour  before  day,  but  he 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  923.  2  Id.,  pp.  855,  856. 

8  Id.,  p.  914.  *  Id.,  p.  376. 


ANTIETAM:    PRELIMINARY  MO VEMENTS       3 1 1 

had  no  authority  to  move  till  explicit  orders  to  that  effect 
should  reach  him.  I  have  said  that  Hooker  claims  in 
his  report  that  the  promise  was  made  him  that  Mans 
field's  corps,  when  it  came  to  reinforce  him,  should  be 
under  his  orders.  If  this  were  so,  it  would  unite  all  the 
troops  now  present  which  had  fought  in  Pope's  Army  of 
Virginia.  I  find  no  trace,  however,  in  the  reports  of  the 
battle,  that  Hooker  exercised  any  such  command.  He 
seems  to  have  confined  his  work  to  the  independent 
action  of  his  own  corps  until  Mansfield's  death,  and  was 
himself  disabled  almost  immediately  afterward.  As  there 
were  commanders  of  wings  of  the  army  duly  designated, 
and  two  corps  were  now  separated  by  a  long  interval 
from  the  rest  in  an  independent  turning  movement,  it 
can  hardly  be  debated  that  that  was  the  place  of  all  others 
where  one  of  them  should  have  been,  unless  McClellan 
were  there  in  person.  Had  Burnside's  two  corps  been 
kept  together  as  the  right  wing,  the  right  attack  could 
have  been  made  a  unit.  If  Sumner  had  then  been 
directed  to  keep  in  communication  with  Burnside,  and 
to  advance  when  the  latter  did,  nobody  will  doubt  that 
Sumner  would  have  been  prompt  in  sustaining  his  com 
rades.  But  both  Sumner  and  Burnside  were  made  to 
feel  that  they  were  reduced  from  their  proper  rank,  and 
however  conscientious  they  might  be  in  carrying  out 
such  orders  as  reached  them,  it  was  not  in  human  nature 
that  they  should  volunteer  suggestions  or  anticipate  com 
mands.  McClellan  had  thus  thrown  away  the  advan 
tages,  if  there  were  any,  in  holding  only  two  or  three 
men  directly  responsible  for  the  co-ordination  of  his 
movements,  and  had  assumed  the  full  personal  responsi 
bility  of  watching  each  phase  of  the  battle  and  suiting  the 
proper  orders  to  each  conjuncture  as  it  should  arise. 


CHAPTER  XV 

ANTIETAM:   THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  RIGHT 

Hooker  astir  early  —  The  field  near  the  Dunker  Church  —  Artillery  combat 

—  Positions  of  Hooker's  divisions  —  Rocky  ledges  in  the  woods  —  Ad 
vance  of   Doubleday  through   Miller's   orchard  and  garden  —  Enemy's 
fire  from  West  Wood  —  They  rush  for  Gibbon's  battery  —  Repulse  — 
Advance  of  Patrick's  brigade  —  Fierce   fighting  along   the  turnpike  — 
Ricketts's  division  in  the  East  Wood  —  Fresh  effort  of  Meade's  division 
in  the  centre  —  A  lull  in  the  battle  —  Mansfield's  corps  reaches  the  field 

—  Conflicting  opinions  as  to  the  hour  —  Mansfield  killed  —  Command 
devolves    on     Williams  —  Advance    through    East    Wood  —  Hooker 
wounded  —  Meade  in  command  of  the  corps  —  It  withdraws  —  Greene's 
division  reaches  the  Dunker  Church  —  Crawford's  in  the  East  Wood  — 
Terrible  effects  on  the  Confederates  —  Sumner's  corps  coming  up  —  Its 
formation  —  It   moves  on  the   Dunker  Church  from  the  east  —  Diver 
gence  of  the  divisions  —  Sedgwick's  passes  to  right  of  Greene  — Attacked 
in  flank  and  broken  —  Rallying  at  the  Poffenberger  hill  —  Twelfth  Corps 
hanging  on  near  the  church  —  Advance  of  French's  division  —  Richard 
son  follows  later  —  Bloody  Lane  reached  —  The  Piper  house  —  Franklin's 
corps  arrives  —  Charge  of  Irwin's  brigade. 

T)EFORE  the  break  of  day  on  Wednesday  the  i;th, 
JL)  it  was  discovered  that  Doubleday's  division  of 
Hooker's  corps  lay  exposed  to  artillery  fire  from  batteries 
of  the  enemy  supposed  to  be  in  position  on  their  front 
and  right.  In  rousing  the  men  and  changing  their  place, 
the  stillness  of  the  night  was  so  far  broken  that  the  Con 
federates  believed  they  were  advancing  to  attack,  and  a 
lively  cannonade  and  picket  firing  anticipated  the  dawn.1 
The  chance  for  getting  their  breakfast  was  thus  de 
stroyed,  and  Hooker  prepared  his  whole  command  for 
action  as  soon  as  it  should  be  light  enough  to  move. 
Looking  south  from  the  Poffenberger  farm  along  the 
turnpike,  he  then  saw  a  gently  rolling  landscape  of  which 

1  R.  R.  Dawes,  Service  with  the  Sixth  Wisconsin,  p.  87. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  RIGHT      313 

the  commanding  point  was  the  Dunker  Church,  whose 
white  brick  walls  appeared  on  the  right  of  the  road, 
backed  by  the  foliage  of  the  West  Wood,  which  came 
toward  him  filling  a  hollow  that  ran  parallel  to  the  turn 
pike,  with  a  single  row  of  fields  between.  On  the  east 
side  of  the  turnpike  was  the  Miller  house,  with  its  barn 
and  stack-yard  across  the  road  to  the  right,  and  beyond 
these  the  ground  dipped  into  a  little  depression.  Still 
further  on  was  seen  a  large  cornfield  between  the  East 
Wood  and  the  turnpike,  rising  again  to  the  higher  level, 
and  Hooker  noticed  the  glint  from  a  long  line  of  bayonets 
beyond  the  corn,  struck  by  the  first  rays  of  the  rising  sun. 
There  was,  however,  another  little  hollow  at  the  further 
side  of  the  cornfield,  which  could  not  be  seen  from 
Hooker's  position;  and  on  the  farthest  ridge,  near  the 
church  and  extending  across  the  turnpike  toward  the 
East  Wood,  were  the  Confederate  lines,  partly  sheltered 
by  piles  of  rails  taken  from  the  fences.  They  looked  to 
Hooker  as  if  they  were  deployed  along  the  edge  of  the 
corn,  but  an  open  sloping  field  lay  between  the  corn  and 
them,  after  passing  the  second  hollow.  It  was  plain  that 
the  high  ground  about  the  little  white  church  was  the 
key  of  the  enemy's  position,  and  if  that  could  be  carried, 
Hooker's  task  would  be  well  done. 

The  enemy's  artillery  had  opened  early  from  a  high 
hill  nearly  east  of  the  Miller  house  in  a  position  to  strike 
our  forces  in  flank  and  rear  as  they  should  go  forward, 
and  Hooker  placed  batteries  on  the  equally  commanding 
height  above  Poffenberger's  and  detached  Hofmann's  bri 
gade  from  Doubleday's  division  to  support  it  and  to  pre 
vent  the  enemy  from  turning  our  extreme  right.1  This 
force  maintained  its  position  during  the  day,  and  was  the 
nucleus  about  which  both  Hooker's  and  Sedgwick's  men 
rallied  after  their  fight.  The  enemy's  artillery  referred 
to  were  several  batteries  under  Stuart's  command  sup- 

*  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  224. 


314         REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ported  by  his  cavalry  and  by  Early 's  brigade  of  infantry 
which  Jackson  detached  for  that  purpose.1 

Doubleday's  division  (except  Hofmann),  was  in  two 
lines,  Gibbon's  and  Phelps's  in  front,  supported  by  Pat 
rick's.  Of  Meade's  division  Seymour's  brigade,  which 
had  sustained  the  combat  of  the  evening  before,  had  con 
tinued  to  cover  the  front  with  skirmishers  during  the 
night,  and  remained  on  the  northeast  side  of  the  East 
Wood.  The  other  brigades  (Anderson  and  Magilton) 
were  placed  in  reserve  behind  Doubleday.2  The  Tenth 
Regiment  Pennsylvania  Reserves  was  sent  from  Ander 
son's  to  a  strong  position  west  of  the  turnpike  near  the 
extremity  of  the  strip  of  wood  northwest  of  the  Miller 
house.  It  was  among  ledges  of  rock  looking  into  the 
ravine  beyond  which  were  Stuart  and  Early.  The  ravine 
was  the  continuation  northward  to  the  Potomac  of  a  little 
watercourse  which  headed  near  the  Dunker  Church  and 
along  one  side  of  which  the  West  Wood  lay,  the  outcrop 
of  rock  making  broken  ledges  along  its  whole  length. 
Indeed,  all  the  pieces  of  wood  in  the  neighborhood 
seemed  to  be  full  of  such  rocks,  and  for  that  reason  had 
been  allowed  to  remain  in  forest.  The  regiment  was 
ordered  to  cover  its  front  with  skirmishers  and  to  hold 
its  position  at  all  hazards.  Ricketts's  division  had  biv 
ouacked  in  a  wood  east  of  Doubleday's.  Its  three 
brigades  (Duryea's,  HartsufTs,  and  Christian's)  were 
deployed  on  the  left  of  Doubleday,  and  were  to  march 
toward  the  Dunker  Church  through  the  East  Wood,  pass 
ing  the  line  of  Seymour's  brigade,  which  was  then  to 
become  its  support. 

The  Confederates  opened  a  rapid  artillery  fire  from  the 
open  ground  in  front  of  the  Dunker  Church  as  well  as 
from  Stuart's  position,  and  Hooker  answered  the  chal 
lenge  by  an  immediate  order  for  his  line  to  advance. 
Doubleday  directed  Gibbon,  who  was  on  the  right,  to 

1  O.  R.  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  819.  2  Id.,  p.  269. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  RIGHT      315 

guide  upon  the  turnpike.  Patrick  remained  for  a  time 
in  the  wood  north  of  the  Miller  house,  till  he  should  be 
needed  at  the  front1  Doubleday  and  his  brigade  com 
manders  seem  to  have  supposed  that  Meade's  men  occu 
pied  part  at  least  of  the  West  Wood,  and  that  they  would 
cover  Gibbon's  flank  as  he  advanced.  This  belief  was 
based  on  the  stationing  of  the  Tenth  Pennsylvania  Re 
serves;  but  that  regiment  was  fifteen  or  twenty  rods 
north  of  the  northern  end  of  the  West  Wood,  and  Gibbon's 
right  flank,  as  he  advanced,  was  soon  exposed  to  attack 
from  Ewell's  division  (Lawton  in  command),  which  held 
the  wood,  hidden  from  view  and  perfectly  protected  by 
the  slope  of  the  ground  and  the  forest,  as  they  looked 
over  the  rim  into  the  undulating  open  fields  in  front. 
Part  of  Battery  B,  Fourth  United  States  Artillery  (Gib 
bon's  own  battery),  was  run  forward  to  Miller's  barn  and 
stack-yard  on  the  right  of  the  road,  and  fired  over  the 
heads  of  the  advancing  regiments.2  Other  batteries  were 
similarly  placed,  more  to  the  left,  and  our  cannon  roared 
from  all  the  hill  crests  encircling  the  field.  The  line 
moved  swiftly  forward  through  Miller's  orchard  and 
kitchen  garden,  breaking  through  a  stout  picket  fence  on 
the  near  side,  down  into  the  moist  ground  of  the  hollow, 
and  up  through  the  corn  which  was  higher  than  their 
heads  and  shut  out  everything  from  view.3  At  the 
southern  side  of  the  field  they  came  to  a  low  fence,  be 
yond  which  was  the  open  field  already  mentioned,  and  the 
enemy's  line  at  the  further  side  of  it.  But  the  cornfield 
only  covered  part  of  the  line,  and  Gibbon's  right  had 
outmarched  the  left,  which  had  been  exposed  to  a  terrible 
fire.  The  direction  taken  had  been  a  little  oblique,  so 
that  the  right  wing  of  the  Sixth  Wisconsin  (the  flanking 
regiment)  had  crossed  the  turnpike  and  was  suddenly 
assailed  by  a  sharp  fire  from  the  West  Wood  on  its  flank. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  224.  2  2d.t  pp.  229,  248. 

3  Dawes,  Sixth  Wisconsin,  p.  88. 


316          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

They  swung  back  into  the  road,  lying  down  along  the 
high,  stout  post-and-rail  fence,  keeping  up  their  fire  by 
shooting  between  the  rails.1 

Leaving  this  little  band  to  protect  their  right,  the 
main  line,  which  had  come  up  on  the  left,  leaped  the 
fence  at  the  south  edge  of  the  cornfield,  and  charged  up 
hill  across  the  open  at  the  enemy  in  front.  But  the  con 
centrated  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry  was  more  than 
they  could  bear.  Men  fell  by  scores  and  hundreds,  and 
the  thinned  lines  gave  way  and  ran  for  the  shelter  of  the 
corn.  They  were  rallied  in  the  hollow  on  the  north  side 
of  the  field.  The  enemy  had  rapidly  extended  his  left 
under  cover  of  the  West  Wood,  and  now  made  a  dash  at 
the  right  flank  and  at  Gibbon's  exposed  guns.  His  men 
on  the  right  faced  by  that  flank  and  followed  him  bravely, 
though  with  little  order,  in  a  dash  at  the  Confederates 
who  were  swarming  out  of  the  wood.2  The  gunners 
double-charged  the  cannon  with  canister,  and  under  a 
terrible  fire  of  artillery  and  rifles  Lawton's  division 
broke  and  sought  shelter.3 

Patrick's  brigade  had  now  come  up  in  support  of  Gib 
bon,  and  was  sent  across  the  turnpike  into  the  West  Wood 
to  cover  that  flank,  two  regiments  of  Gibbon's  going 
with  him.4  His  men  pushed  forward,  the  enemy  retir 
ing,  until  they  were  in  advance  of  the  principal  line  in 
the  cornfield  upon  which  the  Confederates  of  Jackson's 
division  were  now  marching  to  attack.  Patrick  faced  his 
brigade  to  the  left,  parallel  to  the  edge  of  the  wood  and 
to  the  turnpike,  and  poured  his  fire  into  the  flank  of  the 
enemy,  following  it  by  a  charge  through  the  field  and  up 
to  the  fence  along  the  road.  Again  the  Confederates 
were  driven  back,  but  their  left  came  forward  in  the 
wood  again,  attacking  Patrick's  right,  forcing  him  to 
resume  his  original  direction  of  front  and  to  retire  to  the 

1  Dawes,  Sixth  Wisconsin,  p.  89.  2  /</.,  p.  91. 

8  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  248.  *  Id.,  p.  243. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  RIGHT      317 

cover  of  a  rocky  ledge  in  the  open  at  right  angles  to  the 
turnpike  not  far  from  the  northern  end  of  the  timber. 
Phelps's  brigade  had  gone  forward  with  Gibbon's,  push 
ing  nearly  to  the  Confederate  lines,  and  being  driven 
back  with  great  loss  when  they  charged  over  open  ground 
against  the  enemy. 

Ricketts's  division  advanced  from  the  wood  in  which 
it  had  spent  the  night,  passed  through  Seymour's  skir 
mishers  and  entered  the  East  Wood,  swinging  his  left  for 
ward  as  he  went.  This  grove  was  open,  but  the  rocks 
made  perfect  cover  for  Jackson's  men,  and  every  stone 
and  tree  blazed  with  deadly  fire.  Hartsuff  endeavored  to 
reconnoitre  the  ground,  but  was  wounded  and  disabled 
immediately.  Ricketts  pushed  on,  suffering  fearfully 
from  an  enemy  which  in  open  order  could  fall  back  from 
rock  to  rock  and  from  tree  to  tree  with  little  comparative 
loss.  He  succeeded  at  last  in  reaching  the  west  edge  of 
this  wood,  forming  along  the  road  and  fences  that  were 
just  within  its  margin.  Here  he  kept  up  a  rapid  fire  till 
his  ammunition  was  exhausted.1 

When  Doubleday's  men  had  been  finally  repulsed,  our 
line  on  the  right  curved  from  the  ledge  where  Patrick 
took  refuge,  forward  in  front  of  Miller's  orchard  and  gar 
den,  part  of  Gibbon's  men  lying  down  along  the  turnpike 
fence  facing  to  the  west.  Meade's  two  brigades  in  re 
serve  were  sent  forward,  but  when  they  reached  Gibbon 
and  Phelps,  Ricketts  was  calling  for  assistance  in  the 
East  Wood  and  Magilton's  brigade  was  sent  to  him,  leav 
ing  a  gap  on  the  left  of  Anderson.  Another  gallant 
effort  was  now  made,  Seymour's  depleted  brigade  striv 
ing  to  cover  the  opening,  but  the  enemy  dashed  at  it  as 
Anderson  came  up  the  slope,  and  the  left  being  taken  in 
flank,  the  whole  broke  again  to  the  rear.2  Ricketts's 
right  was  also  imperilled,  and  he  withdrew  his  exhausted 
lines  to  reorganize  and  to  fill  their  empty  cartridge-boxes. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  258.  -  Id.,  pp.  269,  270. 


31 8          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

There  was  a  lull  in  the  battle,  and  the  combatants  on 
both  sides  were  making  desperate  efforts  to  reform  their 
broken  regiments. 

Mansfield  had  called  the  Twelfth  Corps  to  arms  at  the 
first  sound  of  Hooker's  battle  and  marched  to  his  aid.1 
It  consisted  of  two  divisions,  Williams's  and  Greene's, 
the  first  of  two  and  the  other  of  three  brigades.  There 
were  a  number  of  new  and  undrilled  regiments  in  the 
command,  and  in  hastening  to  the  front  in  columns  of 
battalions  in  mass,  proper  intervals  for  deployment  had 
not  been  preserved,  and  time  was  necessarily  lost  before 
the  troops  could  be  put  in  line.  Indeed,  some  of  them 
were  not  regularly  deployed  at  all.  They  had  left  their 
bivouac  at  sunrise  which,  as  it  was  about  the  equinox, 
was  not  far  from  six  o'clock.  They  had  marched  across 
the  country  without  reference  to  roads,  always  a  very 
slow  mode  of  advancing,  and  doubly  so  with  undrilled 
men.  The  untrained  regiments  must,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  have  been  very  much  like  a  mob  when  their  so- 
called  columns-in-mass  approached  the  field  of  battle. 
It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  the  statements  of  the  re 
ports  as  to  the  time  they  became  engaged.  General 
Williams  says  they  were  engaged  before  seven  o'clock.2 
General  Meade  says  they  relieved  his  men  not  earlier 
than  ten  or  eleven.3  It  seems  to  be  guesswork  in  both 
cases,  and  we  are  forced  to  judge  from  circumstantial 
evidence.  Ricketts  thinks  he  had  been  fighting  four 
hours  when  he  retired  for  lack  of  ammunition,  and  the 
Twelfth  Corps  men  had  not  yet  reached  him.4  Patrick, 
on  the  extreme  right,  says  that  his  men  had  made  their 
coffee  in  the  lull  after  his  retreat  to  the  sheltering  ledge 
of  rocks,  and  had  completed  their  breakfast  before  the 
first  of  Mansfield's  men  joined  him  there.5  The  circum- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  475.  2  Id.,  p.  476. 

3  Id.,  p.  270.  *  Id.,  p.  259. 

6  Id.,  p.  244. 


ANT1ETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON   THE  RIGHT      319 

stantial  details  given  by  several  officers  make  the  interval 
between  the  attack  by  the  Twelfth  Corps  and  the  arrival 
of  Sumner  a  very  short  one.  It  may  be  regarded  as  prob 
able,  therefore,  that  Hooker's  battle  covered  the  larger 
part  of  the  time  between  six  o'clock  and  the  arrival  of 
Sumner  at  about  ten. 

On  reaching  the  field,  Mansfield  had  a  brief  consulta 
tion  with  Hooker,  resulting  in  his  ordering  Williams  to 
form  his  division  nearly  as  Doubleday's  had  been,  and  to 
advance  with  his  right  upon  the  turnpike.  He  himself 
led  forward  the  left  of  Crawford's  brigade,  which  was  the 
first  to  arrive,  and  pushed  toward  the  East  Wood.  The 
regiments  were  still  in  columns  of  companies,  and  though 
Williams  had  ordered  them  deployed,  the  corps  com 
mander  himself,  as  Crawford  says,  countermanded  this 
order  and  led  them  under  fire  in  column.1  He  evidently 
believed  Ricketts's  men  to  be  still  holding  the  East 
Wood,  and  tried  to  keep  his  own  from  opening  fire  upon 
the  troops  that  were  seen  there.  At  this  moment  he  was 
mortally  wounded,  before  the  deployment  was  made. 

General  Alpheus  S.  Williams,  on  whom  the  command 
devolved,  was  a  cool  and  experienced  officer.  He  has 
tened  the  deployment  of  Crawford's  and  Gordon's  bri 
gades  of  his  own  division, .  sending  one  of  the  new  and 
large  regiments  to  assist  the  Pennsylvania  regiment  in 
holding  the  important  position  covering  the  right  beyond 
the  turnpike.  As  Greene's  division  came  up,  he  ordered 
him  to  form  beyond  Gordon's  left,  and  when  deployed 
to  move  on  the  Dunker  Church  through  the  East  Wood, 
guiding  his  left  by  the  cloud  of  smoke  from  the  Mumma 
house,  which  had  been  set  on  fire  by  D.  H.  Hill's  men.2 
At  Doubleday's  request,  he  detached  Goodrich's  brigade 
from  Greene,  and  sent  it  to  Patrick  on  the  right  with 
orders  to  advance  into  the  West  Wood  from  its  northern 
extremity.  Patrick  says  the  regiments  came  separately 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  484.  2  Id.,  pp.  475,  1033. 


320          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

and  at  considerable  intervals,1  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that 
the  older  regiments  were  sent  in  to  relieve  Hooker's  men 
as  fast  as  they  were  ready,  and  the  more  disorganized 
ones  were  obliged  to  delay  till  they  could  be  got  into 
some  sort  of  shape.  Williams  made  his  first  disposition 
of  his  troops  according  to  Hooker's  suggestion,  but  the 
latter  received  a  serious  wound  in  the  foot,  as  it  would 
seem,  before  the  attack  by  the  Twelfth  Corps  had  begun. 
Hooker  turned  over  the  command  to  Meade,  and  a  formal 
order  confirming  this  was  issued  from  McClellan's  head 
quarters  later  in  the  day.2 

So  many  of  the  regiments  were  carried  under  fire  while 
still  in  column  that  not  only  was  the  formation  of  the 
line  an  irregular  one,  but  the  deployment  when  made  was 
more  diagonal  to  the  turnpike  than  Hooker's  had  been, 
and  the  whole  line  faced  more  to  the  westward.  But 
they  advanced  with  a  courage  equal  to  the  heroism  al 
ready  shown  on  that  field.  The  Confederates  who  now 
held  the  open  space  at  the  Dunker  Chruch  were  Hood's 
two  brigades,  and  the  rest  of  Jackson's  corps  extended 
into  the  West  Wood.  Stuart  had  found  his  artillery  posi 
tion  on  the  hill  too  far  from  Jackson's  line,  and  the  fight 
ing  was  so  near  the  church  that  he  could  not  fire  upon 
our  men  without  hurting  his  own.3  He  therefore  moved 
further  to  the  south  and  west,  and  Early  carried  his 
brigade  (except  the  Thirteenth  Virginia)  back  toward 
Ewell's  division,  which  now  came  under  his  command 
by  the  disabling  of  General  Lawton  in  the  fight.4 

Williams's  first  line  was  a  good  deal  shortened,  and 
the  divisions,  guiding  as  well  as  they  could  upon  Greene, 
crowded  so  far  to  the  south  that  even  Crawford's  brigade, 
which  was  on  the  right  of  all,  went  partly  through  the 
East  Wood  advancing  on  a  line  nearly  at  right  angles  to 
the  turnpike.  The  enemy  had  followed  Ricketts's  retir- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  244.  2  Id.,  pt.  ii.  p.  315. 

8  Id.,  pt.  i.  p.  820.  4  Id.,  pp.  968,  969. 


ANTIETAM:    THE   FIGHT  ON   THE  RIGHT      321 

ing  battalions  and  were  again  in  occupation  of  the  East 
Wood.  His  work  was  to  be  done  over  again,  though  the 
stubborn  courage  of  Hood's  depleted  brigades  could  not 
make  up  for  the  numbers  which  the  National  officers  now 
led  against  him.  But  the  rocks,  the  ledges,  and  the  trees 
still  gave  him  such  cover  that  it  was  at  a  fearful  cost  that 
the  Twelfth  Corps  men  pushed  him  steadily  back  and  then 
by  a  final  rush  drove  him  from  the  roads  which  skirted 
the  grove  on  west  and  south.  What  was  left  of  Jack 
son's  corps  except  Early 's  brigade  had  come  out  of  the 
West  Wood  to  meet  Crawford's  division,  and  the  stout 
high  fences  along  the  turnpike  were  the  scene  of  fright 
ful  slaughter.1  The  Confederates  tried  to  climb  them, 
but  the  level  fire  of  our  troops  swept  over  the  field  so 
that  the  top  of  the  fence  seemed  in  the  most  deadly  line 
of  the  leaden  storm,  and  the  men  in  gray  fell  in  windrows 
along  its  panels.  Our  own  men  were  checked  by  the 
same  obstacle,  and  lay  along  the  ground  shooting  be 
tween  the  rails  and  over  the  fallen  bodies  of  the  Confed 
erate  soldiers  which  made  a  sort  of  rampart. 

In  obedience  to  his  original  orders,  Greene  took  ground 
a  little  more  to  his  left,  occupying  a  line  along  a  fence 
from  the  burning  Mumma  house  to  the  road  leading  from 
the  East  Wood  directly  to  the  Bunker  Church.2  The  two 
brigades  with  thinned  ranks  barely  filled  this  space,  and 
Crawford's  division  connected  with  them  as  well  as  it 
could.  Batteries  came  forward  on  Greene's  left  and 
right,  and  helped  to  sweep  the  grove  around  the  church. 
Hill  attempted  to  hold  him  back,  and  a  bold  dash  was 
made  at  Greene,  probably  by  Hill's  left  brigades  which 
were  ordered  forward  to  support  Hood.  Greene's  men 
lay  on  the  ground  just  under  the  ridge  above  the  burning 
house  till  the  enemy  were  within  a  few  rods  of  them, 
then  rose  and  delivered  a  volley  which  an  eyewitness 
(Major  Crane,  Seventh  Ohio)  says  cut  them  down  "  like 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  485,  487.  2  Id.,  p.  505. 

VOL.  I.  —  21 


322          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

grass  before  the  mower."1  Those  who  escaped  sought 
refuge  in  the  wood  behind  the  church,  where  the  crown 
ing  ridge  is  some  distance  back  from  the  road.  Greene 
now  dashed  forward  and  gained  the  grove  immediately 
about  the  church,  where  he  held  on  for  an  hour  or  two. 
Crawford's  division,  after  several  ebbs  and  flows  in  the 
tide  of  battle,  was  holding  the  western  skirt  of  the  East 
wood  with  one  or  two  of  its  regiments  still  close  to  the 
turnpike  fence  on  his  right. 

Meanwhile  Goodrich  had  been  trying  to  advance  from 
the  north  end  of  the  West  Wood  to  attack  the  flank  of  the 
enemy  there;  but  Early  with  his  own  brigade  held  the 
ledges  along  the  ravine  so  stubbornly  that  he  was  making 
little  progress. 

Greene  was  calling  for  support  about  the  Dunker 
Church,  for  he  was  close  under  the  ridge  on  which  Hill 
and  Jackson  were  forming  such  line  as  they  could,  and 
he  was  considerably  in  advance  of  our  other  troops. 
Williams  withdrew  one  regiment  from  Goodrich's  bri 
gade  and  sent  it  to  Greene,  and  directed  Crawford  to 
send  also  to  him  the  Thirteenth  New  Jersey,  a  new  and 
strong  regiment  which  had  been  left  in  reserve,  as  we 
have  seen,  in  a  bit  of  wood  northeast  of  the  field  of 
battle.2  Gordon's  brigade  was  withdrawn  by  Crawford 
to  enable  it  to  reorganize  in  rear  of  the  East  Wood,  and 
Crawford's  own  brigade  held  the  further  margin  of  it. 
It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  Twelfth  Corps  was  now 
divided  into  three  portions, —  Greene's  division  at  the 
church,  Crawford's  in  the  East  Wood,  and  Goodrich's 
brigade  near  the  north  end  of  the  West  Wood. 

Meade  had  withdrawn  the  First  Corps  to  the  ridge  at 
Poffenberger's,  where  it  had  bivouacked  the  night  before, 
except  that  Patrick's  brigade  remained  in  support  of 
Goodrich.  The  corps  had  suffered  severely,  having  lost 
2470  in  killed  and  wounded,  but  it  was  still  further  de- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  506.  2  Id.,  pp.  476,  505. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  RIGHT      323 

pleted  by  straggling,  so  that  Meade  reported  less  than 
7000  men  with  the  colors  that  evening.1  Its  organiza 
tion  had  been  preserved,  however,  and  the  story  that  it 
was  utterly  dispersed  was  a  mistake.  The  Twelfth  Corps 
also  had  its  large  list  of  casualties,  increased  a  little 
later  by  its  efforts  to  support  -Sumner,  and  aggregating, 
before  the  day  was  over,  1746. 

But  the  fighting  of  Hooker's  and  Mansfield's  men, 
though  lacking  unity  of  force  and  of  purpose,  had  also 
cost  the  enemy  dear.  J.  R.  Jones,  who  commanded  Jack 
son's  division,  had  been  wounded;  Starke,  who  succeeded 
Jones,  was  killed;  Lawton,  who  commanded  Ewell's  divi 
sion,  was  wounded.3  Lawton's  and  Trimble's  brigades 
had  been  fearfully  crippled  in  the  first  fight  against 
Hooker  on  the  plateau  between  the  Dunker  Church  and 
the  East  Wood,  and  Hood  was  sent  back  to  relieve  them.3 
He,  in  turn,  had  been  reinforced  by  the  brigades  of  Rip- 
ley,  Colquitt,  and  McRae  (Garland's)  from  D.  H.  Hill's 
division.4  When  Greene  reached  the  Dunker  Church, 
therefore,  the  Confederates  on  that  wing  were  more 
nearly  disorganized  than  our  own  troops.  Nearly  half 
their  numbers  were  killed  and  wounded,  and  Jackson's 
famous  "Stonewall"  division  was  so  completely  broken 
up  that  only  a  handful  of  men  under  Colonels  Grigsby 
and  Stafford  remained,  and  attached  themselves  to 
Early 's  command.5  Of  the  division  now  under  Early, 
his  own  brigade  was  all  that  retained  much  strength, 
and  this,  posted  among  the  rocks  in  the  West  Wood  and 
vigorously  supported  by  Stuart  and  the  artillery  on  that 
flank,  was  all  that  covered  the  left  of  Lee's  army.  Could 
Hooker  and  Mansfield  have  attacked  together,  or,  still 
better,  could  Sumner's  Second  Corps  have  marched  be 
fore  day  and  united  with  the  first  onset,  Lee's  left  must 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  349.  z  Id.,  pt.  i.  p.  956. 

8  Id.,  p.  923.  4  Id.,  p.  1022. 

*  Id.t  p.  969- 


324          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

inevitably  have  been  crushed  long  before  the  Confeder 
ate  divisions  of  McLaws,  Walker,  and  A.  P.  Hill  could 
have  reached  the  field.  It  is  this  failure  to  carry  out 
any  intelligible  plan  which  the  historian  must  regard  as 
the  unpardonable  military  fault  on  the  National  side. 
To  account  for  the  hours  between  daybreak  and  eight 
o'clock  on  that  morning,  is  the  most  serious  responsi 
bility  of  the  National  commander.1 

Sumner's  Second  Corps  was  now  approaching  the  scene 
of  action,  or  rather  two  divisions  of  it,  Sedgwick's  and 
French's,  for  Richardson's  was  still  delayed  till  his  place 
could  be  filled  by  Porter's  troops.  Although  ordered  to 
be  ready  to  move  at  daybreak,  Sumner  emphasizes  in  his 
report  the  fact  that  whilst  his  command  was  prepared  to 
move  at  the  time  ordered,  he  "  did  not  receive  from  head 
quarters  the  order  to  march  till  7.20  A.  M."  2  By  the  time 
he  could  reach  the  field,  Hooker  had  fought  his  battle 
and  had  been  repulsed.  The  same  strange  tardiness  in 
sending  orders  is  noticeable  in  regard  to  every  part  of 
the  army,  and  Richardson  was  not  relieved  so  that  he 
could  follow  French  till  an  hour  or  two  later.3 

Sumner  advanced,  after  crossing  the  Antietam,  in  a 
triple  column,  Sedgwick's  division  in  front,  the  three 
brigades  marching  by  the  right  flank  and  parallel  to  each 
other.  French  followed  in  the  same  formation.  They 
crossed  the  Antietam  by  Hooker's  route,  but  did  not 
march  so  far  to  the  northwest  as  Hooker  had  done.  On 
the  way  Sumner  met  Hooker,  who  was  being  carried  from 
the  field,  and  the  few  words  he  could  exchange  with  the 
wounded  general  were  enough  to  make  him  feel  the  need 
of  haste,  but  not  enough  to  give  him  any  clear  idea  of 

1  A  distinguished  officer  (understood  to  be  Gen.  R.  R.  Dawes)  who  visited 
the  field  in  1866  has  published  the  statement  that  at  the  Pry  house,  where 
McClellan  had  his  headquarters,  he  was  informed  that  on  the  morning  of  the 
1 7th  the  general  rose  at  about  seven  o'clock  and  breakfasted  leisurely  after 
that  hour.     (Marietta,  Ohio,  Sentinel.) 

2  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  275.  8  Ibid. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  RIGHT      325 

the  situation.     When  the  centre  of  the  corps  was  opposite 
the  Dunker  Church,  and  nearly  east  of  it,  the  change  of 
direction   was   given;    the  troops  faced   to   their  proper 
front,  and  advanced  in  line  of  battle  in  three  lines,  fully 
deployed  and  sixty  or  seventy  yards  apart,  Sumner  him 
self  being  in  rear  of  Sedgwick's  first  line  and  near  its 
left.1     As  they  approached  the  position  held  by  Greene's 
division  at  the  church,  French  kept  on  so  as  to  form  on 
Greene's  left,2  but  Sedgwick,  under  Sumner's  immediate 
leading,  diverged  somewhat  to  the  right,  passing  through 
the  East  Wood,   crossing  the  turnpike  on  the  right  of 
Greene  and  of  the  Dunker  Church,  and  plunged  into  the 
West  Wood.3    The  fences  there  had  been  destroyed  by 
the  Confederates  before  the  battle  began,  for  the  purpose 
of  making  room  for  their  own  manoeuvres  as  well  as  to 
make  barricades   in  front  of  the  cornfield.     Sedgwick's 
right  did  not  extend  far  enough  north  to  be  obstructed  by 
the  fences  where  the  Twelfth  Corps  men  had  lain  along 
them  in  repulsing  Jackson.     When  he  entered  the  wood, 
there  were  absolutely  no  Confederate  troops  in  front  of 
him.      The  remnants  of  Jackson's  men,   except  Early's 
brigade,  were  clustered  at  the  top  of  the  ridge  immedi 
ately  in  front  of  Greene,  and  Early  was  further  to  the 
right,  opposing  Goodrich  and  Patrick;  Early,  however, 
made  haste  under  cover  of  the  woods  to  pass  around  Sedg 
wick's  right  and  to  get  in  front  of  him  to  oppose  his 
progress.4      This    led   to   a   lively  skirmishing   fight    in 
which  Early  was  making  as  great  a  demonstration  as  pos 
sible,  but  with  no  chance  of  solid  success.      Sedgwick 
pushed  him  back,  and  his  left  was  coming  obliquely  into 
the  open  at  the  bottom  of  the  hollow  beyond  the  wood, 
when,  at  the  very  moment,  McLaws's  and  Walker's  Con 
federate  divisions  came  upon  the  field.     The  former  had 
only  just  arrived  by  rapid  marching  from  Shepherdstown 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  305.  2  Id.,  p.  323. 

3  Id.,  p.  305.  4  Id.,  p.  970. 


326          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

beyond  the  Potomac;  the  latter  had  been  hastily  called 
away  by  Lee  from  his  position  on  the  lower  Antietam 
opposite  the  left  wing  of  Burnside's  Ninth  Corps.1 

Walker  charged  headlong  upon  the  left  flank  of  Sedg- 
wick's  lines,  and  McLaws,  passing  by  Walker's  left,  also 
threw  his  division  diagonally  upon  the  already  broken  and 
retreating  brigades.  Taken  at  such  a  disadvantage,  these 
had  never  a  chance;  and  in  spite  of  the  heroic  bravery 
of  Sumner  and  Sedgwick  with  most  of  their  officers 
(Sedgwick  being  severely  wounded),  the  division  was 
driven  off  to  the  north  with  terrible  losses,  carrying 
along  in  their  rout  Goodrich's  brigade  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps  which  had  been  holding  Early  at  bay.  Goodrich 
was  killed,  and  his  brigade  suffered  hardly  less  than  the 
others.  Patrick's  brigade  of  Hooker's  corps  was  in  good 
order  at  the  rocky  ledges  north  of  the  West  Wood  which 
are  at  right  angles  to  the  turnpike,  and  he  held  on  stub 
bornly  till  the  disorganized  troops  drifted  past  his  left, 
and  then  made  an  orderly  retreat  in  line  toward  the  Pof- 
fenberger  hill.2  Meade  was  already  there  with  the  rem 
nants  of  Hooker's  men.  Here  some  thirty  cannon  of 
both  corps  were  quickly  concentrated,  and,  supported  by 
everything  which  retained  organization,  easily  checked 
the  pursuers  and  repulsed  all  efforts  of  Jackson  and  Stu 
art  to  resume  the  offensive  or  to  pass  between  them  and 
the  Potomac.3 

Sumner  did  not  accompany  the  routed  troops  to  this 
position,  but  as  soon  as  it  was  plain  that  the  division 
could  not  be  rallied,  he  galloped  off  to  put  himself  in 
communication  with  French  and  with  headquarters  of  the 
army  and  to  try  to  retrieve  the  situation.  From  the  flag 
station  east  of  the  East  Wood  he  signalled  to  McClellan, 
"  Reinforcements  are  badly  wanted;  our  troops  are  giving 
way."4  Williams  was  in  that  part  of  the  field,  and  Sum- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  857,  914.  2  Id.,  p.  245. 

3  Id.,  p.  306.  4  Id.,  p.  134. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  RIGHT      327 

ner  sent  a  staff  officer  to  him  ordering  that  he  should 
push  forward  to  Sedgwick's  support  anything  he  could.1 
Williams  in  person  ordered  Gordon's  brigade  to  advance, 
for  this,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  reorganized  behind 
the  East  Wood.  He  sent  the  same  order  to  Crawford  for 
the  rest  of  that  division.  Crawford  had  withdrawn  his 
men  in  the  East  Wood  to  let  Sedgwick  pass  diagonally 
along  his  front,  and  now  advanced  again  to  the  west  mar 
gin  of  the  grove.2  Gordon  was  ahead  of  him  in  time  and 
further  to  the  right,  and  again  charged  up  to  the  turn 
pike  fences.  But  the  routed  troops  were  already  swarm 
ing  from  the  wood  across  his  front,  and  their  pursuers 
were  charging  after  them.  Again  the  turnpike  was  made 
the  scene  of  a  bloody  conflict,  and  the  bodies  of  many 
more  of  the  slain  of  both  armies  were  added  to  those 
which  already  lined  those  fences.  Gordon's  men  were 
overpowered  and  fell  back  in  the  direction  they  had 
come.3  The  enemy's  attack  spread  out  toward  Greene 
and  toward  Crawford,  who  was  now  at  the  edge  of  the 
East  Wood  again ;  but  both  of  these  held  firm,  and  a  couple 
of  batteries  on  the  rise  of  ground  in  -front  poured  canister 
into  the  enemy  till  he  took  refuge  again  in  the  wood  be 
yond  the  church.  It  was  between  nine  and  ten  o'clock, 
probably  about  ten,4  when  Sumner  entered  the  West  Wood, 
and  in  fifteen  minutes  or  a  little  more  the  one-sided  com 
bat  was  over. 

Sumner 's  principal  attack  was  made,  as  I  have  already 
indicated,  at  right  angles  to  that  of  Hooker.  He  had 
thus  crossed  the  line  of  Hooker's  movement  in  both  the 
advance  and  the  retreat  of  the  latter.  This  led  to  some 
misconceptions  on  Sumner's  part.  Crawford's  division 
had  retired  to  the  right  and  rear  to  make  way  for  Sedg- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  477.  2  Id.,  p.  485.  3  Id.,  p.  495. 

4  The  reports  on  the  Confederate  side  fix  ten  o'clock  as  the  time  McLaws 
and  Walker  reached  the  field,  and  corroborate  the  conclusion  I  draw  from 
all  other  available  evidence. 


328          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

wick  as  he  came  up.  It  thus  happened  that  Greene's 
division  was  the  only  part  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  troops 
Sumner  saw,  and  he  led  Sedgwick' s  men  to  the  right  of 
these.  Ignorant  as  he  necessarily  was  of  what  had  oc 
curred  before,  he  assumed  that  he  formed  on  the  extreme 
right  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  and  that  he  fronted  in  the 
same  direction  as  Hooker  had  done.  This  misconcep 
tion  of  the  situation  led  him  into  another  error.  He  had 
seen  only  stragglers  and  wounded  men  on  the  line  of  his 
own  advance,  and  hence  concluded  that  Hooker's  Corps 
was  completely  dispersed  and  its  division  and  brigade 
organizations  broken  up.  He  not  only  gave  this  report 
to  McClellan  at  the  time,  but  reiterated  it  later  in  his 
statement  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War.1  The  truth  was  that  he  had  marched  westward 
more  than  a  mile  south  of  the  Poffenberger  hill  where 
Meade  was  with  the  sadly  diminished  but  still  organized 
First  Corps,  and  half  that  distance  south  of  the  Miller 
farm  buildings,  near  which  Goodrich's  brigade  had 
entered  the  north  end  of  the  West  Wood,  and  in  front 
of  which  part  of  Williams's  men  had  held  the  ground 
along  the  turnpike  till  they  were  relieved  by  Sedgwick's 
advance.  Sedgwick  had  gone  in,  therefore,  between 
Greene  and  Crawford,  and  the  four  divisions  of  the  two 
corps  alternated  in  their  order  from  left  to  right,  thus : 
French,  Greene,  Sedgwick,  Crawford,  the  last  being 
Williams's,  of  which  Crawford  was  in  command. 

It  was  not  Sumner's  fault  that  he  was  so  ill-informed 
of  the  actual  situation  on  our  right;  but  it  is  plain  that 
in  the  absence  of  McClellan  from  that  part  of  the  field 
he  should  have  left  the  personal  leadership  of  the  men  to 
the  division  commanders,  and  should  himself  have  found 
out  by  rapid  examination  the  positions  of  all  the  troops 
operating  there.  It  was  his  part  to  combine  and  give 
intelligent  direction  to  the  whole,  instead  of  charging 

i  C.  W.,  vol.  i.  p.  368. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  RIGHT      329 

forward  at  haphazard  with  Sedgwick's  division.  Both 
Meade  and  Williams  had  men  enough  in  hand  to  have 
joined  in  a  concerted  movement  with  him;  and  had  he 
found  either  of  those  officers  before  plunging  into  the 
West  Wood,  he  would  not  have  taken  a  direction  which 
left  his  flank  wholly  exposed,  with  the  terrible  but 
natural  results  which  followed.  The  original  cause  of 
the  mischief,  however,  was  McClellan's  failure  to  send 
Sumner  to  his  position  before  daybreak,  so  that  the  three 
corps  could  have  acted  together  from  the  beginning  of 
Hooker's  attack. 

But  we  must  return  to  Sumner' s  divisions,  which  were 
advancing  nearer  the  centre.  The  battle  on  the  extreme 
right  was  ended  by  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  there 
was  no  more  serious  righting  north  of  the  Dunker  Church. 
The  batteries  on  the  Poffenberger  hill  and  those  about 
the  East  Wood  swept  the  open  ground  and  the  cornfield 
over  which  Hooker  and  Mansfield  had  fought,  and  for 
some  time  Greene  was  able  to  make  good  his  position  at 
the  church.  The  Confederates  were  content  to  hold  the 
line  of  the  West  Wood  and  the  high  ground  back  of 
the  church,  and  French's  attack  upon  D.  H.  Hill  was 
now  attracting  their  attention.  French  advanced  toward 
Greene's  left,  over  the  open  farm  lands,  and  after  a  fierce 
combat  about  the  Rullett  and  Clipp  farm  buildings, 
drove  Hill's  division  from  them.1  At  what  time  the 
Confederates  made  a  rush  at  Greene  and  drove  him  back 
to  the  edge  of  the  East  Wood  is  uncertain ;  but  it  must 
have  been  soon  after  the  disaster  to  Sedgwick.  It  seems 
to  have  been  an  incident  of  the  aggressive  movement 
against  Sedgwick,  though  not  coincident  with  it.  It 
must  certainly  have  been  before  French's  advance  reached 
the  Rullett  and  Clipp  houses,  for  the  enemy's  men  hold 
ing  them  would  have  been  far  in  rear  of  Greene  at  the 
church,  and  he  must  by  that  time  have  been  back  near 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  323. 


330          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  burnt  house  of   Mumma  and  the  angle  of  the  East 
Wood.1 

Richardson's  division  followed  French  after  an  hour  or 
two,2  and  then,  foot  by  foot,  field  by  field,  from  fence  to 
fence,  and  from  hill  to  hill,  the  enemy  was  pressed  back, 
till  the  sunken   road,   since   known  as  "Bloody  Lane," 
was  in  our  hands,  piled  full  of  the  Confederate  dead  who 
had  defended  it  with  their  lives.     Richardson  had  been 
mortally   wounded,    and    Hancock   had   been   sent   from 
Franklin's    corps    to    command    the    division.       Colonel 
Barlow  had  been  conspicuous  in  the  thickest  of  the  fight, 
and  after  a  series  of  brilliant  actions  had  been  carried 
off  desperately  wounded.     On  the  Confederate  side  equal 
courage  and  a  magnificent  tenacity  had  been  exhibited. 
Men  who  had  fought  heroically  in  one  position  no  sooner 
found  themselves   free  from   the  struggle  of   an  assault 
than  they  were  hurried  away  to  repeat  their   exertions, 
without  even  a  breathing- spell,  on  another  part  of  the 
field.     They  exhausted  their  ammunition,  and  still  grimly 
held  crests,  as  Longstreet  tells  us,  with  their  bayonets, 
but  without    a   single   cartridge    in   their   boxes.3      The 
story  of  the  fight  at  this  part  of  the  field  is  simpler  than 
that  of  the  early  morning,  for  there  was  no  such  variety 
in  the  character  of   the  ground  or  in  the  tactics  of  the 
opposing  forces.     It  was  a  sustained  advance  with  con 
tinuous  struggle,  sometimes  ebbing  a  moment,  then  gain 
ing,  but  with  the  organization  pretty  well  preserved  and 
the    lines   kept   fairly  continuous   on    both    sides.     Our 
men  fought   their  way  up  to  the  Piper   house,  near  the 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  505.    Greene  says  that  he  held  the  ground  at 
the  church  for  two  hours,  and  that  his  men  were  in  action  from  6.30  A.  M.  to 
1.30  P.  M.     The  length  of  time  and  hours  of  the  day  are  so  irreconcilable  as 
given  in  different  reports  that  we  are  forced  to  trust  more  to  the  general 
current  of  events  than  to  the  time  stated. 

2  Hancock  says  the  division  crossed  the  Antietam  about  9.30.     O.  R., 
vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  277. 

G  Id.,  p.  840 


ANTIETAM:    THE   FIGHT  ON  THE  RIGHT       331 

turnpike,  and  that  position  marks  the  advance  made  by 
our  centre.1  The  crest  of  the  ridge  on  which  the  Hagers- 
town  turnpike  runs  had  been  secured  from  Piper's  north 
to  Miller's,  and  it  was  held  until  the  Confederate  retreat 
on  the  iQth. 

The  head  of  Franklin's  Corps  (the  Sixth)  had  arrived 
about  ten  o'clock,  and  had  taken  the  position  near  the 
Sharpsburg  bridge,  which  Sumner  had  occupied  in  the 
night.2  Before  noon  Smith's  and  Slocum's  divisions 
were  both  ordered  to  Sumner's  assistance.  As  they 
passed  by  the  farm  buildings  in  front  of  the  East  Wood, 
the  enemy  made  a  dash  at  Greene  and  French.  Smith 
ordered  forward  Irwin's  brigade  to  their  support,  and 
Irwin  charged  gallantly,  driving  the  assailants  back  to 
the  cover  of  the  woods  about  the  church.3  Franklin's 
men  then  formed  under  the  crest  already  mentioned,  from 
"  Bloody  Lane "  by  the  Clipp,  Rullett,  and  Mumma 
houses  to  the  East  Wood  and  the  ridge  in  front. 
The  aggressive  energy  of  both  sides  seemed  exhausted. 
French  and  Richardson's  battle  may  be  considered  as 
ended  at  one  or  two  o'clock.  There  was  no  fighting  later 
but  that  on  the  extreme  left,  where  Burnside's  Ninth 
Corps  was  engaged,  and  we  must  turn  our  attention  to 
that  part  of  the  field. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  279.  2  Id.,  p.  376. 

8  /</.,  pp.  402,  409. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

ANTIETAM:   THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  LEFT 

Ninth  Corps  positions  near  Antietam  Creek  —  Rodman's  division  at  lower 
ford — Sturgis's  at  the  bridge  —  Burnside's  headquarters  on  the  field  — 
View  from  his  place  of  the  battle  on  the  right —  French's  fight  —  An  ex 
ploding  caisson  —  Our  orders  to  attack  —  The  hour  —  Crisis  of  the  battle 

—  Discussion   of  the  sequence  of  events  —  The  Burnside  bridge  —  Ex 
posed  approach  —  Enfiladed  by  enemy's  artillery  —  Disposition  of  enemy's 
troops —  His  position  very  strong  —  Importance  of  Rodman's  movement 
by  the  ford  —  The  fight  at  the  bridge  —  Repulse  —  Fresh  efforts  —  Tac 
tics  of  the  assault  —  Success  —  Formation  on  further   bank  —  Bringing 
up  ammunition  —  Willcox  relieves  Sturgis — The  latter  now  in  support 

—  Advance  against    Sharpsburg  —  Fierce  combat  —  Edge  of   the   town 
reached  —  Rodman's  advance  on  the  left  —  A.  P.  Hill's  Confederate  di 
vision  arrives  from  Harper's  Ferry  —  Attacks  Rodman's  flank  —  A  raw 
regiment  breaks  —  The  line  retires  —  Sturgis  comes  into  the  gap  —  De 
fensive  position  taken  and  held — Enemy's  assaults  repulsed  —  Troops 
sleeping  on  their  arms  —  McClellan's  reserve  —  Other  troops  not  used  — 
McClellan's  idea  of  Lee's  force  and  plans  —  Lee's  retreat  —  The  terrible 
casualty  lists. 

E  have  seen  that  the  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Corps 
were  conducted  by  staff  officers  of  Burnside's 
staff  to  positions  that  had  been  indicated  by  McClellan 
and  marked  by  members  of  his  staff.  The  morning  of 
Wednesday  the  i/th  broke  fresh  and  fair.  The  men 
were  astir  at  dawn,  getting  breakfast  and  preparing  for  a 
day  of  battle.  The  artillery  fire  which  opened  Hooker's 
battle  on  the  right  spread  along  the  whole  line,  and  the 
positions  which  had  been  assigned  us  in  the  dusk  of 
evening  were  found  to  be  exposed,  in  some  places,  to  the 
direct  fire  of  the  Confederate  guns.  Rodman's  division 
suffered  more  than  the  others,  Fairchild's  brigade  alone 
reporting  thirty-six  casualties  before  they  could  find 
cover.1  My  own  tents  had  been  pitched  at  the  edge  of 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  451. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  LEFT      333 

a  little  grove  of  forest  trees,  and  the  headquarters  mess 
was  at  breakfast  at  sunrise  when  the  cannonade  began. 
The  rapid  explosion  of  shrapnel  about  us  hastened  our 
morning  meal;  the  tents  were  struck  and  loaded  upon 
the  wagons,  horses  were  saddled,  and  everything  made 
ready  for  the  contingencies  of  the  day.  It  was  not  till 
seven  o'clock  that  orders  came  to  advance  toward  the 
creek  as  far  as  could  be  done  without  exposing  the  men 
to  unnecessary  loss.1  Rodman  was  directed  to  acquaint 
himself  with  the  situation  of  the  ford  in  front  of  him, 
and  Sturgis  to  seek  the  best  means  of  approach  to  the 
stone  bridge.  All  were  then  to  remain  in  readiness  to 
obey  further  orders. 

When  these  arrangements  had  been  made,  I  rode  to  the 
position  Burnside  had  selected  for  himself,  which  was 
upon  a  high  knoll  northeast  of  the  Burnside  bridge,  near 
a  haystack  which  was  a  prominent  landmark.  Near  by 
was  Benjamin's  battery  of  twenty-pounder  Parrotts,  and 
a  little  further  still  to  the  right,  on  the  same  ridge, 
General  Sturgis  had  sent  in  Durell's  battery.2  These 
were  exchanging  shots  with  the  enemy's  guns  opposite, 
and  had  the  advantage  in  range  and  weight  of  metal.  At 
this  point  I  remained  until  the  order  for  our  attack  came, 
later  in  the  day.  We  anxiously  watched  what  we  could 
see  at  the  right,  and  noted  the  effect  of  the  fire  of  the 
heavy  guns  of  Benjamin's  battery.  We  could  see  noth 
ing  distinctly  that  occurred  beyond  the  Bunker  Church, 
for  the  East  and  West  Woods  with  farm-houses  and 
orchards  between  made  an  impenetrable  screen.  A 
column  of  smoke  stood  over  the  burning  Mumma  house, 
marking  plainly  its  situation. 

As  the  morning  wore  on,  we  saw  lines  of  troops  advanc 
ing  from  our  right  upon  the  other  side  of  the  Antietam, 
and  engaging  the  enemy  between  us  and  the  East  Wood. 
The  Confederate  lines  facing  them  now  also  rose  into 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  424.  2  Ibid. 


334          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

view.  From  our  position  we  looked,  as  it  were,  down 
between  the  opposing  lines  as  if  they  had  been  the  sides 
of  a  street,  and  as  the  fire  opened  we  saw  wounded  men 
carried  to  the  rear  and  stragglers  making  off.  Our  lines 
halted,  and  we  were  tortured  with  anxiety  as  we  specu 
lated  whether  our  men  would  charge  or  retreat.  The 
enemy  occupied  lines  of  fences  and  stone  walls,  and  their 
batteries  made  gaps  in  the  National  ranks.  Our  long- 
range  guns  were  immediately  turned  in  that  direction, 
and  we  cheered  every  well-aimed  shot.  One  of  our 
shells  blew  up  a  caisson  close  to  the  Confederate  line. 
This  contest  was  going  on,  and  it  was  yet  uncertain 
which  would  succeed,  when  one  of  McClellan's  staff  rode 
up  with  an  order  to  Burnside.  The  latter  turned  to  me, 
saying  we  were  ordered  to  make  our  attack.  I  left  the 
hill-top  at  once  to  give  personal  supervision  to  the  move 
ment  ordered,  and  did  not  return  to  it.  My  knowledge 
by  actual  vision  of  what  occurred  on  the  right  ceased. 

The  question  at  what  hour  Burnside  received  this 
order,  has  been  warmly  disputed.  The  manner  in  which 
we  had  waited,  the  free  discussion  of  what  was  occurring 
under  our  eyes  and  of  our  relation  to  it,  the  public  receipt 
of  the  order  by  Burnside  in  the  usual  and  business-like 
form,  all  forbid  the  supposition  that  this  was  any  reit 
eration  of  a  former  order.1  If  then  we  can  determine 

1  I  leave  this  as  originally  written,  although  the  order  itself  has  since 
come  to  light ;  for  the  discussion  of  the  circumstantial  evidence  may  be 
useful  in  determining  the  value  of  McClellan's  report  of  1863  where  it 
differs  in  other  respects  from  his  original  report  of  1862  and  from  other 
contemporaneous  documents. 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
MAJOR-GENERAL  BURNSIDE:  September  17, 1862,  — 9.10 A.M. 

GENERAL,  —  General  Franklin's  command  is  within  one  mile  and  a  half 
of  here.  General  McClellan  desires  you  to  open  your  attack.  As  soon  as 
you  shall  have  uncovered  the  upper  stone  bridge  you  will  be  supported,  and, 
if  necessary,  on  your  own  line  of  attack.  So  far  all  is  going  well. 

Respectfully,     GEO.  D.  RUGGLES,  Colonel,  etc." 

This  order  appears  in  the  supplementary  volume  of  the  Official  Records, 
vol.  li.  pt.  i.  p.  844.  From  Pry's  house,  where  McClellan's  headquarters  were 


ANTIETAM:    THE   FIGHT  ON  THE   LEFT      335 

whose  troops  we  saw  engaged,  we  shall  know  something 
of  the  time  of  day;  for  there  has  been  a  general  agree 
ment  reached  as  to  the  hours  of  movement  of  Sumner's 
divisions  during  the  forenoon  on  the  right  and  right 
centre.  The  official  map  settles  this.  No  lines  of  our 
troops  were  engaged  in  the  direction  of  Bloody  Lane  and 
the  Rullett  farm-house,  and  between  the  latter  and  our 
station  on  the  hill,  till  French's  division  made  its  attack. 
We  saw  them  distinctly  on  the  hither  side  of  the  farm 
buildings,  upon  the  open  ground,  considerably  nearer 
to  us  than  the  Dunker  Church  or  the  East  Wood.  In 
number  we  took  them  to  be  a  corps.  The  place,  the  cir 
cumstances,  all  fix  it  beyond  controversy  that  they  were 
French's  men  or  French's  and  Richardson's.  No  others 
fought  on  that  part  of  the  field  until  Franklin  went  to 
their  assistance  at  noon  or  later.  The  incident  of  their 
advance  and  the  explosion  of  the  caisson  was  illustrated 
by  the  pencil  of  Mr.  Forbes  on  the  spot,  and  was  placed 
by  him  at  the  time  Franklin's  head  of  column  was  ap 
proaching  from  the  direction  of  Rohrersville,  which  was 
about  ten  o'clock.1 

It  seems  now  very  clear  that  about  ten  o'clock  in  the 
morning  was  the  great  crisis  in  this  battle.  The  sudden 
and  complete  rout  of  Sedgwick's  division  was  not  easily 
accounted  for,  and,  with  McClellan's  theory  of  the  enor 
mous  superiority  of  Lee's  numbers,  it  looked  as  if  the 
Confederate  general  had  massed  overwhelming  forces  on 
our  right.  Sumner's  notion  that  Hooker's  corps  was 
utterly  dispersed  was  naturally  accepted,  and  McClellan 
limited  his  hopes  to  holding  on  at  the  East  Wood  and  the 

that  day,  to  Burnside's,  was  over  two  miles  as  the  crow  flies.  This  establishes 
the  accuracy  of  the  original  reports  of  both,  which  stated  the  hour  of 
receipt  at  ten  o'clock.  It  corroborates  also  the  time  of  Franklin's  arrival 
on  the  field,  and  the  connection  of  this  with  Burnside's  advance. 

1  Forbes's  sketch  is  reproduced  in  "  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil 
War,"  vol.  ii.  p.  647,  and  is  of  historical  importance  in  connection  with  the 
facts  stated  above. 


336          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Poffenberger  hill,  where  Hooker's  batteries  were  massed 
and  supported  by  the  troops  that  had  been  rallied  there. 
Franklin's  corps,  as  it  came  on  the  field,  was  detained  to 
support  the  threatened  right  centre,  and  McClellan  deter 
mined  to  help  it  further  by  a  demonstration  upon  the 
extreme  left  by  the  Ninth  Corps.  At  this  time,  there 
fore,  he  gave  his  order  to  Burnside  to  cross  the  Antietam 
and  attack  the  enemy,  thus  creating  a  diversion  in  favor 
of  our  hard-pressed  right.  His  preliminary  report  of  the 
battle  (dated  October  16,  1862)  explicitly  states  that  the 
order  to  Burnside  to  attack  was  "  communicated  to  him 
at  ten  o'clock  A.M."  This  exactly  agrees  with  the  time 
stated  by  Burnside  in  his  official  report,  and  would  ordi 
narily  be  quite  conclusive.1 

In  the  book  published  in  1864  as  his  official  report  of 
his  whole  military  career,  McClellan  says  he  ordered 
Burnside  to  make  this  attack  at  eight  o'clock.  The 
circumstances  under  which  his  final  published  state 
ments  were  made  take  away  from  them  the  character  of 
a  calm  and  judicial  correction  of  his  first  report.  He 
was  then  a  general  set  aside  from  active  service  and  a 
political  aspirant  to  the  Presidency.  His  book  was  a 
controversial  one,  issued  as  an  argument  to  the  public, 
and  the  earlier  report  must  be  regarded  in  a  military 
point  of  view  as  the  more  authoritative  unless  good 
grounds  are  given  for  the  changes.  When  he  wrote  his 
preliminary  report  he  certainly  knew  the  hour  and  the 
condition  of  affairs  on  the  field  when  he  gave  the  order 
to  Burnside.  To  do  so  at  eight  o'clock  would  not  accord 
with  his  plan  of  battle.2  His  purpose  had  been  to  move 
the  Ninth  Corps  against  the  enemy  "when  matters  looked 
favorably "  on  our  right,  after  an  attack  by  Hooker, 
Mansfield,  and  Sumner,  supported,  if  necessary,  by  Frank 
lin.  But  Sumner's  attack  was  not  made  till  after  nine, 
and  Franklin's  head  of  column  did  not  reach  the  field  till 

1  See  note,  p.  334,  ante,    C.  W.,  pt.  i.  p.  41  ;  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  31, 416. 

2  Id.,  pp.  30,  55. 


ANTIETAMi    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  LEFT      337 

ten.  McClellan's  book,  indeed,  erroneously  postpones 
Franklin's  arrival  till  past  noon,  which,  if  true,  would 
tend  to  explain  why  the  day  wore  away  without  any 
further  activity  on  the  right;  but  the  preliminary  re 
port  better  agrees  with  Franklin's  when  it  says  that 
officer  reached  the  field  about  an  hour  after  Sedgwick's 
disaster.1 

Still  further,  matters  had  at  no  time  "looked  favor 
ably"  on  the  right  up  to  ten  o'clock.  The  condition, 
therefore,  which  was  assumed  as  precedent  to  Burnside's 
movement,  never  existed ;  and  this  was  better  known  to 
McClellan  than  to  any  one  else,  for  he  received  the  first 
discouraging  reports  after  Mansfield  fell,  and  the  subse 
quent  alarming  ones  when  Sedgwick  was  routed.  Burn- 
side's  report  was  dated  on  the  3Oth  of  September,  within 
two  weeks  of  the  battle,  and  at  a  time  when  public  dis 
cussion  of  the  incomplete  results  of  the  battle  was  ani 
mated.  It  was  made  after  he  had  in  his  hands  my  own 
report  as  his  immediate  subordinate,  in  which  I  had 
given  about  nine  o'clock  as  my  remembrance  of  the  time.2 
As  I  directed  the  details  of  the  action  at  the  bridge  in 
obedience  to  this  order,  it  would  have  been  easy  for  him 
to  have  accepted  the  hour  named  by  me,  for  I  should 
have  been  answerable  for  any  delay  in  execution  after 
that  time.  But  he  then  had  in  his  possession  the  order 
which  came  to  him  upon  the  hill-top  overlooking  the 
field,  and  no  officer  in  the  whole  army  has  a  better  estab 
lished  reputation  for  candor  and  freedom  from  any  wish 
to  avoid  full  personal  responsibility  for  his  acts.  It  was 
not  till  his  report  was  published  in  the  Official  Records 
(i887)3  that  I  saw  it  or  learned  its  contents,  although  I 
enjoyed  his  personal  friendship  down  to  his  death.  He 
was  content  to  have  stated  the  fact  as  he  knew  it,  and 
did  not  feel  the  need  of  debating  it.  The  circumstances 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  30,  61,  376.         *  Id.,  p.  424.        3  Id.,  p.  416. 

VOL.    I. —  22 


338          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

have  satisfied   me  that  his  accuracy  in  giving  the  hour 
was  greater  than  my  own.1 

It  will  not  be  wondered  at,  therefore,  if  to  my  mind 
the  story  of  the  eight  o'clock  order  is  an  instance  of  the 
way  in  which  an  erroneous  recollection  is  based  upon  the 
desire  to  make  the  facts  accord  with  a  theory.  The  actual 
time  must  have  been  as  much  later  than  nine  o'clock  as 
the  period  during  which,  with  absorbed  attention,  we  had 
been  watching  the  battle  on  the  right,  —  a  period,  it  is 
safe  to  say,  much  longer  than  it  seemed  to  us.  The 
judgment  of  the  hour  which  I  gave  in  my  report  was 
merely  my  impression  from  passing  events,  for  I  hastened 
at  once  to  my  own  duties  without  thinking  to  look  at  my 
watch;  whilst  the  cumulative  evidence  seems  to  prove, 
conclusively,  that  the  time  stated  by  Burnside,  and  by 
McClellan  himself  in  his  original  report,  is  correct. 
The  order,  then,  to  Burnside  to  attack  was  not  sent  at 
eight  o'clock,  but  reached  him  at  ten;  it  was  not  sent  to 
follow  up  an  advantage  gained  by  Hooker  and  Sumner, 
but  to  create,  if  possible,  a  strong  diversion  in  favor  of 
the  imperilled  right  wing  when  the  general  outlook  was 
far  from  reassuring. 

McClellan  truly  said,  in  his  original  report,  that  the 
task  of  carrying  the  bridge  in  front  of  Burnside  was  a 
difficult  one.2  The  hill  on  which  I  have  placed  the  sta 
tion  of  General  Burnside  was  the  bolder  and  more  promi 
nent  crest  of  the  line  of  hills  which  skirted  the  Antietam 
on  the  east,  and  was  broken  by  depressions  here  and 
there,  through  which  the  country  roads  ran  down  to  the 
stream.  Such  a  hollow  was  just  at  the  south  of  Burn- 
side's  position  at  the  haystack  on  the  Rohrback  farm. 
In  rear  of  him  and  a  little  lower  down  were  the  farm 

1  Upon  reflection,  I  think  it  probable  that  the  order  from  McClellan  was 
read  to  me,  and  that  I  thus  got  the  hour  of  its  date  connected  in  my  mind 
with  the  beginning  of  our  attack. 

2  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  31. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  LEFT       339 

buildings,  and  from  these  a  road  ran  down  the  winding 
hollow  to  the  Antietam,  but  reached  the  stream  several 
hundred  yards  below  the  bridge.  Following  the  road, 
therefore,  it  was  necessary  to  turn  up  stream  upon  the 
narrow  space  between  the  hills  and  the  water,  without 
any  cover  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy  on  the  opposite  side. 
The  bluffs  on  that  side  were  wooded  to  the  water's  edge, 
and  were  so  steep  that  the  road  from  the  bridge  could  not 
go  up  at  right  angles  to  the  bank,  but  forked  both  ways 
and  sought  the  upper  land  by  a  more  gradual  ascent  to 
right  and  left.  The  fork  to  the  right  ran  around  a 
shoulder  of  the  hill  into  a  ravine  which  there  reaches  the 
Antietam,  and  thence  ascends  by  an  easy  grade  toward 
Sharpsburg.  The  left  branch  of  the  road  rises  by  a  simi 
lar  but  less  marked  depression. 

These  roads  were  faced  by  stone  fences,  and  the  depth 
of  the  valley  and  its  course  made  it  impossible  to  reach 
the  enemy's  position  at  the  bridge  by  artillery  fire  from 
the  hill-tops  on  our  side.  Not  so  from  the  enemy's  posi 
tion,  for  the  curve  of  the  valley  was  such  that  it  was 
perfectly  enfiladed  near  the  bridge  by  the  Confederate 
batteries  at  the  position  now  occupied  by  the  National 
Cemetery.  The  bridge  itself  was  a  stone  structure  of 
three  arches  with  stone  parapets  on  the  sides.  These 
curved  outward  at  the  end  of  the  bridge  to  allow  for  the 
turn  of  the  roadway.  On  the  enemy's  side,  the  stone 
fences  came  down  close  to  the  bridge. 

The  Confederate  defence  of  the  passage  was  intrusted 
to  D.  R.  Jones's  division  of  six  brigades,1  which  was  the 
one  Longstreet  himself  had  disciplined  and  led  till  he 
was  assigned  to  a  larger  command.  Toombs's  brigade 
was  placed  in  advance,  occupying  the  defences  of  the 
bridge  itself  and  the  wooded  slopes  above,  while  the 
other  brigades  supported  him,  covered  by  the  ridges 
which  looked  down  upon  the  valley.  The  division  bat- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  804. 


340         REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL   WAR 

teries  were  supplemented  by  others  from  the  enemy's 
reserve,  and  the  valley,  the  bridge,  and  the  ford  below 
were  under  the  direct  and  powerful  fire  of  shot  and 
shell  from  the  Confederate  cannon.  '  Toombs's  force, 
thus  strongly  supported,  was  as  large  as  could  be  dis 
posed  of  at  the  head  of  the  bridge,  and  abundantly  large 
for  resistance  to  any  that  could  be  brought  against  it. 
Our  advance  upon  the  bridge  could  only  be  made  by  a 
narrow  column,  showing  a  front  of  eight  men  at  most; 
but  the  front  which  Toombs  deployed  behind  his  defences 
was  three  or  four  hundred  yards  both  above  and  below 
the  bridge.  He  himself  says  in  his  report : 1  "  From  the 
nature  of  the  ground  on  the  other  side,  the  enemy  were 
compelled  to  approach  mainly  by  the  road  which  led  up 
the  river  near  three  hundred  paces  parallel  with  my  line 
of  battle  and  distant  therefrom  from  fifty  to  a  hundred 
and  fifty  feet,  thus  exposing  his  flank  to  a  destructive 
fire  the  most  of  that  distance."  Under  such  circum 
stances  the  Confederate  position  was  nearly  impregnable 
against  a  direct  attack  over  the  bridge;  for  the  column 
approaching  it  was  not  only  exposed  at  almost  pistol- 
range  to  the  perfectly  covered  infantry  of  the  enemy  and 
to  two  batteries  which  were  assigned  to  the  special  duty 
of  supporting  Toombs,  having  the  exact  range  of  the 
little  valley  with  their  shrapnel;  but,  if  it  should  succeed 
in  reaching  the  bridge,  its  charge  across  it  must  be  made 
under  a  fire  ploughing  through  its  length,  the  head 
of  the  column  melting  away  as  it  advanced,  so  that, 
as  every  soldier  knows,  it  could  show  no  front  strong 
enough  to  make  an  impression  upon  the  enemy's  breast 
works,  even  if  it  should  reach  the  other  side.  As  a 
desperate  sort  of  diversion  in  favor  of  the  right  wing, 
it  might  be  justifiable;  but  I  believe  that  no  officer  or 
man  who  knew  the  actual  situation  at  that  bridge  thinks 
that  a  serious  attack  upon  it  was  any  part  of  McClellan's 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  890. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  LEFT      341 

original  plan.  Yet,  in  his  detailed  report  of  1863,  in 
stead  of  speaking  of  it  as  the  difficult  task  the  original 
report  had  called  it,  he  treats  it  as  little  different  from 
a  parade  or  march  across  which  might  have  been  done  in 
half  an  hour. 

Burnside's  view  of  the  matter  was  that  the  front  attack 
at  the  bridge  was  so  difficult  that  the  passage  by  the  ford 
below  must  be  an  important  factor  in  the  task;  for  if 
Rodman's  division  should  succeed  in  getting  across  there, 
at  the  bend  of  the  Antietam,  he  would  come  up  in  rear 
of  Toombs,  and  either  the  whole  of  D.  R.  Jones's  divi 
sion  would  have  to  advance  to  meet  Rodman,  or  Toombs 
must  abandon  the  bridge.  In  this  I  certainly  concurred, 
and  Rodman  was  ordered  to  push  rapidly  for  the  ford. 
It  is  important  to  remember,  however,  that  Walker's 
Confederate  division  had  been  posted  during  the  earlier 
morning  to  hold  that  part  of  the  Antietam  line,  support 
ing  Toombs  as  well,1  and  it  was  probably  from  him  that 
Rodman  suffered  the  first  casualties  that  occurred  in  his 
ranks.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  Walker  had  been  called 
away  by  Lee  only  an  hour  before,  and  had  made  the 
hasty  march  by  the  rear  of  Sharpsburg  to  fall  upon  Sedg- 
wick.  If  therefore  Rodman  had  been  sent  to  cross  at 
eight  o'clock,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  his  column,  fording 
the  stream  in  the  face  of  Walker's  deployed  division, 
would  never  have  reached  the  further  bank,  —  a  con 
tingency  that  McClellan  did  not  consider  when  arguing, 
long  afterward,  the  favorable  results  that  might  have 
followed  an  earlier  attack.  As  Rodman  died  upon  the 
field,  no  full  report  for  his  division  was  made,  and  we 
only  know  that  he  met  with  some  resistance  from  both 
infantry  and  artillery;  that  the  winding  of  the  stream 
made  his  march  longer  than  he  anticipated,  and  that,  in 
fact,  he  only  approached  the  rear  of  Toombs's  position 
from  that  direction  about  the  time  when  our  last  and 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  914. 


342          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

successful  charge   upon   the   bridge  was  made,  between 
noon  and  one  o'clock. 

The  attacks  at  the  Burnside  bridge  were  made  under 
my  own  eye.     Sturgis's  division  occupied  the  centre  of 
our  line,  with  Crook's  brigade  of  the  Kanawha  division 
on  his  right  front,  and  Willcox's  division  in  reserve,  as 
I  have  already  stated.     Crook's  position  was  somewhat 
above  the  bridge,  but  it  was  thought  that  by  advancing 
part  of  Sturgis's  men  to  the  brow  of  the  hill,  they  could 
cover   the  advance   of    Crook,   and  that  the  latter  could 
make  a  straight  dash  down  the  hill  to  our  end  of  the 
bridge.     The  orders  were  accordingly  given,  and  Crook 
advanced,  covered  by  the  Eleventh  Connecticut  (of  Rod 
man's)    under    Colonel    Kingsbury,    deployed    as    skir 
mishers.1     In  passing  over  the  spurs  of  the  hills,  Crook 
came  out  on  the  bank  of  the  stream  above  the  bridge  and 
found  himself   under  a  heavy  fire  at  short   range.     He 
faced  the  enemy  and  returned  the  fire,  getting  such  cover 
for  his  men  as  he  could  and  trying  to  drive  off  or  silence 
his  opponents.     The  engagement  was  one  in  which  the 
Antietam  prevented  the  combatants  from  coming  to  close 
quarters,  but  it  was  none  the  less  vigorously  continued 
with  musketry  fire.     Crook  reported  that  his  hands  were 
full  and  that  he  could  not  approach  closer  to  the  bridge. 
Later  in  the  contest,  his  men,   lining  the  stream,  made 
experiments  in  trying  to  get  over,  and  found  a  fordable 
place  a  little  way  above,  by  which  he  got  over  five  com 
panies  of  the  Twenty-eighth  Ohio  at  about  the  same  time 
,as  the  final  and  successful  charge.     But  on  the  failure  of 
Crook's  first  effort,  Sturgis  ordered  forward  an  attacking 
column  from  Nagle's  brigade,  supported  and  covered  by 
Ferrero's  brigade,  which  took  position  in  a  field  of  corn 
on  one  of  the  lower  slopes  of  the  hill  opposite  the  head 
of   the  bridge.     The  whole  front  was  carefully  covered 
with  skirmishers,  and  our  batteries  on  the  heights  over- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  419,  424. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  LEFT      343 

head  were  ordered  to  keep  down  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
artillery.  Nagle's  effort  was  gallantly  made,  but  it 
failed,  and  his  men  were  forced  to  seek  cover  behind  the 
spur  of  the  hill  from  which  they  had  advanced.1  We 
were  constantly  hoping  to  hear  something  from  Rod 
man's  advance  by  the  ford,  and  would  gladly  have  waited 
for  some  more  certain  knowledge  of  his  progress,  but  at 
this  time  McClellan's  sense  of  the  necessity  of  relieving 
the  right  was  such  that  he  was  sending  reiterated  orders 
to  push  the  assault.  Not  only  were  these  forwarded  to 
me,  but  to  give  added  weight  to  my  instructions,  Burn- 
side  sent  direct  to  Sturgis  urgent  messages  to  carry  the 
bridge  at  all  hazards. 

I  directed  Sturgis  to  take  two  regiments  from  Ferrero's 
brigade,  which  had  not  been  engaged,  and  make  a  column 
by  moving  them  together  by  the  flank,  the  one  left  in 
front  and  the  other  right  in  front,  side  by  side,  so  that 
when  they  passed  the  bridge  they  could  turn  to  left  and 
right,  forming  line  as  they  advanced  on  the  run.  He 
chose  the  Fifty-first  New  York,  Colonel  Robert  B. 
Potter,  and  the  Fifty-first  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  John  F. 
Hartranft  (both  names  afterward  greatly  distinguished), 
and  both  officers  and  men  were  made  to  feel  the  necessity 
of  success.2  At  the  same  time  Crook  succeeded  in  bring 
ing  a  light  howitzer  of  Simmonds's  mixed  battery  down 
from  the  hill-tops,  and  placed  it  where  it  had  a  point- 
blank  fire  on  the  further  end  of  the  bridge.  The  howitzer 
was  one  we  had  captured  in  West  Virginia,  and  had  been 
added  to  the  battery,  which  was  partly  made  up  of  heavy 
rifled  Parrott  guns.  When  everything  was  ready,  a 
heavy  skirmishing  fire  was  opened  all  along  the  bank, 
the  howitzer  threw  in  double  charges  of  canister,  and  in 
scarcely  more  time  than  it  takes  to  tell  it,  the  bridge  was 
passed  and  Toombs's  brigade  fled  through  the  woods  and 
over  the  top  of  the  hill.  The  charging  regiments  were 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  444.  2  Ibid. 


344         REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

advanced  in  line  to  the  crest  above  the  bridge  as  soon  as 
they  were  deployed,  and  the  rest  of  Sturgis's  division, 
with  Crook's  brigade,  were  immediately  brought  over  to 
strengthen  the  line.  These  were  soon  joined  by  Rod 
man's  division,  with  Scammon's  brigade,  which  had 
crossed  at  the  ford,  and  whose  presence  on  that  side  of 
the  stream  had  no  doubt  made  the  final  struggle  of 
Toombs's  men  less  obstinate  than  it  would  otherwise 
have  been,  the  fear  of  being  taken  in  rear  having  always 
a  strong  moral  effect  upon  even  the  best  of  troops. 

It  was  now  about  one  o'clock,  and  nearly  three  hours 
had  been  spent  in  a  bitter  and  bloody  contest  across  the 
narrow  stream.  The  successive  efforts  to  carry  the  bridge 
had  been  as  closely  following  each  other  as  possible. 
Each  had  been  a  fierce  combat,  in  which  the  men  with 
wonderful  courage  had  not  easily  accepted  defeat,  and 
even,  when  not  able  to  cross  the  bridge,  had  made  use  of 
the  walls  at  the  end,  the  fences,  and  every  tree  and  stone 
as  cover,  while  they  strove  to  reach  with  their  fire  their 
well-protected  and  nearly  concealed  opponents.  The 
lulls  in  the  fighting  had  been  short,  and  only  to  prepare 
new  efforts.  The  severity  of  the  work  was  attested  by 
our  losses,  which,  before  the  crossing  was  won,  exceeded 
500  men,  and  included  some  of  our  best  officers,  such  as 
Colonel  Kingsbury  of  the  Eleventh  Connecticut,  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  Bell  of  the  Fifty-first  Pennsylvania,  and 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Coleman  of  the  Eleventh  Ohio,  two 
of  them  commanding  regiments.1  The  proportion  of 
casualties  to  the  number  engaged  was  much  greater  than 
common;  for  the  nature  of  the  combat  required  that 
comparatively  few  troops  should  be  exposed  at  once,  the 
others  remaining  under  cover. 

Our  next  task  was  to  prepare  to  hold  the  heights  we 
had  gained  against  the  return  assault  of  the  enemy  which 
we  expected,  and  to  reply  to  the  destructive  fire  from 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  427. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  LEFT      345 

the  enemy's  abundant  artillery.  Light  batteries  were 
brought  over  and  distributed  in  the  line.  The  men  were 
made  to  lie  down  behind  the  crest  to  save  them  from  the 
concentrated  cannonade  which  the  enemy  opened  upon  us 
as  soon  as  Toombs's  regiments  succeeded  in  reaching 
their  main  line.  But  McClellan's  anticipation  of  an 
overwhelming  attack  upon  his  right  was  so  strong  that  he 
determined  still  to  press  our  advance,  and  sent  orders 
accordingly.  The  ammunition  of  Sturgis's  and  Crook's 
men  had  been  nearly  exhausted,  and  it  was  imperative 
that  they  should  be  freshly  supplied  before  entering  into 
another  engagement.  Sturgis  also  reported  his  men  so 
exhausted  by  their  efforts  as  to  be  unfit  for  an  immediate 
advance.  On  this  I  sent  to  Burnside  the  request  that 
Willcox's  division  be  sent  over,  with  an  ammunition 
train,  and  that  Sturgis's  division  be  replaced  by  the 
fresh  troops,  remaining,  however,  on  the  west  side  of 
the  stream  as  support  to  the  others.  This  was  done  as 
rapidly  as  was  practicable,  where  everything  had  to  pass 
down  the  steep  hill-road  and  through  so  narrow  a  defile  as 
the  bridge.1  Still,  it  was  three  o'clock  before  these 
changes  and  preparations  could  be  made.  Burnside  had 
personally  striven  to  hasten  them,  and  had  come  over  to 
the  west  bank  to  consult  and  to  hurry  matters,  and  took 
his  share  of  personal  peril,  for  he  came  at  a  time  when 
the  ammunition  wagons  were  delivering  cartridges,  and 
the  road  at  the  end  of  the  bridge  where  they  were  was 
in  the  range  of  the  enemy's  constant  and  accurate  fire. 
It  is  proper  to  mention  this  because  it  has  been  said  that 
he  did  not  cross  the  stream.  The  criticisms  made  by 
McClellan  as  to  the  time  occupied  in  these  changes  and 
movements  will  not  seem  forcible  if  one  will  compare 
them  with  any  similar  movements  on  the  field;  such  as 

1  As  a  mode  of  ready  reckoning,  it  is  usual  to  assume  that  a  division 
requires  an  hour  to  march  past  a  given  point  by  the  flank.  With  the  cross 
ing  of  an  ammunition  train,  the  interval  of  time  is  more  than  accounted  for. 


346          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Mansfield's  to  support  Hooker,  or  Sumner's  or  Frank 
lin's  to  reach  the  scene  of  action.  About  this,  however, 
there  is  fair  room  for  difference  of  opinion:  what  I  per 
sonally  know  is  that  it  would  have  been  folly  to  advance 
again  before  Willcox  had  relieved  Sturgis,  and  that  as 
soon  as  the  fresh  troops  reported  and  could  be  put  in  line, 
the  order  to  advance  was  given.  McClellan  is  in  accord 
with  all  other  witnesses  in  declaring  that  when  the  move 
ment  began,  the  conduct  of  the  troops  was  gallant  beyond 
criticism. 

Willcox's  division  formed  the  right,  Christ's  brigade 
being  north,  and  Welsh's  brigade  south  of  the  road  lead 
ing  from  the  bridge  to  Sharpsburg.  Crook's  brigade  of 
the  Kanawha  division  supported  Willcox.  Rodman's 
division  formed  on  the  left,  Harland's  brigade  having  the 
position  on  the  flank,  and  Fairchild's  uniting  with  Will 
cox  at  the  centre.  Scammon's  brigade  was  the  reserve 
for  Rodman  at  the  extreme  left.1  Sturgis's  division  re 
mained  and  held  the  crest  of  the  hill  above  the  bridge. 
About  half  of  the  batteries  of  the  divisions  accompanied 
the  movement,  the  rest  being  in  position  on  the  hill-tops 
east  of  the  Antietam.  The  advance  necessarily  followed 
the  high  ground  toward  Sharpsburg,  and  as  the  enemy 
made  strongest  resistance  toward  our  right,  the  move 
ment  curved  in  that  direction,  the  six  brigades  of  Jones's 
Confederate  division  being  deployed  diagonally  across 
our  front,  holding  the  stone  fences  and  crests  of  the 
cross-ridges  and  aided  by  abundant  artillery,  in  which 
arm  the  enemy  was  particularly  strong. 

The  battle  was  a  fierce  one  from  the  moment  Willcox's 
men  showed  themselves  on  the  open  ground.  Christ's 
brigade,  taking  advantage  of  all  the  cover  the  trees  and 
inequalities  of  surface  gave  them,  pushed  on  along  the 
depression  in  which  the  road  ran,  a  section  of  artillery 
keeping  pace  with  them  in  the  road.  The  direction  of 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  425,  430. 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  LEFT      347 

movement  brought  all  the  brigades  of  the  first  line  in 
echelon,  but  Welsh  soon  fought  his  way  up  beside  Christ, 
and  they  together  drove  the  enemy  successively  from  the 
fields  and  farm-yards  till  they  reached  the  edge  of  the 
village.  Upon  the  elevation  on  the  right  of  the  road  was 
an  orchard  in  which  the  shattered  and  diminished  force 
of  Jones  made  a  final  stand,  but  Willcox  concentrated  his 
artillery  fire  upon  it,  and  his  infantry  was  able  to  push 
forward  and  occupy  it.  They  now  partly  occupied  the 
town  of  Sharpsburg,  and  held  the  high  ground  command 
ing  it  on  the  southeast,  where  the  National  Cemetery 
now  is.1  The  struggle  had  been  long  and  bloody.  It 
was  half-past  four  in  the  afternoon,  and  ammunition  had 
again  run  low,  for  the  wagons  had  not  been  able  to 
accompany  the  movement.  Willcox  paused  for  his  men 
to  take  breath  again  and  to  fetch  up  some  cartridges; 
but  meanwhile  affairs  were  taking  a  serious  turn  on  the 
left 

As  Rodman's  division  went  forward,  he  found  the 
enemy  before  him  seemingly  detached  from  Willcox's 
opponents,  and  occupying  ridges  on  his  left  front,  so 
that  he  was  not  able  to  keep  his  own  connection  with 
Willcox  in  the  swinging  movement  to  the  right.  Still, 
he  made  good  progress  in  the  face  of  stubborn  resistance, 
though  finding  the  enemy  constantly  developing  more  to 
his  left,  and  the  interval  between  him  and  Willcox  wid 
ening.  The  view  of  the  field  to  the  south  was  now  ob 
structed  by  fields  of  tall  Indian  corn,  and  under  this  cover 
Confederate  troops  approached  the  flank  in  line  of  battle. 
Scammon's  officers  in  the  reserve  saw  them  as  soon  as 
Rodman's  brigades  echeloned,  as  these  were  toward  the 
front  and  right.  This  hostile  force  proved  to  be  A.  P. 
Hill's  division  of  six  brigades,  the  last  of  Jackson's  force 
to  leave  Harper's  Ferry,  and  which  had  reached  Sharps- 
burg  since  noon.  Those  first  seen  by  Scammon's  men 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  431. 


348          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

were  dressed  in  the  National  blue  uniforms  which  they 
had  captured  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  it  was  assumed  that 
they  were  part  of  our  own  forces  till  they  began  to  fire.1 
Scammon  quickly  changed  front  to  the  left,  drove  back 
the  enemy  before  him,  and  occupied  a  line  of  stone 
fences,  which  he  held  until  he  was  afterward  withdrawn 
from  it.2  Harland's  brigade  was  partly  moving  in  the 
corn-fields.  One  of  his  regiments  was  new,  having  been 
organized  only  three  weeks,  and  the  brigade  had  some 
what  lost  its  order  and  connection  when  the  sudden 
attack  came.  Rodman  directed  Colonel  Harland  to  lead 
the  right  of  the  brigade,  while  he  himself  attempted  to 
bring  the  left  into  position.  In  performing  this  duty  he 
fell,  mortally  wounded.  Harland's  horse  was  shot  under 
him,  and  the  brigade  broke  in  confusion  after  a  brief 
effort  of  its  right  wing  to  hold  on.  Fairchild  also  now 
received  the  fire  on  his  left,  and  was  forced  to  fall  back 
and  change  front.3 

Being  at  the  centre  when  this  break  occurred  on  the 
left,  I  saw  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  continue  the 
movement  to  the  right,  and  sent  instant  orders  to  Will- 
cox  and  Crook  to  retire  the  left  of  their  line,  and  to 
Sturgis  to  come  forward  into  the  gap  made  in  Rodman's. 
The  troops  on  the  right  swung  back  in  perfect  order; 
Scammon' s  brigade  hung  on  at  its  stone  wall  at  the 
extreme  left  with  unflinching  tenacity  till  Sturgis  had 
formed  on  the  curving  hill  in  rear  of  them,  and  Rod 
man's  had  found  refuge  behind.  Willcox's  left  then 
united  with  Sturgis,  and  Scammon  was  withdrawn  to  a 
new  position  on  the  left  flank  of  the  whole  line.  That 
these  manoeuvres  on  the  field  were  really  performed  in 
good  order  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  although  the 
break  in  Rodman's  line  was  a  bad  one,  the  enemy  was 
not  able  to  capture  many  prisoners,  the  whole  number  of 
missing,  out  of  the  2349  casualties  which  the  Ninth 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  468.        2  Id.,  p.  466.        8  Id.,  pp.  451,  453. 


ANTIETAM:   THE  FIGHT  ON   THE  LEFT      349 

Corps  suffered  in  the  battle,  being  115,  which  includes 
wounded  men  unable  to  leave  the  field.1 

The  enemy  were  not  lacking  in  bold  efforts  to  take 
advantage  of  the  check  we  had  received,  but  were  re 
pulsed  with  severe  punishment,  and  as  the  day  declined 
were  content  to  entrench  themselves  along  the  line  of 
the  road  leading  from  Sharpsburg  to  the  Potomac  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Antietam,  half  a  mile  in  our  front.  The 
men  of  the  Ninth  Corps  lay  that  night  upon  their  arms, 
the  line  being  one  which  rested  with  both  flanks  near  the 
Antietam  and  curved  outward  upon  the  rolling  hill-tops 
which  covered  the  bridge  and  commanded  the  plateau 
between  us  and  the  enemy.  With  my  staff,  I  lay  upon 
the  ground  behind  the  troops,  holding  our  horses  by  the 
bridles  as  we  rested,  for  our  orderlies  were  so  exhausted 
that  we  could  not  deny  them  the  same  chance  for  a  little 
broken  slumber. 

The  Ninth  Corps  occupied  its  position  on  the  heights 
west  of  the  Antietam  without  further  molestation,  except 
an  irritating  picket  firing,  till  the  Confederate  army  re 
treated  on  the  iQth  of  September.  But  the  position  was 
one  in  which  no  shelter  from  the  weather  could  be  had, 
nor  could  any  cooking  be  done;  and  the  troops  were 
short  of  rations.  My  division  wagon-train,  which  I  had 
brought  from  the  West,  here  stood  us  in  good  stead,  for 
the  corps  as  a  whole  was  very  short  of  transportation. 
The  energy  of  Captain  Fitch,  my  quartermaster,  forced 
the  train  back  and  forth  between  us  and  the  nearest  de 
pot  of  supplies,  and  for  several  days  the  whole  corps  had 
the  benefit  of  the  provisions  thus  brought  forward.  Late 
in  the  afternoon  of  Thursday  the  i8th,  Morell's  division 
of  Porter's  corps  was  ordered  to  report  to  Burnside  to 
relieve  the  picket  line  and  some  of  the  regiments  in  the 
most  exposed  position.  One  brigade  was  sent  over  the 
Antietam  for  this  purpose,  and  a  few  of  the  Ninth  Corps 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  200,  427. 


350          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

regiments  were  enabled  to  withdraw  far  enough  to  cook 
some  rations,  of  which  they  had  been  in  need  for  twenty- 
four  hours.1  Harland's  brigade  of  Rodman's  division 
had  been  taken  to  the  east  side  of  the  stream  to  be  re 
organized,  on  the  evening  of  Wednesday  the  i/th.  The 
sounds  heard  within  the  enemy's  lines  by  our  pickets 
gave  an  inkling  of  their  retrograde  movement  in  the 
night  of  Thursday,  and  at  break  of  day  on  Friday  morn 
ing  the  retreat  of  Lee's  whole  army  was  discovered  by 
advancing  the  picket  line.  Reconnoissances  sent  to  the 
front  discovered  that  the  whole  Confederate  army  had 
crossed  the  Potomac. 

The  conduct  of  the  battle  on  the  left  has  given  rise  to 
several  criticisms,  among  which  the  most  prominent  has 
been  that  Porter's  corps,  which  lay  in  reserve,  was  not 
put  in  at  the  same  time  with  the  Ninth  Corps.  It  has 
been  said  that  some  of  them  were  engaged  or  in  support 
of  the  cavalry  and  artillery  at  the  centre.  This  does  not 
appear  to  have  been  so  to  any  important  extent,  for  no 
active  fighting  was  going  on  elsewhere  after  Franklin's 
corps  relieved  Sumner's  about  noon.  McClellan's  reports 
do  not  urge  this.  He  answered  the  criticism  by  saying 
that  he  did  not  think  it  prudent  to  divest  the  centre  of 
all  reserve  troops.  No  doubt  a  single  strong  division, 
marching  beyond  the  left  flank  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  would 
have  so  occupied  A.  P.  Hill's  division  that  our  move 
ment  into  Sharpsburg  could  not  have  been  checked,  and, 
assisted  by  the  advance  of  Sumner  and  Franklin  on  the 
right,  would  apparently  have  made  certain  the  complete 
rout  of  Lee.  As  troops  are  put  in  reserve,  not  to  dimin 
ish  the  army,  but  to  be  used  in  a  pinch,  I  am  convinced 
that  McClellan's  refusal  to  use  them  on  the  left  was  the 
result  of  his  rooted  belief,  through  all  the  day  after  Sedg- 

1  General  Porter  in  his  report  says  Morell  took  the  place  of  the  whole 
Ninth  Corps.  In  this  he  is  entirely  mistaken,  as  the  reports  from  Morell's 
division,  as  well  as  those  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  show. 


ANTIETAM:   THE  FIGHT  ON  THE  LEFT       351 

wick's  defeat,  that  Lee  was  overwhelmingly  superior  in 
force,  and  was  preparing  to  return  a  crushing  blow  upon 
our  right  flank.  He  was  keeping  something  in  hand  to 
fill  a  gap  or  cover  a  retreat,  if  that  wing  should  be  driven 
back.  Except  in  this  way,  also,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  account 
for  the  inaction  of  the  right  during  the  whole  of  our 
engagement  on  the  left.  Looking  at  our  part  of  the 
battle  as  only  a  strong  diversion  to  prevent  or  delay 
Lee's  following  up  his  success  against  Hooker  and  the 
rest,  it  is  intelligible.  I  certainly  so  understood  it  at  the 
time,  as  my  report  witnesses,  and  McClellan's  original 
report  sustains  this  view.1  If  he  had  been  impatient  to 
have  our  attack  delivered  earlier,  he  had  reason  for 
double  impatience  that  Franklin's  fresh  troops  should 
assail  Lee's  left  simultaneously  with  our  assault  of  his 
other  wing,  unless  he  regarded  action  there  as  hopeless, 
and  looked  upon  our  movement  as  a  sort  of  forlorn  hope 
to  keep  Lee  from  following  up  his  advantages. 

But  even  these  are  not  all  the  troublesome  questions  re 
quiring  an  answer.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Franklin's 
corps,  after  forcing  Crampton's  Gap,  had  remained  in 
Pleasant  Valley  between  Rohrersville  and  Boonsboro  until 
Tuesday  night  (i6th  September).  McClellan  then  ordered 
Couch's  division  to  be  sent  to  occupy  Maryland  Heights 
and  observe  the  enemy  in  Harper's  Ferry,  whilst  Frank 
lin  with  Smith's  and  Slocum's  divisions  should  march  to 
the  battle-field  at  daybreak  of  Wednesday.  Why  could 
not  Couch  be  called  up  and  come  on  our  left  as  well  as 
A.  P.  Hill's  division,  which  was  the  last  of  the  Con 
federate  troops  to  leave  the  ferry,  there  being  nothing  to 
observe  after  it  was  gone?  Couch's  division,  coming 
with  equal  pace  with  Hill's  on  the  other  side  of  the  river 
would  have  answered  our  needs  as  well  as  one  from  Por 
ter's  corps.  Hill  came,  but  Couch  did  not.  Yet  even 
then,  a  regiment  of  horse,  watching  that  flank  and  scour- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  31,  426. 


352          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ing  the  country  as  we  swung  forward,  would  have  devel 
oped  Hill's  presence  and  enabled  the  commanding  general 
either  to  stop  our  movement  or  to  take  the  available 
means  to  support  it.  The  cavalry  was  put  to  no  such 
use.  It  occupied  the  centre  of  the  whole  line,  only  its 
artillery  being  engaged  during  the  day.  It  would  have 
been  invaluable  to  Hooker  in  the  morning,  as  it  would 
have  been  to  us  in  the  afternoon. 

McClellan  had  marched  from  Frederick  City  with  the 
information  that  Lee's  army  was  divided,  Jackson  being 
detached  with  a  large  force  to  take  Harper's  Ferry.  He 
had  put  Lee's  strength  at  120,000  men.  Assuming  that 
there  was  still  danger  that  Jackson  might  come  upon  our 
left  with  his  large  force,  and  that  Lee  had  proven  strong 
enough  without  Jackson  to  repulse  three  corps  on  our 
right  and  right  centre,  McClellan  might  have  regarded 
his  own  army  as  divided  also  for  the  purpose  of  meeting 
both  opponents,  and  his  cavalry  would  have  been  upon 
the  flank  of  the  part  with  which  he  was  attacking  Lee ; 
Porter  would  have  been  in  position  to  help  either  part  in 
an  extremity  or  to  cover  a  retreat;  and  Burnside  would 
have  been  the  only  subordinate  available  to  check  Lee's 
apparent  success.  Will  any  other  hypothesis  intelligibly 
account  for  McClellan's  dispositions  and  orders?  The 
error  in  the  above  assumption  would  be  that  McClellan  esti 
mated  Lee's  troops  at  nearly  double  their  actual  numbers, 
and  that  what  was  taken  for  proof  of  Lee's  superiority  in 
force  on  the  field  was  a  series  of  partial  reverses  which  re 
sulted  directly  from  the  piecemeal  and  disjointed  way  in 
which  McClellan's  morning  attacks  had  been  made. 

The  same  explanation  is  the  most  satisfactory  one  that 
I  can  give  for  the  inaction  of  Thursday,  the  i8th  of  Sep 
tember.  Could  McClellan  have  known  the  desperate 
condition  of  most  of  Lee's  brigades,  he  would  also  have 
known  that  his  own  were  in  much  better  case,  badly  as 
they  had  suffered.  I  do  not  doubt  that  most  of  his  sub- 


ANTIETAM:    THE  FIGHT  ON   THE   LEFT      353 

ordinates  discouraged  the  resumption  of  the  attack,  for 
the  belief  in  Lee's  great  preponderance  in  numbers  had 
been  chronic  in  the  army  during  the  whole  year.  That 
belief  was  based  upon  the  inconceivably  mistaken  reports  of 
the  secret-service  organization,  accepted  at  headquarters, 
given  to  the  War  Department  at  Washington  as  a  reason 
for  incessant  demands  of  reinforcements,  and  permeating 
downward  through  the  whole  organization  till  the  error  was 
accepted  as  truth  by  officers  and  men,  and  became  a  factor 
in  their  morale  which  can  hardly  be  overestimated.  The 
result  was  that  Lee  retreated  unmolested  on  the  night  of 
the  1 8th  of  September,  and  that  what  might  have  been  a 
real  and  decisive  success  was  a  drawn  battle  in  which  our 
chief  claim  to  victory  was  the  possession  of  the  field. 

The  numbers  engaged  and  the  losses  on  each  side  have 
been  the  subject  of  unending  dispute.  If  we  take  the 
returns  of  Lee  at  the  beginning  of  his  campaign  against 
Pope,  and  deduct  his  acknowledged  losses,  he  crossed  the 
Potomac  with  over  72,000  men.1  If  we  take  his  returns 
of  September  22,  and  add  the  acknowledged  losses  of  the 
month,  he  had  over  57,ooo.2  McClellan's  87,000  present 
for  duty  is  accepted  by  all,  though  various  causes  consider 
ably  reduced  the  number  he  brought  into  action.  The  best 
collation  of  reports  of  casualties  at  Antietam  gives  12,410 
as  those  on  the  National  side,  and  1 1, 172  on  the  Confeder 
ate.3  Longstreet,  comparing  the  fighting  in  the  fiercest 
battles  of  the  war,  says  "on  no  single  day  in  any  one  of 
them  was  there  such  carnage  as  in  this  fierce  struggle. "  4 

1  See  my  review   of  Henderson's   Stonewall   Jackson,  "The   Nation," 
Nov.  24,  1898,  p.  396. 

2  See  my  review  of  Allan's  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  "  The  Nation," 
Feb.  2,  1893,  p.  86.     Also  reply  to  General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Id.,  Dec.  20,  1894, 
p.  462 ;  Confederate  Statistics,  Id.,  Jan.  24,  1895,  p.  71  ;  Review  of  Ropes's 
Story  of  the  Civil  War,  Id.,  March  9,  1899,  p.  185. 

8  Century  War  Book,  vol.  ii.  p.  603. 
4  From  Manassas  to  Appomattox,  p.  239. 
VOL.  i.  —  23 


CHAPTER  XVII 

MCCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS  —  HIS  REMOVAL  AND  ITS 

CAUSE 

Meeting  Colonel  Key— His  changes  of  opinion  —  His  relations  to  Me- 
Clellan  —  Governor  Dennison's  influence  —  McClellan's  attitude  toward 
Lincoln  —  Burnside's  position  —  The  Harrison  Landing  letter  —  Com 
pared  with  Lincoln's  views  —  Probable  intent  of  the  letter  —  Incident  at 
McClellan's  headquarters— John  W.  Garrett  —  Emancipation  Proclama 
tion—An  after-dinner  discussion  of  it— Contrary  influences  —  Frank 
advice  —  Burnside  and  John  Cochrane  —  General  Order  163  —  Lincoln's 
visit  to  camp  —  Riding  the  field  —  A  review  —  Lincoln's  desire  for 
continuing  the  campaign  —  McClellan's  hesitation  —  His  tactics  of 
discussion  —  His  exaggeration  of  difficulties  —  Effect  on  his  army  — 
Disillusion  a  slow  process  —  Lee's  army  not  better  than  Johnston's  — 
Work  done  by  our  Western  army  —  Difference  in  morale — An  army 
rarely  bolder  than  its  leader  —  Correspondence  between  Halleck  and 
McClellan  —  Lincoln's  remarkable  letter  on  the  campaign  —  The  army 
moves  on  November  2  —  Lee  regains  the  line  covering  Richmond 
—  McClellan  relieved  —  Burnside  in  command. 

WHEN  I  rode  up  with  Burnside  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  1 5th  September,  in  the  group  around 
McClellan  I  met  Judge  Key,  whom  I  had  not  seen  since 
we  parted  in  the  Ohio  Senate  in  April  of  the  preceding 
year.  He  was  now  aide-de-camp  on  the  headquarters 
staff  with  the  rank  of  colonel,  and  doing  duty  also  as 
judge-advocate.  When  McClellan  directed  us  to  leave 
the  ridge  because  the  display  of  numbers  attracted  the 
enemy's  fire,  Colonel  Key  took  my  arm  and  we  walked  a 
little  way  down  the  slope  till  we  found  a  fallen  tree,  on 
which  we  sat  down,  whilst  he  plunged  eagerly  into  the 
history  of  his  own  opinions  since  we  had  discussed  the 
causes  of  the  war  in  the  legislature  of  our  State.  He 
told  me  with  earnestness  that  he  had  greatly  modified  his 
views  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  and  he  was  now  satisfied 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS  355 

that  the  war  must  end  in  its  abolition.  The  system  was 
so  plainly  the  soul  of  the  rebellion  and  the  tie  which 
bound  the  seceded  States  together,  that  its  existence  must 
necessarily  depend  upon  the  success  of  the  revolutionary 
movement,  and  it  would  be  a  fair  object  of  attack,  if 
doing  so  would  help  our  cause.  I  was  struck  by  the  zeal 
with  which  he  dashed  into  the  discussion,  forgetful  of 
his  actual  surroundings  in  his  wish  to  make  me  quickly 
understand  the  change  that  had  come  over  his  views  since 
we  parted  at  Columbus.  He  was  so  absorbed  that  even 
when  a  shell  burst  near  us,  he  only  half  gave  it  atten 
tion,  saying  in  a  parenthetical  way  that  he  would  change 
his  position,  as  he  would  "  rather  not  be  hit  in  the  back 
by  one  of  those  confounded  things."  We  had  been  so 
sitting  that  in  facing  me  his  back  was  toward  the  front 
and  the  line  of  fire. 

Colonel  Key  has  been  regarded  by  many  as  McClellan's 
evil  genius,  whose  influence  had  been  dominant  in  the 
general's  political  conduct  and  who  was  therefore  the 
cause  of  his  downfall.  His  influence  on  McClellan  was 
unquestionably  great,  and  what  he  said  to  me  is  an  im 
portant  help  in  understanding  the  general's  conduct  and 
opinions.  It  accords  with  other  statements  of  his  which 
have  been  made  public  by  Judge  William  M.  Dickson  of 
Cincinnati,  who  at  one  time  was  Colonel  Key's  partner 
in  the  practice  of  the  law.1 

General  McClellan  urged  me  to  come  to  his  headquar 
ters  without  ceremony,  and  after  the  battle  of  Antietam 
I  had  several  opportunities  of  unrestrained  discussion  of 
affairs  in  which  he  seemed  entirely  frank  in  giving  me 
his  opinions.  It  was  plainly  evident  that  he  was  sub 
jected  to  a  good  deal  of  pressure  by  opponents  of  the 
administration  to  make  him  commit  himself  to  them. 

1  I  have  failed  in  my  efforts  to  find  a  communication  on  the  subject  in  a 
newspaper,  written  by  Judge  Dickson,  which  he  showed  to  me,  reiterating 
his  statements  in  it. 


356          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

On  the  other  hand,  Governor  Dennison  of  Ohio,  who  was 
his  sincere  friend,  took  every  opportunity  to  counteract 
such  influences  and  to  promote  a  good  understanding  be 
tween  him  and  Mr.  Lincoln.  McClellan  perfectly  knew 
my  own  position  as  an  outspoken  Republican  who  from 
the  first  had  regarded  the  system  of  slavery  as  the  stake 
ventured  by  the  Secessionists  on  their  success  in  the  war, 
and  who  held  to  John  Quincy  Adams's  doctrine  that  the 
war  powers  were  adequate  to  destroy  the  institution  which 
we  could  not  constitutionally  abolish  otherwise.  With 
me,  the  only  question  was  when  the  ripe  time  had  come 
for  action,  and  I  had  looked  forward  to  Mr.  Lincoln's 
proclamation  with  some  impatience  at  the  delay. 

The  total  impression  left  upon  me  by  the  general's 
conversation  was  that  he  agreed  with  Colonel  Key  in 
believing  that  the  war  ought  to  end  in  abolition  of  slav 
ery;  but  he  feared  the  effects  of  haste,  and  thought  the 
steps  toward  the  end  should  be  conservatively  careful  and 
not  brusquely  radical.  I  thought,  and  still  think,  that 
he  regarded  the  President  as  nearly  right  in  his  general 
views  and  political  purposes,  but  overcrowded  by  more 
radical  men  around  him  into  steps  which  as  yet  were 
imprudent  and  extreme.  Such  an  attitude  on  his  part 
made  Governor  Dennison  and  myself  feel  that  there  was 
no  need  of  any  political  quarrel  between  him  and  the 
administration,  and  that  if  he  would  only  rebuff  all  po 
litical  intriguers  and  put  more  aggressive  energy  into  his 
military  operations,  his  career  might  be  a  success  for  the 
country  as  well  as  for  himself.  The  portions  of  his  cor 
respondence  with  Burnside  which  have  become  public 
show  that  the  latter  also  had,  as  a  true  friend,  constantly 
urged  him  to  keep  out  of  political  controversy.  Burnside 
himself,  like  Grant  and  Sherman,  began  with  a  dislike 
of  the  antislavery  movement;  but,  also  like  them,  his 
patriotism  being  the  dominant  quality,  the  natural  effect 
of  fighting  the  Secessionists  was  to  beget  in  him  a  hearty 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS  357 

acceptance  of  the  policy  of  emancipation  to  which  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  been  led  by  the  same  educational  process. 

At  the  time  I  am  speaking  of,  I  knew  nothing  of 
McClellan's  famous  letter  to  the  President  from  Harri 
son's  Landing,  of  July  7,  but  since  it  has  come  to  light,  I 
have  interpreted  it  much  less  harshly  than  many  have 
done.  Reading  it  in  the  light  of  his  talk  during  those 
Antietam  days,  I  think  it  fair  to  regard  it  as  an  effort  to 
show  Mr.  Lincoln  that  they  were  not  far  apart  in  opinion, 
and  to  influence  the  President  to  take  the  more  conserva 
tive  course  to  which  he  thought  him  inclined  when  taking 
counsel  only  of  his  own  judgment.  McClellan  knew  that 
his  "  change  of  base"  to  the  James  River  in  June  was  not 
accepted  as  the  successful  strategy  he  declared  it  to  be, 
and  that  strong  influences  were  at  work  to  remove  him. 
Under  the  guise  of  giving  advice  to  the  President,  he 
was  in  fact  assuring  him  that  he  did  not  look  to  the 
acknowledgment  of  the  Confederacy  as  a  conceivable  out 
come  of  the  war;  that  the  "contraband"  doctrine  applied 
to  slaves  was  consistent  with  compensated  emancipation ; 
that  he  favored  the  application  of  the  principle  to  the 
border  States  so  as  to  make  them  free  States ;  that  con 
centration  of  military  force  as  opposed  to  dispersion  of 
effort  was  the  true  policy;  that  he  opposed  the  rules  of 
warfare  which  he  assumed  were  announced  in  General 
Pope's  much  criticised  orders;  and  lastly,  that  he  would 
cordially  serve  under  such  general-in-chief  as  Mr.  Lincoln 
should  select. 

Compare  all  this  with  Mr.  Lincoln's  known  views.  It 
was  notorious  that  he  was  thought  to  be  too  conservative 
by  many  of  his  own  party.  He  had  urged  a  system  of 
compensated  emancipation  for  the  border  States.  He  had 
said  that  he  held  the  slavery  question  to  be  only  a  part, 
and  an  absolutely  subordinate  part,  of  the  greater  ques 
tion  of  saving  the  Union.  He  had  disapproved  of  a 
portion  of  Pope's  order  regarding  the  treatment  of 


358          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

non-combatants.  However  ill-advised  McClellan's  letter 
was,  it  may  be  read  between  the  lines  as  an  attempt  to 
strengthen  himself  with  the  President  as  against  Stanton 
and  others,  and  to  make  his  military  seat  firmer  in  the 
saddle  by  showing  that  he  was  not  in  political  antagonism 
to  Mr.  Lincoln,  but  held,  in  substance,  the  conservative 
views  that  were  supposed  to  be  his.  Its  purpose  seems 
to  me  to  have  been  of  this  personal  sort.  He  did  not 
publish  it  at  the  time,  and  it  was  not  till  he  was  removed 
from  his  command  that  it  became  a  kind  of  political  man 
ifesto.  This  view  is  supported  by  what  occurred  after  the 
publication  of  the  Emancipation  Proclamation,  which  I 
shall  tell  presently;  but,  to  preserve  the  proper  sequence, 
I  must  first  give  another  incident. 

A  few  days  after  the  battle  of  Antietam  a  prominent 
clergyman  of  Hagerstown  spent  the  Sunday  in  camp,  and 
McClellan  invited  a  number  of  officers  to  attend  religious 
services  in  the  parlors  of  the  house  where  headquarters 
were.  The  rooms  were  well  filled,  several  civilians  being 
also  present.  I  was  standing  by  myself  as  we  were  wait 
ing  for  the  clergyman  to  appear,  when  a  stout  man  in 
civilian's  dress  entered  into  conversation  with  me.  He 
stood  at  my  side  as  we  faced  the  upper  part  of  the  suite  of 
rooms,  and  taking  it  to  be  a  casual  talk  merely  to  pass  the 
time,  I  paid  rather  languid  attention  to  it  and  to  him  as 
he  began  with  some  complimentary  remarks  about  the 
army  and  its  recent  work.  He  spoke  quite  enthusias 
tically  of  McClellan,  and  my  loyalty  to  my  commander 
as  well  as  my  personal  attachment  to  him  made  me  assent 
cordially  to  what  he  said.  He  then  spoke  of  the  politi 
cians  in  Washington  as  wickedly  trying  to  sacrifice  the 
general,  and  added,  whispering  the  words  emphatically  in 
my  ear,  "  But  you  military  men  have  that  matter  in  your 
own  hands,  you  have  but  to  tell  the  administration  what 
they  must  do,  and  they  will  not  dare  to  disregard  it!" 
This  roused  me,  and  I  turned  upon  him  with  a  sharp 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS  359 

"What  do  you  mean,  sir!"  As  I  faced  him,  I  saw  at 
once  by  his  look  that  he  had  mistaken  me  for  another; 
he  mumbled  something  about  having  taken  me  for  an 
acquaintance  of  his,  and  moved  away  among  the  company. 

I  was  a  good  deal  agitated,  for  though  there  was  more 
or  less  of  current  talk  about  disloyal  influences  at  work, 
I  had  been  sceptical  as  to  the  fact,  and  to  be  brought  face 
to  face  with  that  sort  of  thing  was  a  surprise.  I  was  a 
stranger  to  most  of  those  who  were  there,  and  walked  a 
little  aside,  watching  the  man  who  had  left  me.  I  soon 
saw  him  talking  with  General  Fitz-John  Porter,  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  room,  evidently  calling  attention  to 
me  as  if  asking  who  I  was.  I  made  inquiries  as  to  who 
the  civilian  was,  and  later  came  to  know  him  by  sight 
very  well.  He  was  John  W.  Garrett,  President  of  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  Company. 

Mr.  Lincoln's  Emancipation  Proclamation  was  pub 
lished  on  the  24th  of  September,  and  within  a  very  few 
days  I  was  invited  to  meet  General  Burnside  and  Gen 
eral  John  Cochrane  of  New  York  at  a  camp  dinner 
in  McClellan's  tent.  General  Cochrane  was  a  "War 
Democrat"  in  politics,  and  had  been  active  as  a  politician 
in  his  State.  He  was  also  the  son-in-law  of  Gerrit 
Smith,  the  well-known  abolitionist,  and  had  advocated 
arming  the  slaves  as  early  as  November,  1861.  McClellan 
told  us  frankly  that  he  had  brought  us  there  for  the  pur 
pose  of  asking  our  opinions  and  advice  with  regard  to  the 
course  he  should  pursue  respecting  the  Proclamation. 
He  said  that  he  was  urged  to  put  himself  in  open  opposi 
tion  to  it  by  politicians  not  only,  but  by  army  officers 
who  were  near  to  him.  He  named  no  names,  but  inti 
mated  that  they  were  of  rank  and  influence  which  gave 
weight  to  their  advice.  He  knew  that  we  were  all  friends 
of  the  administration,  and  his  object  seemed  to  be  to 
learn  whether  we  thought  he  should  say  anything  or 
should  maintain  silence  on  the  subject;  for  he  assumed 


360          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

that  we  would  oppose  any  hostile  demonstration  on  his 
part. 

This  naturally  led  to  inquiries  as  to  his  actual  attitude 
to  the  slavery  question,  and  he  expressed  himself  in  sub 
stance  as  I  have  before  indicated;  repeating  with  even 
stronger  emphasis  his  belief  that  the  war  would  work  out 
the  manumission  of  the  slaves  gradually  and  ultimately, 
and  that  as  to  those  who  came  within  our  lines  as  we 
advanced  the  liberation  would  be  complete  and  immedi 
ate.  He  thought,  however,  that  the  Proclamation  was 
premature,  and  that  it  indicated  a  change  in  the  Presi 
dent's  attitude  which  he  attributed  to  radical  influences 
at  Washington. 

There  had  been  no  previous  understanding  between  us 
who  were  his  guests.  For  my  part,  I  then  met  General 
Cochrane  for  the  first  time,  and  had  conversed  with 
McClellan  himself  more  freely  on  political  subjects  than 
I  had  with  Burnside.  We  found  ourselves,  however,  in 
entire  accord  in  advising  him  that  any  declaration  on  his 
part  against  the  Proclamation  would  be  a  fatal  error. 
We  could  easily  understand  that  he  should  differ  from  us 
in  his  way  of  viewing  the  question  of  public  policy,  but 
we  pointed  out  very  clearly  that  any  public  utterance  by 
him  in  his  official  character  criticising  the  civil  policy  of 
the  administration  would  be  properly  regarded  as  a  usur 
pation.  He  intimated  that  this  was  his  own  opinion,  but, 
by  way  of  showing  how  the  matter  was  thrust  at  him  by 
others,  said  that  people  had  assured  him  that  the  army 
was  so  devoted  to  him  that  they  would  as  one  man  enforce 
any  decision  he  should  make  as  to  any  part  of  the  war 
policy. 

I  had  so  recently  gone  through  the  little  experience  on 
this  subject  which  I  have  narrated  above,  that  I  here 
spoke  out  with  some  emphasis.  I  said  that  those  who 
made  such  assurances  were  his  worst  enemies,  and  in  my 
judgment  knew  much  less  of  the  army  than  they  pre- 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS  361 

tended;  that  our  volunteer  soldiers  were  citizens  as  well 
as  soldiers,  and  were  citizens  more  than  soldiers;  and 
that  greatly  as  I  knew  them  to  be  attached  to  him,  I 
believed  not  a  corporal's  guard  would  stand  by  his  side 
if  he  were  to  depart  from  the  strict  subordination  of  the 
military  to  the  civil  authority.  Burnside  and  Cochrane 
both  emphatically  assented  to  this,  and  McClellan  added 
that  he  heartily  believed  both  that  it  was  true  and  that 
it  ought  to  be  so.  But  this  still  left  the  question  open 
whether  the  very  fact  that  there  was  an  agitation  in  camp 
on  the  subject,  and  intrigues  of  the  sort  I  have  men 
tioned,  did  not  make  it  wise  for  him  to  say  something 
which  would  show,  at  least,  that  he  gave  no  countenance 
to  any  would-be  revolutionists.  We  debated  this  at  some 
length,  with  the  general  conclusion  that  it  might  be  well 
for  him  to  remind  the  army  in  general  orders  that  what 
ever  might  be  their  rights  as  citizens,  they  must  as 
soldiers  beware  of  any  organized  effort  to  meddle  with 
the  functions  of  the  civil  government. 

I  left  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  before  McClellan 's 
general  order  on  this  subject,  dated  October  7,  was  pub 
lished,  but  when  I  read  it  in  the  light  of  the  conference 
in  his  tent,  I  regarded  it  as  an  honest  effort  on  his  part  to 
break  through  the  toils  which  intriguers  had  spread  for 
him,  and  regretted  that  what  seemed  to  me  one  of  his 
most  laudable  actions  should  have  been  one  of  the  most 
misrepresented  and  misunderstood.1 

1  The  order  is  found  in  Official  Records,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  395,  and  is 
as  follows .  — 

"  General  Orders.  )  HEAD-QUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  CAMP  NEAR 

No.  163.         )  SHARPSBURG,  MD.,  October  7,  1862. 

The  attention  of  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  army  of  the  Potomac  is 
called  to  General  Orders  No.  139,  War  Department,  September  24,  1862, 
publishing  to  the  army  the  President's  proclamation  of  September  22. 

A  proclamation  of  such  grave  moment  to  the  nation,  officially  com 
municated  to  the  army,  affords  to  the  general  commanding  an  opportunity 
of  defining  specifically  to  the  officers  and  soldiers  under  his  command  the 


362  REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

I  have  always  understood  that  the  order  was  drafted  by 
Colonel  Key,  who  afterward  expressed  in  very  strong 
terms  his  confidence  in  the  high  motives  and  progressive 
tendencies  of  McClellan  at  the  time  he  issued  it. 

General  Cochrane,  some  time  after  the  close  of  the  war, 
in  a  pamphlet  outlining  his  own  military  history,  made 
reference  to  the  visit  to  McClellan  which  I  have  nar 
rated,  and  states  that  he  was  so  greatly  impressed  by  the 

relation  borne  by  all  persons  in  the  military  service  of  the  United  States 
toward  the  civil  authorities  of  the  Government. 

The  Constitution  confides  to  the  civil  authorities  —  legislative,  judicial, 
and  executive  —  the  power  and  duty  of  making,  expounding,  and  executing 
the  Federal  laws.  Armed  forces  are  raised  and  supported  simply  to  sustain 
the  civil  authorities,  and  are  to  be  held  in  strict  subordination  thereto  in  all 
respects.  This  fundamental  rule  of  our  political  system  is  essential  to  the 
security  of  our  republican  institutions,  and  should  be  thoroughly  understood 
and  observed  by  every  soldier.  The  principle  upon  which  and  the  object 
for  which  armies  shall  be  employed  in  suppressing  rebellion,  must  be 
determined  and  declared  by  the  civil  authorities,  and  the  Chief  Executive, 
who  is  charged  with  the  administration  of  the  national  affairs,  is  the  proper 
and  only  source  through  which  the  needs  and  orders  of  the  Government  can 
be  made  known  to  the  armies  of  the  nation. 

Discussions  by  officers  and  soldiers  concerning  public  measures  deter 
mined  upon  and  declared  by  the  Government,  when  carried  at  all  beyond 
temperate  and  respectful  expressions  of  opinion,  tend  greatly  to  impair  and 
destroy  the  discipline  and  efficiency  of  troops,  by  substituting  the  spirit  of 
political  faction  for  that  firm,  steady,  and  earnest  support  of  the  authorities 
of  the  Government,  which  is  the  highest  duty  of  the  American  soldier.  The 
remedy  for  political  errors,  if  any  are  committed,  is  to  be  found  only  in  the 
action  of  the  people  at  the  polls. 

In  thus  calling  the  attention  of  this  army  to  the  true  relation  between  the 
soldier  and  the  government,  the  general  commanding  merely  adverts  to  an 
evil  against  which  it  has  been  thought  advisable  during  our  whole  history 
to  guard  the  armies  of  the  Republic,  and  in  so  doing  he  will  not  be  con 
sidered  by  any  right-minded  person  as  casting  any  reflection  upon  that 
loyalty  and  good  conduct  which  has  been  so  fully  illustrated  upon  so  many 
battle-fields. 

In  carrying  out  all  measures  of  public  policy,  this  army  will  of  course  be 
guided  by  the  same  rules  of  mercy  and  Christianity  that  have  ever  controlled 
its  conduct  toward  the  defenceless. 

By  Command  of  Major-General  McClellan, 

JAS.  A.  HARDIE, 
Lieutenant-Colonel,  Aide-de-camp,  and  Act'g  Ass't  Adj't  Gen'l." 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS  363 

anti-slavery  sentiments  avowed  by  the  general,  that  he 
made  use  of  them  in  a  subsequent  effort  to  bring  him  and 
Secretary  Chase  into  more  cordial  relations.1  It  is  pos 
sible  that,  in  a  friendly  comparison  of  views  in  which  we 
were  trying  to  find  how  nearly  we  could  come  together, 
the  general  may  have  put  his  opinions  with  a  liberality 
which  outran  his  ordinary  statements  of  belief ;  but  I  am 
very  sure  that  he  gave  every  evidence  of  sincerity,  and 
that  none  of  us  entertained  a  doubt  of  his  being  entirely 
transparent  with  us.  He  has  since,  in  his  "Own  Story," 
referred  to  his  taking  counsel  of  Mr.  Aspinwall  of  New 
York  at  about  the  same  time,  and  there  is  evidence  that 
General  W.  F.  Smith  also  threw  his  influence  against 
any  opposition  by  McClellan  to  the  Emancipation  Procla 
mation.2  McClellan's  letters  show  that  his  first  impulse 
was  to  antagonism ;  but  there  is  no  fair  reason  to  doubt 
that  his  action  at  last  was  prompted  by  the  reasons 
which  he  avowed  in  our  conversation,  and  by  the  honor 
able  motives  he  professed.  He  immediately  sent  a  copy 
of  his  order  to  Mr.  Lincoln  personally,  and  this  indicates 
that  he  believed  the  President  would  be  pleased  with  it. 

The  reference  which  he  made  to  suggestions  that  the 
army  would  follow  him  in  a  coup  d'etat  is  supported  by 
what  he  formally  declared  in  his  memoirs.  He  there 
tells  us  that  in  1861  he  was  often  approached  in  regard  to 
a  "dictatorship,"  and  that  when  he  was  finally  removed 
many  in  the  army  were  in  favor  of  his  marching  upon 
Washington  to  take  possession  of  the  government.3  It 
would  seem  that  treasonable  notions  were  rife  about  him 
to  an  extent  that  was  never  suspected,  unless  he  was 
made  the  dupe  of  pretenders  who  saw  some  profit  in  what 
might  be  regarded  as  a  gross  form  of  adulation.  He 
must  be  condemned  for  the  weakness  which  made  such 

1  The  War  for  the  Union,  Memoir  by  General  John  Cochrane,  pp.  29-31. 

2  Nicolay  and  Hay's  Lincoln,  vol.  vi.  p.  180. 
8  Own  Story,  pp.  85,  652. 


364          REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

approaches  to  him  possible;  but  we  are  obliged  to  take 
the  fact  as  he  gives  it,  and  to  accept  as  one  of  the  strange 
elements  of  the  situation  a  constant  stream  of  treasonable 
suggestions  from  professed  friends  in  the  army  and  out 
of  it.  An  anecdote  which  came  to  me  in  a  way  to  make 
it  more  than  ordinarily  trustworthy  was  that  in  the  sum 
mer  of  1861  McClellan  was  riding  with  an  older  officer 
of  the  regular  army,1  and  said  to  him,  "I  understand 
there  is  a  good  deal  of  talk  of  making  a  dictatorship." 
"Ah!"  said  the  other,  "Mr.  Lincoln,  I  suppose." 
"Oh,  no,"  replied  McClellan,  "it's  me  they're  talking 
of."  Bits  of  evidence  from  many  sources  prove  that 
there  had  been  from  the  first  too  much  such  talk  about 
Washington,  and  whilst  McClellan  cannot  be  held  re 
sponsible  for  it,  there  is  no  proof  that  he  rebuked  it  as 
he  should  have  done.  It  was  part  of  the  fermenting 
political  and  military  intrigue  which  is  found  at  the  seat 
of  government  in  such  a  time,  if  anywhere,  and  I  take 
satisfaction  in  testifying  that  away  from  that  neighbor 
hood  I  never  even  heard  the  thing  mentioned  or  referred 
to,  that  I  can  recollect.  Washington  would  be  spoken 
of  in  a  general  way  as  a  place  of  intrigues,  but  I  never 
knew  this  to  have  a  wider  meaning  given  to  it  than  the 
ordinary  one  of  political  schemes  within  lawful  limits 
and  personal  ambitions  of  no  criminal  character. 

Mr.  Lincoln  visited  our  camp  on  the  ist  of  October, 
and  remained  two  or  three  days.  I  was  with  the  party  of 
officers  invited  by  McClellan  to  accompany  the  President 
in  a  ride  over  the  route  which  Sumner  had  followed  in 
the  battle.  We  crossed  the  Antietam  in  front  of  Keedys- 
ville,  followed  the  hollows  and  byways  to  the  East 
Wood,  and  passed  through  this  and  the  cornfields  which 
had  been  the  scene  of  Hooker's  and  Mansfield's  fierce 
fighting.  We  visited  the  Dunker  Church  and  then  re 
turned  to  camp  by  Bloody  Lane  and  the  central  stone 

i  General  McCall. 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS  365 

bridge.  The  President  was  observant  and  keenly  inter 
ested  in  the  field  of  battle,  but  made  no  display  of  sen 
timent.  On  another  day  he  reviewed  the  troops  which 
were  most  accessible  from  headquarters.  As  my  own 
corps  was  among  the  first  on  the  list,  I  did  not  join  the 
escort  of  the  President  at  the  general's  quarters,  but  was 
with  the  troops  attending  to  the  details  of  the  parade. 
We  were  ordered  to  be  under  arms  at  eight  o'clock,  but 
it  was  more  than  two  hours  after  that  when  the  reviewing 
cortege  came  on  the  ground.  The  officers  were  very 
hilarious  over  some  grotesque  story  with  which  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  seasoned  the  conversation,  and  which  seemed 
to  have  caused  some  forgetfulness  of  the  appointment 
with  the  troops.  We  were  reviewed  by  divisions,  and  I 
met  the  party  with  my  staff,  riding  down  the  lines  with 
them,  and  answering  the  inquiries  of  the  President  and 
the  general  as  to  the  history  and  the  experience  of  the 
different  organizations  as  we  passed  them.  The  usual 
march  in  review  was  omitted  for  lack  of  time,  the  Presi 
dent  contenting  himself  with  riding  along  the  lines 
formed  in  parade.  I  had  missed  seeing  the  President  in 
Washington  when  I  paid  my  respects  at  the  White 
House,  and  this  was  my  first  meeting  with  him  after 
his  inauguration.  His  unpretending  cordiality  was  what 
first  impressed  one,  but  you  soon  saw  with  what  sharp 
intelligence  and  keen  humor  he  dealt  with  every  subject 
which  came  up.  He  referred  very  pleasantly  to  his 
knowledge  of  me  through  Secretary  Chase,  showing  the 
kindly  instinct  to  find  some  compliment  or  evidence  of 
recognition  for  all  who  approached  him. 

This  geniality  in  Mr.  Lincoln  made  him  avoid  per 
sonal  criticism  of  the  campaign,  and  gave  an  air  of 
earnest  satisfaction  to  what  he  said  of  the  work  done  by 
McClellan.  There  was  enough  to  praise,  and  he  praised 
it  heartily.  He  was  also  thankful  that  the  threatened 
invasion  of  the  North  had  been  defeated,  and  showed  his 


366          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

sense  of  great  relief.  He  had  adopted  the  rule  for  him 
self  to  limit  his  direct  influence  upon  his  generals  to  the 
presentation  of  his  ideas  of  what  was  desirable,  often 
taking  pains  even  in  his  written  communications  to  say 
that  he  made  no  order,  and  left  the  definite  direction  to 
General  Halleck.  McClellan  gave  the  most  favorable 
interpretation  to  all  that  the  President  said,  but  could 
not  ignore  the  anxiety  Mr.  Lincoln  showed  that  an  ener 
getic  campaign  should  be  continued.  He  wrote  home: 
"I  incline  to  think  that  the  real  purpose  of  his  visit  is  to 
push  me  into  a  premature  advance  into  Virginia."  l 

The  President  had  coupled  his  earliest  telegraphic 
congratulations  with  the  question,  "Can't  you  beat  them 
some  more  before  they  get  off?"  and  McClellan's  pri 
vate  correspondence  shows  that  he,  on  his  part,  chafed  at 
every  suggestion  of  haste.  As  early  as  the  22d  of  Sep 
tember,  the  general  had  written  that  he  looked  upon  the 
campaign  as  substantially  ended,  and  intended  to  give 
some  time  to  the  reorganization  of  the  army  before 
beginning  a  new  one.  The  vicinity  of  Harper's  Ferry 
or  Frederick  seemed  to  him  the  proper  place  for  the 
camp  meanwhile,  and  he  wished  for  a  rise  in  the  Potomac 
River  which  should  make  it  impracticable  for  Lee  to  ford 
it  again.  He  delayed  in  the  neighborhood  of  Sharpsburg, 
waiting  for  this.  To  those  of  us  with  whom  he  talked 
freely,  he  spoke  of  the  necessity  of  incorporating  into  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  at  least  a  hundred  thousand  of  the 
new  levies  to  make  it  really  fit  for  an  aggressive  cam 
paign,  and  argued  that  it  would  save  time  in  the  end  to 
use  some  of  it  now  in  the  work  of  reorganizing. 

Mr.  Lincoln  was  plainly  troubled  with  the  apprehen 
sion  that  the  delays  of  1861  were  to  be  repeated,  and 
that  the  fine  October  weather  of  that  region  would  be 
again  wasted  and  nothing  done  till  the  next  spring. 
There  were  men  enough  about  him  at  Washington  to 

1  o.  s.,  p.  654. 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS  367 

remind  him  of  this  in  irritating  ways,  and  to  make  him 
realize  that  as  he  had  personally  restored  McClellan  to 
the  command  he  would  be  personally  responsible  for 
keeping  him  moving.  McClellan  rightly  understood  Mr. 
Lincoln's  visit  as  meaning  this.  He  did  not  refuse  to 
move;  on  the  other  hand,  he  professed  to  be  anxious  to 
do  so  at  the  earliest  moment  when  it  should  be  really 
practicable.  His  obstinacy  was  of  a  feminine  sort.  He 
avoided  open  antagonism  which  would  have  been  a  chal 
lenge  of  strength,  but  found  constantly  fresh  obstacles  in 
the  way  of  doing  what  he  was  determined  from  the  first 
not  to  do.  The  need  of  clothing  for  the  men  and  of 
horses  for  the  cavalry  was  a  fruitful  subject  for  debate, 
and  the  debate,  if  sufficiently  prolonged,  would  itself 
accomplish  the  delay  that  was  desired. 

The  official  correspondence  shows  that  the  President 
went  back  to  Washington  determined  to  cut  the  knot  in 
a  peremptory  way,  if  he  was  forced  to  do  so.  McClellan 
could  not  have  been  blind  to  this.  His  private  letters 
show  that  he  thought  it  not  improbable  that  he  would  be 
relieved  from  command.  His  desire  for  military  success 
was  a  ruling  one  with  him  on  both  public  and  private 
grounds.  We  are  forced,  therefore,  to  conclude  that  he 
actually  lacked  faith  in  success,  and  regarded  the  cross 
ing  of  the  Potomac  as  too  perilous  until  he  should  re 
organize  the  army  with  the  additional  hundred  thousand 
recruits.  In  this  we  see  the  ever-recurring  effect  of  his 
exaggeration  of  the  enemy's  force.  We  now  know  that 
this  over-estimate  was  inexcusable,  but  we  cannot  deny 
that  he  made  it,  nor,  altogether,  that  he  believed  in  it. 
It  constituted  a  disqualification  for  such  a  command,  and 
led  to  what  must  be  regarded  as  the  inevitable  result,  — 
his  removal.  The  political  questions  connected  with  the 
matter  cut  no  important  figure  in  it.  If  he  had  had  faith 
in  his  ability  to  conquer  Lee's  army,  we  should  never 
have  heard  of  them. 


368          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Whilst  I  mean  what  I  say  in  speaking  of  McClellan's 
exaggeration  of  his  enemy  as  constituting  incompetence 
for  such  a  command,  it  has  reference  to  the  necessity  in 
which  we  were  that  our  army  should  be  aggressively 
handled.  Few  men  could  excel  him  in  strictly  defensive 
operations.  He  did  not  lack  personal  courage,  nor  did 
his  intellectual  powers  become  obscured  in  the  excite 
ment  of  actual  war.  He  showed  the  ordinary  evidences 
of  presence  of  mind  and  coolness  of  judgment  under  fire. 
His  tendency  to  see  his  enemy  doubled  in  force  was, 
however,  a  constitutional  one,  and  no  amount  of  experi 
ence  seemed  to  cure  it.  Had  it  not  been  so  he  would 
have  devised  checks  upon  the  reports  of  his  secret- 
service  agents,  and  corrected  their  estimates  by  those 
more  reliable  methods  which  I  have  already  spoken  of. 
McClellan  was,  even  in  those  days,  often  compared  to 
Marshal  Daun,  whose  fair  ability  but  studiously  defen 
sive  policy  was  so  in  contrast  with  the  daring  strategy 
of  the  great  Frederick.  The  comparison  was  a  fair  one. 
The  trouble  was  that  we  had  need  of  a  Frederick. 

It  may  seem  strange  that  his  subordinates  so  generally 
accepted  his  view  and  supported  him  in  his  conduct;  but 
it  was  a  natural  result  of  forces  always  at  work  in  an 
army.  The  old  maxim  that  "Councils  of  war  never 
fight  "  is  only  another  way  of  saying  that  an  army  is 
never  bolder  than  its  leader.  It  is  the  same  as  the  old 
Greek  proverb,  "  Better  an  army  of  deer  with  a  lion  for 
leader,  than  an  army  of  lions  with  a  deer  for  leader." 
The  body  of  men  thus  organized  relies  upon  its  chief  for 
the  knowledge  of  the  enemy  and  for  the  plan  by  which 
the  enemy  is  to  be  taken  at  a  disadvantage.  It  will 
courageously  carry  out  his  plans  so  long  as  he  has  faith 
in  them  himself  and  has  good  fortune  in  their  execu 
tion.  Let  doubt  arise  as  to  either  of  these  things  and 
his  troops  raise  the  cry  "We  are  sacrificed,"  "We  are 
slaughtered  uselessly."  McClellan's  arts  of  military 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS  369 

popularity  were  such  that  his  army  accepted  his  estimate 
of  the  enemy,  and  believed  (in  the  main)  that  he  had 
shown  great  ability  in  saving  them  from  destruction  in  a 
contest  at  such  odds.  They  were  inclined,  therefore,  to 
hold  the  government  at  Washington  responsible  for  sac 
rificing  them  by  demanding  the  impossible.  Under  such 
circumstances  nothing  but  a  cautious  defensive  policy 
could  be  popular  with  officers  or  men.  If  McClellan's 
data  were  true,  he  and  they  were  right.  It  would  have 
been  folly  to  cross  the  Potomac  and,  with  their  backs  to 
the  river,  fight  a  greatly  superior  enemy.  Because  the 
data  were  not  true  there  was  no  solution  for  the  problem 
but  to  give  the  army  another  commander,  and  painfully 
to  undo  the  military  education  it  had  for  a  year  been 
receiving.  The  process  of  disillusion  was  a  slow  one. 
The  disasters  to  Burnside  and  Hooker  strengthened  the 
error.  Meade's  standstill  after  Gettysburg  was  very 
like  McClellan's  after  Antietam,  and  Mr.  Lincoln  had 
to  deal  with  it  in  a  very  similar  way.  When  Grant  took 
command  the  army  expected  him  to  have  a  similar  fate, 
and  his  reputation  was  treated  as  of  little  worth  because 
he  had  not  yet  "met  Bobby  Lee."  His  terrible  method 
of  "  attrition  "  was  a  fearfully  costly  one,  and  the  flower 
of  that  army  was  transferred  from  the  active  roster  to  the 
casualty  lists  before  the  prestige  of  its  enemy  was  broken. 
But  it  was  broken,  and  Appomattox  came  at  last. 

It  will  not  do  to  say  that  the  Confederate  army  in 
Virginia  was  in  any  sense  superior  to  their  army  in  the 
West.  When  the  superior  force  of  the  National  army 
was  systematically  applied,  General  Lee  was  reduced  to 
as  cautious  a  defensive  in  Virginia  as  was  General  John 
ston  in  Georgia.  Longstreet  and  Hood  had  no  better 
success  when  transferred  to  the  West  than  the  men  who 
had  never  belonged  to  the  Army  of  Virginia.  In  fact, 
it  was  with  Joseph  E.  Johnston  as  his  opponent  that 
McClellan's  career  was  chiefly  run.  Yet  the  Confederate 

VOL.    I.  —  24 


370          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

army  in  the  West  was  broken  at  Donelson  and  at  Vicks- 
burg.  It  was  driven  from  Stone's  River  to  Chattanooga, 
and  from  Missionary  Ridge  to  Atlanta.  Its  remnant  was 
destroyed  at  Franklin  and  Nashville,  and  Sherman's 
March  to  the  Sea  nearly  completed  the  traverse  of  the 
whole  Confederacy.  His  victorious  army  was  close  in 
rear  of  Petersburg  when  Richmond  was  finally  won. 
Now  that  we  have  got  rid  of  the  fiction  that  the  Confed 
erate  government  gave  to  Lee  an  enormously  larger  army 
than  it  gave  to  Bragg  or  to  Joseph  Johnston,  we  have  to 
account  for  the  fact  that  with  much  less  odds  in  their 
favor  our  Western  army  accomplished  so  much  more.  As 
a  military  objective  Richmond  was  in  easier  reach  from 
the  Potomac  than  Nashville  from  the  Ohio.  From  Nash 
ville  to  Chattanooga  was  fully  as  difficult  a  task.  The 
vulnerable  lines  of  communication  multiplied  in  length 
as  we  went  southward,  and  made  the  campaign  of  Atlanta 
more  difficult  still.  Vicksburg  was  a  harder  nut  to  crack 
than  Richmond.  We  must  put  away  our  esprit  de  corps, 
and  squarely  face  the  problem  as  one  of  military  art 
with  the  official  reports  and  returns  before  us.  Our 
Western  army  was  of  essentially  the  same  material  as  the 
Eastern.  Regiments  from  nearly  all  the  States  were 
mingled  in  both.  Wisconsin  men  fought  beside  those 
from  Maine  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  men  who 
had  fought  at  Antietam  and  at  Gettysburg  followed  Sher 
man  through  the  Carolinas.  The  difference  was  not  in 
the  rank  and  file,  it  was  not  in  the  subordinates.  It  was 
the  difference  in  leadership  and  in  the  education  of  the 
armies  under  their  leaders  during  their  first  campaigns. 
That  mysterious  thing,  the  morale  of  an  army,  grows  out 
of  its  belief  as  to  what  it  can  do.  If  it  is  systematically 
taught  that  it  is  hopelessly  inferior  to  its  adversary,  it 
will  be  held  in  check  by  a  fraction  of  its  own  force.  The 
general  who  indoctrinates  his  army  with  the  belief  that  it 
is  required  by  its  government  to  do  the  impossible,  may 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS 


preserve  his  popularity  with  the  troops  and  be  received 
with  cheers  as  he  rides  down  the  line,  but  he  has  put  any 
great  military  success  far  beyond  his  reach.  In  this 
study  of  military  morale,  its  causes  and  its  effects,  the 
history  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  one  of  the  most 
important  and  one  of  the  gravest  lessons  the  world  has 
ever  seen. 

I  have  to  confess  that  at  Antietam  I  shared,  more  or 
less  fully,  the  opinions  of  those  among  whom  I  was.  I 
accepted  McClellan  as  the  best  authority  in  regard  to  the 
enemy's  numbers,  and,  assuming  that  he  was  approxi 
mately  right  in  that,  the  reasonable  prudence  of  waiting 
for  reinforcements  could  not  be  denied.  I  saw  that  he 
had  lost  valuable  time  in  the  movements  of  the  cam 
paign,  but  the  general  result  seemed  successful  enough 
to  hide  this  for  the  time  at  least.  My  own  experience, 
therefore,  supports  the  conclusion  I  have  already  stated, 
that  an  army's  enterprise  is  measured  by  its  commander's, 
and,  by  a  necessary  law,  the  army  reflects  his  judgment 
as  to  what  it  can  or  cannot  accomplish. 

Mr.  Lincoln  had  told  McClellan  during  his  visit  to  the 
army  that  his  great  fault  was  "  overcautiousness.  "  He 
had  intimated  plainly  enough  that  he  must  insist  upon 
the  continuance  of  the  campaign.  He  had  discussed  the 
plans  of  advance,  and  urged  McClellan  to  operate  upon 
Lee's  communications  by  marching  south  on  the  east 
side  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  He  had  disclaimed  any  purpose 
of  forcing  a  movement  before  the  army  was  ready,  but 
saw  no  reason  why  it  should  take  longer  to  get  ready 
after  Antietam  than  after  Pope's  last  battle.  Soon  after 
his  return  to  Washington,  Halleck  sent  a  peremptory 
order  to  McClellan  to  cross  the  Potomac.1  It  was  dated 
October  6th,  and  said  :  "  The  President  directs  that  you 
cross  the  Potomac  and  give  battle  to  the  enemy  or  drive 
him  South.  Your  army  must  move  now  while  the  roads 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  10. 


3/2          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

are  good.  If  you  cross  the  river  between  the  enemy  and 
Washington,  and  cover  the  latter  by  your  line  of  opera 
tions,  you  can  be  reinforced  with  30,000  men.  If  you 
move  up  the  valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  not  more  than 
12,000  or  15,000  can  be  sent  to  you.  The  President 
advises  the  interior  line  between  Washington  and  the 
enemy,  but  does  not  order  it."  It  also  required  him  to 
report  immediately  which  line  he  adopted.  Halleck,  as 
General-in-chief,  ought  to  have  given  his  own  decision 
as  to  the  line  of  operations,  but  his  characteristic  inde 
cision  was  shown  in  failing  to  do  so.  He  did  not  even 
express  an  opinion  as  to  the  relative  merits  of  the  two 
lines,  and  limited  himself  to  his  concurrence  in  the  order 
to  move  in  one  way  or  the  other. 

McClellan  replied  on  the  7th,1  saying  that  he  had 
determined  to  adopt  the  Shenandoah  line,  though  he 
wished  to  "state  distinctly"  that  he  should  only  use  that 
line  till  the  enemy  should  retire  beyond  Winchester,  as 
he  did  not  expect  to  be  able  to  supply  his  army  more 
than  twenty  or  twenty-five  miles  beyond  a  railway  or 
canal  depot.  If  the  enemy  retreated,  he  would  adopt 
some  new  and  decisive  line  of  operations.  He  objected 
to  the  interior  line  because  it  did  not  cover  Maryland  and 
Pennsylvania  from  a  return  of  Lee's  army,  and  because 
(as  he  said)  the  army  could  not  be  supplied  by  it.  He 
indicated  three  days  as  the  time  within  which  he  could 
move.  At  the  end  of  that  time  he  complained  of  still 
lacking  clothing.  On  the  I2th  he  found  it  "absolutely 
necessary "  that  the  cavalry  should  have  more  horses. 
The  discussion  over  these  things  ran  on  till  the  2ist. 

Mr.  Lincoln  made  a  strong  effort  to  save  McClellan 
from  the  effects  of  his  mental  deficiencies.  He  ex 
hausted  advice  and  exhortation.  He  even  ventured  upon 
mild  raillery  on  the  idleness  of  the  army.  On  the  I3th 
he  had  written  a  remarkable  letter  to  McClellan,  in 

i  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  ii. 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS  373 

which  he  reminded  him  of  what  had  occurred  between 
them  at  the  Antietam  and  argued  in  favor  of  the  interior 
line  of  movement.1  He  showed  that  Lee  at  Winchester 
supplied  his  army  twice  as  far  from  his  railway  depot  as 
McClellan  thought  possible  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
He  urged  the  recognized  advantage  of  operating  by  a 
line  which  attacked  the  enemy's  communications.  He 
pointed  out  that  if  Lee  should  try  to  cross  the  Potomac, 
our  army  could  be  in  his  rear  and  should  destroy  him. 
He  showed  that  McClellan  at  Harper's  Ferry  was  nearer 
to  Richmond  than  Lee:  "His  route  is  the  arc  of  a 
circle  of  which  yours  is  the  chord."  He  analyzed  the 
map  and  showed  that  the  interior  line  was  the  easier  for 
supplying  the  army:  "The  chord  line,  as  you  see, 
carries  you  by  Aldie,  Hay  market  and  Fredericksburg, 
and  you  see  how  turnpikes,  railroads,  and  finally  the 
Potomac  by  Acquia  Creek,  meet  you  at  all  points  from 
Washington."  He  even  gave  the  figures  in  miles  from 
gap  to  gap  in  the  mountains,  which  would  enable 
McClellan  to  strike  the  enemy  in  flank  or  rear;  and  this 
was  of  course  to  be  done  if  Lee  made  a  stand.  "  It  is  all 
easy,"  his  letter  concluded,  "if  our  troops  march  as  well 
as  the  enemy ;  and  it  is  unmanly  to  say  they  cannot  do 
it."  Yet  he  expressly  disclaimed  making  his  letter  an 
order.2 

As  a  mere  matter  of  military  comprehension  and  judg 
ment  of  the  strategic  situation,  the  letter  puts  Mr. 
Lincoln  head  and  shoulders  above  both  his  military  sub 
ordinates.  Halleck  saw  its  force,  but  would  not  order  it 
to  be  carried  out.  McClellan  shrank  from  the  decisive 
vigor  of  the  plan,  though  he  finally  accepted  it  as  the 
means  of  getting  the  larger  reinforcements.  On  the  2ist 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix,  pt.  i.  p.  13. 

2  Since  writing  this,  I  have  had  occasion  to  treat  this  subject  more  fully, 
as  bearing  upon  Mr.  Lincoln's  military  judgment  and  intelligence,  in  a  review 
of  Henderson's  Stonewall  Jackson,  "The  Nation,"  Nov.  24,  Dec.  i,  1898. 


374          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

of  October  the  discussion  of  cavalry  horses  was  pretty 
well  exhausted,  and  McClellan  telegraphed  Halleck  1  that 
in  other  respects  he  was  nearly  ready  to  move,  and 
inquires  whether  the  President  desired  him  to  march  on 
the  enemy  at  once  or  to  wait  the  arrival  of  the  new 
horses.  Halleck  answered  that  the  order  of  the  6th 
October  remained  unchanged.  "  If  you  have  not  been 
and  are  not  now  in  condition  to  obey  it,  you  will  be  able 
to  show  such  want  of  ability.  The  President  does  not 
expect  impossibilities,  but  he  is  very  anxious  that  all 
this  good  weather  should  not  be  wasted  in  inactivity. 
Telegraph  when  you  will  move  and  on  what  lines  you 
propose  to  march."  This  dispatch  was  plainly  a  notice 
to  McClellan  that  he  would  be  held  responsible  for  the 
failure  to  obey  the  order  of  the  6th  unless  he  could  exon 
erate  himself  by  showing  that  he  could  not  obey  it.  In 
his  final  report,  however,  he  says  that  he  treated  it  as 
authority  to  decide  for  himself  whether  or  not  it  was 
possible  to  move  with  safety  to  the  army;2  "and  this 
responsibility,"  he  says,  "I  exercised  with  the  more  con 
fidence  in  view  of  the  strong  assurance  of  his  trust  in  me, 
as  commander  of  that  army,  with  which  the  President 
had  seen  fit  to  honor  me  during  his  last  visit. "  Argu 
ment  is  superfluous,  in  view  of  the  correspondence,  to 
show  that  orders  and  exhortations  were  alike  wasted. 

The  movement  began  in  the  last  days  of  October,  the 
Sixth  Corps,  which  was  in  the  rear,  crossing  the  Potomac 
on  the  2d  of  November.  McClellan  had  accepted  Mr. 
Lincoln's  plan,  but  lack  of  vigor  in  its  execution  broke 
down  the  President's  patience,  and  on  the  5th  of  Novem 
ber,  upon  Lee's  recrossing  the  Blue  Ridge  without  a 
battle,  he  ordered  the  general  to  turn  over  the  command 
to  Burnside,  as  he  had  declared  he  would  do  if  Lee's  was 
allowed  to  regain  the  interior  line.  The  order  was  pre 
sented  and  obeyed  on  the  7th,  and  McClellan  left  the 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  81.  z  Ibid. 


McCLELLAN  AND  POLITICS.  375 

army.  The  fallen  general  brooded  morbidly  over  it  all 
for  twenty  years,  and  then  wrote  his  "Own  Story,"  a 
most  curious  piece  of  self-exposure,  in  which  he  uncon 
sciously  showed  that  the  illusions  which  had  misguided 
him  in  his  campaigns  were  still  realities  to  him,  and  that 
he  had  made  no  use  of  the  authentic  facts  which  Con 
federate  as  well  as  National  records  had  brought  within 
his  reach.  He  had  forgotten  much,  but  he  had  learned 
nothing. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

PERSONAL    RELATIONS     OF    McCLELLAN,    BURNSIDE,    AND 

PORTER 

Intimacy  of  McClellan  and  Burnside  —  Private  letters  in  the  official  files  — 
Burnside's  mediation  —  His  self-forgetful  devotion  —  The  movement  to 
join  Pope  —  Burnside  forwards  Porter's  dispatches — His  double  refusal 
of  the  command  —  McClellan  suspends  the  organization  of  wings  —  His 
relations  to  Porter — Lincoln's  letter  on  the  subject  —  Fault-finding  with 
Burnside  —  Whose  work  ?  —  Burnside's  appearance  and  bearing  in  the 
field. 

MCCLELLAN  and  Burnside  had  been  classmates  at 
West  Point,  and  had  been  associated  in  railway 
employment  after  they  had  left  the  army,  in  the  years 
immediately  before  the  war.  The  intimacy  which  began 
at  the  Academy  had  not  only  continued,  but  they  had 
kept  up  the  demonstrative  boyish  friendship  which  made 
their  intercourse  like  that  of  brothers.  They  were  "  Mac" 
and  "  Burn"  to  each  other  when  I  knew  them,  and  al 
though  Fitz-John  Porter,  Hancock,  Parker,  Reno,  and 
Pleasonton  had  all  been  members  of  the  same  class,  the 
two  seemed  to  be  bosom  friends  in  a  way  totally  different 
from  their  intimacy  with  the  others.  Probably  there  was 
no  one  outside  of  his  own  family  to  whom  McClellan 
spoke  his  secret  thoughts  in  his  letters,  as  he  did  to 
Burnside.  The  characteristic  lack  of  system  in  business 
which  was  very  noticeable  in  Burnside,  made  him  negli 
gent,  apparently,  in  discriminating  between  official  letters 
and  private  ones,  and  so  it  happens  that  there  are  a  num 
ber  in  the  official  records  which  were  never  meant  to  reach 
the  public.  They  show,  however,  as  nothing  else  could, 


McCLELLAN,  BURNSIDE,  AND  PORTER          377 

the  relations  which  the  two  men  sustained  to  each  other, 
and  reveal  strong  traits  in  the  characters  of  both. 

After  Burnside  had  secured  his  first  success  in  the 
Roanoke  expedition,  he  had  written  to  McClellan,  then 
in  the  midst  of  his  campaign  of  the  peninsula,  and  this 
was  McClellan's  reply  on  the  2ist  of  May,  1862  i1 — 

"  MY  DEAR  BURN,  —  Your  dispatch  and  kind  letter  received. 
I  have  instructed  Seth  [Williams]  to  reply  to  the  official  letter,  and 
now  acknowledge  the  kind  private  note.  It  always  does  me  good, 
in  the  midst  of  my  cares  and  perplexities,  to  see  your  wretched  old 
scrawling.  I  have  terrible  troubles  to  contend  with,  but  have  met 
them  with  a  good  heart,  like  your  good  old  self,  and  have  thus  far 
struggled  through  successfully.  ...  I  feel  very  proud  of  York- 
town  :  it  and  Manassas  will  be  my  brightest  chaplets  in  history,  for 
I  know  that  I  accomplished  everything  in  both  places  by  pure  mili 
tary  skill.  I  am  very  proud,  and  very  grateful  to  God  that  he 
allowed  me  to  purchase  such  great  success  at  so  trifling  a  loss  of 
life.  .  .  .  The  crisis  cannot  long  be  deferred.  I  pray  for  God's 
blessing  on  our  arms,  and  rely  far  more  on  his  goodness  than  I  do 
on  my  own  poor  intellect.  I  sometimes  think,  now,  that  I  can 
almost  realize  that  Mahomet  was  sincere.  When  I  see  the  hand 
of  God  guarding  one  so  weak  as  myself,  I  can  almost  think  myself 
a  chosen  instrument  to  carry  out  his  schemes.  Would  that  a  better 
man  had  been  selected.  .  .  .  Good-bye  and  God  bless  you,  Burn. 
With  the  sincere  hope  that  we  may  soon  shake  hands,  I  am,  as 
ever, 

Your  sincere  friend,  MC€LELLAN." 

When  McClellan  reached  the  James  River  after  the 
seven  days'  battles,  the  first  suggestion  as  to  reinforcing 
him  was  that  Burnside  should  bring  to  his  aid  the  bulk  of 
his  little  army  in  North  Carolina.  This  was  determined 
upon,  and  the  Ninth  Corps  was  carried  by  sea  to  Fortress 
Monroe.  As  soon  as  the  movement  was  started,  Burnside 
hastened  in  advance  to  Washington,  and  on  returning  to 
the  fortress  wrote  McClellan  as  follows:2  — 

1  o.  R.,  voi  ix.  p.  392.  2  o.  s.,  p.  472. 


378          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

"OLD  POINT,  July  15,  1862. 

MY  DEAR  MAC,  —  I  have  just  arrived  from  Washington,  and 
have  not  time  to  get  ready  to  go  up  this  morning,  'but  will  to-mor 
row.  I  Ve  much  to  say  to  you  and  am  very  anxious  to  see  you. 
.  .  .  The  President  has  ordered  me  to  remain  here  for  the  present, 
and  when  I  asked  him  how  long,  he  said  five  or  six  days.  I  don't 
know  what  it  means ;  but  I  do  know,  my  dear  Mac,  that  you  have 
lots  of  enemies.  But  you  must  keep  cool ;  don't  allow  them  to 
provoke  you  into  a  quarrel.  You  must  come  out  all  right ;  I  '11  tell 
you  all  to-morrow. 

Your  old  friend,  BURN." 

He  went  up  the  river  to  Harrison's  Landing  and  stayed 
a  couple  of  days,  consulting  with  McClellan  as  to  the 
situation.  He  returned  to  Old  Point  Comfort  on  the 
1 8th,  and  immediately  telegraphed  to  the  War  Depart 
ment  for  leave  to  go  to  Washington  and  present  the 
results  of  his  conference  with  McClellan.1  This  was 
granted,  and  he  again  presented  himself  before  the  Pres 
ident  and  Secretary  Stanton  as  the  friend  of  McClellan. 
He  urged  the  increase  of  McClellan's  army  to  an  extent 
which  would  make  the  general  resume  the  aggressive 
with  confidence.  Halleck  visited  McClellan  at  once  after 
assuming  command  as  general-in-chief,  but  satisfied  him 
self  that  the  government  could  not  furnish  the  thirty 
thousand  additional  troops  which  McClellan  then  de 
manded.2  This  led  to  the  decision  to  bring  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  back  by  water,  and  to  unite  it  with  Pope's 
army  on  the  Rappahannock. 

On  this  visit  to  Washington  the  President  and  Secre 
tary  of  War  had  offered  to  Burnside  himself  the  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  He  had  refused  it,  earnestly 
asserting  his  faith  that  McClellan  was  much  fitter  for  the 
command  than  he,  and  trying  hard  to  restore  confidence 
and  a  mutual  good  understanding  between  his  friend  and 
the  government.  He  was  discouraged  at  the  result,  and 

O.  R.,  vol.  xi.  pt.  iii.  p.  326.  2  Id,,  p.  337. 


McCLELLAN,  BURNSIDE,   AND  PORTER  3/9 

after  he  returned  to  his  command  wrote  a  letter,  every 
line  of  which  shows  his  sadness  and  his  disinterested 
friendship,  for  he  does  not  mention,  much  less  take  credit 
to  himself  for,  the  refusal  to  supersede  his  friend.1 

"FORT  MONROE,  Aug.  2,  1862. 

MY  DEAR  MAC,  —  I  'm  laid  up  with  a  lame  leg,  and  besides  am 
much  worried  at  the  decision  they  have  chosen  to  make  in  regard 
to  your  army.  From  the  moment  I  reached  Washington  I  feared 
it  would  be  so,  and  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  your  engineers  2  had 
much  to  do  with  bringing  about  the  determination.  When  the 
conclusion  was  arrived  at,  I  was  the  only  one  who  advocated  your 
forward  movement.  I  speak  now  as  if  a  positive  decision  had 
been  arrived  at,  which  I  do  not  know,  and  you  of  course  do ;  my 
present  orders  indicate  it.  But  you  know  what  they  are  and  all 
about  it,  so  I  will  accept  it  as  something  that  is  ordered  for  the 
best.  Let  us  continue  to  give  our  undivided  support  to  the  cause 
and  all  will  be  well.  It  looks  dark  sometimes,  but  a  just  God  will 
order  everything  for  the  best.  We  can't  expect  to  have  it  all  as 
we  wish.  I  'm  off  for  my  destination,  and  will  write  you  a  long 
letter  from  there.  The  troops  are  nearly  all  embarked.  Good 
bye.  God  bless  you  ! 

Your  old  friend,  A.  E.  BURNSIDE." 

Burnside  was  sent  with  the  Ninth  Corps  to  Falmouth 
on  the  Rappahannock.  Porter's  corps  joined  him  there, 
and  both  the  corps  were  sent  forward  to  Warrenton  to 
join  Pope.  When  Pope's  communication  with  Wash 
ington  was  cut,  it  was  only  through  Burnside  that  the 
government  could  hear  of  him  for  several  days,  and  in 
response  to  the  calls  for  news  he  telegraphed  copies  of 
Porter's  dispatches  to  him.  Like  McClellan's  private 
letters,  these  dispatches  told  more  of  the  writer's  mind 
and  heart  than  would  willingly  have  been  made  public. 

1  o.  s.,  p.  472. 

2  This  hints  at  General  Barnard's  unfavorable  criticisms  of  McClellan's 
management,  which  led  to  a  request  by  the  latter  to  have  another  officer 
assigned  as  chief  engineer.     See  Halleck  to  McClellan,  Aug.  7, 1862.     O.  R., 
vol.  xi.  pt.  iii.  p.  359. 


380          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Burnside's  careless  outspoken  frankness  as  to  his  own 
opinions  was  such  that  he  probably  did  not  reflect  what 
reticences  others  might  wish  to  have  made.  Perhaps  he 
also  thought  that  Porter's  sarcasms  on  Pope,  coming  from 
one  who  had  gained  much  reputation  in  the  peninsula, 
would  be  powerful  in  helping  to  reinstate  McClellan. 
At  any  rate,  the  dispatches  were  the  only  news  from  the 
battle-field  he  could  send  the  President  in  answer  to  his 
anxious  inquiries,  and  he  sent  them.  They  were  the 
cause  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  request  to  McClellan,  on  Septem 
ber  ist,  that  he  would  write  Porter  and  other  friends 
begging  them  to  give  Pope  loyal  support.  They  were 
also  the  most  damaging  evidence  against  Porter  in  his 
subsequent  court-martial. 

Before  the  Maryland  campaign  began,  Mr.  Lincoln 
again  urged  upon  Burnside  the  command  of  the  army, 
and  he  again  declined,  warmly  advocating  McClellan's 
retention  as  before.1  His  advocacy  was  successful,  as  I 
have  already  stated.2  The  arrangement  that  Burnside 
and  Sumner  were  to  command  wings  of  the  army  of 
at  least  two  corps  each,  was  made  before  we  left  Wash 
ington,  and  Burnside's  subordinates,  Hooker  and  Reno, 
were,  by  direction  of  the  President,  assigned  to  corps 
commands  through  orders  from  army  headquarters.3 
McClellan  did  not  publish  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
this  assignment  of  Burnside  and  Sumner  till  the  I4th  of 
September,  though  it  had  been  acted  upon  from  the  be 
ginning  of  the  campaign.4  On  the  evening  of  the  same 
day  Porter's  corps  joined  the  army  at  South  Mountain, 
and  before  the  advance  was  resumed  on  the  following 
morning,  the  order  was  again  suspended  and  Burnside 
reduced  to  the  command  of  a  single  corps.6  I  have 
already  suggested  Hooker's  relation  to  this,  and  only 

1  C.  W.,  vol.  i.  p.  650.  2  Ante,  p.  257. 

8  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  188,  197.         4  Id.,  p.  290. 
6  Id.,  p.  297. 


McCLELLAN,   BURNSIDE,  AND  PORTER          381 


note  at  this  point  the  coincidence,  if  it  was  nothing 
more,  that  the  first  evidence  of  any  change  in  McClellan's 
friendship  toward  Burnside  occurs  within  a  few  hours 
from  Porter's  arrival,  and  in  connection  with  a  complaint 
made  by  the  latter. 

McClellan  and  Burnside  had  slept  in  the  same  house 
the  night  after  the  battle  of  South  Mountain.  Porter 
seems  to  have  joined  them  there.  During  the  evening 
McClellan  dictated  his  orders  for  the  movements  of 
the  1 5th  which  were  communicated  to  the  army  in  the 
morning.  That  Porter  should  be  unfriendly  to  Burnside 
was  not  strange,  for  it  had  by  this  time  become  known 
that  the  dispatches  of  August  2/th  to  3Oth  were  relied  upon 
by  General  Pope's  friends  to  show  Porter's  hostile  and 
insubordinate  spirit  in  that  campaign.  The  court-martial 
was  still  impending  over  Porter,  and  he  had  been  allowed 
to  take  the  field  only  at  McClellan's  special  request. 
Although  Burnside  had  not  dreamed  of  doing  Porter  an 
ill  service,  his  transmittal  of  the  dispatches  to  the  Presi 
dent  had  made  them  available  as  evidence,  and  Porter,  not 
unnaturally,  held  him  responsible  for  part  of  his  peril. 
The  sort  of  favoritism  which  McClellan  showed  to  Porter 
was  notorious  in  the  army.  Had  the  position  of  chief  of 
staff  been  given  him,  it  would  have  sanctioned  his  per 
sonal  influence  without  offending  the  self-respect  of  other 
general  officers ;  but  that  position  was  held  by  General 
Marcy,  the  father-in-law  of  McClellan,  and  Porter's  mani 
fest  power  at  headquarters  consequently  wore  the  air  of 
discourtesy  toward  others.  The  incident  I  have  narrated 
of  the  examination  of  Lee's  position  at  Sharpsburg  from 
the  ridge  near  Pry's  house  was  an  example  of  this.  It 
was  Porter  who  in  the  presence  of  the  commandants  of 
the  wings  of  the  army  was  invited  by  McClellan  to  con 
tinue  the  examination  when  the  others  were  sent  below 
the  crest  of  the  hill.  Governor  Sprague  testified  before 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  to  the  notoriety 


382          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

of  this  from  the  beginning  of  the  peninsular  campaign 
and  to  the  bad  feeling  it  caused.1  General  Rosecrans 
testified  that  in  the  winter  of  1861-62,  on  his  visit  to 
Washington,  he  found  that  Porter  was  regarded  as  the 
confidential  adviser  of  McClellan.2  It  was  matter  of  com 
mon  fame,  too  well  known  to  be  questioned  by  anybody 
who  served  in  that  army.  Mr.  Lincoln  had  discussed  it 
to  some  extent  in  his  correspondence  with  McClellan  in 
the  month  of  May,  and  had  warned  the  general  of  the 
mischiefs  likely  to  ensue,  even  whilst  authorizing  pro 
visional  corps  to  be  organized  for  Porter  and  Franklin. 
He  had  used  such  exceptional  plainness  as  to  say  to  the 
general 3  that  "  it  is  looked  upon  as  merely  an  effort  to 
pamper  one  or  two  pets  and  to  persecute  and  degrade 
their  supposed  rivals.  The  commanders  of  these  corps 
are  of  course  the  three  highest  officers  with  you,  but  I 
am  constantly  told  that  you  have  no  consultation  or  com 
munication  with  them ;  that  you  consult  and  communi 
cate  with  nobody  but  General  Fitz-John  Porter  and 
perhaps  General  Franklin.  I  do  not  say  these  complaints 
are  true  or  just,  but  at  all  events  it  is  proper  you  should 
know  of  their  existence." 

McClellan's  dealing  with  the  division  of  the  army  into 
wings  was  part  of  the  same  persistent  method  of  thwart 
ing  the  purpose  of  the  administration  while  ostensibly 
keeping  the  letter.  It  was  perfectly  easy  to  advance 
from  South  Mountain  upon  Sharpsburg,  keeping  Sum- 
ner's  and  Burnside's  commands  intact.  The  intermin 
gling  of  them  was  unnecessary  at  the  beginning,  and  was 
mischievous  during  the  battle  of  Antietam.  No  military 
reason  can  be  given  for  it,  and  the  history  of  the  whole 
year  makes  it  plain  that  the  reasons  were  personal. 

The  offer  of  the  command  of  the  army  to  Burnside, 
though  refused,  was  a  sufficiently  plain  designation  of 

1  C.  W.,  vol.  i.  p.  566.  2  /</.,  vol.  vi.  (Rosecrans)  p.  14. 

3  O.  R.,  vol.  xi.  pt.  iii.  p.  154. 


McCLELLAN,  BURNSIDE,  AND  PORTER  383 

McClellan's  successor  in  case  he  should  be  relieved  or  be 
disabled.  It  needed  a  more  magnanimous  nature  than 
McClellan's  proved  to  be,  to  bear  the  obligation  of  Burn- 
side's  powerful  friendship  in  securing  for  him  again  the 
field  command  of  the  army.  When  he  was  in  personal 
contact  with  Burnside,  the  transparent  sincerity  of  the 
latter' s  friendship  always  brought  McClellan  to  his  better 
self,  and  to  the  eye  of  an  observer  they  were  as  cordially 
intimate  as  they  had  ever  been.  Yet  unfriendly  things 
which  had  been  done  officially  could  not  easily  be  undone, 
and  the  friendship  was  maintained  by  the  subordinate 
condoning  the  sins  against  it.  Hooker  was  allowed  to 
separate  himself  from  Burnside' s  command  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  1 5th,  against  the  protest  of  his  commander;  the 
order  announcing  the  assignment  of  the  wing  command 
was  suspended  and  was  never  renewed,  though  McClellan 
afterward  gave  Burnside  temporary  command  of  several 
corps  when  detached  from  the  rest  of  the  army. 

Burnside  spent  several  hours  with  his  chief  on  Monday 
morning  (i5th),  and  was  disturbed  and  grieved  at  the 
course  things  had  taken.  It  is  possible  that  his  pre 
occupation  of  mind  made  him  neglect  the  prompt  issue 
of  orders  for  moving  the  Ninth  Corps,  though  I  know 
nothing  definite  as  to  this.1  Porter's  corps  was  to  follow 
us  through  Fox's  Gap,  and  when  his  head  of  column 
came  up  the  mountain  at  noon,  we  certainly  were  not  in 
motion.  My  own  division  was  the  rear  one  of  the  column 
that  day,  by  way  of  change,  as  I  had  had  the  advance  all 
the  way  from  Washington.  General  Porter  reported  at 
McClellan's  headquarters  that  the  movement  of  his  troops 
was  obstructed  by  Burnside's,  and  got  at  his  own  special 

1  My  own  recollection  is  that  part  of  the  corps  had  marched  without  ra 
tions  on  the  preceding  day,  and  had  sent  back  during  the  night  for  them. 
Burnside  took  the  responsibility  of  allowing  the  corps  to  wait  until  these 
supplies  came  and  the  men  could  be  fed  before  marching  again.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  McClellan  made  no  effort  to  bring  on  an  engagement  that 
day,  nor  during  the  whole  of  the  next  day. 


384          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 


request  an  order  to  push  by  them.1  The  written  order 
Porter  preserved,  and  put  upon  it  an  endorsement  adding 
to  what  it  contains  the  accusation  that  "  Burnside's  corps 
was  not  moving  three  hours  after  the  hour  designated  for 
him."2  No  doubt  there  was  many  a  delay  in  that  cam 
paign  in  divers  corps.  The  significant  thing  in  this  one 
was  the  pains  taken  to  "  make  a  record "  of  it  against 
Burnside,  and  the  inclusion  in  this  of  unofficial  matter  by 
means  of  the  endorsement. 

On  the  i6th  another  vexatious  incident  of  a  similar 
character  occurred.  After  McClellan's  reconnoitring  on 
our  left,  he  orally  directed  that  the  divisions  of  the  Ninth 
Corps  should  be  moved  to  positions  designated  by  mem 
bers  of  his  staff.  When  Burnside  had  taken  his  position 
on  a  hill-top  from  which  the  positions  could  be  seen  and 
the  movement  accurately  directed,  another  staff  officer 
from  McClellan  came  and  requested  that  the  movement 
be  delayed  for  further  consideration  by  the  commanding 
general.  It  was  this  that  occasioned  a  halt  and  our  sub 
sequent  march  in  the  dusk  of  evening,  as  has  been  nar 
rated  in  its  place.  That  evening  the  following  note 
was  written  at  McClellan's  headquarters,  but  it  was  not 
delivered  to  Burnside  till  the  next  day,  the  day  of  the 
battle:8  — 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
September  16,  1862. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  BURNSIDE,  Commanding  Ninth  Corps,  etc. 

GENERAL,  —  The  General  commanding  has  learned  that  although 
your  corps  was  ordered  to  be  in  a  designated  position  at  12  M. 
to-day,  at  or  near  sunset  only  one  division  and  four  batteries  had 
reached  the  ground  intended  for  your  troops.  The  general  has 
also  been  advised  that  there  was  a  delay  of  some  four  hours  in  the 
movement  of  your  command  yesterday.  I  am  instructed  to  call 
upon  you  for  explanations  of  these  failures  on  your  part  to  comply 
with  the  orders  given  you,  and  to  add,  in  view  of  the  important 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  296.  z  Ibid. 

3  Id.,  p.  308. 


McCLELLAN,  BURNSIDE,  AND  PORTER  385 

military  operations  now  at  hand,  the  commanding  general  can 
not  lightly  regard  such  marked  departure  from  the  tenor  of  his 
instructions. 

I  am,  general,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

Lieutenant-Colonel,  Aide-de-camp,  and  Act'g  Ass't  Adj!  Gen!" 

To  this  missive  Burnside  dictated  the  following  answer 
on  the  field  during  the  battle : ]  — 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  September  17,  1862. 
BRIG.  GEN.  S.  WILLIAMS,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

GENERAL,  —  Your  dispatch  of  yesterday  this  moment  received. 
General  Burnside  directs  me  to  say  that  immediately  upon  the  receipt 
of  the  order  of  the  general  commanding,  which  was  after  twelve 
o'clock,  he  ordered  his  corps  to  be  in  readiness  to  march,  and  in 
stead  of  having  Captain  Duane  2  post  the  divisions  in  detail,  and 
at  the  suggestion  of  Captain  Duane,  he  sent  three  aides  to  ascer 
tain  the  position  of  each  of  the  three  divisions,  that  they  might 
post  them.  These  aides  returned  shortly  before  three  o'clock,  and 
they  immediately  proceeded  to  post  the  three  columns.  The  gen 
eral  then  went  on  an  eminence  above  these  positions  to  get  a  good 
view  of  them,  and  whilst  there,  during  the  progress  of  the  move 
ment  of  his  corps,  an  aide  from  General  McClellan  came  to  him 
and  said  that  General  McClellan  was  not  sure  that  the  proper  posi 
tion  had  been  indicated,  and  advised  him  not  to  hasten  the  move 
ment  until  the  aide  had  communicated  with  the  general  command 
ing.  He  (General  Burnside)  at  once  went  to  General  McClellan's 
headquarters  to  inform  him  that  he  had  seen  large  bodies  of  the 
enemy  moving  off  to  the  right.  Not  finding  the  general  command 
ing,  General  Burnside  returned  to  his  command,  and  the  move 
ment  was  resumed  and  continued  as  rapidly  as  possible.  General 
Burnside  directs  me  to  say  that  he  is  sorry  to  have  received  so 
severe  a  rebuke  from  the  general  commanding,  and  particularly 
sorry  that  the  general  commanding  feels  that  his  instructions  have 
not  been  obeyed ;  but  nothing  can  occur  to  prevent  the  general 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  314. 

2  Captain  Duane  was  senior  engineer  officer  in  the  field,  on  the  staff  of 
McClellan,  and  had  conducted  the  reconnoitring  of  the  Antietam. 

VOL.  i.  —  25 


386          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

from  continuing  his  hearty  co-operation  to  the  best  of  his  ability 
in  any  movement  the  general  commanding  may  direct. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  general,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient 
servant, 

LEWIS  RICHMOND, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General." 

The  answer  was  of  course  conclusive,  but  it  leaves  the 
difficult  problem,  how  came  the  reprimand  to  be  written 
which  General  McClellan  could  not  have  dictated,  as  the 
interruption  of  Burnside's  movement  was  caused  by  a 
message  from  himself?  The  blank  for  the  name  of  a 
staff  officer  who  was  to  sign  it,  and  the  indication  of  his 
rank  and  position  point  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  James  A. 
Hardie  as  the  one  for  whom  it  was  prepared,  but  Colonel 
Hardie  must  have  demurred  to  signing  it,  since  Colonel 
Richmond's  answer  implies  that  General  Seth  Williams's 
name  was  finally  attached.  All  of  us  who  knew  General 
Williams  and  his  methods  of  doing  business  will  be  slow 
to  believe  that  he  volunteered  a  paper  of  that  kind.  He 
afterward  served  on  Burnside's  own  staff  and  had  his 
confidence.  The  responsibility  must  fall  upon  General 
Marcy,  the  chief  of  staff,  and  most  of  the  officers  of  that 
army  will  be  likely  to  conclude  that  he  also  would  act 
only  by  the  direction  of  McClellan  or  of  some  one  whom 
he  regarded  as  having  decisive  authority  to  speak  for  him 
in  his  absence. 

I  have  already  referred  to  an  error  contained  in  General 
Porter's  report  of  the  battle  of  Antietam,  where  he  says 
that  "Morell's  division  in  reporting  to  General  Burnside 
relieved  his  corps,  which  was  at  once  recalled  from  its 
position  in  front  of  Antietam  bridge."1  I  mention  it 
again  only  to  say  that  since  this  was  not  only  contrary  to 
the  fact,  but  is  unsupported  by  the  records,  to  accept  it 
and  to  embody  it  in  his  official  report  certainly  indicates 
no  friendly  disposition  toward  Burnside.  To  that  extent 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.  339. 


McCLELLAN,  BURNSIDE,  AND  PORTER  387 

it  supports  any  other  circumstances  which  point  to  Porter 
as  the  hostile  influence  which  becomes  so  manifest  at 
McClellan's  headquarters  after  the  I4th  of  September. 

I  know  by  many  expressions  uttered  by  Burnside  dur 
ing  those  days  and  afterward,  that  though  he  was  deeply 
grieved  at  some  things  which  had  occurred,  he  did  not 
waver  in  his  loyal  friendship  to  McClellan.  He  uttered 
no  unkind  word  in  regard  to-  him  personally,  either  then 
or  ever  in  my  hearing.  He  sometimes  spoke  of  what  he 
believed  to  be  mischievous  influences  about  McClellan 
and  which  he  thought  were  too  powerful  with  him,  but 
was  earnest  and  consistent  in  wishing  for  him  the  per 
manent  command  of  that  army  till  success  should  give  a 
glorious  end  to  the  war.  It  was  after  the  irritating  inci 
dents  I  have  narrated  that  the  visit  to  McClellan  to  dine 
with  him  occurred,  and  I  saw  them  frequently  together 
till  I  left  the  army  on  the  5th  of  October.  Their  man 
ner  toward  each  other  was  more  than  cordial,  it  was 
affectionately  intimate.  Burnside  never  mentioned  to 
me,  although  I  was  next  him  in  command,  the  reprimand 
which  is  copied  above.  His  real  unwillingness  to  su 
persede  McClellan,  even  when  the  final  order  came  in 
November,  is  abundantly  attested.  McClellan  only  by 
degrees  gave  outward  evidence  of  the  souring  of  his  own 
feelings  toward  Burnside,  but  his  private  letters  show 
that  the  process  began  with  the  battle  of  South  Mountain. 
By  the  time  that  he  wrote  his  final  report  in  the  latter 
part  of  1863  it  had  advanced  far  enough  to  warp  his 
memory  of  the  campaign  and  to  make  him  try  to  transfer 
to  Burnside  the  responsibility  for  some  of  his  mishaps. 
When  his  "Own  Story"  was  written,  the  process  was 
complete,  and  no  kindly  remembrance  dictated  a  word 
which  could  give  any  indication  of  the  friendship  that 
had  died. 

Those  who  are  not  familiar  with  the  customs  of  mili 
tary  service  might  see  little  significance  in  the  fact  that 


388          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  fault-finding  with  Burnside  was  put  in  the  form  of 
official  communications  which  thus  became  part  of  the 
permanent  documentary  history  of  the  war.  To  military 
men,  however,  it  would  be  almost  conclusive  proof  of  a 
settled  hostility  to  him,  formally  calling  his  military 
character  in  question  in  a  way  to  make  it  tell  against 
him  for  ulterior  purposes.  Nothing  is  more  common  in 
an  active  campaign  than  for  a  commanding  officer  to  send 
messages  hurrying  the  movement  of  a  part  of  his  army. 
These  are  usually  oral,  and  even  when  delays  are  com 
plained  of,  the  commander,  in  the  interests  of  cordial  co 
operation  and  cheerful  alacrity,  awaits  a  full  opportunity 
for  personal  explanation  from  his  immediate  subordinates 
before  administering  a  reprimand.  It  goes  without  say 
ing  that  where  intimate  friendship  exists,  still  more 
delicate  consideration  is  used.  To  send  such  a  letter  as 
that  of  September  i6th,  and  in  the  course  of  such  deliber 
ate  movements  as  were  McClellan's  during  those  days, 
would  be  scarcely  conceivable  unless  there  had  been  a 
formal  breach  of  personal  relations,  and  it  was  equivalent 
to  notice  that  they  were  henceforth  to  deal  at  arm's-length 
only. 

McClellan's  "Own  Story"  shows  that  in  regard  to  the 
alleged  delay  on  the  morning  of  the  I5th,  he  had  a  per 
sonal  explanation  from  Burnside.1  Yet  in  the  night  of 
the  i6th  the  same  querulous  inquiry  was  repeated  as  if 
it  had  not  been  answered,  with  the  addition  of  the  new 
complaint  of  a  delay  on  the  i6th  which  was  caused  by 
McClellan's  personal  request,  and  the  whole  accompanied 
by  so  formal  a  reprimand  that  the  ordinary  reply  to  it 
would  have  been  a  demand  for  a  court  of  inquiry.  The 
occurrence  was  unexampled  in  that  campaign  and  stands 
entirely  alone,  although  McClellan's  memoirs  show  that 
he  alleged  delays  in  other  cases,  notably  in  Hooker's 
march  that  same  afternoon  to  attack  the  enemy,  of  which 
1  o.  s.,  P.  586. 


McCLELLAN,  BURNSIDE,  AND  PORTER  389 

no  recorded  notice  was  taken.1  Considering  the  personal 
relations  of  the  men  before  that  time,  and  as  I  myself 
witnessed  them  from  day  to  day  afterward,  it  is  simply 
incredible  that  McClellan  dictated  the  letters  which  went 
from  his  headquarters. 

Before  ending  the  discussion  of  matters  personal  to 
these  officers  I  will  say  a  few  words  regarding  Burnside's 
appearance  and  bearing  in  the  field.  He  was  always  a 
striking  figure,  and  had  a  dashing  way  with  him  which 
incited  enthusiasm  among  his  soldiers.  Without  seem 
ing  to  care  for  his  costume,  or  even  whilst  affecting  a 
little  carelessness,  there  was  apt  to  be  something  pictur 
esque  about  him.  He  had  a  hearty  and  jovial  manner,  a 
good-humored  cordiality  toward  everybody,  that  beamed 
in  his  face  as  he  rode  through  the  camps  or  along  the 
lines.  When  not  on  parade,  he  often  discarded  his  uni 
form  coat,  wearing  a  light  undress  jacket,  with  no  indica 
tion  of  his  rank  except  the  yellow  silk  sash  about  his 
waist  which  showed  that  he  was  a  general  officer.  On  one 
occasion  when  I  accompanied  him  in  a  change  of  position, 
we  passed  the  Ninth  Corps  column  in  march,  and  it  was 
interesting  to  see  how  he  was  greeted  by  the  troops  which 
had  been  with  him  in  his  North  Carolina  campaign.  He 
wore  that  day  a  "Norfolk  jacket,"  a  brown  knit  round 
about,  fitting  close  to  his  person ;  his  hat  was  the  stiff 
broad-rimmed,  high-crowned  regulation  hat,  worn  rather 
rakishly,  with  gold  cord,  acorn-tipped ;  his  pistol-belt  was 
a  loose  one,  allowing  the  holster  to  hang  on  his  hip  instead 
of  being  buckled  tight  about  the  waist ;  his  boots  were  the 
high  cavalry  boots  reaching  to  the  knee ;  his  large  buckskin 
gauntlets  covered  his  forearm  ;  he  rode  a  large  bony  horse, 
bob-tailed,  with  a  wall-eye  which  gave  him  a  vicious  look, 
and  suited  well  the  brigandish  air  of  his  rider's  whole 
appearance.  Burnside's  flashing  eyes,  his  beard  trimmed 
to  the  "Burnside  cut"  with  the  mustache  running  into 
i  o.  s.,  p.  590. 


390          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  side  whiskers  whilst  the  square,  clean-shaven  chin 
and  jaws  gave  a  tone  of  decision  and  force  to  his  features, 
made  up  a  picture  that  at  once  arrested  the  eye.  As  we 
went  along  the  roadside  at  a  fast  trot,  his  high-stepping 
horse  seemed  to  be  keeping  his  white  eye  on  the  lookout 
for  a  chance  to  lash  out  at  somebody.  The  men  evidently 
enjoyed  the  scene,  cheering  him  loudly.  I  was  particu 
larly  amused  with  one  group  of  soldiers  at  rest  by  their 
stacked  muskets.  They  sat  upon  their  haunches,  and 
clapped  their  hands  as  he  passed,  exclaiming  and  laugh 
ing,  "Just  see  the  old  fellow !  just  look  at  him  !  "  Burn- 
side  laughed  at  their  fun  as  jollily  as  they  did  themselves, 
and  took  no  offence  at  the  free-and-easy  way  in  which 
they  showed  their  liking  for  him.  There  was  no  affecta 
tion  in  all  this,  but  an  honest  enjoyment  in  following  his 
own  whim  in  style  and  in  accoutrement.  His  sincere 
earnestness  in  the  cause  for  which  he  was  fighting  was 
apparent  to  all  who  met  him,  and  no  one  in  his  presence 
could  question  the  single-hearted  honesty  and  unselfish 
ness  of  the  man.  His  bearing  under  fire  was  good,  and 
his  personal  courage  beyond  question.  He  shrank  from 
responsibility  with  sincere  modesty,  because  he  ques 
tioned  his  own  capacity  to  deal  with  affairs  of  great  mag 
nitude.  He  was  not  only  not  ambitious  to  command  a 
great  army,  but  he  honestly  sought  to  put  it  aside  when 
it  was  thrust  upon  him,  and  accepted  it  at  last  from  a 
sense  of  obligation  to  the  administration  which  had  nom 
inated  him  to  it  in  spite  of  his  repeated  disclaimers.  It 
came  to  him  finally,  without  consulting  him,  as  a  military 
order  he  could  not  disobey  without  causing  a  most  awk 
ward  dead-lock  in  the  campaign. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

RETURN  TO   WEST  VIRGINIA 

Ordered  to  the  Kanawha  valley  again  —  An  unwelcome  surprise  —  Reasons 
for  the  order — Reporting  to  Halleck  at  Washington  —  Affairs  in  the 
Kanawha  in  September  —  Lightburn's  positions  —  Enemy  under  Loring 
advances  —  Affair  at  Fayette  C.  H.  —  Lightburn  retreats  —  Gauley 
Bridge  abandoned  —  Charleston  evacuated  —  Disorderly  flight  to  the 
Ohio  —  Enemy's  cavalry  raid  under  Jenkins  —  General  retreat  in  Ten 
nessee  and  Kentucky  —  West  Virginia  not  in  any  Department  —  Now 
annexed  to  that  of  Ohio  —  Morgan's  retreat  from  Cumberland  Gap  — 
Ordered  to  join  the  Kanawha  forces  —  Milroy's  brigade  also  —  My  inter 
views  with  Halleck  and  Stanton  —  Promotion  —  My  task  —  My  division 
sent  with  me  —  District  of  West  Virginia  —  Colonel  Crook  promoted  — 
Journey  westward  —  Governor  Peirpoint  —  Governor  Tod  —  General 
Wright  —  Destitution  of  Morgan's  column  —  Refitting  at  Portland,  Ohio 

—  Night   drive   to   Gallipolis  —  An   amusing    accident  —  Inspection    at 
Point  Pleasant  —  Milroy  ordered  to  Parkersburg  —  Milroy's  qualities  — 
Interruptions  to  movement  of  troops  —  No  wagons  —  Supplies  delayed 

—  Confederate   retreat  —  Loring   relieved — Echols  in  command  —  Our 
march   up   the   valley  —  Echols   retreats — We  occupy  Charleston  and 
Gauley  Bridge  —  Further  advance  stopped — Our  forces  reduced  —  Dis 
tribution  of  remaining  troops  —  Alarms  and  minor   movements  —  Case 
of  Mr.  Summers  —  His  treatment  by  the  Confederates. 

IN  war  it  is  the  unexpected  that  happens.  On  the  4th 
of  October  my  permanent  connection  with  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  seemed  assured.  I  was  in  command  of 
the  Ninth  Corps,  encamped  in  Pleasant  Valley,  await 
ing  the  renewal  of  active  operations.  My  promotion  to 
the  rank  of  Major-General  had  been  recommended  by 
McClellan  and  Burnside,  with  the  assurance  that  the  per 
manent  command  of  the  corps  would  be  added.  On  that 
evening  an  order  came  from  Washington  directing  me  to 
return  to  the  Kanawha  valley,  from  which  our  troops  had 
been  driven.  I  was  to  report  in  person  at  Washington 


392          REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

immediately,  and  would  there  get  detailed  directions. 
The  order  was  as  much  a  surprise  to  my  immediate 
superiors  as  it  was  to  me,  and  apparently  as  little  wel 
come.  We  all  recognized  the  necessity  of  sending  some 
one  to  the  Kanawha  who  knew  the  country,  and  the 
reasonableness,  therefore,  of  assigning  the  duty  to  me. 
McClellan  and  Burnside  both  promised  that  when  matters 
should  be  restored  to  a  good  footing  in  West  Virginia 
they  would  co-operate  in  an  effort  to  bring  me  back,  and 
as  this  was  coupled  with  a  strong  request  to  the  War 
Department  that  my  promotion  should  be  made  imme 
diate,1  I  acquiesced  with  reasonably  good  grace. 

Going  to  Washington  on  the  6th,  I  received  my  orders 
and  instructions  from  Halleck,  the  General-in-Chief. 
They  were  based  upon  the  events  which  had  occurred  in 
the  Kanawha  valley  since  I  left  it  in  August.  The 
information  got  by  General  Stuart  from  Pope's  captured 
quartermaster  had  led  to  a  careful  examination  of  the 
letter-books  captured  at  the  same  time,  and  Lee  thus 
learned  that  I  had  left  5000  men,  under  Colonel  Light- 
burn,  to  garrison  the  posts  about  Gauley  Bridge.  The 
Confederate  forces  were  therefore  greater  than  ours  in 
that  region,  and  General  Loring,  who  was  in  command, 
was  ordered  to  make  at  once  a  vigorous  aggressive  cam 
paign  against  Lightburn,  to  "clear  the  valley  of  the 
Kanawha  and  operate  northwardly  to  a  junction  "  with 
the  army  of  Lee  in  the  Shenandoah  valley.2  Loring 
marched,  on  the  6th  of  September,  with  a  column  which 
he  reported  about  5000  strong,  expecting  to  add  to  it  by 
organizing  recruits  and  militia  as  Floyd  had  done  in  the 
previous  year.  His  line  of  operations  was  by  way  of 
Princeton,  Flat-top  Mountain  and  Raleigh  C.  H.  to 

1  McClellan  to  Halleck,  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  383. 

2  O.    R.,   vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  p.    1069;  Id.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  pp.  940-943,  946. 
This  correspondence  fully  justifies  Pope's  suspicion  that  Lee  then  planned 
to  operate  by  the  Valley  of  Virginia. 


RETURN   TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  393 

Fayette  C.  H.  His  forces  do  not  seem  to  have  been 
noticeably  increased  by  recruiting  till  ours  had  retreated 
out  of  the  valley. 

Lightburn's  advanced  positions  were  two,  —  a  brigade 
under  Colonel  Siber  of  the  Thirty-seventh  Ohio  being  at 
Raleigh  C.  H.  and  another  under  Colonel  Gilbert  of  the 
Forty-fourth  Ohio,  near  the  Hawk's  Nest,  and  at  Alder- 
son's  on  the  Lewisburg  road.  A  small  post  was  kept  up 
at  Summersville  and  one  at  Gauley  Bridge,  where  Light- 
burn  had  his  headquarters,  and  some  detachments  guarded 
trains  and  steamboats  in  the  lower  valley.  Gauley 
Bridge  was,  as  in  the  preceding  year,  the  central  point, 
and  though  it  was  necessary  to  guard  both  the  Lewisburg 
and  the  Raleigh  roads  on  the  opposite  sides  of  the  New 
River  gorge,  a  concentration  on  the  line  the  enemy 
should  take  was  the  plain  rule  of  action  when  the  oppos 
ing  armies  were  about  equal.  Or,  by  concentrating  at 
Gauley  Bridge,  my  experience  had  proved  that  we  could 
hold  at  bay  three  or  four  times  our  numbers.  In  either 
case,  fighting  in  detail  was  to  be  avoided,  and  rapid  con 
centration  under  one  leader  to  be  effected. 

On  the  approach  of  the  enemy  Siber  was  withdrawn 
from  Raleigh  C.  H.  to  Fayette,  and  Gilbert  to  Tomp- 
kins  farm,  three  miles  from  Gauley  Bridge,  but  the 
brigades  were  not  united.  On  the  loth  of  September 
Loring  attacked  Siber  at  Fayette,  in  the  intrenchments 
made  by  Scammon  in  the  winter.  Siber  repulsed  the 
efforts  of  Loring  to  drive  him  out  of  his  position,  and 
held  it  during  the  day.  Three  companies  of  the  Fourth 
Virginia  under  Captain  Vance,  and  a  squad  of  horse  were 
sent  by  Lightburn  from  Gauley  Bridge  to  Siber's  assist 
ance,  but  the  latter,  being  without  definite  orders  and 
thinking  he  could  not  hold  the  position  another  day, 
retreated  in  the  night,  setting  fire  to  a  large  accumula 
tion  of  stores  and  abandoning  part  of  his  wagons.  He 
halted  on  the  ridge  of  Cotton  Hill,  covering  the  road  to 


394          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

Gauley  Bridge,  and  was  there  joined  by  five  companies 
of  the  Forty-seventh  Ohio,  also  sent  to  his  assistance  by 
Lightburn.  Loring  followed  and  made  a  partial  attack, 
which  was  met  by  the  rear-guard  under  Captain  Vance 
and  repulsed,  whilst  Siber's  principal  column  marched  on 
to  Montgomery's  ferry  on  the  Kanawha. 

Meanwhile  Lightburn  had  called  in  Gilbert's  force  to 
Gauley  Bridge  during  the  night  of  the  roth,  and  placed 
them  opposite  the  ferry  connecting  with  Siber,  which 
was  just  below  Kanawha  Falls  and  in  the  lower  part  of 
the  Gauley  Bridge  camp.  On  Siber's  appearance  at  the 
ferry,  Lightburn  seems  to  have  despaired  of  having  time 
to  get  him  over,  and  directed  him  to  march  down  the  left 
bank  of  the  river,  burning  the  sheds  full  of  stores  which 
were  on  that  side  of  the  stream.  When  Captain  Vance 
with  the  rear-guard  reached  the  ferry,  the  buildings  were 
blazing  on  both  sides  of  the  narrow  pass  under  the  bluff, 
and  his  men  ran  the  gantlet  of  fire,  protecting  their 
heads  with  extra  blankets  which  they  found  scattered 
near  the  stores.  Vance  easily  held  the  enemy  at  bay  at 
Armstrong's  Creek,  and  Siber  marched  his  column,  next 
morning,  to  Brownstown,  some  twenty-five  miles  below 
Kanawha  Falls,  where  steamboats  met  him  and  ferried 
him  over  to  Camp  Piatt.  There  he  rejoined  Lightburn. 

Gilbert's  artillery  was  put  in  position  on  the  right 
bank  at  Montgomery's  Ferry,  and  checked  the  head  of 
Loring' s  column  when  it  approached  the  Kanawha  in 
pursuit  of  Siber.  Lightburn  had  ordered  the  detachment 
in  post  at  Summersville  to  join  him  at  Gauley,  and 
Colonel  Elliot  of  the  Forty-seventh  Ohio,  who  com 
manded  it,  marched  down  the  Gauley  with  his  ten  com 
panies  (parts  of  three  regiments)  and  a  small  wagon 
train.  He  approached  Gauley  Bridge  on  the  nth,  but 
Lightburn  had  not  waited  for  him,  and  the  enemy  were 
in  possession.  Elliot  burned  his  wagons  and  took  to  the 
hills  with  his  men,  cutting  across  the  angle  between  the 


RETURN  TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  395 

Gauley  and  the  Kanawha  and  joining  Gilbert's  column 
near  Cannelton.  A  smaller  detachment,  only  a  little 
way  up  the  Gauley,  was  also  left  to  its  fate  in  the  pre 
cipitate  retreat,  and  it  also  took  to  the  hills  and  woods 
and  succeeded  in  evading  the  enemy.  It  was  about  ten 
o'clock  in  the  morning  when  Loring's  head  of  column 
approached  the  Kanawha  and  drew  the  fire  of  Gilbert's 
guns.  After  about  an  hour's  cannonade  across  the  river, 
Lightburn  gave  the  order  to  retreat  down  the  right  bank, 
after  burning  the  stores  and  blowing  up  the  magazine  at 
Gauley  Bridge.  Loring  found  men  to  swim  across  the 
river  and  extinguish  the  fires  kindled  on  the  ferry-boats, 
which  were  soon  put  in  use  to  ferry  Echols's  brigade 
across.  This  followed  Lightburn  down  the  right  bank, 
whilst  Loring  himself,  with  Williams's  and  Wharton's 
brigades,  marched  after  Siber  down  the  left.  The  over 
hanging  cliffs  and  hills  echoed  with  the  cannonade,  and 
the  skirmishers  exchanged  rifle-shots  across  the  rapid 
stream;  but  few  casualties  occurred,  and  after  Elliot 
joined  the  column,  it  marched  with  little  interruption  to 
Camp  Piatt,  thirteen  miles  from  Charleston,  where  Siber 
met  them,  and  the  steamboats  he  had  used  passed  down 
the  river  to  the  Ohio. 

Siber' s  brigade  continued  its  retreat  rapidly  to  Charles 
ton,  passed  through  the  town  and  crossed  the  Elk  River. 
Gilbert's  brigade  also  retired,  but  in  better  order,  and  it 
kept  up  a  skirmish  with  the  advance-guard  of  Echols's 
column  which  was  following  them.  When  Gilbert 
reached  the  outskirts  of  Charleston,  he  checked  the 
advance  of  the  enemy  long  enough  to  enable  the  quarter 
masters  at  the  post  to  move  their  trains  across  the  Elk ; 
but  the  haste  of  the  evacuation  was  so  great  that  the 
stores  in  depot  there  were  not  removed,  and  were  burned 
to  prevent  their  falling  into  the  enemy's  hands.  Gilbert 
retired  across  the  Elk,  and  the  suspension  bridge  was 
destroyed.  Loring's  artillery  made  a  dash  for  a  hill  on 


396  REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  left  bank  of  the  Kanawha,  which  commanded  the 
new  position  taken  up  by  Lightburn's  troops,  and  the 
Confederate  battery  soon  opened  an  enfilade  fire  across 
the  river,  taking  the  line  of  breastworks  along  the  Elk 
in  flank  and  in  reverse.  The  trains  and  the  stragglers 
started  in  direst  confusion  on  the  road  to  Ravenswood  on 
the  Ohio,  which  offered  a  line  of  retreat  not  subject  to 
the  enemy's  fire.  Siber's  brigade  followed,  Gilbert's 
continued  to  bring  up  the  rear.  The  road  down  the 
Kanawha  was  abandoned  because  it  was  in  range  of  artil 
lery  from  the  opposite  side  of  the  river  throughout  -its 
whole  course  down  the  valley.  The  road  to  Ripley  and 
Ravenswood  was  therefore  taken,  and  the  flying  troops 
were  met  at  those  towns  on  the  Ohio  by  steamboats 
which  conveyed  part  of  them  to  Point  Pleasant  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Kanawha,  where  the  whole  command  was 
concentrated  in  the  course  of  a  few  days.1  Siber's  loss 
was  16  killed,  87  wounded,  and  over  100  missing.  Gil 
bert  reported  9  men  killed  and  8  wounded,  with  about  75 
missing;  but  as  the  enemy  do  not  enumerate  any  cap 
tured  prisoners  in  their  reports  except  a  lieutenant  and 
10  men,  it  is  evident  that  the  missing  were  mostly  men 
who  outran  the  others.  Loring's  losses  as  reported  by 
his  surgeon  were  18  killed  and  89  wounded.  The  enemy 
claim  to  have  captured  large  numbers  of  wagons,  horses, 
mules,  and  stores  of  all  kinds  which  Loring  estimated  at 
a  million  dollars'  worth,  besides  all  that  were  burned. 

It  was  a  panicky  retreat  after  the  hot  little  fight  by 
Siber's  brigade  at  Fayette  C.  H.,  and  it  is  not  worth 
while  to  apply  to  it  any  military  criticism,  further  than 
to  say  that  either  of  the  brigades  intrenched  at  Gauley 
Bridge  could  have  laughed  at  Loring.  The  river  would 
have  been  impassable,  for  all  the  ferry-boats  were  in  the 
keeping  of  our  men  on  the  right  bank,  and  Loring  would 
not  dare  pass  down  the  valley  leaving  a  fortified  post  on 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  i.  pp.  1058-1060. 


RETURN  TO   WEST  VIRGINIA  397 

the  line  of  communications  by  which  he  must  return. 
The  topography  of  the  wild  mountain  region  was  such 
that  an  army  could  only  pass  from  the  lower  Kanawha  to 
the  headwaters  of  the  James  River  by  the  road  Loring 
had  used  in  his  advance,  or  by  that  leading  through  the 
post  of  Gauley  Bridge  to  Lewisburg  and  beyond.  The 
Confederate  War  Department  seem  to  have  thought  that 
their  forces  might  have  passed  from  Charleston  to  the 
Ohio,  thence  to  Parkersburg,  and  turning  east  from 
this  town,  have  made  their  way  to  Beverly  and  to  the 
Valley  of  Virginia  by  the  route  Garnett  had  used  in  the 
previous  year.  They  would  have  found,  however,  as 
Loring  told  them,  that  it  would  have  been  easy  for  the 
National  forces  to  overwhelm  them  with  numbers  while 
they  were  making  so  long  and  so  difficult  a  march  in  a 
vast  region  most  of  which  was  a  wilderness. 

Lightburn's  position  had  been  made  more  embarrassing 
by  the  fact  that  a  cavalry  raid  under  Brigadier-General 
Jenkins  was  passing  around  his  left  flank  while  Loring 
came  upon  him  in  front.  Jenkins  with  a  light  column 
of  horse  moved  from  Lewisburg  by  way  of  the  Wilder 
ness  Road  to  northwestern  Virginia,  captured  posts  and 
destroyed  stores  at  Weston,  Buckhannon,  and  Roane 
C.  H.,  and  made  a  circuit  to  the  lower  Kanawha,  re 
joining  Loring  after  Lightburn's  retreat.  Little  real 
mischief  was  done  by  this  raid,  but  it  added  to  the  con 
fusion,  and  helped  to  disturb  the  self-possession  of  the 
commanding  officer.  In  this  way  it  was  one  of  the  causes 
of  the  precipitate  retreat. 

Several  circumstances  combined  to  make  Lightburn's 
disaster  embarrassing  to  the  government.  West  Vir 
ginia  had  not  been  connected  with  any  military  department 
after  Pope's  command  had  been  broken  up.  McClellan's 
authority  did  not  extend  beyond  his  own  army  and  its 
theatre  of  operations.  Halleck  could  hardly  take  per 
sonal  charge  of  the  affairs  of  remote  districts.  Thus  the 


39$          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 


Kanavvha  valley  had  dropped  out  of  the  usual  system  and 
was  an  omitted  case.  The  embarrassment  was  increased 
by  the  fact  that  Buell  was  retreating  out  of  Tennessee 
before  Bragg,  Morgan  had  evacuated  Cumberland  Gap 
and  was  making  a  painful  and  hazardous  retreat  to  the 
Ohio,  and  the  Confederate  forces  under  Kirby  Smith 
were  moving  directly  upon  Cincinnati.  Lightburn's 
mishap,  therefore,  was  only  the  northern  extremity  of  a 
line  of  defeats  extending  through  the  whole  length  of 
the  Ohio  valley  from  Parkersburg  to  Louisville.  The 
governors  of  West  Virginia  and  Ohio  were  naturally 
alarmed  at  the  events  in  the  Kanawha  valley,  and  were 
earnest  in  their  calls  upon  the  War  Department  for  troops 
to  drive  Loring  back  beyond  the  mountains  and  for  an 
officer  to  command  them  who  knew  something  of  the 
country. 

Halleck  seems  to  have  been  puzzled  at  the  condition 
of  things,  not  having  realized  that  Pope's  retirement  had 
left  West  Virginia  "in  the  air."  It  took  a  week,  appar 
ently,  to  get  satisfactory  details  of  the  actual  situation, 
and  on  the  iQth  of  September  the  first  important  step 
was  taken  by  annexing  the  region  to  the  Department  of 
the  Ohio,  then  commanded  by  Major-General  Horatio  G. 
Wright,  whose  headquarters  were  at  Cincinnati.1  Wright 
was  directed  to  provide  for  the  recovery  of  lost  ground 
in  West  Virginia  as  rapidly  as  possible,  but  the  cam 
paign  in  Kentucky  was  the  more  important  and  urgent, 
so  that  no  troops  could  be  spared  for  secondary  operations 
until  the  Confederates  had  ceased  to  threaten  Cincinnati 
and  Louisville. 

On  the  ist  of  October  Halleck  again  called  General 
Wright's  attention  to  the  need  of  doing  something  for 
West  Virginia.  Governor  Peirpoint,  of  that  State,  rep 
resented  the  Confederates  under  Loring  as  about  10,000 
in  number,  and  this  reflected  the  opinion  which  Light- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xvi.  pt.  ii.  p.  528v 


RETURN  TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  399 

burn  had  formed  during  his  retreat.  It  became  the  basis 
of  calculation  in  the  campaign  which  followed,  though  it 
greatly  exaggerated  Loring's  force.  Three  days  later 
Brigadier-General  George  W.  Morgan  was  known  to  have 
reached  the  Ohio  River  with  the  division  he  had  brought 
from  Cumberland  Gap,  and  General  Halleck  outlined  a 
plan  of  action.  He  ordered  Morgan's  division  to  be 
sent  to  Gallipolis  to  take  part  in  the  advance  into  the 
Kanawha  valley,  where  some  new  Ohio  regiments  were 
also  to  join  them.1  He  at  the  same  time  called  me 
to  Washington  to  receive  instructions  under  which  I 
was  to  take  command  of  the  whole  force  operating  on  the 
Kanawha  line.  Brigadier-General  Milroy  had  already 
(September  25th)  been  ordered  to  proceed  thither  with 
his  brigade,  which  was  in  Washington  and  was  part  of 
Banks' s  forces  garrisoning  the  capital.2  He  was  moved 
through  Pennsylvania  to  Wheeling  by  rail,  and  thence 
down  the  Ohio  River  to  Point  Pleasant  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Kanawha. 

My  order  to  leave  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  reached 
me  on  Saturday  evening.  Much  business  had  to  be 
closed  up  before  I  could  properly  turn  over  the  command 
of  the  Ninth  Corps,  but  I  was  able  to  complete  it  and 
make  the  journey  to  Washington  so  as  to  report  to  Gen- 
eral  Halleck  on  Monday  morning.  He  received  me  very 
kindly,  and  explained  the  necessity  they  were  under  to 
send  some  one  to  the  Kanawha  valley  who  knew  the 
country.  He  was  complimentary  as  to  my  former  ser 
vice  there;  and  said  my  return  to  that  region  would  meet 
the  earnest  wishes  of  the  governors  of  West  Virginia  and 
Ohio,  as  well  as  the  judgment  of  the  War  Department 
and  of  himself.  To  compensate  for  separating  me  from 
the  command  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  it  had  been  decided  to 
make  my  promotion  at  once  and  to  put  the  whole  of  West 
Virginia  under  my  command  as  a  territorial  district. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  381.  2  Id.,  pp.  355,  359. 


400          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 


He  inquired  into  some  details  of  the  topography  of  the 
Kanawha  valley  and  of  my  experience  there,  and  con 
cluded  by  saying  that  reinforcements  would  be  sent 
to  make  the  column  I  should  lead  in  person  stronger 
than  the  10,000  attributed  to  Loring.  My  task  would 
then  be  to  drive  back  the  enemy  beyond  the  mountains. 
When  that  was  accomplished,  part  of  the  troops  would 
probably  be  withdrawn.  The  actual  position  of  Milroy's 
brigade  was  not  definitely  known,  and  Governor  Peirpoint 
of  West  Virginia  had  asked  to  have  it  sent  to  Clarks 
burg.  This  gave  me  the  opportunity  to  urge  that  my 
own  Kanawha  division  be  detached  from  the  Ninth  Corps 
and  sent  back  to  Clarksburg,  where  with  Milroy  they 
would  make  a  force  strong  enough  to  take  care  of  that 
part  of  the  State  and  to  make  a  co-operative  movement 
toward  Gauley  Bridge.  This  also  was  granted,  and  im 
mediate  promotion  was  given  to  Colonel  Crook  so  that  he 
might  command  the  division,  and  a  promise  was  made  to 
do  the  like  for  Colonel  Scammon,  who  would  then  be 
available  for  the  command  of  the  division  still  under 
Lightburn,  whose  retreat  was  strongly  condemned  as  pre 
cipitate.  No  soldier  could  object  to  an  arrangement  so 
satisfactory  as  this,  and  though  I  still  preferred  to  re 
main  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  I  could  only  accept 
the  new  duty  with  sincere  thanks  for  the  consideration 
shown  me.  The  General-in-Chief  accompanied  me  to  the 
room  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  Mr.  Stanton  added  to 
my  sense  of  obligation  by  warm  expressions  of  personal 
good-will.  His  manner  was  so  different  from  the  brusque 
one  commonly  attributed  to  him  that  I  have  nothing  but 
pleasant  remembrances  of  my  relations  to  him,  both  then 
and  later.  My  own  appointment  as  major-general  was 
handed  me  by  him,  the  usual  promotions  of  my  personal 
staff  were  also  made,  and  directions  were  given  for  the 
immediate  appointment  of  Crook  to  be  brigadier. 

I  called  to  pay  my  respects  to  the  President,  but  he 


RETURN  TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  401 

was  in  Cabinet  meeting  and  could  not  be  seen.  I  had  a 
short  but  warmly  friendly  visit  with  Mr.  Chase  later 
in  the  day,  and  was  ready  to  leave  town  for  my  new  post 
of  duty  by  the  evening  train.  The  Secretary  of  War 
directed  me  to  visit  Wheeling  and  Columbus  on  my  way, 
and  then  to  report  to  General  Wright  at  Cincinnati  before 
going  to  the  Kanawha  valley.  This  was  in  fact  the 
quickest  way  to  reach  the  mouth  of  the  Kanawha  River,  for 
the  fall  rains  had  not  yet  come  to  make  the  Ohio  navi 
gable,  and  from  Columbus  to  Cincinnati,  and  thence  by 
the  Marietta  Railway  eastward,  was,  as  the  railway  routes 
then  ran,  the  best  method  of  joining  my  command.  The 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  was  interrupted  between 
Harper's  Ferry  and  Hancock  (about  fifty  miles)  by  the 
Confederate  occupation  of  that  part  of  Virginia.1  General 
Crook  was  ordered  to  march  the  division  from  its  camp  in 
Pleasant  Valley  to  Hancock,  where  trains  on  the  west 
ern  division  of  the  railway  would  meet  him  and  transport 
the  troops  to  Clarksburg.  For  myself  and  staff,  we  took 
the  uninterrupted  railway  line  from  Washington  to  Pitts- 
burg,  and  thence  to  Wheeling,  where  we  arrived  on  the 
evening  of  October  8th.  The  Qth  was  given  to  con 
sultation  with  Governor  Peirpoint  and  to  communication 
with  such  military  officers  as  were  within  reach.  We 
reached  Columbus  on  the  loth,  when  I  had  a  similar 
consultation  with  Governor  Tod  and  his  military  staff  in 
regard  to  new  regiments  available  for  my  use.  Leaving 
Columbus  in  the  afternoon,  we  arrived  at  Cincinnati  late 
the  same  night,  and  on  Saturday,  the  nth,  I  reported  to 
General  Wright. 

He  was  an  officer  of  the  engineer  corps  of  the  regular 
army,  a  man  of  fine  acquirements  and  of  a  serious  and 
earnest  character,  whose  military  service  throughout  the 
war  was  marked  by  solidity  and  modesty.  If  there 
seemed  at  first  a  little  hauteur  in  his  manner,  one  soon 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  393,  394. 
VOL.  I.  — 26 


402        REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

saw  that  it  was  a  natural  reserve  free  from  arrogance. 
The  sort  of  confusion  in  which  everything  was,  is  indi 
cated  by  the  fact  that  he  knew  nothing  of  my  whereabouts 
when  informed  from  Washington  that  I  would  be  ordered 
to  the  Kanawha,  and  on  the  same  day  (6th  October)  ad 
dressed  a  dispatch  to  me  at  Point  Pleasant  whilst  I  was 
receiving  instructions  from  General  Halleck  in  Washing 
ton.1  Our  personal  consultation  established  a  thoroughly 
good  understanding  at  once,  and  as  long  as  I  remained 
under  his  orders,  I  found  him  thoroughly  considerate  of 
my  wishes  and  appreciative  of  my  suggestions  and  of 
the  conduct  of  my  own  part  of  the  work  to  be  done. 

Morgan's  division,  after  reaching  the  Ohio  River,  had 
been  moved  to  Portland  on  the  Marietta  Railroad,  the  near 
est  point  to  Gallipolis,  which  was  twenty-five  miles  away 
and  nearly  opposite  the  mouth  of  the  Great  Kanawha. 
His  retreat  had  been  through  a  sparsely  settled  country, 
much  of  which  was  a  wilderness,  rugged  and  broken  in 
the  extreme.  His  wagons  had  broken  down,  his  teams 
were  used  up,  his  soldiers  were  worn  out,  ragged,  and 
barefoot.2  Many  arms  and  accoutrements  had  been  lost, 
and  the  command  was  imperatively  in  need  of  complete 
refitting  and  a  little  rest.  The  men  had  been  largely 
recruited  in  East  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  and  were 
unwilling  to  serve  in  any  other  theatre  of  war.  The  Ten- 
nesseans,  indeed,  were  reported  to  be  mutinous  at  the 
news  that  they  were  to  be  sent  to  the  Kanawha  valley. 
General  Wright  issued  orders  for  the  refitting  of  the 
command,  and  promised  such  delay  and  rest  as  might  be 
found  practicable.  He  detached  three  regiments  to  serve 
in  Kentucky,  and  directed  their  place  to  be  made  good 
by  three  new  Ohio  regiments  then  organizing.  The  divi 
sion  was  permitted  to  remain  at  Portland  till  imperatively 
needed  for  my  movement. 

There  were  no  trains  running  on  the  railroad  on  Sun- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xvi.  pt.  ii.  p.  579.  2  Id.,  pt.  i.  p.  990. 


RETURN  TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  403 

day,  and  Monday  morning,  the  I3th  October,  was  the 
earliest  possible  start  on  the  remainder  of  my  journey. 
I  left  Cincinnati  at  that  time,  and  with  my  personal  staff 
reached  Portland  in  the  afternoon.  Morgan's  division 
was  found  to  be  in  quite  as  bad  condition  as  had  been 
reported,  but  he  was  in  daily  expectation  of  the  new 
equipments  and  clothing,  as  well  as  wagons  for  his 
baggage-train  and  fresh  horses  for  his  artillery.  It  was 
stated  also  that  a  paymaster  had  been  ordered  to  join  the 
division,  with  funds  to  pay  part  at  least  of  the  large 
arrears  of  pay  due  to  the  men.  This  looked  hopeful,  but 
still  implied  some  further  delay.  Uneasy  to  learn  the 
actual  condition  of  affairs  with  Lightburn's  command,  I 
determined  to  reach  Gallipolis  the  same  night.  Our 
horses  had  been  left  behind,  and  being  thus  dismounted, 
we  took  passage  in  a  four-horse  hack,  a  square  wagon  on 
springs,  enclosed  with  rubber-cloth  curtains.  Night  fell 
soon  after  we  began  our  journey,  and  as  we  were  pushing 
on  in  the  dark,  the  driver  blundered  and  upset  us  off  the 
end  of  a  little  sluiceway  bridge  into  a  mud-hole.  He 
managed  to  jump  from  his  seat  and  hold  his  team,  but 
there  was  no  help  for  us  who  were  buttoned  in.  The 
mud  was  soft  and  deep,  and  as  the  wagon  settled  on  its 
side,  we  were  tumbled  in  a  promiscuous  heap  into  the 
ooze  and  slime,  which  completely  covered  us.  We  were 
not  long  in  climbing  out,  and  seeing  lights  in  a  farm 
house,  made  our  way  to  it.  As  we  came  into  the  light  of 
the  lamps  and  of  a  brisk  fire  burning  on  the  open  hearth, 
we  were  certainly  as  sorry  a  military  spectacle  as  could 
be  imagined.  We  were  most  kindly  received,  the  men 
taking  lanterns  and  going  to  our  driver's  help,  whilst  we 
stood  before  the  fire,  and  scraped  the  thick  mud  from  our 
uniforms  with  chips  from  the  farmer's  woodyard,  making 
rather  boisterous  sport  of  our  mishap.  Before  the  wagon 
had  been  righted  and  partly  cleaned,  we  had  scraped  and 
sponged  each  other  off  and  were  ready  to  go  on.  We 


404          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

noticed,  however,  that  the  room  had  filled  with  men, 
women,  and  children  from  the  neighborhood,  who  stood 
bashfully  back  in  the  shadows,  and  who  modestly  explained 
that  they  had  heard  there  was  a  "  live  general "  there,  and 
as  they  had  never  seen  one,  they  had  "  come  over."  They 
must  have  formed  some  amusing  ideas  of  military  per 
sonages,  and  we  found  at  least  as  much  sport  in  being  the 
menagerie  as  they  did  in  visiting  it.  Our  mishap  made 
us  wait  for  the  moon,  which  rose  in  an  hour  or  so,  and  we 
then  took  leave  of  our  entertainers  and  our  audience  and 
drove  on,  with  no  desire,  however,  to  repeat  the  perform 
ance.  We  made  some  ten  miles  more  of  the  road,  but 
found  it  so  rough,  and  our  progress  so  slow,  that  we  were 
glad  to  find  quarters  for  the  rest  of  the  night,  finishing 
the  journey  in  the  morning. 

On  reaching  my  field  of  duty,  my  first  task  was  to  in 
spect  the  forces  at  Point  Pleasant,  and  learn  what  was 
necessary  to  make  a  forward  movement  as  soon  as  Mor 
gan's  troops  should  reach  me.  General  Wright  had  ori 
ginally  expected  that  inclusive  of  Milroy's  and  Morgan's 
troops,  I  should  find  at  the  mouth  of  the  Kanawha,  on 
arriving  there,  some  20,000  men.1  In  fact,  however, 
Lightburn's  diminished  command  had  only  been  rein 
forced  by  three  new  Ohio  regiments  (the  Eighty-ninth, 
Ninety-first,  and  Ninety-second)  and  a  new  one  from  West 
Virginia  (the  Thirteenth),  and  with  these  his  strength 
was  less  than  7300,  officers  and  men,  showing  that  his 
original  command  was  sadly  reduced  by  straggling  and 
desertion  during  his  retreat.2  The  new  regiments  were 
made  up  of  good  material,  but  as  they  were  raw  recruits, 
their  usefulness  must  for  some  time  be  greatly  limited. 

Two  regiments  of  infantry  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry 
with  a  howitzer  battery  were  at  Guyandotte,  under  Colonel 
Jonathan  Cranor  of  the  Fortieth  Ohio,  and  the  Fifth  West 
Virginia  was  at  Ceredo  near  the  mouth  of  the  Big  Sandy 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  402.  2  Id.,  p.  522. 


RETURN  TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  405 

River.  They  had  been  stationed  at  these  points  to  pro 
tect  the  navigation  of  the  Ohio  and  to  repel  the  efforts  of 
the  Confederate  Cavalry  General  Jenkins  to  "  raid  "  that 
region  in  which  was  his  old  home.1  They  formed,  a  little 
later,  the  Third  Brigade  of  the  Kanawha  division  under 
Crook. 

I  found  General  Milroy  in  command  as  the  ranking  offi 
cer  present,  and  he  had  sent  Cranor's  command  down  the 
river.  When  Governor  Peirpoint  learned  that  Milroy's 
brigade  had  passed  Wheeling  on  his  way  to  the  Kanawha, 
he  applied  urgently  to  General  Wright  to  send  him,  in 
stead,  from  Parkersburg  by  rail  to  Clarksburg  to  form  the 
nucleus  of  a  column  to  move  southward  from  that  point 
upon  the  rear  of  Loring's  forces.  Wright  assented,  for 
both  he  and  Halleck  accepted  the  plan  of  converging  col 
umns  from  Clarksburg  and  Point  Pleasant,  and  regarded 
that  from  the  former  place  as  the  more  important.2  If 
directions  were  sent  to  Milroy  to  this  effect,  they  seem  to 
have  miscarried.  Besides  his  original  brigade,  some  new 
Indiana  regiments  were  ordered  to  report  to  him.  He  had, 
with  characteristic  lack  of  reflection  and  without  authority, 
furloughed  the  Fifth  West  Virginia  regiment  in  mass 
and  sent  the  men  home.  I  gave  him  a  new  one  in  place 
of  this,  ordered  him  to  reassemble  the  other  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  to  march  at  once  to  Parkersburg,  proceed 
ing  thence  to  Clarksburg  by  rail.  The  new  troops  added 
to  his  command  enabled  him  to  organize  them  into  a 
division  of  two  brigades,  and  still  other  regiments  were 
added  to  him  later.  Milroy  was  a  picturesque  character, 
with  some  excellent  qualities.  A  tall  man,  with  tren 
chant  features,  bright  eyes,  a  great  shock  of  gray  hair 
standing  out  from  his  head,  he  was  a  marked  personal 
figure.  He  was  brave,  but  his  bravery  was  of  the  excit 
able  kind  that  made  him  unbalanced  and  nearly  wild  on 
the  battle-field.  His  impulsiveness  made  him  erratic  in 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  459,  522.  2  Id,  p.  402. 


406          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

all  performances  of  duty,  and  negligent  of  the  system 
without  which  the  business  of  an  army  cannot  go  on. 
This  was  shown  in  his  furlough  of  a  regiment  whilst  en 
route  to  reinforce  Lightburn,  who  was  supposed  to  be  in 
desperate  straits.  It  is  also  seen  in  the  absence  of  official 
reports  of  the  organization  of  his  command  at  this  time, 
so  that  we  cannot  tell  what  regiments  constituted  it  when 
his  division  was  assembled  at  Clarksburg.  He  is  de 
scribed,  in  the  second  Battle  of  Bull  Run,  as  crazily  career 
ing  over  the  field,  shouting  advice  to  other  officers  instead 
of  gathering  and  leading  his  own  command,  which  he  said 
was  routed  and  scattered.1  Under  the  immediate  control 
of  a  firm  and  steady  hand  he  could  do  good  service,  but 
was  wholly  unfit  for  independent  responsibility.  His 
demonstrative  manner,  his  boiling  patriotism,  and  his 
political  zeal  gave  him  prominence  and  made  him  a 
favorite  with  the  influential  war-governor  of  Indiana, 
Oliver  P.  Morton,  who  pushed  his  military  advancement. 
The  Kanawha  division  left  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on 
the  8th  of  October  and  reached  Hancock  on  the  loth. 
There  it  crossed  the  track  of  a  raid  of  the  Confederate 
cavalry  into  Pennsylvania,  under  Stuart.  By  McClel- 
lan's  order  one  brigade  was  sent  to  McConnelsville  to 
intercept  the  enemy,  and  the  other  was  halted.2  By  the 
1 3th  Crook  had  been  allowed  to  concentrate  the  division 
at  Hancock  again,  but  was  kept  waiting  for  orders,  so 
that  he  was  not  able  to  report  to  me  his  arrival  at  Clarks 
burg  till  the  2Oth.  Colonel  Scammon  was  on  a  short 
leave  of  absence  during  this  march,  and  was  promoted.3 
He  reported  to  me  in  person  in  his  new  rank  of  brigadier 
a  little  later.  The  brigades  of  the  Kanawha  division 
were  commanded  by  the  senior  colonels  present. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  342,  362-364. 

2  Id.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  62-78. 

8  His  new  rank  dated  from  i5th  October,  that  of  Crook  from  yth  Sep 
tember.     Army  Register,  1863. 


RETURN  TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  407 

The  increase  of  troops  in  the  district  made  immediate 
need  of  transportation  and  munitions  and  supplies  of  all 
kinds.  The  Kanawha  division  had  not  been  allowed  to 
bring  away  with  it  its  admirably  equipped  supply  train, 
but  its  energetic  quartermaster,  Captain  Fitch,  came  with 
the  troops,  and  I  immediately  made  him  chief  quarter 
master  of  the  district.  Milroy's  division  had  no  wagons, 
neither  had  Morgan's.  The  fall  rains  had  not  yet  raised 
the  rivers,  and  only  boats  of  lightest  draught  could  move  on 
the  Ohio,  whilst  navigation  on  the  Kanawha  was  wholly 
suspended.1  Four  hundred  wagons  and  two  thousand 
mules  were  estimated  as  necessary  to  supply  two  moving 
columns  of  ten  thousand  men  each,  in  addition  to  such 
trains  as  were  still  available  in  the  district.  Only  one 
hundred  wagons  could  be  promised  from  the  depot  at  Cin 
cinnati,  none  of  which  reached  me  before  the  enemy  was 
driven  out  of  the  Kanawha  valley.  I  was  authorized  to 
contract  for  one  hundred  more  to  be  built  at  Wheeling, 
where,  however,  the  shops  could  only  construct  thirty- 
five  per  week,  and  these  began  to  reach  the  troops  only 
after  the  ist  of  November.2  We  hoped  for  rains  which 
would  give  us  navigation  in  the  Kanawha  in  spite  of  the 
suffering  which  wet  weather  at  that  season  must  produce, 
and  I  ordered  wagons  and  teams  to  be  hired  from  the 
country  people  as  far  as  this  could  be  done.  Similar 
delays  and  trouble  occurred  in  procuring  advance  stores 
and  equipments.  Part  of  Morgan's  men  were  delayed  at 
the  last  moment  by  their  new  knapsacks  coming  to  them 
without  the  straps  which  fasten  them  to  the  shoulders. 
General  Wright  blamed  the  depot  officers  for  this,  and 
took  from  me  and  my  subordinates  all  responsibility  for 
the  delays ; 3  but  the  incidents  make  an  instructive  lesson 
in  the  difficulty  of  suddenly  organizing  a  new  and  strong 
military  column  in  a  region  distant  from  large  depots  of 

i  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  433.  2  Id.,  pp.  535-537- 

»  Id.,  pp.  438,  475. 


408          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

supply.  It  also  shows  the  endless  cost  and  mischief  that 
may  result  from  an  ill-advised  retreat  and  destruction  of 
property  at  such  posts  as  Gauley  Bridge  and  Charleston. 
To  put  the  local  quartermasters  at  Gallipolis  and  other 
towns  on  the  Ohio  side  of  the  river  under  my  command, 
General  Wright  enlarged  the  boundaries  of  my  district 
so  as  to  include  the  line  of  Ohio  counties  bordering  on 
the  river.1 

On  visiting  Lightburn's  command  at  Point  Pleasant,  I 
ordered  a  brigade  to  be  sent  forward  next  day  (i  5th)  to 
Ten-mile  Creek,  repairing  the  road  and  bridges,  whilst 
a  scouting  party  of  experienced  men  started  out  at  once 
to  penetrate  the  country  by  circuitous  ways  and  to  col 
lect  information.2  In  two  or  three  days  bits  of  news 
began  to  arrive,  with  rumors  that  Loring  was  retreating. 
The  truth  was  that  he  in  fact  withdrew  his  infantry,  leav 
ing  Jenkins  with  the  cavalry  and  irregular  forces  to  hold 
the  valley  for  a  time,  and  then  to  make  a  circuit  north 
ward  by  way  of  Bulltown,  Sutton,  etc.,  gaining  the  Bev 
erly  turnpike  near  the  mountains  and  rejoining  the 
infantry,  which  would  march  to  join  Lee  by  roads  inter 
secting  that  highway  at  Monterey.  Such  at  least  was 
the  purpose  Loring  communicated  to  the  Confederate  War 
Department;  but  he  was  not  allowed  to  attempt  it.  His 
instructions  had  been  to  march  his  whole  command  by  the 
route  Jenkins  was  taking  and  at  least  to  hold  the  valley 
stubbornly  as  far  as  Charleston.  On  receipt  of  the  news 
that  he  was  retreating,  orders  were  sent  him  to  turn  over 
the  command  to  Brigadier-General  John  Echols,  the  next 
in  rank,  and  to  report  in  person  at  Richmond.3  Echols 
was  ordered  immediately  to  resume  the  positions  which 
had  been  abandoned,  and  did  so  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
Loring  had  in  fact  begun  his  retreat  on  the  nth,  three 
days  before  I  reached  Gallipolis,  but  the  first  information 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  381,  421.  2  Id.y  p.  433. 

8  Id,,  pp.  661,  667. 


RETURN  TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  409 

of  it  was  got  after  the  scouting  had  been  begun  which  is 
mentioned  above.  By  the  i8th  I  was  able  to  give  Gen 
eral  Wright  confirmation  of  the  news  and  a  correct  outline 
of  Loring's  plan,  though  we  had  not  then  learned  that 
Echols  was  marching  back  to  Charleston.1  We  heard  of 
his  return  two  or  three  days  later.  As  evidence  of  the 
rapidity  with  which  information  reached  the  enemy,  it  is 
noteworthy  that  Lee  knew  my  command  had  left  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  for  West  Virginia  on  the  i  ith  Octo 
ber,  three  days  after  Crook  marched  from  camp  in  Pleas 
ant  Valley.  He  reported  to  Richmond  that  four  brigades 
had  gone  to  that  region,  which  was  accurate  as  to  the 
number,  though  only  half  right  as  to  identification  of  the 
brigades.2  On  the  I3th  he  sent  further  information  that 
I  had  been  promoted  and  assigned  to  command  the 
district. 

By  the  2Oth  there  had  been  a  slight  rise  in  the  Kana- 
wha  River,  so  that  it  was  possible  to  use  small  steamboats 
to  carry  supplies  for  the  troops,  and  Lightburn  was 
ordered  to  advance  his  whole  division  to  Red  House, 
twenty-five  miles,  and  to  remove  obstructions  to  naviga 
tion  which  had  been  planted  there.3  One  brigade  of 
Morgan's  division  was  in  condition  to  move,  and  it  was 
ordered  from  Portland  to  Gallipolis.  The  rest  were  to 
follow  at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  The  discontent 
of  the  East  Tennessee  regiments  had  not  been  lessened 
by  the  knowledge  they  had  that  powerful  political  influ 
ences  were  at  work  to  second  their  desire  to  be  moved 
back  into  the  neighborhood  of  their  home.  On  the  loth 
of  October  a  protest  against  their  being  sent  into  West 
Virginia  was  made  by  Horace  Maynard,  the  loyal  repre 
sentative  of  East  Tennessee  in  Congress,  a  man  of  marked 
character  and  ability  and  deservedly  very  influential  with 
the  government.4  Maynard  addressed  Halleck  a  second 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  449.  2  /</.,  pp.  662,  663. 

8  Id.,  pp.  456,  459.  *  Id.,  vol.  xvi.  pt.  ii.  pp.  604,  635,  651. 


410  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

time  on  the  subject  on  the  22d,  and  on  the  2Qth  Andrew 
Johnson,  then  military  governor  of  Tennessee,  wrote  to 
President  Lincoln  for  the  same  purpose.  It  hardly  need 
be  said  that  the  preparation  of  those  regiments  would 
proceed  slowly,  pending  such  negotiations.  Their  distant 
homes  and  families  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy,  and 
it  seemed  to  them  intolerable  that  their  faces  should  be 
turned  in  any  other  direction.  I  suggested  an  exchange 
for  new  Ohio  regiments,  but  as  these  were  not  yet  filled 
up,  it  could  not  be  done.  General  Wright  assured  them 
that  they  should  be  sent  to  Kentucky  as  soon  as  we  were 
again  in  possession  of  West  Virginia.  Most  of  these 
regiments  came  under  my  command  again  later  in  the 
war,  and  I  became  warmly  attached  to  them.  Their 
drill  and  discipline  were  always  lax,  but  their  courage  and 
devotion  to  the  national  cause  could  not  be  excelled. 

It  was  not  till  the  23d  that  any  of  Morgan's  men  really 
entered  into  the  forward  movement  in  the  valley.1  On 
that  day  the  brigade  of  Colonel  John  F.  DeCourcy  (Six 
teenth  Ohio),  composed  of  Ohio  and  Kentucky  troops, 
reached  Ten-mile  Creek  and  was  ordered  to  march  to  Red 
House  the  day  after.2  Lightburn  was  busy  clearing  the 
river  of  obstructions  and  preparing  to  move  to  Pocataligo 
River  as  the  next  step  in  advance.  Of  the  other  brigades 
belonging  to  Morgan,  that  of  Brigadier-General  Samuel 
P.  Carter,  composed  partly  of  Tennesseans,  was  at  Gal- 
lipolis,  intending  to  enter  the  valley  on  the  24th.  The 
remaining  brigade,  under  Brigadier-General  James  G. 
Spears,  was  entirely  Tennessean,  and  was  still  at  Portland 
where  the  paymaster  had  just  arrived  and  was  giving  the 
regiments  part  payment. 

My  purpose  was  to  concentrate  the  force  at  Pocataligo, 
assume  the  command  in  person,  and  attack  the  enemy  in 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  474,  475. 

2  Colonel  DeCourcy  was  an  Irishman  of  good  family,  who  took  service 
in  our  army,  and  was  a  good  officer.     He  afterwards  inherited  an  Irish 
baronage. 


RETURN  TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  411 

the  positions  in  front  of  Charleston,  in  which  Wise  had 
resisted  me  in  the  previous  year.  I  should  have  been 
glad  to  make  the  expected  movement  of  a  column  from 
Clarksburg  under  Crook  and  Milroy  co-operate  directly 
with  my  own,  but  circumstances  made  it  impracticable. 
The  operations  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  under  Jenkins 
were  keeping  the  country  north  of  the  Kanawha  in  a 
turmoil,  and  reports  had  become  rife  that  he  would  work 
his  way  out  toward  Beverly.  The  country  was  also  full 
of  rumors  of  a  new  invasion  from  East  Virginia.  Mil 
roy 's  forces  were  not  yet  fully  assembled  at  Clarksburg 
on  the  2Oth,  but  he  was  ordered  to  operate  toward  Bev 
erly,  whilst  Crook,  with  the  old  Kanawha  division,  should 
move  on  Summersville  and  Gauley  Bridge.  Both  had  to 
depend  on  hiring  wagons  for  transportation  of  supplies.1 
Separated  as  they  were,  they  would  necessarily  be  cau 
tious  in  their  movements,  making  the  suppression  of  guer 
illas,  the  driving  out  of  raiders,  and  the  general  quieting 
of  the  country  their  principal  task.  Their  r61e  was  thus, 
of  course,  made  subordinate  to  the  movement  of  my  own 
column,  which  must  force  its  own  way  without  waiting  for 
results  from  other  operations. 

Half  of  Carter's  brigade  was,  at  the  last  moment,  de 
layed  at  Gallipolis,  the  clothing  and  equipments  sent  to 
them  there  being  found  incomplete.  Just  half  of  Morgan's 
division  with  two  batteries  of  artillery  were  in  motion 
on  the  24th.  On  that  day  Lightburn  was  moved  to  Poca- 
taligo,  about  forty  miles  from  the  river  mouth,  where  I 
joined  him  in  person  on  the  2/th.  A  cold  storm  of  min 
gled  rain  and  snow  had  made  the  march  and  bivouac  very 
uncomfortable  for  a  couple  of  days.  General  Morgan 
accompanied  me,  and  during  the  28th  the  active  column 
of  three  and  a  half  brigades  was  concentrated,  two  or 
three  other  regiments  being  in  echelon  along  the  river 
below.  Tyler  Mountain  behind  Tyler  Creek  was,  as 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  459,  481,  482. 


412          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

formerly,  the  place  at  which  the  enemy  was  posted  to 
make  a  stand  against  our  further  progress,  though  he  had 
no  considerable  force  on  the  south  side  of  the  river  at  the 
mouth  of  Scary  Creek.  Reconnoissances  showed  nothing 
but  cavalry  in  our  immediate  front,  and  it  afterwards 
appeared  that  Echols  began  a  rapid  retreat  from  Charles 
ton  on  that  day.1  He  had  called  to  him  Jenkins  with  the 
greater  part  of  the  cavalry,  and  entrusted  to  the  latter  the 
duty  of  holding  us  back  as  much  as  possible.  Suspecting 
this  from  evidence  collected  at  Pocataligo,  I  determined 
to  put  Siber's  brigade  and  a  battery,  all  in  light  march 
ing  order,  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  accompanied  by 
a  light-draught  steamboat,  which  the  rise  in  the  river 
after  the  storm  enabled  us  to  use  as  far  as  Charleston. 
This  brigade  could  turn  the  strong  position  at  Tyler  Moun 
tain,  and  passing  beyond  this  promontory  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  river,  could  command  with  artillery  fire  the 
river  road  on  the  other  bank  behind  the  enemy  in  our 
front.  The  steamboat  would  enable  them  to  make  a  rapid 
retreat  if  the  belief  that  no  great  force  was  on  that  side  of 
the  river  should  prove  to  be  a  mistake.  Siber  was  also 
furnished  with  a  battery  of  four  mountain  howitzers, 
which  could  be  carried  to  the  edge  of  the  water  or  any 
where  that  men  could  march.2 

On  the  right  bank  of  the  river  (north  side)  the  princi 
pal  column  of  two  brigades  (Toland's  and  DeCourcy's) 
advanced  on  the  turnpike  near  the  stream,  having  one 
six-gun  battery  and  a  section  of  twenty-pounder  Parrots 
with  them.  What  was  present  of  Carter's  brigade  was 
sent  by  the  mountain  road  further  from  the  stream,  to 
cover  our  left  and  to  turn  the  flank  of  the  Tyler  Mountain 
position,  if  a  stubborn  ^stand  should  be  made  there.  A 
light  six-gun  battery  accompanied  it.  All  moved  forward 
simultaneously  on  the  morning  of  the  2Qth.3  The  disposi- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  685.  2  Id.,  pp.  504,  509,  530. 

3  Ibid. 


RETURN  TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  413 

tions  thus  made  rendered  it  vain  for  the  enemy's  cavalry 
to  offer  any  stubborn  resistance,  and  Jenkins  abandoned 
Tyler  Mountain  on  our  approach,  thus  giving  us  certain 
knowledge  that  he  was  not  closely  supported  by  the  in 
fantry.  Our  advance-guard  reached  the  Elk  River  oppo 
site  Charleston  in  the  afternoon,  and  I  made  personal 
reconnoissance  of  the  means  of  crossing.  The  suspension 
bridge  had  been  ruined  in  Lightburn's  retreat,  and  the 
enemy  had  depended  upon  a  bridge  of  boats  for  commu 
nication  with  their  troops  in  the  lower  valley.  These 
boats  had  been  taken  to  the  further  bank  of  the  river  and 
partly  destroyed,  but  as  the  enemy  had  continued  his  re 
treat,  we  soon  had  a  party  over  collecting  those  that  could 
be  used,  and  other  flatboats  used  in  the  coal  trade,  and  a 
practicable  bridge  was  reconstructed  before  night  of  the 
30th.1  Meanwhile  I  entered  the  town  with  the  advance- 
guard  as  soon  as  we  had  a  boat  to  use  for  a  ferry,  and 
spent  the  night  of  the  2Qth  there.  We  had  friends  enough 
in  the  place  to  put  us  quickly  in  possession  of  all  the 
news,  and  I  was  soon  satisfied  that  Echols  had  no 
thought  of  trying  to  remain  on  the  western  side  of  the 
mountains.2 

The  column  crossed  the  Elk  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
3Oth,  and  I  pushed  Toland's  and  Carter's  brigades  to 
Maiden  and  Camp  Piatt  that  evening,  Siber's  brigade  ad 
vancing  to  Brownstown  on  the  other  side  of  the  Kanawha 
River.  Lightburn's  division  was  ordered  forward  next 
day  to  Gauley  Bridge,  Carter's  brigade  at  Maiden  was 
ordered  to  send  strong  parties  southward  into  Boone 
County,  to  reconnoitre  and  to  put  down  guerilla  bands.3 
DeCourcy's  brigade  was  halted  at  Charleston,  and  Spears' 
Tennessee  brigade  was  directed  to  remain  at  Gallipolis 
till  further  orders.  Communication  was  opened  with 
Crook,  who  was  ordered  to  press  forward  via  Summers- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  530.  2  Id.t  pp.  515,  520. 

3  Sd;  P-  530- 


414          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL   WAR 

ville  to  Gauley  Bridge  as  quickly  as  possible.1  The 
retreating  enemy  had  burned  the  bridges,  obstructed  the 
roads  with  fallen  timber,  and  cut  and  destroyed  the  flat- 
boats  along  the  river;  so  that  the  first  and  most  pressing 
task  was  to  reopen  roads,  make  ferries  and  bridges,  and 
thus  renew  the  means  of  getting  supplies  to  the  troops.2 
The  river  was  still  low,  unusually  so  for  the  season,  and 
the  water  was  falling.  Every  energy  was  therefore  neces 
sary  to  get  forward  supplies  to  Gauley  Bridge  and  the 
other  up-river  posts,  for  if  the  river  should  freeze  whilst 
low,  the  winter  transportation  would  be  confined  to  the 
almost  impassable  roads.3  I  reported  to  General  Wright 
the  re-occupation  of  the  valley,  our  lack  of  wagon-trains 
for  further  advance,  and  all  the  facts  which  would  assist 
in  deciding  whether  anything  further  should  be  attempted. 
I  did  not  conceal  the  opinion  which  all  my  experience  had 
confirmed,  that  no  military  advantage  could  be  secured  by 
trying  to  extend  operation  by  this  route  across  the  moun 
tains  into  the  James  River  valley. 

On  the  2d  of  November  Brigadier-General  Scammon 
reported  for  duty,  and  I  ordered  him  to  Gauley  Bridge  to 
assume  command  of  the  division  which  was  then  under 
Colonel  Lightburn,  who  resumed  the  command  of  his 
brigade.4  Scammon  was  directed  to  inspect  carefully 
all  our  old  positions  as  far  as  Raleigh  C.  H.,  to  report 
whether  the  recent  retreat  of  troops  from  Fayetteville  had 
been  due  to  any  improper  location  of  the  fortifications 
there,  to  examine  the  road  up  Loup  Creek,  and  any  others 
which  might  be  used  by  the  enemy  to  turn  our  position  at 
Gauley  Bridge,  to  state  the  present  conditions  of  build 
ings  at  all  the  upper  posts,  and  whether  any  storehouses 
had  escaped  destruction.  In  short,  we  needed  the  mate 
rial  on  which  to  base  intelligent  plans  for  a  more  secure 
holding  of  the  region  about  the  falls  of  the  Kanawha,  or 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  520.  2  Id.,  p.  536. 

3  Id.,  p.  537.  *  Ibid. 


RETURN  TO   WEST   VIRGINIA  415 

for  a  further  advance  to  the  eastward  if  it  should  be 
ordered. 

The  information  which  came  to  me  as  soon  as  I  was  in 
actual  contact  with  the  enemy,  not  only  satisfied  me  that 
Loring's  forces  had  been  greatly  exaggerated,  but  led  me 
to  estimate  them  at  a  lower  figure  than  the  true  one.  In 
reporting  to  General  Wright  on  ist  November,  I  gave 
the  opinion  that  they  amounted  to  about  3500  infantry, 
but  with  a  disproportionate  amount  of  artillery,  some 
twenty  pieces.  The  cavalry  under  Jenkins  numbered 
probably  1000  or  1500  horse.1  About  the  first  of  October 
Loring,  in  a  dispatch  to  Richmond,  stated  his  force  at 
"only  a  little  more  than  4000, "2  which  probably  means 
that  the  5000  with  which  he  entered  the  valley  were  some 
what  reduced  by  the  sick  and  by  desertions.  He  seems  to 
refer  to  his  infantry,  for  Jenkins's  command  had  been  an 
independent  one.  It  would  be  reasonable,  therefore,  to 
put  his  total  strength  at  some  6000  or  a  little  higher.  On 
our  side,  the  column  with  which  I  actually  advanced  was 
just  about  9000  men,  with  2000  more  of  Morgan's  com 
mand  within  reach,  had  there  been  need  to  call  them  up 
from  the  Ohio  River. 

On  the  8th  of  November  Halleck  telegraphed  to  General 
Wright  that  no  posts  need  be  established  beyond  Gauley 
Bridge,  and  that  about  half  of  my  command  should  be 
sent  to  Tennessee  and  the  Mississippi  valley.3  On  the 
same  day  General  Wright  formally  approved  my  views  as 
submitted  to  him,  and  ordered  Morgan's  division  to  be 
sent  to  Cincinnati  at  once.4  It  was  thus  definitively  settled 
that  my  task  for  the  winter  would  be  to  restore  the  condi 
tion  of  affairs  in  West  Virginia  which  had  existed  before 
Loring's  invasion,  and  organize  my  district  with  a  view 
to  prompt  and  easy  supply  of  my  posts,  the  suppression 
of  lawlessness  and  bushwhacking,  the  support  of  the  State 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  p.  531.  2  Id.,  p.  635. 

8  -#-,  PP.  556,  557-  *  Id.t  p.  537- 


41 6          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

authorities,  and  the  instruction  and  discipline  of  officers 
and  men.  My  first  attention  was  given  to  the  question  of 
transportation,  for  the  winter  was  upon  us  and  wagons 
were  very  scarce.  The  plan  of  using  the  river  to  the 
utmost  was  an  economy  as  well  as  a  necessity,  and  I  re 
turned  to  my  former  arrangement  of  using  batteaux  for 
the  shallow  and  swift  waters  of  the  upper  river,  connect 
ing  with  the  movable  head  of  steamboat  navigation.  A 
tour  of  inspection  to  Gauley  Bridge  and  the  posts  in  that 
vicinity  satisfied  me  that  they  were  in  good  condition  for 
mutual  support,  and  for  carrying  on  a  system  of  scouting 
which  could  be  made  a  useful  discipline  and  instruction 
to  the  troops,  as  well  as  the  means  of  keeping  thoroughly 
informed  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 

The  line  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  was  kept 
under  the  control  of  General  Kelley,  and  his  authority 
extended  to  active  co-operation  with  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  keeping  open  communication  with  Washing 
ton.  In  case  of  need,  the  commander  of  that  army  was 
authorized  to  give  orders  to  General  Kelley  direct,  with 
out  waiting  to  transmit  them  through  my  headquarters. 
General  Milroy  was  established  on  the  Beverly  front, 
communicating  on  his  left  with  General  Kelley  and  on 
his  right  with  General  Crook,  at  Gauley  Bridge.  Gen 
eral  Scammon  had  his  station  at  Fayette  C.  H.,  covering 
the  front  on  the  south  side  of  New  River,  whilst  Crook 
watched  the  north  side  and  extended  his  posts  in  Milroy's 
direction  as  far  as  Summersville.  Colonel  Cranor  re 
mained  on  the  Ohio  near  Guyandotte,  scouting  the  val 
ley  of  the  Guyandotte  River  and  communicating  with 
Charleston  and  other  posts  on  the  Kanawha. 

On  the  1 2th  of  November  reports  were  received  from 
General  Kelley  that  authentic  information  showed  that 
Jackson  was  advancing  from  the  Shenandoah  valley  upon 
West  Virginia.  Similar  information  reached  army  head 
quarters  at  Washington,  and  in  anticipation  of  possible 


RETURN  TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  417 

necessity  for  it,  I  directed  Milroy  to  hold  himself  in 
readiness  to  march  at  once  to  join  Kelley,  if  the  latter 
should  call  upon  him.  I  telegraphed  General  Wright 
that  I  did  not  think  the  report  would  prove  well  founded, 
but  it  put  everybody  upon  the  alert  for  a  little  while. 
Kelley  had  beaten  up  a  camp  of  Confederates  under 
Imboden  about  eighteen  miles  above  Moorefield  on  the 
south  branch  of  the  Potomac,  causing  considerable  loss 
to  the  enemy  in  killed  and  wounded  and  capturing  fifty 
prisoners.1  Some  movement  to  support  Imboden  probably 
gave  rise  to  the  story  of  Jackson's  advance,  but  Lee  kept 
both  corps  of  his  army  in  hand  and  moved  the  whole  down 
the  Rappahannock  soon  afterward,  to  meet  Burnside's 
advance  upon  Fredericksburg. 

The  invasion  of  the  Kanawha  valley  by  Loring  had 
stirred  up  much  bitter  feeling  again  between  Union  men 
and  Confederates,  and  was  followed  by  the  usual  quarrels 
and  recriminations  among  neighbors.  The  Secessionists 
were  stimulated  to  drop  the  prudent  reserve  they  had 
practised  before,  and  some  of  them,  in  the  hope  that  the 
Confederate  occupation  would  be  permanent,  persecuted 
loyal  men  who  were  in  their  power.  The  retreat  of  the 
enemy  brought  its  day  of  reckoning,  and  was  accompanied 
by  a  fresh  emigration  to  eastern  Virginia  of  a  consider 
able  number  of  the  more  pronounced  Secessionists.  I 
have  said2  that  Mr.  George  Summers,  formerly  the  lead 
ing  man  of  the  valley,  had  studiously  avoided  political 
activity  after  the  war  began;  but  this  did  not  save  him 
from  the  hostility  of  his  disloyal  neighbors.  Very  shortly 
after  my  re-occupation  of  Charleston  he  called  upon  me 
one  evening  and  asked  for  a  private  interview.  He  had 
gone  through  a  painful  experience,  he  said,  and  as  it 
would  pretty  surely  come  to  my  ears,  he  preferred  I 
should  hear  it  from  himself,  before  enemies  or  tale 
bearers  should  present  it  with  such  coloring  as  they  might 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xix.  pt.  ii.  pp.  572,  573,  578,  585,  586.  2  Ante,  p.  154. 

VOL.  I.  —  27 


41 8          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

choose.  During  the  Confederate  occupation  he  had 
maintained  his  secluded  life  and  kept  aloof  from  contact 
with  the  military  authorities.  Their  officers,  however, 
summoned  him  before  them,  charged  him  with  treason  to 
Virginia  and  to  the  Confederate  States,  and  demanded  of 
him  that  he  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Southern 
government.  He  demurred  to  this,  and  urged  that  as  he 
had  scrupulously  avoided  public  activity,  it  would  be  harsh 
and  unjust  to  force  him  to  a  test  which  he  could  not  con 
scientiously  take.  They  were  in  no  mood  to  listen  to 
argument,  and  charged  that  his  acquiescence  in  the  rule 
of  the  new  state  government  of  West  Virginia  was,  in 
his  case,  more  injurious  to  the  Confederate  cause  than 
many  another  man's  active  unionism.  Finding  Mr. 
Summers  disposed  to  be  firm,  they  held  him  in  arrest; 
and  as  he  still  refused  to  yield,  he  was  told  that  he  should 
be  tied  by  a  rope  to  the  tail  of  a  wagon  and  forced  to 
march  in  that  condition,  as  a  prisoner,  over  the  mountains 
to  Richmond. 

He  was  an  elderly  man,  used  to  a  refined  and  easy  life, 
somewhat  portly  in  person,  and,  as  he  said,  he  fully  be 
lieved  such  treatment  would  kill  him.  The  fierceness  of 
their  manner  convinced  him  that  they  meant  to  execute 
the  threat,  and  looking  upon  it  as  a  sentence  of  death,  he 
yielded  and  took  the  oath.  He  said  that  being  in  duress 
of  such  a  sort,  and  himself  a  lawyer,  he  considered  that 
he  had  a  moral  right  to  escape  from  his  captors  in  this 
way,  though  he  would  not  have  yielded  to  anything  short 
of  what  seemed  to  him  an  imminent  danger  of  his  life. 
The  obligation,  he  declared,  was  utterly  odious  to  him 
and  was  not  binding  on  his  conscience;  but  he  had  lost 
no  time  in  putting  himself  into  my  hands,  and  would 
submit  to  whatever  I  should  decide  in  the  matter.  It 
would  be  humiliating  and  subject  him  to  misconstruction 
by  others  if  he  took  conflicting  oaths,  but  he  was  willing 
to  abjure  the  obligation  he  had  taken,  if  I  demanded  it, 


RETURN  TO    WEST  VIRGINIA  419 

and  would  voluntarily  renew  his  allegiance  to  the  United 
States  with  full  purpose  to  keep  it. 

He  was  deeply  agitated,  and  I  thoroughly  pitied  him. 
My  acquaintance  with  him  in  my  former  campaign  gave 
me  entire  confidence  in  his  sincerity,  and  made  me  wish 
to  spare  him  any  fresh  embarrassment  or  pain.  After  a 
moment's  reflection,  I  replied  that  I  did  not  doubt  any 
thing  he  had  told  me  of  the  facts  or  of  his  own  sentiments 
in  regard  to  them.  His  experience  only  confirmed  my 
distrust  of  all  test  oaths.  Either  his  conscience  already 
bound  him  to  the  National  government,  or  it  did  not. 
In  either  case  I  could  not  make  his  loyalty  more  sure  by  a 
fresh  oath,  and  believing  that  the  one  he  had  taken  under 
duress  was  void  in  fact  as  well  as  in  his  own  conscience, 
I  would  leave  the  matter  there  and  ask  nothing  more  of 
him.  He  was  greatly  relieved  by  my  decision,  but  bore 
himself  with  dignity.  I  never  saw  any  reason  to  be  sorry 
for  the  course  I  took,  and  believe  that  he  was  always 
afterward  consistent  and  steady  in  his  loyalty  to  the 
United  States. 


CHAPTER  XX 

WINTER  QUARTERS,  1862-63  —  PROMOTIONS  AND 
POLITICS 

Central  position  of  Marietta,  Ohio  —  Connection  with  all  parts  of  West 
Virginia — Drill  and  instruction  of  troops  —  Guerilla  warfare  —  Parti 
san  Rangers  —  Confederate  laws  —  Disposal  of  plunder — Mosby's 
Rangers  as  a  type  —  Opinions  of  Lee,  Stuart,  and  Rosser  —  Effect  on 
other  troops  —  Rangers  finally  abolished  —  Rival  home-guards  and 
militia  —  Horrors  of  neighborhood  war  —  Staff  and  staff  duties  —  Re 
duction  of  forces  —  General  Cluseret  —  Later  connection  with  the  Paris 
Commune  —  His  relations  with  Milroy  —  He  resigns  —  Political  situa 
tion —  Congressmen  distrust  Lincoln  —  Cutler's  diary — Resolutions 
regarding  appointments  of  general  officers  —  The  number  authorized  by 
law — Stanton's  report  —  Effect  of  Act  of  July,  1862  —  An  excess  of 
nine  major-generals  —  The  legal  questions  involved  —  Congressional 
patronage  and  local  distribution  —  Ready  for  a  "  deal  "  —  Bill  to  in 
crease  the  number  of  generals  —  A  "  slate "  made  up  to  exhaust  the 
number — Senate  and  House  disagree  —  Conference  —  Agreement  in 
last  hours  of  the  session  —  The  new  list  —  A  few  vacancies  by  resignation, 
etc.  —  List  of  those  dropped  —  My  own  case  —  Faults  of  the  method  — 
Lincoln's  humorous  comments  —  Curious  case  of  General  Turchin  — 
Congestion  in  the  highest  grades  —  Effects  —  Confederate  grades  of 
general  and  lieutenant-general  —  Superiority  of  our  system  —  Co- 
temporaneous  reports  and  criticisms  —  New  regiments  instead  of  re 
cruiting  old  ones  —  Sherman's  trenchant  opinion. 

EARLY  in  December  I  established  my  winter  head 
quarters  at  Marietta  on  the  Ohio  River,  a  central 
position  from  which  communication  could  be  had  most 
easily  with  all  parts  of  the  district  and  with  department 
headquarters.  It  was  situated  at  the  end  of  the  railway 
line  from  Cincinnati  to  the  Ohio  River  near  Parkersburg, 
where  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  met  the  Cincin 
nati  line.  The  Baltimore  road,  coming  from  the  east, 
forked  at  Grafton  in  West  Virginia  and  reached  Wheel 
ing,  as  has  been  described  in  an  earlier  chapter.1  The 

i  Ante,  pp.  40,  42. 


WINTER   QUARTERS,  1862-63  421 

river  was  usually  navigable  during  the  winter  and  made 
an  easy  communication  with  Wheeling  as  with  the  lower 
towns.  I  was  thus  conveniently  situated  for  most  speed 
ily  reaching  every  part  of  my  command,  in  person  or  other 
wise.  It  took  but  a  little  while  to  get  affairs  so  organized 
that  the  routine  of  work  ran  on  quietly  and  pleasantly. 
No  serious  effort  was  made  by  the  enemy  to  re-enter  the 
district  during  the  winter,  and  except  some  local  out 
breaks  of  "bush-whacking"  and  petty  guerilla  warfare, 
there  was  nothing  to  interrupt  the  progress  of  the  troops 
in  drill  and  instruction. 

A  good  deal  of  obscurity  still  hangs  about  the  subject 
of  guerilla  warfare,  and  the  relation  of  the  Confederate 
government  to  it.  There  was,  no  doubt,  a  good  deal  of 
loose  talk  that  found  its  way  into  print  and  helped  form 
a  popular  opinion,  which  treated  almost  every  scouting 
party  as  if  it  were  a  lawless  organization  of  "bush 
whackers."  But  there  was  an  authoritative  and  sys 
tematic  effort  of  the  Richmond  government  to  keep  up 
partisan  bodies  within  our  lines  which  should  be  soldiers 
when  they  had  a  chance  to  do  us  a  mischief,  and  citizens 
when  they  were  in  danger  of  capture  and  punishment. 
When  Fremont  assumed  command  of  the  Mountain 
Department,  he  very  early  called  the  attention  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  the  fact  that  Governor  Letcher  was 
sending  commissions  into  West  Virginia,  authorizing  the 
recipients  to  enlist  companies  to  be  used  against  us  in 
irregular  warfare.1 

The  bands  which  were  organized  by  the  Confederate 
Government  under  authority  of  law,  but  which  were  free 
from  the  control  of  army  commanders  and  unrestrained  by 
the  checks  upon  lawlessness  which  are  found  in  subordi 
nation  to  the  operations  of  organized  armies,  were  called 
"Partisan  Rangers,"  and  protection  as  legitimate  soldiers 
was  promised  them.  They  were  not  required  to  camp 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  iii.  p.  75. 


422          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

with  the  army,  or  to  remain  together  as  troops  or  regi 
ments.  They  wore  uniforms  or  not,  as  the  whim  might 
take  them.  They  remained,  as  much  as  they  dared,  in 
their  home  region,  and  assembled,  usually  at  night,  at 
a  preconcerted  signal  from  their  leaders,  to  make  a  "raid." 
They  were  not  paid  as  the  more  regular  troops  were,  but 
were  allowed  to  keep  the  horses  which  they  captured  or 
" lifted."  They  were  nominally  required  to  turn  over  the 
beef-cattle  and  army  stores  to  the  Confederate  commis 
sariat,  but  after  a  captured  wagon-train  had  been  looted 
by  them,  not  much  of  value  would  be  found  in  it.  Their 
raids  were  made  by  such  numbers  as  might  chance  to  be 
got  together.  Stuart,  the  brilliant  Confederate  cavalry 
commander,  whilst  crediting  Mosby  with  being  the  best 
of  the  partisans,  said  of  him,  "  he  usually  operates  with 
only  one-fourth  of  his  nominal  strength.  Such  organiza 
tions,  as  a  rule,  are  detrimental  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
army  at  large."1  General  Lee,  in  forwarding  one  of 
Mosby 's  reports,  commended  his  boldness  and  good  man 
agement,  but  added  :  "  I  have  heard  that  he  has  now  with 
him  a  large  number  of  men,  yet  his  expeditions  are  under 
taken  with  very  few,  and  his  attention  seems  more 
directed  to  the  capture  of  sutlers'  wagons,  etc.,  than  to 
the  injury  of  the  enemy's  communications  and  outposts. 
...  I  do  not  know  the  cause  for  undertaking  his  expedi 
tions  with  so  few  men;  whether  it  is  from  policy  or  the 
difficulty  of  collecting  them.  I  have  heard  of  his  men, 
among  them  officers,  being  in  rear  of  this  army,  selling 
captured  goods,  sutlers'  stores,  etc.  This  had  better  be 
attended  to  by  others.  It  has  also  been  reported  to  me 
that  many  deserters  from  this  army  have  joined  him. 
Among  them  have  been  seen  members  of  the  Eighth  Vir 
ginia  Regiment."2  In  the  "Richmond  Examiner"  of 
August  1 8,  1863  (the  same  date  as  General  Lee's  letter), 
was  the  statement  that  "At  a  sale  of  Yankee  plunder 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxxiii.  p.  1082.  2  /</.,  vol  xxix.  pt.  ii.  p.  652. 


WINTER   QUARTERS,   1862-63  423 

taken  by  Mosby  and  his  men,  held  at  Charlottesville  last 
week,  thirty-odd  thousand  dollars  were  realized,  to  be 
divided  among  the  gallant  band."  l 

The  injury  to  the  discipline  of  their  own  army  grad 
ually  brought  leading  officers  of  the  Confederates  to  the 
conviction  that  the  "  Partisan  Rangers  "  cost  more  than 
they  were  worth.  In  January,  1864,  General  Rosser,  one 
of  the  most  distinguished  cavalry  officers  of  the  South, 
made  a  formal  communication  to  General  Lee  on  the  sub 
ject.  "During  the  time  I  have  been  in  the  valley,"  he 
said,  "I  have  had  ample  opportunity  of  judging  of  the 
efficiency  and  usefulness  of  the  many  irregular  bodies  of 
troops  which  occupy  this  country,  known  as  partisans,  etc., 
and  am  prompted  by  no  other  feeling  than  a  desire  to 
serve  my  country,  to  inform  you  that  they  are  a  nuisance 
and  an  evil  to  the  service.  Without  discipline,  order,  or 
organization,  they  roam  broadcast  over  the  country,  a 
band  of  thieves,  stealing,  pillaging,  plundering,  and 
doing  every  manner  of  mischief  and  crime.  They  are  a 
terror  to  the  citizens  and  an  injury  to  the  cause.  They 
never  fight;  can't  be  made  to  fight.  Their  leaders  are 
generally  brave,  but  few  of  the  men  are  good  soldiers,  and 
have  engaged  in  this  business  for  the  sake  of  gain."2 
After  classifying  the  mischiefs  to  the  regular  service,  he 
continues :  "  It  is  almost  impossible  to  manage  the  differ 
ent  companies  of  my  brigade  that  are  from  Loudoun,  Fau- 
quier,  Fairfax,  etc.,  the  region  occupied  by  Mosby.  They 
see  these  men  living  at  their  ease  and  enjoying  the  com 
forts  of  home,  allowed  to  possess  all  that  they  capture, 
and  their  duties  mere  pastime  pleasures  compared  with 
their  own  arduous  ones,  and  it  is  a  natural  consequence, 
in  the  nature  of  man,  that  he  should  become  dissatisfied 
under  these  circumstances.  Patriotism  fails,  in  a  long 
and  tedious  war  like  this,  to  sustain  the  ponderous  bur 
dens  which  bear  heavily  and  cruelly  upon  the  heart  and 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxix.  pt.  ii.  p.  653.  2  Id.,  vol.  xxxiii.  p.  1081. 


424          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

soul  of  man."  1  General  Rosser  recommended  the  absorp 
tion  of  the  partisan  bodies  into  the  ordinary  brigades, 
using  their  supposed  talents  for  scouting  by  sending  them 
on  expeditions  as  regular  patrols  and  reconnoitring  par 
ties,  reporting  to  their  proper  command  as  soon  as  the 
duty  was  done. 

It  was  upon  Rosser's  communication  that  Stuart  made 
the  endorsement  already  quoted,  and  Lee  sent  it  forward 
to  the  War  Department,  further  endorsed  thus :  "  As  far 
as  my  knowledge  and  experience  extend,  there  is  much 
truth  in  the  statement  of  General  Rosser.  I  recommend 
that  the  law  authorizing  these  partisan  corps  be  abol 
ished.  The  evils  resulting  from  their  organization  more 
than  counterbalance  the  good  they  accomplish."  The 
Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Siddon,  drafted  a  bill  to  abolish 
them,  and  it  passed  the  Confederate  House.  Delay 
occurring  in  the  Senate,  the  matter  was  compromised  by 
transferring  all  the  Rangers  except  Mosby's  and  McNeill's 
to  the  line,2  As  it  was  to  Mosby's  that  the  reported  facts 
applied,  and  all  agreed  that  his  was  the  best  of  the  lot, 
we  may  imagine  what  must  have  been  the  character  of 
the  rest. 

In  the  first  two  winters  of  the  war,  these  organizations 
were  in  the  height  of  their  pernicious  activity,  and  the 
loyal  West  Virginians  were  their  favorite  victims.  We 
knew  almost  nothing  of  their  organization,  except  that 
they  claimed  some  Confederate  law  for  their  being.  We 
seldom  found  them  in  uniform,  and  had  no  means  of  dis 
tinguishing  them  from  any  other  armed  horse-stealers  and 
"bush-whackers."  We  were,  however,  made  unpleasantly 
certain  of  the  fact  that  in  every  neighborhood  where  seces 
sion  sentiments  were  rife,  our  messengers  were  waylaid 
and  killed,  small  parties  were  ambushed,  and  all  the 
exasperating  forms  of  guerilla  warfare  were  abundant. 
Besides  all  this,  the  Confederate  authorities  assumed  to 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxxiii.  p.  1081.         2  /</.,  pp.  1082,  1253. 


WINTER   QUARTERS,   1862-63  425 

call  out  the  militia  of  counties  into  which  they  were  in 
tending  to  make  an  expedition,  so  that  they  might  have 
the  temporary  co-operation  of  local  troops.  They  claimed 
the  right  to  do  this  because  they  had  not  recognized  the 
separation  of  West  Virginia,  and  insisted  that  the  whole 
was  subject  to  the  laws  of  Virginia.  The  result  was  that 
the  Union  men  formed  companies  of  "  Home  Guards  "  for 
self-protection,  and  the  conflict  of  arms  was  carried  into 
every  settlement  in  the  mountain  nooks  and  along  the 
valleys.  In  this  kind  of  fighting  there  was  no  quarter 
given,  or  if  prisoners  were  taken,  they  were  too  often  re 
ported  as  having  met  with  fatal  accidents  before  they 
could  be  handed  over  to  the  regular  authorities.  As  all 
this  could  have  no  effect  upon  the  progress  of  the  war, 
the  more  cool  and  intelligent  heads  of  both  sides  opposed 
it,  and  gradually  diminished  it.  Severe  measures  against 
it  were  in  fact  merciful,  for  the  horrors  of  war  are  always 
least  when  the  fighting  is  left  to  the  armies  of  responsible 
belligerents,  unprovoked  by  the  petty  but  exasperating 
hostilities  of  irregulars.  The  trouble  from  this  source 
was  less  during  the  winter  of  1862-63  tnan  it  had  been  the 
year  before,  but  it  still  gave  occupation  to  small  movable 
columns  of  our  troops  from  time  to  time. 

The  organization  of  my  staff  was  somewhat  increased 
with  the  enlargement  of  responsibilities.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  McElroy,  who  had  been  my  adjutant-general  in  the 
campaign  of  1861,  returned  to  me  as  inspector-general 
and  took  the  whole  supervision  of  the  equipment,  drill, 
and  instruction  of  the  troops  of  the  district.  Major  Bas- 
com,  who  had  received  his  promotion  at  the  same  time 
with  mine,  continued  to  be  adjutant-general.  The  in 
creased  work  in  looking  after  supplies  made  more  force  in 
the  commissariat  a  necessity,  and  Captain  Barriger  of 
the  regular  army  was  sent  to  me,  my  former  commissary, 
Captain  Treat,  continuing  on  the  staff.  Barriger  was  a 
modest,  clear-headed  officer  of  admirable  business  qualifi- 


426          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

cations,  whom  I  had  the  good  fortune  to  be  again  associ 
ated  with  late  in  the  war.  Three  principal  depots  of 
supply  were  established  at  the  bases  of  the  principal  lines 
of  communication  in  the  district,  —  Wheeling,  Parkers- 
burg,  and  Gallipolis.  At  each  of  these,  depot  commis 
saries  and  quartermasters  were  located,  and  the  posts  and 
commands  at  the  front  drew  their  supplies  from  them. 
Captain  Fitch,  my  quartermaster,  supervised  his  depart 
ment  in  a  similar  way  to  that  of  the  commissariat.  My 
aides  were  Captain  Christie  and  Lieutenant  Conine,  as 
before,  and  I  added  to  them  my  brother,  Theodore  Cox, 
who  served  with  me  as  volunteer  aide  without  rank  in  the 
battles  of  South  Mountain  and  Antietam,  and  was  then 
appointed  lieutenant  in  the  Eleventh  Ohio  Infantry.  He 
was  my  constant  companion  from  this  time  till  peace  was 
established.  The  medical  department  remained  under 
the  care  of  Major  Holmes,  Brigade-Surgeon,  who  com 
bined  scientific  with  administrative  qualities  in  a  rare 
measure. 

There  was  no  military  movement  during  the  winter  of 
sufficient  importance  to  be  told  at  length.  Constant 
scouting  and  reconnoissances  were  kept  up,  slight  skir 
mishes  were  not  infrequent,  but  these  did  not  prevent  our 
sense  of  rest  and  of  preparation  for  the  work  of  the  next 
spring.  General  Crook,  with  a  brigade,  was  transferred 
temporarily  to  the  command  of  Rosecrans  in  Tennessee, 
and  Kelley,  Milroy,  and  Scammon  divided  the  care  of  the 
three  hundred  miles  of  mountain  ranges  which  made  our 
front.  My  own  leisure  gave  me  the  opportunity  for 
some  systematic  and  useful  reading  in  military  history 
and  art.  An  amusing  interlude  occurred  in  a  hot  contro 
versy  which  arose  between  General  Milroy  and  one  of  his 
subordinates  which  would  not  be  worth  mentioning  ex 
cept  for  the  fact  that  the  subordinate  had  afterward  a 
world-wide  notoriety  as  military  chief  of  the  Paris  Com 
mune  in  1870. 


PROMOTIONS  AND  POLITICS  427 

Gustave  Cluseret  was  a  Frenchman,  who  was  appointed 
in  the  spring  of  1862  an  aide-de-camp  with  the  rank  of 
colonel  upon  the  staff  of  General  Fremont,  who  (with 
questionable  legality)  assigned  him  to  command  a  brigade,1 
and  recommended  his  appointment  as  brigadier  for  good 
conduct  in  the  May  and  June  campaign  against  Jackson. 
The  appointment  was  made  on  October  I4th,2  and  during 
the  fall  and  winter  he  had  a  brigade  in  Milroy's  division. 
Milroy  was,  for  a  time,  loud  in  his  praises  of  Cluseret  as 
the  beau  ideal  of  an  officer,  and  their  friendship  was  fra 
ternal.3  In  the  winter,  however,  their  mutual  admiration 
was  nipped  by  a  killing  frost,  and  a  controversy  sprung 
up  between  them  which  soon  led  to  mutual  recrimination 
also  in  the  superlative  degree.  They  addressed  their 
complaints  to  General  Halleck,  and  as  the  papers  passed 
through  my  headquarters,  I  was  a  witness  of  their  berat 
ing  of  each  other.  They  made  a  terrible  din,  on  paper, 
for  a  while,  but  I  cannot  recall  anything  very  serious  in 
their  accusations.  Halleck  pigeon-holed  their  corre 
spondence,  but  Milroy  had  powerful  political  friends,  and 
Cluseret,  learning  that  his  appointment  would  not  be 
confirmed  by  the  Senate,  anticipated  their  action,  and  ter 
minated  his  military  career  in  the  United  States  by  resign 
ing  two  days  before  the  close  of  the  session  of  Congress.4 

This  brings  me  to  the  subject  of  Congressional  action 
in  the  matter  of  the  promotions  and  appointments  in  the 
army  during  this  winter  session  which  closed  the  Thirty- 
seventh  Congress.  By  it  I  was  myself  to  suffer  the  one 
severe  disappointment  of  my  military  career.  The  time 
was  one  of  great  political  excitement,  for  the  fall  elections 
had  resulted  in  a  great  overturning  in  the  Congressional 
delegations.  The  Democrats  had  elected  so  many  repre- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xii.  pt.  i.  pp.  9,  35.  2  Army  Register,  1863,  p.  95. 

8  O.  R.,  vol.  xxi.  p.  779. 

*  Army  Register,  1863,  p.  101.  His  name  does  not  appear  in  the  lists 
in  the  body  of  the  Register,  because  he  was  not  in  the  Army  April  I,  1863, 
the  date  of  publication. 


428          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

sentatives  for  the  Thirty-eighth  Congress  that  it  was  doubt 
ful  whether  the  administration  would  be  able  to  command 
a  majority  in  the  House.  The  retirement  of  McClellan 
from  the  command  had  also  provoked  much  opposition, 
and  in  the  lack  of  full  knowledge  of  the  reasons  for  dis 
placing  him,  political  ones  were  imagined  and  charged. 
Public  policy  forbade  the  President  to  make  known  all  his 
grounds  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  general,  and  many  of 
his  own  party  openly  questioned  his  wisdom  and  his 
capacity  to  govern.  Men  whose  patriotism  cannot  be 
questioned  shared  in  this  distrust,  and  in  their  private 
writings  took  the  most  gloomy  view  of  the  situation  and 
of  the  future  of  the  country.  This  was  intensified  when 
Burnside  was  so  bloodily  repulsed  at  Fredericksburg  at 
the  close  of  the  first  week  of  the  session.1 

As  is  usual  in  revolutionary  times,  more  radical  meas 
ures  were  supposed  by  many  to  be  the  cure  for  disasters, 
and  in  caucuses  held  by  congressmen  the  supposed  con 
servatism  of  Mr.  Lincoln  and  part  of  his  cabinet  was 
openly  denounced,  and  the  earnestness  of  the  army  leaders 
was  questioned.2  Much  of  this  was  a  misunderstanding 

1  Mr.  W.  P.  Cutler,  Representative  from  Ohio,  a  modest  but  very  intel 
ligent  and  patriotic  man,  wrote  in  his  diary  under  December  i6th  :  "  This  is 
a  day  of  darkness  and  peril  to  the  country.  .  .  .  Lincoln  himself  seems  to 
have  no  nerve  or  decision  in  dealing  with  great  issues.     We  are  at  sea,  and 
no  pilot  or  captain.     God  alone  can  take  care  of  us,  and  all  his  ways  seem  to 
be  against  us  and  to  favor  the  rebels  and  their  allies  the  Democrats.     Truly 
it  is  a  day  of  darkness  and  gloom."     "  Life  and  Times  "  of  Ephraim  Cutler, 
with  biographical  sketches  of  Jervis  Cutler  and  W.  P.  Cutler,  p.  296. 

2  Mr.  Cutler  reports  a  caucus  of  the  House  held  January  27th,  in  which 

"  Mr. stated  that  the  great  difficulty  was  in  holding  the  President  to 

anything.     He  prided  himself  on  having  a  divided  cabinet,  so  that  he  could 
play  one  against  the  other.  .  .  .  The  earnest  men  are  brought  to  a  deadlock 
by  the  President.     The  President  is  tripped  up  by  his  generals,  who  for  the 
most  part  seem  to  have  no  heart  in  their  work."     Id.,  p.  301.    Mr.  Cutler 
himself  expresses  similar  sentiments  and  reiterates:    "It  really  seems  as  if 
the  ship  of  state  was  going  to  pieces  in  the  storm."     "  How  striking  the 
want  of  a  leader.     The  nation  is  without  a  head."     "  The  true  friends  of  the 
government  are  groping  around  without  a  leader,"  etc.     Id.,  pp.  297,  301, 
302. 


PROMOTIONS  AND  POLITICS  429 

of  the  President  and  of  events  which  time  has  corrected, 
but  at  the  moment  and  in  the  situation  of  the  country  it 
was  natural.  It  strongly  affected  the  conduct  of  the  fed 
eral  legislators,  and  must  be  taken  into  the  account  when 
we  try  to  understand  their  attitude  toward  the  army  and 
the  administration  of  military  affairs. 

In  the  Senate,  at  a  very  early  day  after  the  opening  of 
the  session,  Mr.  Wilson,  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Military  Affairs,  offered  a  resolution  (which  passed  with 
out  opposition)  calling  upon  the  Secretary  of  War  for  "the 
number  and  names  of  the  major-generals  and  brigadier- 
generals  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  and  where 
and  how  they  are  employed. " 1  This  was,  no  doubt,  the 
offspring  of  an  opinion  in  vogue  in  Congress,  that  the 
President  had  gone  beyond  the  authority  of  law  in  the 
number  of  these  officers  he  had  appointed.  If  this  were 
true,  the  course  taken  was  not  a  friendly  one  toward  the 
administration.  The  whole  list  of  appointments  and 
promotions  would  be  submitted  to  the  Senate  for  confir 
mation,  and  if  the  statutory  number  had  been  exceeded, 
that  body  could  stop  confirming  when  it  reached  the  legal 
limit.  There  were,  of  course,  frequent  consultations  be 
tween  the  Congressional  committees  or  the  individual 
members  and  the  Secretary  of  War;  but  whatever  efforts 
there  may  have  been  to  reach  a  quiet  understanding 
failed.  On  the  2ist  of  January,  the  Secretary  not  having 
responded  to  Mr.  Wilson's  resolution,  Mr.  Rice  of  Min 
nesota  offered  another  (which  also  passed  by  unanimous 
consent),  directing  the  Secretary  of  War  "to  inform  the 
Senate  whether  any  more  major  and  brigadier  generals 
have  been  appointed  and  paid  than  authorized  by  law ;  and 
if  so,  how  many;  give  names,  dates  of  appointment  and 
.amounts  paid."2 

Two  days  later  the  Secretary  sent  in  his  reports  in  re- 

1  Senate  Journal,  3d  Session,  37th  Congress,  Dec.  8,  1862. 

2  Id.,  Jan.  21,  1863. 


430          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

sponse  to  both  resolutions.  To  the  first  he  replied  that  the 
interests  of  the  public  service  would  not  permit  him  to 
state  "  where  and  how"  the  general  officers  were  employed, 
but  he  gave  the  list  of  names.  He  gave  also  a  separate 
list  of  six  major-generals  who  were  not  assigned  to  any 
duty.1  To  the  second  resolution  he  replied  that  "It  is 
believed  by  this  Department  that  the  law  authorizing  the 
increase  of  the  volunteer  and  militia  forces  necessarily 
implied  an  increase  of  officers  beyond  the  number  speci 
fied  in  the  Act  of  July  17,  1862,  to  any  extent  required 
by  the  service,  and  that  the  number  of  appointments  is 
not  beyond  such  limit."  If  the  limit  of  the  statute 
named  were  strictly  applied,  he  said  there  would  be  found 
to  be  nine  major-generals  and  forty-six  brigadier-generals 
in  excess.  There  had  been  no  payments  of  increased 
salary  to  correspond  with  the  increased  rank,  except  in 
one  instance.2  The  list  submitted  showed  fifty-two 
major-generals  in  service,  and  one  (Buford)  was  omitted, 
so  that  if  forty  should  prove  to  be  the  limit,  there  would 
be  thirteen  in  excess.  This,  however,  was  only  appar 
ently  true,  for  the  Secretary's  list  included  the  four  major- 
generals  in  the  regular  army,  whose  case  was  not  covered 
by  the  limitation  of  the  statute.  This  seems  to  have 
been  overlooked  in  the  steps  subsequently  taken  by  mem 
bers  of  Congress,  and  as  the  action  was  unwelcome  to  the 
President,  he  did  not  enlighten  the  legislators  respecting 
their  miscalculation.  The  business  proceeded  upon  the 
supposition  that  the  appointments  in  the  highest  rank 
were  really  thirteen  in  excess  of  the  number  fixed  by  the 
statute. 

1  These   were   McClellan,   Fremont,   Cassius   M.   Clay,  Buell   (ordered 
before  a  military  commission),  McDowell,  and  F.  J.  Porter  (both  before 
military  courts  in  connection  with  the  second  battle  of  Bull  Run). 

2  Executive  Documents  of  Senate,  3d  Session,  37th  Congress,  Nos.  21 
and  22.     The  nine  major-generals  were  Schuyler  Hamilton,  Granger,  Cox, 
Rousseau,  McPherson,  Augur,  Meade,  Hartsuff,  and  N.  B.  Buford.     If  the 
number  were  thirteen,  it  would  include  Foster,  Parke,  Schenck,  and  Hurlbut. 


PROMOTIONS  AND  POLITICS  431 

The  state  of  the  law  was  this.  The  Act  of  July  22, 
1861,  authorized  the  President  to  call  for  volunteers,  not 
exceeding  half  a  million,  and  provided  for  one  brigadier- 
general  for  four  regiments  and  one  major-general  for 
three  brigades.  The  Act  of  25th  July  of  the  same  year 
authorized  a  second  call  of  the  same  number,  and  provided 
for  "  such  number  of  major-generals  and  brigadier-generals 
as  may  in  his  (the  President's)  judgment  be  required  for 
their  organization."  In  the  next  year,  however,  a  "rider" 
was  put  upon  the  clause  in  the  appropriation  bill  to  pay 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  volunteer  service,  which  pro 
vided  "that  the  President  shall  not  be  authorized  to  ap 
point  more  than  forty  major-generals,  nor  more  than  two 
hundred  brigadier-generals,"  and  repealed  former  acts 
which  allowed  more.1  This  limit  just  covered  those  who 
had  been  appointed  up  to  the  date  of  the  approval  of  the 
appropriation  bill.  Two  questions,  however,  were  still 
open  for  dispute.  First,  whether  a  "rider"  upon  the 
appropriation  should  change  a  general  law  on  the  subject 
of  army  organization,  and  second,  whether  the  new  limit 
might  not  allow  appointments  to  be  thereafter  made  to  the 
extent  of  the  numbers  stated.  The  report  of  Mr.  Stanton 
evidently  suggests  such  questions. 

The  matter  was  now  in  good  shape  for  what  politicians 
call  "a  deal,"  and  negotiations  between  members  of 
Congress  and  the  executive  were  active.  The  result 
appears  to  have  been  an  understanding  that  a  bill  should 
be  passed  increasing  the  number  of  general  officers,  so 
as  not  only  to  cover  the  appointments  already  made,  but 
leaving  a  considerable  margin  of  new  promotions  to  be 
filled  by  arrangement  between  the  high  contracting  par 
ties.  On  the  1 2th  of  February,  1863,  the  Senate  passed 
a  bill  providing  for  the  appointment  of  twenty  major- 

1  The  several  acts  referred  to  may  be  found  in  vol.  xii.  U.  S.  Statutes  at 
Large,  pp.  268,  274,  506.  The  appropriation  bill  was  passed  July  5,  1862. 
The  date  July  17, 1862,  in  the  Secretary's  report  seems  to  be  a  misprint. 


432          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

generals  of  volunteers  and  fifty  brigadiers.  This  was  not 
acceptable  to  the  House.  The  battle  of  Stone's  River 
had  lately  been  fought  in  Tennessee,  and  representatives 
from  the  West  were  urgent  in  arguing  that  affairs  near 
Washington  unduly  filled  the  view  of  the  administration. 
There  was  some  truth  in  this.  At  any  rate  the  House 
amended  the  bill  so  as  to  increase  the  numbers  to  forty 
major-generals  and  one  hundred  brigadiers,  to  be  made 
by  promotions,  for  meritorious  service,  from  lower  grades. 
As  soon  as  it  was  known  that  the  Military  Committee  of 
the  House  would  report  such  an  amendment,  it  was  as 
sumed  that  the  Senate  would  concur,  and  a  "  slate  "  was 
made  up  accordingly.  On  the  hypothesis  that  the  list  of 
major-generals  was  thirteen  in  excess  of  the  forty  fixed  by 
statute,  a  new  list  of  twenty-seven  was  made  out,  which 
would  complete  the  forty  to  be  added  by  the  new  bill. 
A  similar  list  was  prepared  for  the  brigadiers  and  pre 
cisely  similar  negotiations  went  on,  but  for  brevity's  sake 
I  shall  confine  myself  to  the  list  for  the  highest  rank,  in 
which  I  was  personally  concerned. 

The  House  passed  the  amended  bill  on  the  27th  of  Feb 
ruary,  and  it  went  back  to  the  Senate  for  concurrence  in 
the  amendments.  But  now  an  unexpected  difficulty  arose. 
The  Senate  refused  to  concur  in  the  changes  made  by  the 
House.  It  matters  little  whether  the  senators  were 
offended  at  the  determination  of  the  lower  House  to  have 
so  large  a  share  in  the  nominations,  or  desired  to  punish 
the  President  for  having  gone  beyond  the  letter  of  the 
law  in  his  promotions  of  1862;  the  fact  was  that  they 
voted  down  the  amendments.  A  committee  of  conference 
between  the  two  houses  was  appointed,  and  a  compromise 
report  was  made  fixing  the  additional  number  of  major- 
generals  at  thirty  and  of  brigadiers  at  seventy-five.  Both 
Houses  finally  concurred  in  the  report,  the  bill  went  to 
the  President  on  the  ist  of  March,  and  he  signed  it  on 
the  next  day. 


PROMOTIONS  AND  POLITICS  433 


There  was  but  a  single  working-day  of  the  session  left, 
for  the  session  must  end  at  noon  of  the  4th  of  March. 
The  list  must  be  reduced.  The  manner  in  which  this  was 
done  clinches  the  proof,  if  there  had  been  any  doubt 
before,  that  the  list  of  twenty-seven  was  the  result  of 
negotiations  with  congressmen.  No  meddling  with  that 
list  was  permitted,  though  the  use  of  patronage  as 
"spoils"  had  some  very  glaring  illustrations  in  it.  The 
President  had  to  make  the  reduction  from  his  own  promo 
tions  made  earlier,  and  which  were  therefore  higher  on 
the  list  and  in  rank,  instead  of  dropping  those  last  added, 
as  had  seemed  to  be  demanded  by  the  earlier  action  of 
Congress.  The  only  exception  to  this  was  in  the  case 
of  General  Schofield,  whose  even-handed  administration 
of  the  District  of  Missouri  and  army  of  the  frontier  had 
excited  the  enmity  of  extreme  politicians  in  that  State 
and  in  Kansas,  led  by  Senator  "Jim"  Lane,  the  prince 
of  "jay-hawkers."  Schofield  was  dropped  from  the 
twenty-seven. 

A  few  changes  had  occurred  in  the  original  roster 
of  officers,  making  additional  vacancies.  Governor  Mor 
gan  of  New  York,  who  had  a  complimentary  appoint 
ment  as  major-general,  but  had  never  served,  resigned. 
Schuyler  Hamilton  also  resigned,  and  Fitz-John  Porter 
was  cashiered. 

The  number  to  be  sacrificed  was  thus  reduced  to  six, 
and  the  lot  fell  on  Generals  N.  B.  Buford,  G.  W.  Morell, 
W.  F.  Smith,  H.  G.  Wright,  J.  M.  Schofield,  and  myself. 
The  last  four  won  their  promotion  a  second  time  and  were 
re-appointed  and  confirmed  at  varying  intervals;  but  of 
that  later.  Of  course,  in  such  a  scramble  it  was  only  a 
question  as  to  who  had  or  had  not  powerful  friends  on  the 
spot  who  would  voluntarily  champion  his  cause.  No  one 
at  a  distance  could  have  any  warning.  The  passage  of  the 
bill  and  action  under  it  came  together.  For  myself,  I 
had  gone  quietly  on  in  the  performance  of  duty,  never 
VOL.  i. —  28 


434          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

dreaming  of  danger,  and  it  was  long  years  after  the  war 
before  I  learned  how  the  thing  had  in  fact  been  done. 
My  place  had  been  near  the  top  of  the  list,  the  commands 
which  I  had  exercised  and  the  responsibilities  intrusted 
to  me  had  been  greater  than  those  of  the  large  majority  of 
the  appointees,  and  I  had  conclusive  evidence  of  the 
approval  of  my  superiors.  The  news  was  at  first,  there 
fore,  both  astonishing  and  disheartening.  As  a  result  of 
political  "influences,"  it  is  sufficiently  intelligible.  I 
had  at  that  time  a  barely  speaking  acquaintance  with 
Senator  Wade  of  Ohio.  It  was  the  same  with  Senator 
Sherman,  but  with  the  added  disadvantage  that  in  the 
senatorial  contest  of  1860  between  him  and  Governor 
Dennison  I  had  warmly  espoused  the  cause  of  the  latter. 
Mr.  Hutchins,  the  representative  from  my  district,  had 
not  been  renominated,  and  Garfield,  who  was  elected  in 
his  place,  had  not  yet  taken  his  seat,  but  was  still  in  the 
military  service  in  the  field.  Mr.  Chase  had  been  a  con 
stant  friend,  but  this  was  just  the  time  when  his  differ 
ences  with  Mr.  Lincoln  had  become  acute,  and  since  the 
2Oth  of  December  the  President  had  in  his  hands  the 
resignations  of  both  Seward  and  Chase,  which  enabled  him 
to  refuse  both,  and  to  baffle  the  party  in  the  Senate  which 
was  trying  to  force  him  to  reorganize  his  cabinet  by  ex 
cluding  Seward  and  those  who  were  thought  the  more 
conservative.  As  he  expressed  it  "he  had  a  pumpkin  in 
each  end  of  his  bag,  and  could  now  ride."1  If,  on  the 
theory  of  apportioning  the  promotions  to  States,  it  were 
held  that  Ohio  must  lose  one  of  the  six  nominated,  it 
was  easy  to  see  where  the  balance  of  influence  would  be. 
General  Halleck  was  well  known  to  be  persistent  in 
favoring  appointments  from  the  regular  army,  and  would 
urge  that  the  reduction  should  be  made  from  those  orig 
inally  appointed  from  civil  life.  These  were  Schenck 
and  myself.  But  General  Schenck  was  a  veteran  member 

1  Hay  and  Nicolay's  "  Lincoln,"  vol.  vi.  p.  271. 


PROMOTIONS  AND  POLITICS  435 

of  the  House  of  Representatives  and  had  now  been  elected 
to  the  next  house,  in  which  it  was  known  he  would  be  a 
prominent  character.  It  goes  without  saying,  therefore, 
that  on  such  a  basis  the  black  ball  would  come  to  me.1 
To  complete  the  story  of  the  promotions  made  at  this 
time,  it  may  be  added  that  a  short  executive  session  of 
the  Senate  was  held  after  the  regular  adjournment  of 
Congress  on  the  4th  of  March,  and  that  the  President  sent 
in  the  names  of  Carl  Schurz  and  Julius  Stahel  to  be  made 
major-generals.  For  one  of  these  a  vacancy  was  made  by 
the  arrangement  that  Cassius  M.  Clay  was  reappointed 
minister  to  St.  Petersburg  and  resigned  the  military  rank 
which  he  had  never  used.  The  other  seems  to  have  been 
made  by  a  resignation  to  take  effect  the  next  month. 
General  Sumner  died  on  the  2ist  of  March,  making 
another  vacancy,  but  it  is  difficult  to  fix  with  accuracy 
the  exact  date  of  the  changes  which  occurred.2  In  the 
case  of  the  last  two  promotions  Mr.  Lincoln  openly  de 
clared  that  he  made  them  in  recognition  of  the  German 
element  in  the  army  and  in  politics.3 

It  would  be  unjust  to  assume  that  members  of  Con 
gress  and  the  President  were  not  guided  by  patriotic 
motives.  The  reform  of  the  public  service  in  matters 
of  appointment  had  not  then  attracted  much  attention. 
Patronage  was  used  for  political  purposes  with  complete 
frankness  and  openness.  In  civil  offices  this  custom  was 
boldly  defended  and  advocated.  There  was  some  con- 

1  The  promotions  of  Ohio  officers  then  pending,  besides  my  own,  were 
of  Schenck,  McCook,  Rosecrans,  Stanley,  McPherson,  and  Sheridan. 

2  The  reason  for  this  difficulty  is  in  part  found  in  the  frequent  assignment 
of  rank  to  officers  from  an  earlier  date  than  their  appointment,  and  as  the 
official  lists  are  arranged  according  to  rank,  they  are  sometimes  misleading 
as   to   date   of  appointment.     Thus  Rosecrans   dates  in  the  register  from 
March  21,  1862,  but  he  was  not  appointed  till  some  six  months  later.     So 
also  Schofield  when  reappointed  in  May,  1863,  was  made  to  rank  as  in  his 
first  appointment,  from  Nov.  29,  1862. 

3  For  an  illustration  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  way  of  putting  things  in  such  cases, 
see  "  Military  Miscellany"  by  Colonel  James  B.  Fry,  p.  281. 


436          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

sciousness  shown  that  promotions  in  the  army  ought  to 
be  controlled  by  a  somewhat  different  rule,  but  it  seemed 
to  be  thought  that  enough  was  done  in  the  way  of  safe 
guard  when  the  choice  was  confined  to  officers  already  in 
service,  and  appointments  for  the  highest  grades  were  not 
given  to  entirely  new  men  from  civil  life.  Each  aspirant 
could  find  friends  to  sound  his  praises,  and  it  was  easy 
to  assert  that  it  was  only  giving  preference  to  one's 
friends  among  officers  of  equal  merit.  Many  excellent 
appointments  were  in  fact  made,  and  the  proportion  of 
these  would  have  been  greater  if  the  judgment  of  mili 
tary  superiors  had  been  more  controlling  in  determining 
the  whole  list.  Mr.  Lincoln's  humorous  way  of  explain 
ing  his  actions  may  give  an  impression  of  a  lower  stand 
ard  than  he  actually  acknowledged;  but  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  he  allowed  himself  to  be  pressed  into  making 
military  promotions,  at  times,  upon  purely  political  or 
personal  reasons.1 

It  did  not  seem  to  occur  to  the  authorities  that  the 
judgment  of  superior  officers  in  the  field  should  be  called 
for  and  carefully  considered  when  it  was  a  question  of 
promoting  one  of  their  subordinates.  An  instance  which 
occurred  in  General  Buell's  army  carried  this  beyond  the 
verge  of  the  grotesque.  Colonel  Turchin,  of  an  Illinois 
regiment,  was  a  Russian,  an  educated  officer  who  had 
served  in  the  Russian  staff  corps.  An  excellent  soldier 
in  many  respects,  his  ideas  of  discipline  were,  unfortu 
nately,  lax,  and  in  the  summer  of  1862  he  was  court- 
martialled  for  allowing  his  men  to  pillage  a  town  in 

1  Colonel  Fry,  who  was  assistant  adjutant-general  at  Washington  and  in 
personal  intercourse  with  the  President,  gives  the  following  as  a  memoran 
dum  made  by  Mr.  Lincoln  himself  in  reference  to  an  application  to  have  a 
regular-army  officer  made  a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers.  "  On  this  day 

Mrs. called  upon   me  :   she  is  the  wife  of  Major of   the  regular 

army.  She  is  a  saucy  little  woman,  and  I  think  she  will  torment  me  till  I 
have  to  do  it."  Colonel  Fry  adds,  "  It  was  not  long  till  that  little  woman's 
husband  was  appointed  a  brigadier-general."  Miscellany,  pp.  280,  281. 


PROMOTIONS  AND  POLITICS  437 

Tennessee.  The  court  was  an  intelligent  one,  of  which 
General  Garfield  was  president.  The  story  current  in 
the  army  at  the  time,  and  which  I  believe  to  be  true,  is 
that  after  the  court  had  heard  part  of  the  testimony  it 
became  apparent  that  they  must  convict,  and  Mrs.  Tur- 
chin,  who  usually  accompanied  her  husband  in  the  field, 
started  to  the  rear  to  procure  political  "  influences  "  to 
save  him.  With  various  recommendations  she  went  to 
Washington,  and  was  so  successful  that  although  the 
sentence  of  the  court  dismissing  him  from  the  service 
was  promulgated  on  the  6th  of  August,  he  had  been 
appointed  a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers  on  the  5th, 
and  he  was  not  one  of  those  who  were  dropped  from  the 
list  on  March  3,  1863. l  The  trial  was  one  of  consider 
able  notoriety,  yet  it  is  probable  that  it  was  overlooked 
by  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War  at  the  time  the 
appointment  was  made;  but  it  cannot  need  to  be  said 
that  whatever  grounds  for  leniency  might  have  existed, 
it  turns  the  whole  business  into  a  farce  when  they  were 
made  the  basis  of  a  promotion  in  the  revised  list  six 
months  later.  To  add  to  the  perfection  of  the  story, 
Mrs.  Turchin  had  acted  on  her  own  responsibility,  and 
the  colonel  did  not  know  of  the  result  till  he  had  gone 
home,  and  in  an  assembly  of  personal  friends  who  called 
upon  him  ostensibly  to  cheer  him  in  his  doleful  despond 
ency,  his  wife  brought  the  little  drama  to  its  de'nouement 
by  presenting  him  with  the  appointment  in  their  presence. 
One  of  the  worst  features  of  the  method  of  appointment 
by  "slate"  made  up  between  congressmen  and  the  execu 
tive  was  that  it  filled  up  every  place  allowed  by  law,  and 
left  nothing  to  be  used  as  a  recognition  for  future  ser 
vices  in  the  field,  except  as  vacancies  occurred,  and 
these  were  few  and  far  between.  The  political  influ 
ences  which  determined  the  appointment  were  usually 
powerful  enough  to  prevent  dismissal.  Whoever  will 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xvi.  pt.  ii.  p.  277. 


438          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

trace  the  employment  of  officers  of  the  highest  grades  in 
the  last  half  of  the  war,  will  find  large  numbers  of  these 
on  unimportant  and  nominal  duty,  whilst  their  work  in 
the  active  armies  was  done  by  men  of  lower  grade,  to 
whom  the  appropriate  rank  had  to  be  refused.  The  sys 
tem  was  about  as  bad  as  could  be,  but  victory  was  won  in 
spite  of  it.  It  was  fortunate,  on  the  whole,  that  we  did 
not  have  the  grades  of  lieutenant-general  and  general 
during  the  war,  as  the  Confederates  had.  They  made  the 
one  the  regular  rank  of  a  corps  commander  and  the 
other  of  the  commander  of  an  army  in  the  field.  With 
<us  the  assignment  of  a  major-general  by  the  President  to 
command  a  corps  gave  him  a  temporary  precedence  over 
other  major-generals  not  so  assigned,  and  in  like  manner 
for  the  commander  of  an  army.1  If  these  were  relieved, 
they  lost  the  precedence,  and  thus  there  was  a  sort  of 
temporary  rank  created,  giving  a  flexibility  to  the  grade 
of  major-general,  without  which  we  should  have  been 
•greatly  embarrassed.  Grant's  rank  of  lieutenant-general 
was  an  exceptional  grade,  made  for  him  alone,  when, 
after  the  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge,  he  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  all  the  armies. 

These  opinions  of  mine  are  not  judgments  formed  after 
the  fact.  The  weak  points  in  our  army  organization 
were  felt  at  the  time,  and  I  took  every  means  in  my 
power  to  bring  them  to  the  attention  of  the  proper  author 
ities,  State  and  National.  At  the  close  of  1862  a  com 
mission  was  appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  revise 
the  articles  of  war  and  army  regulations.  Of  this  com 
mission  Major-General  Hitchcock  was  chairman.  They 
issued  a  circular  calling  for  suggestions  as  to  alterations 
supposed  to  be  desirable,  and  a  copy  was  sent  to  me 
among  others.  I  took  occasion  to  report  the  results  of 

1  Our  system  was  essentially  that  of  the  first  French  Republic  and  the 
Consulate,  under  which  any  general  of  division  was  assignable  to  an  army 
command  in  chief. 


PROMOTIONS  AND  POLITICS  439 

my  own  experience,  and  to  trace  the  evils  which  existed 
to  their  sources  in  our  military  system.  I  called  atten 
tion  to  the  striking  parallel  between  our  practices  and 
those  that  had  been  in  use  in  the  first  French  Republic, 
and  to  the  identical  mischiefs  which  had  resulted. 
Laxity  of  discipline,  straggling,  desertion,  demagoguery 
in  place  of  military  spirit,  giving  commissions  as  the 
reward  of  mere  recruiting,  making  new  regiments  instead 
of  filling  up  the  old  ones,  absence  of  proper  staff  corps, 
—  every  one  of  these  things  had  been  suffered  in  France 
till  they  could  no  longer  be  endured,  and  we  had  faith 
fully  copied  their  errors  without  profiting  by  the  lesson. 

In  the  freedom  of  private  correspondence  with  Mr. 
Chase  I  enlarged  upon  the  same  topics,  and  urged  him  to 
get  the  serious  attention  of  the  President  and  the  cabinet 
to  them.  I  gave  him  examples  of  the  mischiefs  that 
were  done  by  the  insane  efforts  to  raise  new  regiments 
by  volunteering  when  we  ought  to  apply  a  conscription 
as  the  only  fair  way  of  levying  a  tax  on  the  physical 
strength  of  the  nation.  I  said :  "  I  have  known  a  lieu 
tenant  to  be  forced  by  his  captain  (a  splendid  soldier)  to 
resign  on  account  of  his  general  inefficiency.  I  have 
seen  that  same  lieutenant  take  the  field  a  few  months 
later  as  lieutenant-colonel  of  a  new  regiment,  whilst  the 
captain  still  stood  at  the  head  of  his  fraction  of  a  com 
pany  in  the  line.  This  is  not  a  singular  instance,  but  an 
example  of  cases  occurring  literally  by  the  thousand  in 
our  vast  army  during  the  year  past.  .  .  .  Governor  Tod 
(of  Ohio)  said  to  me  some  time  ago,  with  the  deepest 
sorrow,  that  he  was  well  aware  that  in  raising  the  new 
regiments  by  volunteering,  the  distribution  of  offices  to 
the  successful  recruiters  was  filling  the  army  with  incom 
petent  men  whom  we  should  have  to  sift  out  again  by 
such  process  as  we  could !  .  .  .  Have  we  time  for  the 
sifting  process?  Even  if  we  had,  how  inefficient  the 
process  itself  when  these  officers  have  their  commissions 


440          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

in  their  pockets,  and  cannot  be  brought  before  a  court  or 
a  military  commission  till  much  of  the  mischief  they 
can  do  is  accomplished,  bad  habits  amongst  the  soldiers 
formed,  and  the  work  of  training  them  made  infinitely 
more  difficult  than  with  absolutely  raw  recruits.  It  was 
in  view  of  such  probable  results  that  I  expressed  the 
hope  that  no  more  new  regiments  would  be  raised  by 
volunteering,  when,  in  July  last,  the  levy  of  an  addi 
tional  force  was  mooted.  It  seemed  to  me  that  the  Presi 
dent  could  well  say  to  the  world,  '  Our  people  have  shown 
abundant  proof  of  their  enthusiasm  in  support  of  the 
government  by  volunteering  already  to  the  number  of 
more  than  half  a  million,  a  thing  unprecedented  in  the 
world's  history:  we  now,  as  a  matter  of  military  expedi 
ency,  call  for  a  draft  to  fill  up  the  broken  battalions. '  " * 

I  urged  with  equal  frankness  the  need  of  giving  unity 
to  the  army  by  abolishing  the  distinction  between  regu 
lars  and  volunteers,  and  by  a  complete  reorganization  of 
the  staff.  I  said  it  seemed  absurd  that  with  nearly  a 
million  of  men  in  the  field,  the  Register  of  the  Army  of 
the  United  States  should  show  an  organization  of  some 
twenty  regiments  only,  of  which  scarce  a  dozen  had 
been  in  active  service.  "  If  a  volunteer  organization  is  fit 
to  decide  the  great  wars  of  the  nation,  is  it  not  ridiculous 
to  keep  an  expensive  organization  of  regulars  for  the 
petty  contests  with  Indians  or  for  an  ornamental  appen 
dage  to  the  State  in  peace?"  The  thing  to  be  aimed  at 
seemed  to  me  to  be  to  have  a  system  flexible  enough  to 
provide  for  the  increase  of  the  army  to  any  size  required, 
without  losing  any  of  the  advantage  of  character  or  effi 
ciency  which,  in  any  respect,  pertained  to  it  as  a  regular 
army.  Circumstances  to  which  I  have  already  alluded, 
probably  prevented  Mr.  Chase  from  taking  any  active 
part  again  in  the  discussion  of  army  affairs  in  the  cabi 
net.  Probably  many  of  the  same  ideas  were  urged  upon 

1  From  private  letter  of  Jan.  i,  1863. 


PROMOTIONS  AND  POLITICS  441 

the  President  from  other  quarters,  for  there  was  much 
agitation  of  the  subject  in  the  army  and  out  of  it.  But 
nothing  came  of  it,  for  even  the  draft,  when  it  became 
the  law,  was  used  more  as  a  shameful  whip  to  stimulate 
volunteering  than  as  an  honorable  and  right  way  to 
fill  the  ranks  of  the  noble  veteran  regiments.  General 
Sherman  found,  in  1864,  the  same  wrong  system  thwart 
ing  his  efforts  to  make  his  army  what  it  should  be,  and 
broke  out  upon  it  in  glorious  exasperation.1 

1  Letter  to  Halleck,  Sept.  4,  1864.  "  To-morrow  is  the  day  for  the  draft, 
and  I  feel  more  interested  in  it  than  in  any  event  that  ever  transpired.  I 
do  think  it  has  been  wrong  to  keep  our  old  troops  so  constantly  under  fire. 
Some  of  these  old  regiments  that  we  had  at  Shiloh  and  Corinth  have  been 
with  me  ever  since,  and  some  of  them  have  lost  seventy  per  cent  in  battle. 
It  looks  hard  to  put  these  brigades,  now  numbering  less  than  800  men,  into 
battle.  They  feel  discouraged,  whereas,  if  we  could  have  a  steady  influx  of 
recruits,  the  living  would  soon  forget  the  dead.  The  wounded  and  sick  are 
lost  to  us,  for  once  at  a  hospital,  they  become  worthless.  It  has  been  a 
very  bad  economy  to  kill  off  our  best  men  and  pay  full  wages  and  bounties 
to  the  drift  and  substitutes."  O.  R.,  vol.  xxxviii.  pt.  v.  p.  793. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

FAREWELL  TO   WEST  VIRGINIA — BURNSIDE   IN  THE 
DEPARTMENT   OF  THE    OHIO 

Desire  for  field  service  —  Changes  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac —  Judgment 
of  McClellan  at  that  time  —  Our  defective  knowledge  —  Changes  in  West 
Virginia  —  Errors  in  new  organization  —  Embarrassments  resulting  — 
Visit  to  General  Schenck  —  New  orders  from  Washington  —  Sent  to 
Ohio  to  administer  the  draft  —  Burnside  at  head  of  the  department  — 
District  of  Ohio  —  Headquarters  at  Cincinnati  —  Cordial  relations  of 
Governor  Tod  with  the  military  authorities  —  System  of  enrolment  and 
draft —  Administration  by  Colonel  Fry  —  Decay  of  the  veteran  regiments 

—  Bounty-jumping — Effects    on    political   parties — Soldiers   voting  — 
Burnside's     military   plans  —  East    Tennessee  —  Rosecrans    aiming    at 
Chattanooga — Burnside's    business     habits  — His   frankness  —  Stories 
about  him  —  His  personal  characteristics  —  Cincinnati  as  a  border  city 

—  Rebel   sympathizers  —  Order  No.  38  —  Challenged  by  Vallandigham 

—  The  order  not  a  new  departure  —  Lincoln's  proclamation  —  General 
Wright's  circular. 

MY  purpose  to  get  into  active  field  service  had  not 
slept,  and  soon  after  the  establishment  of  a 
winter  organization  in  the  district,  I  had  applied  to  be 
ordered  to  other  duty.  My  fixed  conviction  that  no  use 
ful  military  movements  could  be  made  across  the  moun 
tain  region  implied  that  the  garrisons  of  West  Virginia 
should  be  reduced  to  a  minimum  and  confined  to  the  duty 
of  defending  the  frontier  of  the  new  State.  The  rest  of 
the  troops  might  properly  be  added  to  the  active  columns 
in  the  field.  McClellan  had  been  relieved  of  command 
whilst  I  was  conducting  active  operations  in  the  Kanawha 
valley,  and  Burnside  suffered  his  repulse  at  Fredericks- 
burg  within  a  few  days  after  I  was  directed  to  make  my 
headquarters  at  Marietta  and  perfect  the  organization  of 


FAREWELL    TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  443 

the  district.  I  was  therefore  at  a  loss  to  choose  where  I 
would  serve,  even  if  I  had  been  given  carte  blanche  to 
determine  my  own  work.  Enough  was  known  of  the 
reasons  for  the  President's  dissatisfaction  with  McClellan 
to  make  me  admit  that  the  change  of  command  was  an 
apparent  necessity,  yet  much  was  unknown,  and  the  full 
strength  of  the  President's  case  was  not  revealed  till  the 
war  was  over.  My  personal  friendship  for  McClellan 
remained  warm,  and  I  felt  sure  that  Hooker  as  a  com 
mander  would  be  a  long  step  downward.  In  private  I 
did  not  hesitate  to  express  the  wish  that  McClellan 
should  still  be  intrusted  with  the  command  of  the  Poto 
mac  army,  that  it  should  be  strongly  reinforced,  and  that 
by  constant  pressure  upon  its  commander  his  indecision 
of  character  might  be  overcome.  Those  who  were  near 
to  McClellan  believed  that  he  was  learning  greater  self- 
confidence,  for  the  Antietam  campaign  seemed  a  decided 
improvement  on  that  of  the  Chickahominy.  The  event, 
in  great  measure,  justified  this  opinion,  for  it  was  not 
till  Grant  took  command  a  year  later  that  any  leadership 
superior  to  McClellan's  was  developed.  Yet  it  must  be 
confessed  that  we  did  not  know  half  the  discouragements 
that  were  weighing  upon  the  President  and  his  Secretary 
of  War,  and  which  made  the  inertia  of  the  Eastern  army 
demand  a  desperate  remedy. 

My  personal  affairs  drifted  in  this  way:  the  contest 
over  the  lists  of  promotions,  of  which  I  knew  next  to 
nothing,  prevented  any  action  on  the  request  for  a  change 
of  duty,  and  the  close  of  the  session  of  Congress  brought 
the  official  notice  that  the  promotion  had  expired  by  legal 
limitation.1  The  first  effect  was  naturally  depressing, 
and  it  took  a  little  time  and  some  philosophy  to  over 
come  it ;  but  the  war  was  not  ended  yet,  and  reflection 
made  the  path  of  duty  appear  to  be  in  the  line  of  con 
tinued  active  service. 

•  March  24th ;  received  the  3Oth. 


444          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

To  form  a  new  department  for  General  Schenck,  West 
Virginia  was  detached  from  the  Department  of  the  Ohio 
and  annexed  to  Maryland.1  This  was  a  mistake  from  a 
military  point  of  view,  for  not  only  must  the  posts  near 
the  mountains  be  supplied  and  reinforced  from  the  Ohio 
as  their  base,  toward  which  would  also  be  the  line  of 
retreat  if  retreat  were  necessary,  but  the  frequent  ad 
vances  of  the  Confederate  forces,  through  the  Shenandoah 
valley  to  the  Potomac,  always  separated  the  West  from 
any  connection  with  Baltimore,  and  made  it  impossible 
for  an  officer  stationed  there  (as  General  Schenck  was)  to 
direct  affairs  in  the  western  district  at  the  very  time  of 
greatest  necessity. 

Another  important  fact  was  overlooked.  The  river 
counties  of  Ohio  formed  part  of  the  district,  and  the 
depots  on  the  river  were  supplied  from  Cincinnati.  Not 
only  was  Gallipolis  thus  put  in  another  department  from 
the  posts  directly  dependent  on  that  depot  as  a  base  of 
supplies  and  the  principal  station  for  hospitals,  but  the 
new  boundary  line  left  me,  personally,  and  my  head 
quarters  in  the  Department  of  the  Ohio.  I  at  once  called 
the  attention  of  the  War  Department  to  these  results, 
sending  my  communication  in  the  first  instance  through 
General  Wright.  He  was  in  the  same  boat  with  myself, 
for  his  rank  had  also  been  reduced  on  the  4th  of  March, 
but  he  thought  the  intention  must  have  been  to  transfer 
me  with  the  district  to  the  Eastern  Department.  On 
this  I  wrote  to  Washington  direct,  asking  for  definite 
orders.  I  also  wrote  to  General  Schenck,  telling  him  of 
General  Wright's  supposition  that  I  was  transferred  with 
the  district,  and  inquiring  if  he  had  any  definite  decision 
of  the  question.2 

About  the  3d  of  April  I  was  directed  to  report  in  per 
son  to  General  Schenck  at  Baltimore,3  and  reached  that 
city  on  the  4th.  My  relations  with  General  Schenck  had 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxv.  pt.  ii.  p.  145.  2  Id.,  pp.  159,  160.  8  Id.,  p.  175. 


FAREWELL    TO    WEST   VIRGINIA  445 

been,  personally,  cordial,  and  our  friendship  continued 
till  his  death,  many  years  after  the  war.  Whatever  plans 
he  may  have  had  were  set  aside  by  orders  from  Washing 
ton,  which  met  me  at  his  headquarters,  ordering  me  to 
report  at  Columbus,  Ohio,  to  assist  the  governor  in 
organizing  the  troops  to  be  called  out  under  the  new 
enrolment  and  conscription  law.  This  was  accompanied 
by  the  assurance  that  this  duty  would  be  but  temporary, 
and  that  my  desire  to  be  assigned  to  active  field  duty 
would  then  be  favorably  considered.  It  is  not  improb 
able  that  my  report  on  army  organization,  which  has 
been  mentioned,  had  something  to  do  with  this  assign 
ment;  but  I  did  not  ask  permission  to  visit  Washington, 
though  within  a  couple  of  hours'  ride  of  the  capital,  and 
hastened  back  to  my  assigned  post.  Besides  my  wish  to 
cut  my  connection  with  West  Virginia  on  general  mili 
tary  theories  of  its  insignificance  as  a  theatre  of  war,  my 
stay  there  would  have  been  intolerable,  since  General 
Milroy,  in  whose  judgment  I  had  less  confidence  than  in 
that  of  any  of  my  other  subordinates,  was,  by  the  curious 
outcome  of  the  winter's  promotions,  the  one  of  all  others 
who  had  been  put  over  my  head.  I  could  not  then  fore 
see  the  cost  the  country  would  pay  for  this  in  the  next 
summer's  campaign  in  the  Shenandoah,  but  every  instinct 
urged  me  to  sever  a  connection  which  could  bode  no 
good.  The  reasonableness  of  my  objection  to  serving 
as  a  subordinate  where  I  had  been  in  command  was 
recognized,  and  the  arrangement  actually  made  was  as 
acceptable  as  anything  except  a  division  in  an  active 
army. 

It  greatly  added  to  my  contentment  to  learn  that  Gen 
eral  Burnside  had  been  ordered  to  the  Department  of  the 
Ohio,  and  would  be  my  immediate  superior.  I  hastened 
back  to  Marietta,  closed  up  the  business  pending  there, 
and  went  to  Columbus  on  the  gth  of  April.  The  arrange 
ment  between  Governor  Tod  and  General  Burnside  proved 


REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

to  be  the  formation  of  the  Military  District  of  Ohio, 
including  the  whole  State.  I  was  placed  in  command  of 
this  district,  reporting  directly  to  the  general,  who  him 
self  conferred  with  the  governor.  My  own  relations  to 
my  superiors  were  thus  made  strictly  military,  which 
was  a  much  pleasanter  thing  for  me  than  direct  connec 
tion  with  the  civil  authorities  would  be;  for  this  in 
volved  a  danger  of  cross-purposes  and  conflicting  orders. 
Brigadier-General  John  S.  Mason,  an  excellent  officer, 
was  ordered  to  report  to  me  as  my  immediate  subordinate 
in  command  of  the  camps  and  the  post  at  Columbus,  and 
before  the  end  of  the  month  Burnside  directed  me  to  fix 
my  own  headquarters  at  Cincinnati,  where  I  could  be  in 
constant  communication  with  himself.  All  this  was 
done  with  the  most  cordial  understanding  between  Burn- 
side  and  the  governor.  Indeed,  nothing  could  be  more 
perfect  than  the  genial  and  reasonable  tone  of  Governor 
Tod's  intercourse  with  the  military  officers  stationed  in 
Ohio. 

My  duties  under  the  Enrolment  Act  turned  out  to  be 
very  slight.  The  Act  (passed  March  3,  1863)  made,  in 
general,  each  congressional  district  an  enrolment  dis 
trict  under  charge  of  a  provost-marshal  with  the  rank  of 
captain.  A  deputy  provost-marshal  supervised  the  en 
rolment  and  draft  for  the  State,  and  the  whole  was 
under  the  control  of  the  provost-marshal-general  at 
Washington,  Colonel  James  B.  Fry.  The  law  provided 
for  classification  of  all  citizens  capable  of  military  duty 
between  the  ages  of  twenty  and  forty-five,  so  as  to  call 
out  first  the  unmarried  men  and  those  not  having  fami 
lies  dependent  on  them.  The  exemptions  on  account  of 
physical  defects  were  submitted  to  a  board  of  three,  of 
which  the  local  provost-marshal  was  chairman,  and  one 
was  a  medical  man.  Substitutes  might  be  accepted  in 
the  place  of  drafted  men,  or  a  payment  of  three  hundred 
dollars  would  be  taken  in  place  of  personal  service,  that 


FAREWELL    TO    WEST  VIRGINIA  447 

sum  being  thought  sufficient  to  secure  a  voluntary  re 
cruit  by  the  government.  The  principal  effect  of  this 
provision  was  to  establish  a  current  market  price  for 
substitutes. 

The  general  provisions  of  the  law  for  the  drafting  were 
wise  and  well  matured,  and  the  rules  for  the  subordinate 
details  were  well  digested  and  admirably  administered 
by  Colonel  Fry  and  his  bureau.  It  was  a  delicate  and 
difficult  task,  but  it  was  carried  out  with  such  patience, 
honesty,  and  thoroughness  that  nothing  better  could  be 
done  than  copy  it,  if  a  future  necessity  for  like  work 
should  arise.  There  was  no  good  ground  for  complaint, 
and  in  those  cases  where,  as  in  New  York,  hostile  polit 
ical  leaders  raised  the  cry  of  unfairness  and  provoked 
collision  between  the  mob  and  the  National  authorities, 
the  victims  were  proved  to  be  the  dupes  of  ignorance  and 
malice.  The  administration  of  the  law  was  thoroughly 
vindicated,  and  if  there  were  to  be  a  draft  at  all,  it  could 
not  be  more  fairly  and  justly  enforced. 

There  was  room  for  difference  of  opinion  as  to  some  of 
the  provisions  of  the  law  regarding  exemption  and  sub 
stitution,  but  the  most  serious  question  was  raised  by  the 
section  which  applied  to  old  regiments  and  which  had 
nothing  to  do  with  the  enrolment  and  draft.  This  sec 
tion  directed  that  when  regiments  had  become  reduced  in 
numbers  by  any  cause,  the  officers  of  the  regiment  should 
be  proportionately  diminished.  As  new  regiments  were 
still  received  and  credited  upon  the  State's  liability 
under  the  draft,  it  of  course  resulted  that  the  old  regi 
ments  continued  to  decay.  A  public  sentiment  had  been 
created  which  looked  upon  the  draft  as  a  disgrace,  and 
the  most  extraordinary  efforts  were  made  to  escape  it. 
Extra  bounties  for  volunteering  were  paid  by  counties  and 
towns,  and  the  combination  of  influences  was  so  powerful 
that  it  was  successful  in  most  localities,  and  very  few 
men  were  actually  put  in  the  ranks  by  the  draft. 


448          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

The  offer  of  extra  bounties  to  induce  volunteering 
brought  into  existence  "  bounty-jumping,"  a  new  crime 
analogous  to  that  of  "  repeating  "  at  elections.  A  man 
would  enlist  and  receive  the  bounty,  frequently  several 
hundred  dollars,  but  varying  somewhat  in  different  places 
and  periods.  He  would  take  an  early  opportunity  to 
desert,  as  he  had  intended  to  do  from  the  first.  Chang 
ing  his  name,  he  would  go  to  some  new  locality  and 
enlist  again,  repeating  the  fraud  as  often  as  he  could 
escape  detection.  The  urgency  to  get  recruits  and  for 
ward  them  at  once  to  the  field,  and  the  wide  country 
which  was  open  to  recruiting,  made  the  risk  of  punish 
ment  very  small.  Occasionally  one  was  caught,  and  he 
would  of  course  be  liable  to  punishment  as  a  deserter. 
The  final  report  of  the  provost-marshal-general  mentions 
the  case  of  a  criminal  in  the  Albany  penitentiary,  New 
York,  who  confessed  that  he  had  "jumped  the  bounty" 
thirty-two  times.1 

Another  evil  incidental  to  the  excessive  stimulus  of 
volunteering  was  a  political  one,  which  threatened  seri 
ous  results.  It  deranged  the  natural  political  balance  of 
the  country  by  sending  the  most  patriotic  young  men  to 
the  field,  and  thus  giving  an  undue  power  to  the  dis 
affected  and  to  the  opponents  of  the  administration. 
This  led  to  the  State  laws  for  allowing  the  soldiers  to 
vote  wherever  they  might  be,  their  votes  being  certified 
and  sent  home.  In  its  very  nature  this  was  a  makeshift 
and  a  very  dubious  expedient  to  cure  the  mischief.  It 
would  not  have  been  necessary  if  we  had  had  at  an  early 
day  a  system  of  recruiting  that  would  have  drawn  more 
evenly  from  different  classes  into  the  common  service  of 
the  country. 

The  military  officers  of  the  department  and  district 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  enrolment  and  drafting, 
unless  resistance  to  the  provost-marshals  should  make 

1  Provost-Marshal-General's  Report,  p.  153. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE   OHIO  449 

military  support  for  these  officers  necessary.  We  had 
hoped  to  have  large  camps  of  recruits  to  be  organized 
and  instructed,  but  the  numbers  actually  drafted  in  Ohio, 
in  1863,  were  insignificant,  for  reasons  already  stated. 
Three  or  four  very  small  post  garrisons  were  the  only 
forces  at  my  command,  and  these  were  reduced  to  the 
minimum  necessary  to  guard  the  prison  camps  and  the 
depots  of  recruiting  and  supply. 

General  Burnside  had  not  come  West  with  a  purpose 
to  content  himself  with  the  retiracy  of  a  department  out 
of  the  theatre  of  actual  war.  His  department  included 
•eastern  Kentucky,  and  afforded  a  base  for  operations  in 
the  direction  of  East  Tennessee.  Mr.  Lincoln  had  never 
lost  his  eagerness  and  zeal  to  give  assistance  to  the  loyal 
mountaineers,  and  had  arranged  with  Burnside  a  plan  of 
co-operation  with  Rosecrans  by  which  the  former  should 
move  from  Lexington,  Ky.,  upon  Knoxville,  whilst  the 
latter  marched  from  Murfreesboro,  Tenn.,  upon  Chat 
tanooga.  This  was  better  than  the  impracticable  plan 
of  1861,  which  aimed  at  the  occupation  of  East  Ten 
nessee  before  Chattanooga  had  been  taken,  and  the  task 
was  at  last  accomplished  by  the  method  now  used.  It 
was  by  no  means  the  best  or  most  economical  method, 
which  would  have  been  to  have  but  one  strong  army  till 
Chattanooga  were  firmly  in  our  hands,  and  then  direct  a 
subordinate  column  upon  the  upper  Holston  valley.  It 
was  utterly  impossible  to  keep  up  a  line  of  supply  for  an 
army  in  East  Tennessee  by  the  wagon  roads  over  the 
mountains.  The  railroad  through  Chattanooga  was  in 
dispensable  for  this  purpose.  But  Mr.  Lincoln  had  not 
fully  appreciated  this,  and  was  discontented  that  both 
Buell  and  Rosecrans  had  in  turn  paid  little  attention,  as 
it  seemed,  to  his  desire  to  make  the  liberation  of  East 
Tennessee  the  primary  and  immediate  aim  of  their  cam 
paigns.  He  had  therefore  determined  to  show  his  own 
faith  in  Burnside,  and  his  approval  of  the  man,  by  giving 

VOL.  I.  —  29 


450         REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

him  a  small  but  active  army  in  the  field,  and  to  carry  out 
his  cherished  purpose  by  having  it  march  directly  over 
the  Cumberland  Mountains,  whilst  Rosecrans  was  allowed 
to  carry  out  the  plan  on  which  the  commanders  of  the 
Cumberland  army  seemed,  in  the  President's  opinion,  too 
stubbornly  bent. 

Burnside's  old  corps,  the  Ninth,  was  taken  from  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  and  sent  to  Kentucky,  and  a  new 
corps,  to  be  called  the  Twenty-third,  was  soon  author 
ized,  to  contain  the  Tennessee  regiments  which  had  been 
in  General  Morgan's  command,  and  two  divisions  made 
up  of  new  regiments  organized  in  Ohio,  Indiana,  and 
Illinois  under  the  last  call  for  volunteers.  To  these  were 
added  several  Kentucky  regiments  of  different  ages  in 
service.  General  Parke,  so  long  Burnside's  chief  of  staff, 
was  to  command  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  Major-General 
George  L.  Hartsuff  was  assigned  to  the  Twenty-third. 
In  a  former  chapter  I  have  spoken  of  Hartsuff 's  abilities 
as  a  staff  officer  in  West  Virginia.1  His  qualities  as  a 
general  officer  had  not  been  tried.  He  was  wounded  at 
the  beginning  of  the  engagement  at  Antietam,  where  he 
commanded  a  brigade  in  Hooker's  corps.2  That  was  his 
first  service  under  his  appointment  as  brigadier,  and  he 
had  necessarily  been  out  of  the  field  since  that  time. 
My  own  expectation  was  that  he  would  make  an  excellent 
reputation  as  a  corps  commander,  but  it  was  not  his 
fortune  to  see  much  continuous  field  service.  His  health 
was  seriously  affected  by  his  wounds,  and  after  a  short 
trial  of  active  campaigning  he  was  obliged  to  seek  more 
quiet  employment. 

The  establishment  of  my  headquarters  at  Cincinnati 
threw  me  once  more  into  close  personal  relations  with 
Burnside,  and  enabled  me  to  learn  his  character  more 
intimately.  His  adjutant-general's  office  was  on  East 
Fourth  Street,  and  most  of  the  routine  work  was  done 

1  Chap,  vi.,  ante.  2  Chap,  xv.,  ante. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE   OHIO  451 

there.      The   general   had   his   own   quarters    on    Ninth 
Street,  where  he  had  also  an  office  for  himself  and  his 
aides-de-camp.      My   own   office   and   the   official   head 
quarters  of  the  district  were  on  Broadway  below  Fourth*, 
in  the  house  now  occupied  by  the  Natural  History  Soci 
ety.     There  was  thus  near  half  a  mile  between  us,  though 
I  was  but  a  little  way  from  the  adjutant-general  of  the 
department,    through  whose   office   my  regular   business 
with  the  general  went.     Burnside,  however,  loved  to  dis 
cuss  department  affairs  informally,  and  with  the  perfect 
freedom  of   unrestrained   social    intercourse.     When   he: 
gave  his  confidence  he  gave  it  without  reserve,  and  en 
couraged  the  fullest  and  freest  criticism  of  his  own  plans 
and  purposes.     His  decisions  would  then  be  put  in  offi 
cial  form  by  the  proper  officers  of  the  staff,  and  would 
be  transmitted,  though  I  was    nearly  always   personally 
aware  of  what  was  to  be  ordered  before  the  formal  papers 
reached  me.     He  had  very  little  pride  of  opinion,  and 
was  perfectly  candid  in  weighing  whatever  was  contrary 
to  his  predilections;   yet   he  was  not  systematic  in   his 
business  methods,  and  was  quite  apt  to  decide  first  and 
discuss  afterward.     He  never  found  fault  with  a  subordi 
nate  for  assuming  responsibility  or  acting  without  orders, 
provided  he  was  assured  of  his  earnest  good  purpose  in 
doing  so.     In  such  cases  he  would  assume  the  responsi 
bility   for   what   was  done   as   cheerfully   as    if   he   had 
given   the   order.     In    like   manner   he   was   careless  of 
forms   himself,   in  doing  whatever   seemed  necessary  or 
proper,  and  might  pass  by  intermediate  officers  to  reach 
immediately  the  persons  who  were  to  act  or  the  things 
to   be  done.       There  was   no  intentional    slight   to   any 
one  in  this :  it  was  only  a  characteristic  carelessness  of 
routine.      Martinets   would   be   exasperated    by   it,    and 
would  be  pretty  sure  to  quarrel  with  him.     No  doubt  it 
was  a  bad  business  method,  and  had  its   mischiefs   and 
inconveniences.     A  story  used  to  go  the  rounds  a  little 


452          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

later  that  soldiers  belonging  to  the  little  army  in  East 
Tennessee  were  sometimes  arrested  at  their  homes  and 
sent  back  as  deserters,  when  they  would  produce  a  fur 
lough  written  by  Burnside  on  a  leaf  of  his  pocket  memo 
randum-book,  which,  as  they  said,  had  been  given  by 
him  after  hearing  a  pitiful  story  which  moved  his  sym 
pathies.  Such  inventions  were  a  kind  of  popular  recog 
nition  of  his  well-known  neglect  of  forms,  as  well  as  of 
his  kind  heart.  There  was  an  older  story  about  him,  to 
the  effect  that,  when  a  lieutenant  in  the  army,  he  had  been 
made  post-quartermaster  at  some  little  frontier  garrison, 
and  that  his  accounts  and  returns  got  into  such  confusion 
that  after  several  pretty  sharp  reminders  the  quarter 
master-general  notified  him,  as  a  final  terror,  that  he 
would  send  a  special  officer  and  subject  him  and  his 
papers  to  a  severe  scrutiny.  As  the  story  ran,  Burnside, 
in  transparent  honesty,  wrote  a  cordial  letter  of  thanks 
in  reply,  saying  it  was  just  what  he  desired,  as  he  had 
been  trying  hard  to  make  his  accounts  up,  but  had  to 
confess  he  could  do  nothing  with  them,  but  was  sure 
such  an  expert  would  straighten  them.  In  my  own  ser 
vice  under  him  I  often  found  occasion  to  supply  the 
formal  links  in  the  official  chain,  so  that  business  would 
move  on  according  to  "  regulations ;  "  but  any  trouble 
that  was  made  in  this  way  was  much  more  than  com 
pensated  by  the  generous  trust  with  which  he  allowed 
his  name  and  authority  to  be  used  when  prompt  action 
would  serve  the  greater  ends  in  view. 

My  habit  was  to  go  to  his  private  quarters  on  Ninth 
.Street,  when  the  regular  business  of  the  day  was  over, 
and  there  get  the  military  news  and  confer  with  him  on 
pending  or  prospective  business  affecting  my  own  dis 
trict.  His  attractive  personality  made  him  the  centre  of 
a  good  deal  of  society,  and  business  would  drop  into  the 
background  till  late  in  the  evening,  when  his  guests 
voluntarily  departed.  Then,  perhaps  after  midnight,  he 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE   OHIO  453 

would  take  up  the  arrears  of  work  and  dictate  letters, 
orders,  and  dispatches,  turning  night  into  day.  It  not 
unfrequently  happened  that  after  making  my  usual  official 
call  in  the  afternoon,  I  had  gone  to  my  quarters  and  to 
bed  at  my  usual  hour,  when  I  would  be  roused  by  an 
orderly  from  the  general  begging  that  I  would  come  up 
and  consult  with  him  on  some  matter  of  neglected  busi 
ness.  He  was  always  bright  and  clear  in  those  late 
hours,  and  when  he  buckled  to  work,  rapidly  disposed 
of  it. 

He  did  not  indulge  much  in  retrospect,  and  rarely  re 
ferred  to  his  misfortunes  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
On  one  or  two  occasions  he  discussed  his  Fredericksburg 
campaign  with  me.  The  delay  in  sending  pontoons  from 
Washington  to  Falmouth,  which  gave  Lee  time  to  con 
centrate  at  Fredericksburg,  he  reasonably  argued,  was 
the  fault  of  the  military  authorities  at  Washington;  but 
I  could  easily  see  that  if  his  supervision  of  business  had 
been  more  rigidly  systematic,  he  would  have  made  sure 
that  he  was  not  to  be  disappointed  in  his  means  of  cross 
ing  the  Rappahannock  promptly.  As  to  the  battle  itself 
he  steadily  insisted  that  the  advance  of  Meade's  division 
proved  that  if  all  the  left  wing  had  acted  with  equal 
vigor  and  promptness,  Marye's  heights  would  have  been 
turned  and  carried.  It  is  due  to  him  to  repeat  that  in 
such  discussions  his  judgment  of  men  and  their  motives 
was  always  kind  and  charitable.  I  never  heard  him  say 
anything  bitter,  even  of  those  whom  I  knew  he  distrusted. 

At  the  time  I  am  speaking  of,  Cincinnati  was  in  a 
curious  political  and  social  condition.  The  advance 
through  Kentucky  of  Bragg  and  Kirby  Smith  in  the  pre 
ceding  year  had  made  it  a  centre  for  "  rebel  sympathizers." 
The  fact  that  a  Confederate  army  had  approached  the 
hills  that  bordered  the  river  had  revived  the  hopes  and 
the  confidence  of  many  who,  while  wishing  success  to  the 
Southern  cause,  had  done  so  in  a  vague  and  distant  way. 


454          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Now  it  seemed  nearer  to  them,  and  the  stimulus  to  per- 
.sonal  activity  was  greater.  There  was  always,  in  the 
city,  a  considerable  and  influential  body  of  business  men 
who  were  of  Southern  families;  and  besides  this,  the 
trade  connections  with  the  South,  and  the  personal 
alliances  by  marriage,  made  a  ground  of  sympathy  which 
had  noticeable  effects.  There  were  two  camps  in  the 
community,  pretty  distinctly  defined,  as  there  were  in 
Kentucky.  The  loyal  were  ardently  and  intensely  so. 
The  disloyal  were  bitter  and  not  always  restrained  by 
common  prudence.  A  good  many  Southern  women, 
refugees  from  the  theatre  of  active  war,  were  very  open 
in  their  defiance  of  the  government,  and  in  their  efforts 
to  aid  the  Southern  armies  by  being  the  bearers  of  intel 
ligence.  The  "contraband  mail "  was  notoriously  a  large 
and  active  one. 

Burnside  had  been  impressed  with  this  condition  of 
things  from  the  day  he  assumed  command.  His  prede 
cessor  had  struggled  with  it  without  satisfactory  results. 
It  was,  doubtless,  impossible  to  do  more  than  diminish 
and  restrain  the  evil,  which  was  the  most  annoying 
•of  the  smaller  troubles  attending  the  anomalous  half- 
-military  and  half-civil  government  of  the  department. 
Within  three  weeks  from  his  arrival  in  Cincinnati,  Burn- 
side  was  so  convinced  of  the  widespread  and  multiform 
activity  of  the  disloyal  element  that  he  tried  to  subdue  it 
by  the  publication  of  his  famous  General  Order  No.  38. 
The  reading  of  the  order  gives  a  fair  idea  of  the  hostile 
influences  he  found  at  work,  for  of  every  class  named  by 
him  there  were  numerous  examples.1  It  was  no  doubt 

1  The  text  of  the  order  is  as  follows  : 

*'  General  Orders.  )  HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO, 

No.  38.  j  CINCINNATI,  OHIO,  April  13,  1863. 

The  commanding  general  publishes,  for  the  information  of  all  concerned, 
that  hereafter  all  persons  found  within  our  lines  who  commit  acts  for  the 
JDenefit  of  the  enemies  of  our  country,  will  be  tried  as  spies  or  traitors,  and, 
if  convicted,  will  suffer  death.  This  order  includes  the  following  classes  of 
^persons  :  Carriers  of  secret  mails  ;  writers  of  letters  sent  by  secret  mails ; 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE   OHIO  455 

true  that  the  Confederate  authorities  had  constant  corre 
spondence  with  people  in  the  Northern  States,  and  that 
systematic  means  were  used  to  pass  information  and  con 
traband  merchandise  through  the  lines.  Quinine  among 
drugs,  and  percussion  caps  among  ordnance  stores  were 
the  things  they  most  coveted,  and  dealers  in  these  car 
ried  on  their  trade  under  pretence  of  being  spies  for  each 
side  in  turn.  But  besides  these  who  were  merely  mer 
cenary,  there  were  men  and  women  who  were  honestly 
fanatical  in  their  devotion  to  the  Confederate  cause.  The 
women  were  especially  troublesome,  for  they  often  seemed 
to  court  martyrdom.  They  practised  on  our  forbearance 
to  the  last  degree;  for  they  knew  our  extreme  unwilling 
ness  to  deal  harshly  with  any  of  their  sex.  Personally,  I 
rated  the  value  of  spies  and  informers  very  low,  and  my 
experience  had  made  me  much  more  prone  to  contempt 
than  to  fear  of  them.  But  examples  had  to  be  made 
occasionally;  a  few  men  were  punished,  a  few  women 
who  belonged  in  the  South  were  sent  through  the  lines, 
and  we  reduced  to  its  lowest  practical  terms  an  evil  and 
nuisance  which  we  could  not  wholly  cure.  The  best 
remedy  for  these  plots  and  disturbances  at  the  rear 
always  was  to  keep  the  enemy  busy  by  a  vigorous  aggres 
sive  at  the  front.  We  kept,  however,  a  species  of 
provost  court  pretty  actively  at  work,  and  one  or  two 

secret  recruiting  officers  within  the  lines ;  persons  who  have  entered  into  an 
agreement  to  pass  our  lines  for  the  purpose  of  joining  the  enemy ;  persons 
found  concealed  within  our  lines,  belonging  to  the  service  of  the  enemy ; 
and,  in  fact,  all  persons  found  improperly  within  our  lines  who  could  give 
private  information  to  the  enemy ;  and  all  persons  within  our  lines  who 
harbor,  protect,  conceal,  feed,  clothe,  or  in  any  way  aid  the  enemies  of  our 
country.  The  habit  of  declaring  sympathy  for  the  enemy  will  not  be  allowed 
in  this  department.  Persons  committing  such  offences  will  be  at  once 
arrested  with  a  view  to  being  tried  as  above  stated,  or  sent  beyond  our  lines 
into  the  lines  of  their  friends.  It  must  be  distinctly  understood  that  treason, 
expressed  or  implied,  will  not  be  tolerated  in  this  department.  All  officers 
and  soldiers  are  strictly  charged  with  the  execution  of  this  order. 
By  command  of  Major-General  Burnside, 

LEWIS  RICHMOND,  Assistant  Adjutant  General" 


45^          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

officers  were  assigned  to  judge-advocate's  duty,  who  ran 
these  courts  tinder  a  careful  supervision  to  make  sure  that 
they  should  not  fall  into  indiscretions. 

So  long  as  the  hand  of  military  power  was  laid  only  on 
private  persons  who  were  engaged  in  overt  acts  of  giving 
aid  and  comfort  to  the  rebellion  in  the  ways  specified 
in  Order  No.  38,  there  was  little  criticism.  But  the 
time  came  when  General  Burnside  seemed  to  be  chal 
lenged  by  a  public  character  of  no  little  prominence  to 
enforce  his  order  against  him.  The  Vallandigham  case 
became  the  sensation  of  the  day,  and  acquired  a  singular 
historical  importance.  The  noise  which  was  made  about 
it  seemed  to  create  a  current  opinion  that  Burnside' s 
action  was  a  new  departure,  and  that  his  Order  No.  38 
was  issued  wholly  on  his  own  responsibility.  This  was 
not  so.  In  the  preceding  year,  and  about  the  time  of  his 
Emancipation  Proclamation,  the  President  had  also  pro 
claimed  against  treasonable  practices  in  very  emphatic 
terms.  He  had  declared  that  "all  rebels  and  insurgents, 
their  aiders  and  abettors,  within  the  United  States,  and 
all  persons  discouraging  volunteer  enlistments,  resisting 
militia  drafts,  or  guilty  of  any  disloyal  practice,  afford 
ing  aid  and  comfort  to  rebels  against  the  authority  of  the 
United  States,  shall  be  subject  to  martial  law  and  liable 
to  trial  and  punishment  by  courts-martial  or  military 
commission."  l 

Burnside's  order  was  in  strict  accordance  with  this 
authority,  and  he  had  no  ultimate  responsibility  for  the 
policy  thus  proclaimed.  He  was  simply  reiterating  and 
carrying  out  in  his  department  the  declared  purpose  of 
the  administration.  Even  in  the  matter  of  newspaper 
publications,  his  predecessor,  General  Wright,  had  felt 
obliged,  upon  Bragg  and  Kirby  Smith's  invasion  of  Ken- 

1  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  vi.  p.  98.  See  also  Order 
No.  42  of  General  Burbridge,  commanding  District  of  Kentucky.  O.  R., 
vol.  xxxix.  pt.  ii.  p.  27. 


DEPARTMENT  OF  THE   OHIO  457 

tucky,  to  put  a  stop  to  treasonable  editorials  and  to  the 
publication  of  military  information  likely  to  benefit  the 
enemy.  He  issued  a  circular  on  September  13,  1862, 
notifying  the  publishers  of  the  Cincinnati  papers  that 
the  repetition  of  such  offence  would  be  immediately  fol 
lowed  by  the  suppression  of  the  paper  and  the  arrest  and 
confinement  of  the  proprietors  and  writers.1  It  is  neces 
sary  to  keep  these  facts  in  mind  if  we  would  judge  fairly 
of  Burnside's  responsibility  when  it  was  his  fortune 
to  apply  the  rule  to  a  case  attracting  great  public 
attention. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  XYI.  pt.  ii.  p.  514.  See  a  characteristic  letter  by  Sherman  on 
this  subject,  Id.,  vol.  xxxi.  pt.  i.  p.  765 :  "  Now  I  am  again  in  authority 
over  you,  and  you  must  heed  my  advice.  Freedom  of  speech  and  freedom 
of  the  press,  precious  relics  of  former  history,  must  not  be  construed  too 
largely.  You  must  print  nothing  that  prejudices  government  or  excites 
envy,  hatred,  and  malice  in  a  community.  Persons  in  office  or  out  of  office 
must  not  be  flattered  or  abused.  Don't  publish  an  account  of  any  skirmish, 
battle,  or  movement  of  an  army,  unless  the  name  of  the  writer  is  given  in 
full  and  printed.  I  wish  you  success;  but  my  first  duty  is  to  maintain 
'  order  and  harmony.'  "  (To  editors  of  "  Memphis  Bulletin.") 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE  VALLANDIGHAM   CASE  —  THE   HOLMES   COUNTY  WAR 

Clement  L.  Vallandigham  —  His  opposition  to  the  war.  —  His  theory  of 
reconstruction  —  His  Mount  Vernon  speech —  His  arrest  —  Sent  before 
the  military  commission  —  General  Potter  its  president  —  Counsel  for 
the  prisoner — The  line  of  defence  —  The  judgment — Habeas  Corpus 
proceedings  —  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  — Judge  Leavitt  denies 
the  release  —  Commutation  by  the  President—  Sent  beyond  the  lines  — 
Conduct  of  Confederate  authorities  — Vallandigham  in  Canada  —  Candi 
date  for  Governor  —  Political  results  —  Martial  law  —  Principles  under 
lying  it  —  Practical  application  —  The  intent  to  aid  the  public  enemy 

—  The  intent  to  defeat  the  draft  —  Armed  resistance  to  arrest  of  de 
serters,  Noble  County  —  To  the  enrolment  in  Holmes  County  —  A  real 
insurrection  —  Connection  of  these  with  Vallandigham's  speeches  —  The 
Supreme  Court  refuses  to  interfere  —  Action  in  the  Milligan  case  after 
the  war  —  Judge  Davis's  personal  views  —  Knights  of  the  Golden  Circle 

—  The  Holmes  County  outbreak  —  Its  suppression  —  Letter  to  Judge 
Welker. 

CLEMENT  L.  VALLANDIGHAM  had  been  repre- 
v_x  sentative  in  Congress  of  the  Montgomery  County 
district  of  Ohio,  and  lived  at  Dayton.  He  was  a  man  of 
intense  and  saturnine  character,  belligerent  and  denuncia 
tory  in  his  political  speeches,  and  extreme  in  his  views. 
He  was  the  leader  in  Ohio  of  the  ultra  element  of  oppo 
sition  to  the  administration  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  a  bitter 
opponent  of  the  war.  He  would  have  prevented  the 
secession  of  the  Southern  States  by  yielding  all  they  de 
manded,  for  he  agreed  with  them  in  thinking  that  their 
demands  for  the  recognition  of  the  constitutional  invio 
lability  of  the  slave  system  were  just.  After  the  war 
began  he  still  advocated  peace  at  any  price,  and  vehe- 


VALLANDIGHAM  CASE  459 

mently  opposed  every  effort  to  subdue  the  rebellion. 
To  his  mind  the  war  was  absolutely  unconstitutional  on 
the  part  of  the  national  government,  and  he  denounced 
it  as  tyranny  and  usurpation.  His  theory  seemed  to  be 
that  if  the  South  were  "let  alone,"  a  reconstruction  of 
the  Union  could  be  satisfactorily  effected  by  squelching 
the  anti-slavery  agitation,  and  that  the  Western  States, 
at  any  rate,  would  find  their  true  interest  in  uniting  with 
the  South,  even  if  the  other  Northern  States  should 
refuse  to  do  so.  Beyond  all  question  he  answered  to  the 
old  description  of  a  "  Northern  man  with  Southern  prin 
ciples,"  and  his  violence  of  temper  made  it  all  a  matter  of 
personal  hatred  with  him  in  his  opposition  to  the  leaders 
of  the  party  in  power  at  the  North.  His  denunciations 
were  the  most  extreme,  and  his  expressions  of  contempt 
and  ill-will  were  wholly  unbridled.  He  claimed,  of 
course,  that  he  kept  within  the  limits  of  a  "constitutional 
opposition,"  because  he  did  not,  in  terms,  advise  his 
hearers  to  combine  in  armed  opposition  to  the  government. 
About  the  first  of  May  he  addressed  a  public  meeting 
at  Mount  Vernon  in  central  Ohio,  where,  in  addition  to 
his  diatribes  against  the  Lincoln  administration,  he  de 
nounced  Order  No.  38,  and  Burnside  as  its  author.  His 
words  were  noted  down  in  short-hand  by  a  captain  of 
volunteers  who  was  there  on  leave  of  absence  from  the 
army,  and  the  report  was  corroborated  by  other  reputable 
witnesses.  He  charged  the  administration  with  design 
ing  to  erect  a  despotism,  with  refusing  to  restore  the 
Union  when  it  might  be  done,  with  carrying  on  the  war 
for  the  liberation  of  the  blacks  and  the  enslavement  of 
the  whites.  He  declared  that  the  provost-marshals  for 
the  congressional  districts  were  intended  to  restrict  the 
liberties  of  the  people;  that  courts-martial  had  already 
usurped  power  to  try  citizens  contrary  to  law;  that  he 
himself  would  never  submit  to  the  orders  of  a  military 
dictator,  and  such  were  Burnside  and  his  subordinates; 


460          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

that  if  those  in  authority  were  allowed  to  accomplish 
their  purposes,  the  people  would  be  deprived  of  their 
liberties  and  a  monarchy  established.  Such  and  like  ex 
pressions,  varied  by  "trampling  under  his  feet"  Order 
No.  38,  etc.,  made  the  staple  of  his  incendiary  speech. 

When  the  report  was  made  to  Burnside  and  he  had 
satisfied  himself  of  its  substantial  truth,  he  promptly 
accepted  the  challenge  to  test  the  legality  of  his  order, 
and  directed  the  arrest  of  Mr.  Vallandigham.  It  was 
characteristic  of  him  that  he  did  not  consult  with  his 
subordinates  or  with  lawyers.  He  did  not  even  act 
through  my  district  organization,  but  sent  his  own  aide- 
de-camp  with  a  guard  to  make  the  arrest  at  Dayton.  My 
recollection  is  that  I  did  not  know  of  the  purpose  till  it 
was  accomplished.  His  reason  for  direct  action,  no  doubt, 
was  that  if  there  were  many  links  in  the  chain  of  routine, 
there  were  multiplied  chances  of  failure.  He  did  not 
want  to  be  baffled  in  the  arrest,  or  to  give  the  opportu 
nity  for  raising  a  mob,  which  there  would  be  if  his  pur 
poses  were  to  become  known  in  advance. 

The  arrest  was  made  in  the  early  morning  of  the  5th 
of  May,  before  dawn,  and  the  prisoner  was  brought  to 
Cincinnati.  He  was  at  first  taken  under  guard  to  the 
Burnet  House,  where  he  breakfasted,  and  was  then  put 
in  the  military  prison  connected  with  the  houses  used  as 
barracks  for  the  troops  in  the  city.  A  military  commis 
sion  had  been  ordered  on  the  2ist  of  April  from  Depart 
ment  Headquarters  for  the  trial  of  the  classes  of  offenders 
named  in  Order  No.  38,  and  of  this  commission  Brigadier- 
General  R.  B.  Potter  of  the  Ninth  Corps  was  President. 
General  Potter  was  a  distinguished  officer  throughout  the 
war.  He  was  a  brother  of  Clarkson  N.  Potter,  the  promi 
nent  lawyer  and  Democratic  member  of  Congress  later, 
and  both  were  sons  of  the  Episcopal  Bishop  Potter  of 
Pennsylvania.  The  character  of  the  whole  court  was 
very  high  for  intelligence  and  standing.  Before  this 


VALLANDIGHAM  CASE  461 

court  Mr.  Vallandigham  was  arraigned  on  the  charge  of 
publicly  expressing  sympathy  with  those  in  arms  against 
the  government,  and  uttering  disloyal  sentiments  and 
opinions  with  intent  to  weaken  the  power  of  the  govern 
ment  in  its  efforts  to  suppress  the  rebellion. 

Vallandigham  consulted  with  the  Hon.  George  E. 
Pugh  and  others  as  his  counsel,  and  then  adopted  the 
course  of  protesting  against  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
and  against  the  authority  for  his  arrest.  His  grounds 
were  that  he  was  not  amenable  to  any  military  jurisdic 
tion,  and  that  his  public  speech  did  not  constitute  an 
offence  known  to  the  Constitution  and  laws.  To  avoid 
the  appearance  of  waiving  the  question  of  jurisdiction, 
his  counsel  did  not  appear,  though  offered  the  opportu 
nity  to  do  so,  and  Mr.  Vallandigham  cross-examined  the 
witnesses  himself,  and  called  those  who  testified  for  him. 
The  question  of  fact  raised  by  him  was  that  he  had  not 
advised  forcible  resistance  to  the  government,  but  had 
urged  action  at  the  elections  by  defeating  the  party  in 
power  at  the  polls.  That  he  did  not  in  terms  advocate 
insurrection  was  admitted  by  the  judge  advocate  of  the 
court,  but  the  commission  were  persuaded  that  the  effect 
of  his  speech  was  intended  and  well  calculated  to  be 
incendiary,  and  to  arouse  any  kind  of  outbreak  in  sym 
pathy  with  the  armed  enemies  of  the  country.  The  trial 
ended  on  the  /th  of  May,  but  the  judgment  was  not  pro 
mulgated  till  the  i6th,  proceedings  in  habeas  corpus  hav 
ing  intervened.  The  finding  of  the  court  was  that  the 
prisoner  was  guilty,  as  charged,  and  the  sentence  was 
close  confinement  in  Fort  Warren,  Boston  harbor,  during 
the  continuance  of  the  war. 

On  the  gth  of  May  Mr.  Pugh  made  application  to  the 
United  States  Circuit  Court,  Judge  Leavitt  sitting,  for  a 
writ  of  habeas  corpus  directed  to  General  Burnside,  in 
order  that  the  lawfulness  of  Mr.  Vallandigham' s  arrest 
and  trial  might  be  tested.  The  court  directed  notice  of 


462          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  application  to  be  given  to  the  general,  and  set  the 
nth  for  the  hearing.  The  case  was  elaborately  argued  by 
Mr.  Pugh  for  the  prisoner,  and  by  Mr.  Aaron  F-  Perry  and 
the  District  Attorney  Flamen  Ball  for  General  Burnside. 
The  hearing  occupied  several  days,  and  the  judgment 
of  the  court  was  given  on  the  morning  of  the  i6th. 
Judge  Leavitt  refused  the  writ  on  the  ground  that,  civil 
war  being  flagrant  in  the  land,  and  Ohio  being  under  the 
military  command  of  General  Burnside  by  appointment 
of  the  President,  the  acts  and  offences  described  in  Gen 
eral  Order  No.  38  were  cognizable  by  the  military  author 
ities  under  the  powers  of  war. 

General  Burnside  had  awaited  the  action  of  the  court, 
and  now  promulgated  the  sentence  under  the  judgment  of 
the  military  commission.  Three  days  later  (May  iQth) 
the  President  commuted  the  sentence  by  directing  that 
Mr.  Vallandigham  be  sent  "under  secure  guard,  to  the 
headquarters  of  General  Rosecrans,  to  be  put  by  him 
beyond  our  military  lines,  and  that  in  case  of  his  return 
within  our  line,  he  be  arrested  and  kept  in  close  custody 
for  the  term  specified  in  his  sentence."  This  was  done 
accordingly.  The  Confederate  officials  adopted  a  careful 
policy  of  treating  him  courteously  without  acknowledging 
that  he  was  one  of  themselves,  and  facilities  were  given 
him  for  running  the  blockade  and  reaching  Canada. 
There  he  established  himself  on  the  border  and  put  him 
self  in  communication  with  his  followers  in  Ohio,  by 
whom  he  was  soon  nominated  for  the  Governorship  of  the 
State. 

The  case,  of  course,  excited  great  public  interest,  and 
was,  no  doubt,  the  occasion  of  considerable  embarrass 
ment  to  the  administration.  Mr.  Lincoln  dealt  with  it 
with  all  that  shrewd  practical  judgment  for  which  he 
was  so  remarkable,  and  in  the  final  result  it  worked  to 
the  political  advantage  of  the  National  cause.  Sending 
Vallandigham  beyond  the  lines  took  away  from  him  the 


VALLANDIGHAM  CASE  463 

personal  sympathy  which  might  have  been  aroused  had 
he  been  confined  in  one  of  the  casemates  of  Fort  Warren, 
and  put  upon  him  an  indelible  badge  of  connection  with 
the  enemies  of  the  country.  The  cautious  action  of  the 
Confederates  in  regard  to  him  did  not  tend  to  remove 
this :  for  it  was  very  apparent  that  they  really  regarded 
him  as  a  friend,  and  helped  him  on  his  way  to  Canada 
in  the  expectation  that  he  would  prove  a  thorn  in  Mr. 
Lincoln's  side.  The  President's  proposal  to  the  leading 
politicians  who  applied  to  him  to  rescind  the  sentence, 
that  as  a  condition  of  this  they  should  make  certain 
declarations  of  the  duty  to  support  the  government  in  a 
vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war,  was  a  most  telling  bit 
of  policy  on  his  part,  and  took  the  sting  entirely  out  of 
the  accusations  of  tyranny  and  oppression. 

It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  the  case  was  one  in 
which  the  administration  ought  to  have  left  Burnside 
wholly  untrammelled  in  carrying  out  the  proclamation  of 
September  25,  1862,  or  should  have  formulated  a  rule 
for  its  military  officers,  so  that  they  would  have  acted 
only  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  government,  and 
in  cases  where  the  full  responsibility  would  be  assumed 
at  Washington.  When  Burnside  arrested  Mr.  Vallandig- 
ham,  the  Secretary  of  War  telegraphed  from  Washington 
his  approval,  saying,  "In  your  determination  to  support 
the  authority  of  the  government  and  suppress  treason  in 
your  department,  you  may  count  on  the  firm  support  of 
the  President."1  Yet  when  a  little  later  Burnside  sup 
pressed  the  "  Chicago  Times  "  for  similar  utterances,  the 
President,  on  the  request  of  Senator  Trumbull,  backed 
by  prominent  citizens  of  Chicago,  directed  Burnside  to 
revoke  his  action.2  This  the  latter  did  by  General  Order 
No.  91,  issued  on  the  4th  of  June.  He  read  to  me  on 
June  7th  a  letter  from  Mr.  Stanton,  which  practically 
revoked  the  whole  of  his  Order  No.  38  by  directing  him 

*  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  316.  2  Id.,  pp.  385,  386. 


464          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

not  to  arrest  civilians  or  suppress  newspapers  without 
conferring  first  with  the  War  Department.  This  would 
have  been  very  well  if  it  had  been  done  at  the  begin 
ning;  but  to  have  it  come  after  political  pressure  from 
the  outside,  and  in  so  marked  contradiction  to  the  ap 
proval  first  expressed,  shows  that  there  was  no  well-con 
sidered  policy.  It  put  Burnside  himself  in  an  intolerable 
position,  and,  of  course,  made  him  decline  further  respon 
sibility,  for  such  affairs  in  his  department.1 

The  whole  question  as  to  the  right  and  the  policy  of 
military  arrests  and  orders  in  such  a  time  bristles  with 
difficulties.  Had  I  been  consulted  before  Burnside  took 
action,  I  should  have  advised  him  to  collect  carefully 
the  facts  and  report  them  to  Washington,  asking  for 
specific  instructions.  The  subject  called  for  directions 
which  would  be  applicable  in  all  the  military  depart 
ments  which  included  States  out  of  the  theatre  of  active 
warlike  operations;  and  such  general  directions  should 
be  given  by  the  government.  But  Burnside  was  apt  to 
act  impulsively,  and  his  impulse  was  to  follow  the  bent 
of  his  ardent  patriotism.  He  was  stirred  to  burning 
wrath  by  what  seemed  to  him  an  intent  to  give  aid  and 
comfort  to  the  rebellion,  and  meant  to  punish  such  con 
duct  without  stopping  to  ask  what  complications  might 
come  of  it. 

I  had  found  it  desirable  to  form  a  judgment  of  my  own 
with  reference  to  the  extent  or  limitation  of  military 
authority  in  the  actual  circumstances,  and  I  quote  the 
form  in  which  I  then  cast  it,  so  that  I  may  not  seem  to 
be  giving  opinions  formed  after  my  own  military  duties 
were  ended.  I  concluded,  "First:  That  martial  law 
operates  either  by  reason  of  its  proclamation  by  com 
petent  authority,  or  ex  necessitate  rei  in  the  immediate 

1  I  do  not  find  in  the  Official  Records  the  letter  of  Mr.  Stanton  above 
referred  to ;  but  I  speak  of  it  from  a  written  memorandum  I  made  at  the 
time. 


VALLANDIGHAM  CASE  465 

theatre  of  military  operations.     Second;   That  when  the 
struggle  is  in  the  nature  of  a  revolution,  and  so  long  as 
the  attempted  revolution  is  in  active  progress,  no  definite 
limits  can  be  given  to  the  'theatre  of  operations,'  but 
the   administration   must    be   regarded   as   possessing   a 
limited  discretionary  power  in  the  use  of  martial  law." 
As  to  the  practical  application  of  this  power,  "the  pre 
sumptions  are  always  in  favor  of  the  established  civil  law 
of  the  land,  whenever  and  wherever  it  has  a  reasonable 
chance  of  unobstructed  operation.     In  a  State  or  portion 
of   the  country  not  the  theatre  of  actual  fighting,  and 
where  the  civil  courts  are  actually  organized  and  working, 
there  must  be  some  strong  reason  for  sending  criminals 
or  State   prisoners   before  a  military  tribunal;  such   as 
that   the  government  had   reason  to  believe  that  a  con 
spiracy  was  so  powerful  as  to  make  an  actual  present 
danger  of   its   overthrowing   the   loyal   governments    in 
some  of  the  States  before  the  civil  courts  could  act  in 
the  ordinary  process   of   business.     In  such  a  case,  the 
arrest  and  admission   to  bail  of   the  conspirators  might 
be  only  the  signal  for  their  adherents  to  seize  the  reins 
of  civil  power,  overthrow  the  courts,  and  consummate  a 
revolution.     The  quick  and  summary  action  of  military 
power  would  then  be  the  only  thing  which  could  avert 
the  danger.     The  justification  of   the  use  of  a  military 
tribunal  depends  on  the   existence  of    *  probable  cause  ' 
for  believing  the  public  danger  to  be  great." 

I  see  no  reason  to  change  the  form  of  stating  the  prin 
ciple  I  then  adopted.  The  limitations  given  it  seem 
sufficient  to  secure  proper  caution  in  applying  it,  and 
will  show  that  I  thought  then,  as  I  do  now,  that  the 
administration  ought  to  have  laid  down  rules  by  which 
the  commandants  of  military  departments  could  be 
guided,  and  which  would  have  saved  us  from  the  weak 
ness  of  acting  with  seeming  vigor  on  one  day,  only  to 
retreat  from  our  position  the  next. 
VOL.  i. — 30 


466          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

In   Vallandigham's    case   the   common    argument  was 
used  by  his  friends  that  he  was  not  exceeding  a  lawful 
liberty  of  speech  in  political  opposition  to  the  adminis 
tration.     When,  however,  a  civil  war  is  in  progress,  it  is 
simply  a  question  of  fact  whether  words  used  are  intended 
to  give  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemy  and  are  evidence 
of  conspiracy   with  the  public  enemy.       If  so,   it  is  too 
clear  for  argument  that  the  overt  acts  of  the  enemy  are 
brought  home  to  all  who  combine  and  confederate  with 
them,   and   all   are  involved   in  the  same  responsibility. 
This  question  of  fact  and  intent  was  officially  settled  by 
the  findings  of  the  military  court.     But  there  was  another 
connection  of  the  speech  with  overt  acts,  which  the  pub 
lic  mind  took  firm  hold  of.     Among  the  most  incendiary 
of  Vallandigham's  appeals  had  been  those  which  urged 
the  people  to  resist  the  provost-marshals  in  the  several 
districts.      It  is  nonsense  to  say  that  resisting  the  draft 
or  the  arrest  of  deserters  only  meant  voting  for  an  oppo 
sition   party  at   the  elections.     There  had   been    armed 
and  organized  resistance  to  arrest  of  deserters  in  Noble 
County  just  before  his  speech,  and  soon  after  it  there  was 
a  still  more  formidable  armed  organization  with  warlike 
action  against  the  enrolling  officers  in  Holmes  County, 
in    the    same   region    in    which    the    speech    was    made. 
This  last  took  the  form  of  an  armed  camp,  and  the  in 
surgents  did  not  disperse  till  a  military  force  was  sent 
against  them  and  attacked  them  in  fortified  lines,  where 
they  used  both  cannon  and  musketry.     It  did  not  seem 
plausible  to  the  common   sense  of   the  people  that  we 
could  properly  charge  with  volleying  musketry  upon  the 
barricades  of  the  less  intelligent  dupes,  whilst  the  leader 
who  had  incited  and  counselled  the  resistance  was  to  be 
held  to  be  acting  within  the  limits  of  proper  liberty  of 
speech.     Law  and  common  sense  are  entirely  in  harmony 
in    regarding   the    conspiracy  as   a   unit,   the   speech    at 
Mount  Vernon  and  the  armed  collision  on  the  Holmes 


VALLANDIGHAM  CASE  467 

County  hill  being  parts  of  one  series  of  acts  in  which 
the  instigator  was  responsible  for  the  natural  conse 
quences  of  the  forces  he  set  in  motion. 

To  complete  the  judicial  history  of  the  Vallandigham 
case,  it  may  be  said  that  he  applied  to  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States  a  few  months  afterward  for  a  writ 
to  revise  and  examine  the  proceedings  of  the  military 
commission  and  to  determine  their  legality.  The  court 
dismissed  his  application  on  the  ground  that  the  writ 
applied  for  was  not  a  legal  means  of  bringing  the  pro 
ceedings  of  the  military  court  under  review.  The  charges 
and  specifications  and  the  sentence  were  all  set  forth  in 
the  application,  so  that  the  court  was  made  officially 
aware  of  the  full  character  of  the  case.  This  was  natu 
rally  accepted  at  the  time  as  practically  sustaining  the 
action  of  the  President  and  General  Burnside.  When, 
however,  the  war  was  over,  there  was  taken  up  to  the 
Supreme  Court  the  case  of  Milligan  from  Indiana,  who 
had  been  condemned  to  death  for  treasonable  conduct  in 
aid  of  the  rebellion,  done  as  a  member  of  the  Knights  of 
the  Golden  Circle,  an  organization  charged  with  overt 
acts  in  attempting  to  liberate  by  force  the  Confederate 
prisoners  of  war  in  the  military  prisons,  and  otherwise 
to  assist  the  rebellion.  The  current  public  sentiment  in 
regard  to  executive  power  had  unquestionably  changed 
with  the  return  to  peace,  and  Lincoln  having  been  assas 
sinated  and  Johnson  being  in  the  presidential  chair,  the 
tide  was  running  strongly  in  favor  of  congressional  rather 
than  executive  initiative  in  public  affairs.  It  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  court  responded  more  or  less  fully  to  the 
popular  drift,  then  as  in  other  important  historical  junc 
tures.  In  the  opinion  as  delivered  by  Judge  Davis,  it 
went  all  lengths  in  holding  that  the  military  commission 
could  not  act  upon  charges  against  a  person  not  in  the 
military  service,  and  who  was  a  citizen  of  the  State  where 
tried,  when  in  such  State  the  civil  courts  were  not  actu- 


468          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

ally  suspended  by  the  operations  of  war.  Chief  Justice 
Chase  and  three  of  the  justices  thought  this  was  going 
too  far,  and  whilst  concurring  in  discharging  Milligan, 
held  that  Congress  could  authorize  military  commissions 
to  try  civilians  in  time  of  actual  war,  and  that  such  mili 
tary  tribunals  might  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  with 
the  civil  courts.1 

We  must  not  forget  that  whilst  the  judicial  action 
determines  the  rights  of  the  parties  in  a  suit,  the  execu 
tive  has  always  asserted  his  position  as  an  independent 
co-ordinate  branch  of  the  government,  authorized  by  the 
Constitution  to  determine  for  himself,  as  executive,  his 
duties,  and  to  interpret  his  powers,  subject  only  to  the 
Constitution  as  he  understands  it.  Jefferson,  Jackson, 
and  Lincoln  in  turn  found  themselves  in  exigencies  where 
they  held  it  to  be  their  duty  to  decide  for  themselves  on 
their  high  political  responsibility  in  matters  of  constitu 
tional  power  and  duty.  Lincoln  suspended  the  privilege 
of  habeas  corpus  by  his  own  proclamation,  and  adhered  to 
his  view,  although  Judge  Taney  in  the  Circuit  Court 
for  Maryland  denied  his  power  to  do  so.  When  Con 
gress  passed  a  regulating  act  on  the  subject  which  seemed 
to  him  sufficient,  he  signed  the  statute  because  he  was 
quite  willing  to  limit  his  action  by  the  provisions  em 
bodied  in  it,  and  not  because  he  thought  the  act  neces 
sary  to  confer  the  power. 

An  incident  in  the  history  of  the  treasonable  organiza 
tions  believed  to  exist  in  Indiana  emphasizes  the  change 
of  mental  attitude  of  Judge  Davis  between  1863  and  1866. 
During  the  progress  of  the  Vallandigham  case,  General 
Burnside  conceived  a  distrust  of  the  wisdom  of  the 
course  pursued  by  Brigadier-General  Carrington,  who 
commanded  at  Indianapolis,  and  sent  Brigadier-General 
Hascall  there  to  command  that  district.  Carrington  had 

1  Ex  parte  Vallandigham,  Wallace's  Reports,  i.  243.  Ex  parte  Milligan, 
Id.t  iv.  2,  etc. 


VALLANDIGHAM  CASE  469 

been  the  right  hand  of  Governor  Morton  in  ferreting  out 
the  secrets  of  the  Golden  Circle,  and  applying  Order  No. 
38  to  them,  but  Burnside's  lack  of  confidence  in  the  cool- 
headed  caution  and  judgment  of  his  subordinate  led  him 
to  make  the  change.  Hascall  was  a  brave  and  reliable 
Indiana  officer,  who  had  seen  much  active  field  service, 
and  with  whom  I  was  associated  in  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  during  the  Atlanta  campaign.  He  was  ardently 
loyal,  but  an  unexcitable,  matter-of-fact  sort  of  person. 
He  did  not  suit  Governor  Morton,  who  applied  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  have  him  removed  from  command, 
declaring  that  immediate  action  was  important.  Judge 
Davis,  who  was  in  Indianapolis,  was  induced  to  co-operate 
with  the  governor  in  the  matter,  and  telegraphed  to  Mr. 
Stanton  that  Hascall' s  removal  was  demanded  by  the 
honor  and  interests  of  the  government.1  Hascall  was 
sent  to  the  field,  and  after  a  short  interval  Carrington 
was  restored  to  duty  at  Indianapolis.  In  the  continued 
investigation  and  prosecution  of  the  Golden  Circle,  and 
finally  in  the  trial  of  Milligan,  General  Carrington  was, 
under  Governor  Morton,  the  most  active  instrument ;  and 
it  was,  of  course,  to  keep  him  at  work  on  that  line  that 
the  changes  in  command  were  secured.  Yet  it  was  the 
fruit  of  this  very  work  of  Carrington  that  was  so  strongly 
and  sweepingly  declared  to  be  illegal  by  the  Supreme 
Court,  Judge  Davis  himself  delivering  the  opinion  and 
going  beyond  the  chief-justice  and  others  in  denying  all 
power  and  authority  to  military  courts  in  such  cases. 
Had  Mr.  Lincoln  lived,  he  would  no  doubt  have  avoided 
any  question  before  the  Supreme  Court  in  regard  to  his 
authority,  by  pardoning  Milligan  as  he  granted  amnesty 
to  so  many  who  had  been  active  in  the  rebellion.  But 
Mr.  Johnson  was  so  much  hampered  by  his  quarrel  with 
Congress  over  reconstruction  that  he  was  disposed  to 
avoid  interference  with  criminal  cases  where  his  action 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  369.     See  also  /</.,  p.  194. 


470          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

could  subject  him  to  the  charge  of  sympathy  with  the 
accused.  He  carefully  abstained  from  meddling  with 
Jefferson  Davis  as  he  did  with  Milligan,  and  left  the 
responsibility  with  the  courts. 

The  final  development  of  the  investigation  of  the  Soci 
ety  of  the  Golden  Circle  took  place  after  I  had  again 
obtained  a  field  command,  and  I  was  glad  to  have  no 
occasion  to  form  a  personal  judgment  about  it.  The 
value  of  evidence  collected  by  means  of  detectives  de 
pends  so  greatly  on  the  character  of  the  men  employed 
and  the  instructions  under  which  they  act,  that  one  may 
well  suspend  judgment  unless  he  has  more  than  ordinarily 
full  knowledge  on  these  points.  The  findings  of  the 
military  commission  must  stand  as  a  prima  facie  his 
torical  determination  of  the  facts  it  reported,  and  the 
burden  of  proof  is  fairly  upon  those  who  assert  that  the 
conclusions  were  not  sustained  by  trustworthy  evidence. 

I  have  mentioned  the  open  resistance  to  the  draft  and 
to  the  arrest  of  deserters  in  Noble  and  in  Holmes  coun 
ties.  The  first  of  these  was  scarcely  more  than  a  petty 
riotous  demonstration,  which  melted  away  before  the  offi 
cers  as  soon  as  they  were  able  to  show  that  they  were 
backed  by  real  power.  The  second  looked  for  a  time 
more  formidable,  and  assumed  a  formal  military  organiza 
tion.  Governor  Tod  issued  a  proclamation  warning  the 
offenders  of  the  grave  consequences  of  their  acts,  and 
exhorting  them  for  their  own  sake  and  the  sake  of  their 
families  to  disperse  and  obey  the  laws.  I  directed  Gen 
eral  Mason  at  Columbus  to  be  sure,  if  military  force  had 
to  be  used,  that  enough  was  concentrated  to  make  stub 
born  resistance  hopeless.  The  insurgents  maintained  a 
bold  face  till  the  troops  were  close  upon  them ;  but  when 
they  saw  a  strong  line  of  infantry  charging  up  toward  the 
stone  fences  on  the  hillside  where  they  had  made  their 
camp,  and  heard  the  whistling  of  bullets  from  the  skir 
mishers,  their  courage  gave  way  and  they  fled,  every 


VALLANDIGHAM  CASE  471 

man  for  himself.  Only  two  or  three  were  seriously 
wounded,  and  comparatively  few  arrests  were  made.1 
Submission  to  law  was  all  that  was  demanded,  and  when 
this  was  fully  established,  the  prisoners  were  soon  re 
leased  without  further  punishment.  The  fear  of  further 
prosecutions  operated  to  preserve  the  peace,  and  the  men 
who  had  been  allowed  to  go  at  large  were  a  guaranty,  in 
effect,  for  the  good  behavior  of  the  community. 

Before  dropping  the  subject,  I  may  properly  add  that 
the  arrest  of  Mr.  Vallandigham  very  naturally  raised  the 
question  how  far  we  were  willing  to  go  in  bringing  dis 
loyal  men  before  the  military  courts.  Prominent  citi 
zens,  and  especially  men  in  official  position,  often  found 
themselves  urged  to  ask  for  the  arrest  of  the  more  out 
spoken  followers  of  Vallandigham  in  every  country 
neighborhood.  In  answer  to  inquiries  which  had  come 
through  the  Hon.  Martin  Welker,2  member  of  Congress 
for  the  Wayne  County  district,  I  wrote  him  a  letter 
which  shows  the  efforts  we  made  to  be  prudent  and  to 
avoid  unnecessary  collisions.  Judge  Welker  had  served 
as  Judge  Advocate  on  my  staff  in  the  three  months'  ser 
vice  in  the  spring  of  1861,  and  my  intimacy  with  him 
made  me  speak  as  to  our  policy  without  reserve. 

"We  are  hopeful,"  I  wrote,  "now  that  the  United 
States  Circuit  Court  has  refused  to  release  Mr.  Vallan 
digham  on  habeas  corpus^  that  his  followers  will  take 
warning  and  that  their  course  will  be  so  modified  that 
there  may  be  no  occasion  to  make  many  more  arrests. 

"  I  am  persuaded  that  our  policy  should  be  to  repress 
disloyalty  and  sedition  at  home  rather  by  punishment  of 
prominent  examples  than  by  a  general  arrest  of  all  who 
may  make  themselves  obnoxious  to  General  Order  No. 
38,  as  the  latter  course  will  involve  a  more  frequent 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  pp.  395-397- 

2  Afterward  for  many  years   Judge  of   the   U.   S.  District  Court  for 
northern  Ohio. 


472          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

application  of  military  authority  than  we  choose  to  resort 
to,  unless  circumstances  should  make  it  imperatively 
necessary.  ...  I  am  full  of  hope  that  the  seditious 
designs  of  bad  men  will  fail  by  reason  of  the  returning 
sense  of  those  who  have  been  their  dupes,  and  that  the 
able  and  patriotic  opinion  of  Judge  Leavitt  in  the  habeas 
corpus  case  will  cause  great  numbers  to  take  positive 
ground  in  favor  of  the  government,  who  have  hitherto 
been  more  or  less  under  the  influence  of  our  northern 
traitors.  If  such  shall  be  the  result  we  can  afford  to 
overlook  bygones,  and  I  am  inclined  to  await  the  devel 
opment  of  public  sentiment  before  following  up  Vallan- 
digham's  arrest  by  many  others." 

This  letter  was  written  before  the  Secretary  of  War 
made  any  limitation  of  Burnside's  authority  in  enforcing 
his  famous  order,  and  shows  that  in  the  District  of  Ohio, 
at  least,  there  was  no  desire  to  set  up  a  military  des 
potism,  or  to  go  further  in  applying  military  methods  to 
conduct  in  aid  of  the  rebellion  than  we  might  be  forced 
to  go. 

Burnside's  action  in  suppressing  disloyal  newspapers 
was  not  peculiar  to  himself.  General  Wright,  his  prede 
cessor,  had  done  the  same,  and  other  military  comman 
dants,  both  before  and  after  and  in  other  parts  of  the 
country,  had  felt  obliged  to  take  the  same  course.  These 
facts  only  make  more  clear  the  desirability  of  a  well-con 
sidered  system  of  action  determined  by  the  government  at 
Washington,  and  applicable  to  all  such  cases. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

BURNSIDE  AND   ROSECRANS  —  THE   SUMMER'S   DELAYS 

Condition  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  —  Halleck's  instructions  to  Burn- 
side —  Blockhouses  at  bridges  —  Relief  of  East  Tennessee  —  Condi 
tions  of  the  problem —  Vast  wagon-train  required  —  Scheme  of  a  railroad 
—  Surveys  begun  —  Burnside's  efforts  to  arrange  co-operation  with 
Rosecrans  —  Bragg  sending  troops  to  Johnston  —  Halleck  urges  Rose- 
crans  to  activity  —  Continued  inactivity — Burnside  ordered  to  send 
troops  to  Grant — Rosecrans's  correspondence  with  Halleck  —  Lincoln's 
dispatch  —  Rosecrans  collects  his  subordinates'  opinions  —  Councils  of 
war  —  The  situation  considered  —  Sheridan  and  Thomas  —  Computation 
of  effectives  —  Garfield's  summing  up  —  Review  of  the  situation  when 
Rosecrans  succeeded  Buell  —  After  Stone's  River — Relative  forces  — 
Disastrous  detached  expeditions  —  Appeal  to  ambition  —  The  major- 
generalship  in  regular  army  —  Views  of  the  President  justified — Burn- 
side's  forces  —  Confederate  forces  in  East  Tennessee  —  Reasons  for  the 
double  organization  of  the  Union  armies. 

"OURNSIDE  was  not  a  man  to  be  satisfied  with  quasi- 
JL)  military  duty  and  the  administration  of  a  depart 
ment  outside  of  the  field  of  active  warfare.  He  had  been 
reappointed  to  the  formal  command  of  the  Ninth  Corps 
before  he  came  West,  and  the  corps  was  sent  after  him 
as  soon  as  transportation  could  be  provided  for  it.  He 
reached  Cincinnati  in  person  just  as  a  raid  into  Kentucky 
by  some  2000  Confederate  cavalry  under  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  John  Pegram  was  in  progress.  Pegram  marched 
from  East  Tennessee  about  the  middle  of  March,  reach 
ing  Danville,  Ky.,  on  the  23d.  He  spread  reports  that 
he  was  the  advance-guard  of  a  large  force  of  all  arms 
intending  a  serious  invasion  of  the  State.  These  exag 
gerations  had  their  effect,  and  the  disturbance  in  the 
Department  of  the  Ohio  was  out  of  proportion  to  the 


474          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

strength  of  the  hostile  column.1  The  troops  belonging 
to  the  post  at  Danville  retreated  to  the  hither  side  of  the 
Kentucky  River  at  Hickman's  Bridge,  where  they  took 
up  a  defensive  position.  They  saved  the  railway  bridge 
from  destruction,  and  Brigadier-General  Quincy  A. 
Gillmore,  who  commanded  the  District  of  Central  Ken 
tucky  with  headquarters  at  Lexington,  was  able  to  con 
centrate  there  a  sufficient  force  to  resume  the  offensive 
against  Pegram. 

Burnside  ordered  reinforcements  to  Gillmore  from  the 
other  parts  of  Kentucky,  and  Pegram,  whose  report  indi 
cates  that  a  foray  for  beef,  cattle,  and  horses  was  the 
principal  object  of  his  expedition,  commenced  his  retreat. 
Gillmore  followed  him  up  vigorously,  recapturing  a  con 
siderable  part  of  the  cattle  he  had  collected,  and  over 
taking  his  principal  column  at  Somerset,  routed  him  and 
drove  him  beyond  the  Cumberland  River. 

The  month  of  March  had  begun  with  pleasant  spring 
weather,  and  on  the  I5th  General  Wright  had  written  to 
Halleck  that  an  invasion  of  Kentucky  was  probable,  espe 
cially  as  Rosecrans  showed  no  signs  of  resuming  the 
aggressive  against  Bragg's  army  in  middle  Tennessee.2 
In  Halleck's  letter  of  instructions  to  Burnside  as  the 
latter  was  leaving  Washington  to  relieve  Wright,  the 
general  plan  of  an  advance  on  East  Tennessee  in  con 
nection  with  that  of  Rosecrans  toward  Chattanooga  was 
outlined,  but  the  General-in-Chief  acknowledged  that  the 
supply  of  an  army  in  East  Tennessee  by  means  of  the 
wagon  roads  was  probably  impracticable.3  He  pointed 
out  the  necessity  of  reducing  the  number  and  size  of  gar 
risons  in  the  rear,  and  making  everything  bend  to  the 
great  object  of  organizing  the  army  for  active  initiative 
against  the  enemy.  He  recommended  building  block- 

1  Letter  of  Governor  Robinson,  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  97  ;  Id.,  pp. 
121,  126. 

2  Id.,  p.  143-  3  Id;  P-  163- 


BURNSIDE  AND  ROSECRANS  475 

houses  to  protect  the  principal  bridges  on  the  railroads, 
where  very  small  garrisons  could  give  comparative  secur 
ity  to  our  lines  of  communication.  This  plan  was  ulti 
mately  carried  out  on  a  large  scale,  and  was  the  neces 
sary  condition  of  Sherman's  Atlanta  campaign  of  1864. 
Taken  as  a  whole,  Halleck's  instructions  to  Burnside 
presented  no  definite  objective,  and  were  a  perfunctory 
sort  of  introduction  to  his  new  command,  which  raises 
a  doubt  whether  the  organization  of  a  little  army  in  the 
Department  of  the  Ohio  met  his  approval. 

The  fact  was  that  Burnside  was  acting  on  an  under 
standing  with  President  Lincoln  himself,  whose  ardent 
wish  to  send  a  column  for  the  relief  of  the  loyal  people 
of  East  Tennessee  never  slumbered,  and  who  was  already 
beginning  to  despair  of  its  accomplishment  by  Rose- 
crans's  army.  The  uneasiness  at  Washington  over  Rose- 
crans's  inaction  was  becoming  acute,  and  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  evidently  turning  to  Burnside's  department  in  hope 
of  an  energetic  movement  there.  In  this  hope  Burnside 
was  sent  West,  and  the  Ninth  Corps  was  detached  from  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  and  sent  after  him.  The  project 
of  following  up  his  advance  by  the  construction  of  a  rail 
road  from  Danville,  then  the  terminus  of  the  railway  line 
reaching  southward  from  Cincinnati,  was  discussed,  and 
the  President  recommended  it  to  Congress,  but  no  appro 
priation  of  money  was  made.  The  scheme  was  hardly 
within  the  limits  of  practicable  plans,  for  the  building  of  a 
railway  through  such  difficult  country  as  the  Cumberland 
mountain  region  implied  laborious  engineering  surveys 
which  could  only  be  made  when  the  country  was  reduced 
to  secure  possession,  and  the  expenditure  of  time  as  well 
as  of  money  would  be  likely  to  exceed  the  measure  of 
reasonable  plans  for  a  military  campaign.  The  true  thing 
to  do  was  to  push  Rosecrans's  army  to  Chattanooga  and 
beyond.  With  the  valley  of  the  Tennessee  in  our  posses 
sion,  and  Chattanooga  held  as  a  new  base  of  supply  for  a 


476          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

column  in  East  Tennessee  as  well  as  another  in  Georgia, 
the  occupation  of  Knoxville  and  the  Clinch  and  Holston 
valleys  to  the  Virginia  line  was  easy.  Without  it,  all  East 
Tennessee  campaigns  were  visionary.  It  was  easy  enough 
to  get  there  ;  the  trouble  was  to  stay.  Buell's  original  les 
son  in  logistics,  in  which  he  gave  the  War  Department  a 
computation  of  the  wagons  and  mules  necessary  to  supply 
ten  thousand  men  at  Knoxville,  was  a  solid  piece  of  mili 
tary  arithmetic  from  which  there  was  no  escape.1 

When  Burnside  reached  Cincinnati  and  applied  himself 
practically  to  the  task  of  organizing  his  little  army  for  a 
march  over  the  mountains,  his  first  requisitions  for  wagons 
and  mules  were  a  little  startling  to  the  Quartermaster- 
General  and  a  little  surprising  to  himself.  He  began  at 
once  an  engineering  reconnoissance  of  the  country  south  of 
Lexington  and  Danville,  as  far  as  it  was  within  our  control, 
and  employed  an  able  civil  engineer,  Mr.  Gunn,  to  locate 
the  preliminary  line  for  a  railway.2  These  surveys  were 
the  starting-points  from  which  the  actual  construction  of 
the  road  between  Cincinnati  and  Chattanooga  was  made 
after  the  close  of  the  war. 

Burnside  also  urged  that  the  troops  in  Kentucky,  exclu 
sive  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  be  organized  into  a  new  corps 
with  General  Hartsuff  as  its  commander.3  Halleck  de 
murred  to  this,  but  the  President  directed  it  to  be  done, 
and  the  order  was  issued  by  the  War  Department  on  2/th 
April.4  Burnside  also  applied  himself  earnestly  to  pro 
curing  from  Rosecrans  a  plan  of  active  co-operation  for 
an  advance.  As  soon  as  Hartsuff  assumed  command  of 
the  new  Twenty-third  Corps,  Burnside  sent  him,  on  May  3d, 
to  visit  Rosecrans  in  person,  giving  him  authority  to  ar 
range  an  aggressive  campaign.5  Hartsuff's  old  relations 
to  Rosecrans  made  him  a  very  fit  person  for  the  negotia 
tion.  Rosecrans  hesitated  to  decide,  and  called  a  council 

1  Ante,  p.  199.     O.  R.,  vol.  vii.  p.  931.         2  Id.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  6ro. 
3  Id.,  p.  259.  *  Id.,  pp.  269,  283,  400.  6  Id.,  p.  312. 


BURNSIDE  AND  ROSECRANS  477 

of  his  principal  officers.  He  suggested  that  the  Ninth 
Corps  be  sent  down  the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad 
to  Glasgow,  near  the  Tennessee  line,  but  did  not  indicate 
any  immediate  purpose  of  advancing.1  Burnside  meant  to 
take  the  field  with  both  corps  of  his  command,  which  he 
had  organized  under  the  name  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio ; 
but  to  reassure  Rosecrans,  he  wrote  that  if  in  co-operation 
the  two  armies  should  come  together,  he  would  waive  his 
elder  rank  and  serve  under  Rosecrans  whilst  he  should  re 
main  in  middle  Tennessee.2  It  was  now  the  I5th  of  May, 
and  he  sent  a  confidential  staff  officer  again  to  Rosecrans 
to  try  to  settle  a  common  plan  of  operations.  On  the  i8th 
Halleck  had  heard  of  Bragg's  army  being  weakened  to 
give  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  a  force  with  which  to  re 
lieve  Pemberton  at  Vicksburg,  and  he  became  urgent  for 
both  Rosecrans  and  Burnside  to  advance.3  He  thought  it 
probable  that  raids  would  be  attempted  by  the  enemy  to 
distract  attention  from  his  real  object,  and  pointed  out 
concentration  and  advance  as  the  best  way  to  protect  the 
rear  as  well  as  to  reach  the  enfeebled  adversary.  Burnside 
hastened  in  good  faith  his  preparations  for  movement. 
He  was  collecting  a  pack  mule  train  to  supply  the  lack  of 
wagons,  and  put  his  detachments  in  motion  to  concentrate. 
He  begged  for  the  third  division  of  his  corps  (Getty's), 
which  had  been  detained  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and 
could  not  yet  be  spared,  but  did  not  wait  for  it.4  By  the 
1st  of  June  he  was  ready  to  leave  in  person  for  the  front, 
and  on  the  3d  was  at  Lexington,  definitely  committed 
to  the  movement  into  East  Tennessee.  There  he  was  met 
by  an  order  from  Halleck  to  send  8000  men  at  once  to  re 
inforce  General  Grant  at  Vicksburg.5  The  promise  was 
made  that  they  should  be  returned  as  soon  as  the  imme 
diate  exigency  was  over,  but  the  order  was  imperative. 
Burnside  never  hesitated  in  obedience.  The  two  divisions 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  313,  315.  2  Id.,  p.  331. 

3  Id.,  p.  337-  4  Id.,  p.  338.  5  Idn  p.  384. 


4/8          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

of  the  Ninth  Corps  made  about  the  number  required,  and 
they  were  immediately  turned  back  and  ordered  to  the 
Ohio  River  to  be  shipped  on  steamboats.  Sorely  dis 
appointed,  Burnside  asked  that  he  might  go  with  his  men, 
but  was  told  that  his  departmental  duties  were  too  impor 
tant  to  spare  him  from  them.1  Major-General  Parke  was 
therefore  sent  in  command  of  the  corps.  Burnside  re 
turned  to  Cincinnati,  grieving  at  the  interruption  of  his 
plans,  yet  hoping  it  would  not  be  for  long.  His  duties  at 
the  rear  were  not  agreeable,  especially  as  this  was  just  the 
time  when  he  was  directed  to  recall  his  order  suppressing 
disloyal  newspapers,  and  to  refrain  from  arrests  of  civilians 
without  explicit  authority  from  Washington. 

We  may  safely  assume  that  the  President  and  his  War 
Secretary  were  as  little  pleased  at  having  to  order  the 
Ninth  Corps  away  as  Burnside  was  to  have  them  go.  In 
fact  the  order  was  not  made  till  they  entirely  despaired  of 
making  Rosecrans  advance  with  the  vigor  necessary  to 
checkmate  the  Confederates.  On  the  receipt  of  Halleck's 
dispatch  of  the  i8th  May,  Rosecrans  entered  into  a  tele 
graphic  discussion  of  the  probable  accuracy  of  Halleck's 
information,  saying  that  whatever  troops  were  sent  by  the 
enemy  to  Mississippi  were  no  doubt  sent  from  Charleston 
and  Savannah  and  not  from  Bragg.2  He  insisted  that 
it  was  not  good  policy  to  advance  at  present.  On  the 
2ist  he  said,  "If  I  had  6000  cavalry  in  addition  to 
the  mounting  of  the  2000  now  waiting  horses,  I  would 
attack  Bragg  within  three  days."8  He  also  interposed  the 
unfavorable  judgment  of  his  corps  commanders  in  regard 
to  an  advance.  Military  history  shows  that  this  is  pretty 
uniformly  an  excuse  for  a  delay  already  fully  resolved  on 
by  a  commanding  general.  Halleck  had  no  more  cavalry 
to  send,  and  could  only  say  so.  Burnside  notified  Rose 
crans  on  the  22d  that  his  columns  had  begun  the  move 
ments  of  concentration  and  that  they  would  be  complete 

1  O.  E..,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  384,  386.         2  Id.,  p.  337.         8  Id.,  p.  351. 


BURNSIDE  AND  ROSECRANS  4/9 

in  three  or  four  days.1  On  the  28th  Mr.  Lincoln  himself 
telegraphed  Rosecrans,  "  I  would  not  push  you  to  any 
rashness,  but  I  am  very  anxious  that  you  do  your  utmost, 
short  of  rashness,  to  keep  Bragg  from  getting  off  to  help 
Johnston  against  Grant."2  Rosecrans  curtly  answered, 
"  Dispatch  received.  I  will  attend  to  it."  In  his  dis 
patches  to  Mr.  Stanton  of  similar  date  there  is  no  intima 
tion  of  any  purpose  whatever  to  move.3  In  telegraphing 
to  Burnside,  Rosecrans  said  that  he  was  only  waiting  for 
the  development  of  the  former's  concentration,  and  that 
he  wished  to  advance  by  the  4th  of  June.4  Burnside  had 
already  informed  him  that  he  would  be  ready  by  June  2d, 
and  repeated  it.  On  the  date  last  named  Rosecrans  tele 
graphed  Burnside  that  his  movement  had  already  begun, 
and  that  he  wanted  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  to  come  up  as 
near  and  as  quickly  as  possible.5  Still  he  gave  no  intima 
tion  to  the  authorities  at  Washington  of  an  advance,  for 
none  had  in  fact  been  made  by  his  army,  nor  even  of  any 
near  purpose  to  make  one.  On  June  3d,  Halleck  telegraphed 
him:  "Accounts  received  here  indicate  that  Johnston  is 
being  heavily  reinforced  from  Bragg's  army.  If  you  can 
not  hurt  the  enemy  now,  he  will  soon  hurt  you."  He 
followed  this  by  his  dispatch  to  Burnside  ordering  re 
inforcements  to  be  sent  to  Grant,  and  the  remainder  of  the 
troops  in  the  Department  of  the  Ohio  to  be  concentrated 
defensively  in  Kentucky.6  The  only  move  that  Rose 
crans  made  was  to  send  on  the  8th  to  his  general  officers 
commanding  corps  and  divisions,  a  confidential  circular 
asking  their  opinion  in  writing  in  answer  to  the  following 
questions,  in  substance,  — 

I.  Has  the  enemy  been  so  materially  weakened  that 
this  army  could  advance  on  him  at  this  time  with  strong 
reasonable  chances  of  fighting  a  great  and  successful 
battle  ? 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  355.          2  Id.,  p.  369.         3  Ibid. 

*  Id-,  PP.  372,  376.  5  Id.,  p.  381.        *  Idtf  pp.  383>  384. 


480          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

2.  Is  an  advance  of  our  army  likely  to  prevent  addi 
tional  reinforcements  being  sent  against  General  Grant  by 
Bragg? 

3.  Is    an    immediate    or    early    advance   of  our   army 
advisable  ? 1 

With  substantial  unanimity  they  answered  that  it  was 
not  advisable  to  move,  though  they  seem  generally  to  have 
been  aware  that  Breckinridge  with  about  10,000  men  of  all 
arms  had  gone  from  Bragg  to  Johnston.  When  Rosecrans 
reported  the  result  of  this  council  to  Halleck,  the  latter 
reminded  him  of  the  maxim  that  "  councils  of  war  never 
fight,"  and  that  the  responsibility  for  his  campaign  rests 
upon  a  commanding  general  and  cannot  be  shared  by  a 
council  of  war. 

The  careful  study  of  the  correspondence  elicited  by 
Rosecrans's  circular  would  make  a  most  valuable  commen 
tary  upon  the  theme,  "  Why  Councils  of  War  never  fight." 
The  three  questions  were  addressed  to  sixteen  general 
officers  commanding  corps  and  divisions.2  In  reading  the 
responses  the  impression  grows  strong  that  there  was  what 
may  be  called  a  popular  feeling  among  these  officers  that 
their  duty  was  to  back  up  their  commanding  general  in  a 
judgment  of  his  on  the  subjects  submitted,  which  could 
hardly  be  other  than  well  known.  On  the  question  as  to 
the  probable  reduction  of  Bragg's  army  by  detachments 
sent  to  Johnston,  whilst  they  nearly  all  have  some  knowl 
edge  of  the  diminution  of  the  Confederate  army  to  about 
the  extent  mentioned  above,  most  of  them  answer  that 
they  do  not  think  it  a  material  weakening,  that  being  the 
tenor  of  the  inquiry  put  to  them.  Some  of  them,  however, 
say  very  naturally  that  as  the  secret  service  is  managed 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  395. 

2  Their  answers  are  found  in  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  as  follows :  Davis, 
p.  395,  Johnson,  do.,  McCook,  396,  Turchin,  397,  Brannan,  402,  Crittenden, 
403,  Granger,  403,  Wood,  405,  Negley,  407,  Palmer,  do.,  Reynolds,  409, 
Rousseau,  410,  Sheridan,  411,  Stanley,  412,  Thomas,  414,  Van  Cleve,  415, 
Mitchell,  417,  and  Garfield's  summing  up,  420. 


BURNSIDE  AND  ROSECRANS  481 

from  headquarters  and  all  the  information  received  is  for 
warded  there,  General  Rosecrans  should  be  much  better 
able  to  answer  this  question  than  his  subordinates.  As  to 
the  second  part  of  that  question,  nearly  all  seem  to  assume 
that  the  battle  would  be  in  the  nature  of  a  direct  attack  on 
the  fortifications  at  Shelbyville  and  are  not  sanguine  of  a 
successful  result.  The  few  who  speak  of  turning  manoeu 
vres  feel  that  the  further  retreat  of  Bragg  would  only 
lengthen  their  own  line  of  communications  and  do  no 
good.  Strangely,  too,  they  argue,  many  of  them,  that  an 
advance  would  not  prevent  further  depletion  of  Bragg  to 
strengthen  Johnston.  They  consequently  and  almost  unani 
mously  advise  against  an  immediate  or  early  advance. 

It  is  instructive  to  compare  these  opinions  with  the  act 
ual  facts.  The  inaction  of  the  summer  had  led  directly 
to  the  detachment  of  two  divisions  of  infantry  and  artillery 
and  one  of  cavalry  to  reinforce  Johnston,  just  as  the  in 
activity  of  Meade  later  in  the  season  encouraged  the 
Richmond  government  to  send  Longstreet  to  Bragg  from 
Virginia.  If  Rosecrans  had  moved  early  in  the  season,  not 
only  must  Bragg  have  kept  his  army  intact,  but  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga,  if  fought  at  all,  must  have  been  decided 
without  Longstreet,  and  therefore  most  probably  with 
brilliant  success  for  our  arms.  It  was  delay  in  advancing, 
both  in  Tennessee  and  in  Virginia,  that  thus  directly  led 
to  disaster.  If  a  brilliant  victory  at  Chickamauga  had 
been  coincident  with  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  and  Lee's  de 
feat  at  Gettysburg,  it  does  not  seem  rash  to  believe  that 
the  collapse  of  the  Confederacy  would  have  been  hastened 
by  a  year. 

Two  of  the  generals  who  answered  these  questions  at 
tained  afterward  to  such  distinction  that  their  replies  are 
an  interesting  means  of  learning  their  mental  character  and 
gauging  their  development.  Sheridan  answered  briefly 
that  he  believed  Bragg  had  no  more  than  25,000  or  30,000 
infantry  and  artillery,  with  a  "  large  "  cavalry  force.  In 
VOL.  i.  —  31 


482          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

this  he  was  very  close  to  the  mark.  Bragg's  report  for  the 
latter  part  of  May,  before  sending  reinforcements  to  John 
ston,  showed  his  forces  present  for  duty  to  be  37,000  in 
fantry,  a  little  less  than  3000  artillery,  and  15,000  cavalry, 
in  round  numbers.  Deduct  10,000  from  these,  and  Sher 
idan  is  found  to  be  sufficiently  accurate.1  He  did  not 
think  Bragg  would  fight,  but  would  retreat,  and  thought 
that  in  such  a  case  he  would  not  be  hindered  from  send 
ing  more  help  to  Johnston.  Again,  as  forage  in  the 
country  was  scarce,  he  voted  against  an  early  advance. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  846. 

The  reference  to  Bragg's  returns  of  strength  to  the  Adjutant-General's 
office  makes  this  an  appropriate  place  to  note  the  method  of  making  these 
returns  and  its  bearing  on  the  much  debated  question  of  the  "  Effective 
Total"  commonly  given  by  Confederate  writers  as  the  force  of  their  armies 
compared  with  ours.  The  blanks  for  these  reports  were  sent  out  from 
the  Adjutant-and-Inspector-General's  office  at  Richmond,  with  the  order 
that  the  numerical  returns  be  made  "  on  the  forms  furnished  and  according 
to  the  directions  expressed  on  them  "(General  Orders  No.  64,  Sept.  8,  1862). 
The  column  "  Effective  Total"  in  these  returns  included  only  enlisted  men 
carrying  arms  and  actually  in  the  line  of  battle.  It  excluded  all  officers,  the 
non-commissioned  staff,  extra-duty  men,  the  sick  in  hospital,  and  those  in 
arrest.  To  secure  uniformity  in  the  method  of  reporting  in  his  army  and 
to  correct  some  irregularity,  General  Bragg  issued  a  circular,  as  follows 
(O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  619) :  — 

[Circular.]  "  HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  TENNESSEE, 

TULLAHOMA,  January  29,  1863. 

Hereafter,  under  the  column  of  '  Effective  Total '  in  the  reports  from 
this  army,  extra-duty  men  and  men  in  arrest  will  not  be  included.  The 
1  Effective  Total '  must  include  only  the  fighting  field  force  —  those  who  are 
carried  into  the  field  of  battle  with  fire-arms  in  their  hands. 

By  command  of  General  Bragg. 

GEORGE  WM.  BRENT, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General." 

Before  the  publication  of  the  Official  Records,  I  had  occasion  to  call 
attention  to  the  subject :  see  "  The  Nation,"  May  21,  1874,  p.  334;  also  "At 
lanta"  (Scribners'  Series),  pp.  27,  28;  and  again  in  "  The  Nation,"  February 
2,  1893,  P-  86.  A  fair  comparison  between  the  Confederate  and  the  National 
armies,  therefore,  demands  a  computation  of  numbers  by  the  same  method  ; 
and  as  we  did  not  use  forms  containing  the  "  Effective  Total  "  as  reported  by 
the  Confederates,  the  columns  of  officers  and  men  "  present  for  duty " 
which  are  computed  alike  in  the  returns  on  both  sides  are  the  most 
satisfactory  and  fair  basis  of  comparison. 


THE   SUMMER'S  DELAYS  483 

Thomas  did  not  believe  Bragg  had  been  materially- 
weakened,  for  if  any  troops  had  been  sent  away,  he 
thought  they  had  returned  or  their  places  had  been  sup 
plied.  He  concluded  that  Bragg  was  ready  to  fight  with 
an  army  at  least  as  large  as  that  of  Rosecrans ;  that  to- 
hold  our  army  where  it  was  would  sufficiently  prevent  fur 
ther  reduction  of  Bragg's ;  that  an  advance  would  give  the 
latter  the  advantage  and  was  not  advisable.  His  prefer 
ence  for  defensive  warfare  was  very  evident.  He  said  it 
was  true  that  Bragg  might  be  reinforced  and  take  the  in 
itiative,  but  that  he  "  should  be  most  happy  to  meet  him; 
here  with  his  reinforcements."  In  conclusion  he  indicated 
the  necessity  of  6000  more  cavalry  to  be  added  to  the 
army.1 

When  the  answers  were  all  received,  Garfield  summed 
them  up  in  a  paper,  which  must  be  admitted  to  be  a 
remarkable  production  for  a  young  volunteer  officer  de 
liberately  controverting  the  opinions  of  such  an  array  of 
seniors.  He  gave,  as  the  best  information  at  headquarters, 
the  force  of  Bragg,  before  sending  help  to  Johnston,  as 
38,000  infantry,  2600  artillery,  and  17,500  cavalry.  This 
made  the  infantry  about  1000  too  many,  the  artillery 
nearly  exactly  right,  and  the  cavalry  2500  too  many, 
—  on  the  whole  a  very  close  estimate.  From  these  he 
deducted  10,000,  which  was  right.  He  stated  Rosecrans's 
force  at  82,700  " bayonets  and  sabres"  with  about  3000 
more  on  the  way,  but  deducted  15,000  for  necessary  posts 
and  garrisons.  The  balancing  showed  65,000  to  throw 
against  Bragg's  41,500.  He  further  showed  that  delay 
would  give  time  for  the  enemy's  detachments  to  return, 
whilst  we  could  hope  for  no  further  increase  during  the 
rest  of  the  season.  He  then  analyzed  the  military  and 
civil  reasons  for  activity,  declared  that  he  believed  we 
could  be  victorious,  and  that  the  administration  and  the 
country  had  the  right  to  expect  the  army  to  try. 

1  See  also  ante,  p.  478. 


484          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

The  result  was  a  curious  but  encouraging  result  of 
bold  and  cogent  reasoning.  Although  Rosecrans  reported 
to  General  Halleck  on  the  nth  of  June  the  opinion  of  his 
corps  and  division  commanders  against  an  early  advance, 
the  logic  and  the  facts  pressed  upon  him  by  his  chief  of 
staff  evidently  took  strong  hold  of  his  active  intellect,  so 
that  when  Halleck  on  the  i6th  asked  for  a  categorical 
answer  whether  he  would  make  an  immediate  movement 
forward,  he  replied,  "  If  it  means  to-night  or  to-morrow, 
no.  If  it  means  as  soon  as  all  things  are  ready,  say  five 
days,  yes." 1  No  doubt  the  rather  plain  intimation  that  a 
categorical  "  no  "  would  be  followed  by  action  at  Washing 
ton  helped  the  decision ;  but  it  would  have  helped  it  to  a 
decided  negative  if  Garfield's  paper,  reinforced  by  the 
personal  advice  and  oral  discussions  which  we  now  know 
were  of  daily  occurrence  between  them,  had  not  had  a 
convincing  weight  with  him,  both  as  to  the  feasibility  of 
the  campaign  of  turning  manoeuvres  which  he  devised  and 
adopted,  and  as  to  its  probable  success.  The  result  is 
reckoned  one  of  his  chief  claims  to  military  renown. 

But  to  judge  properly  the  relations  of  the  government 
to  both  the  commanding  generals  in  Kentucky  and  Ten 
nessee,  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  to  the  days  immediately 
after  the  battle  of  Stone's  River,  and  to  inquire  what  were 
the  tasks  assigned  these  commanders  and  the  means 
furnished  to  perform  them.  The  disappointment  of  the 
administration  at  Washington  with  Rosecrans's  conduct  of 
tiis  campaign  dated,  indeed,  much  earlier  than  the  time 
indicated.  He  had  succeeded  Buell  at  the  end  of  October 
'when  Bragg  was  in  full  retreat  to  the  Tennessee  River. 
'The  continuance  of  a  vigorous  pursuit  and  the  prompt 
preoccupation  of  the  country  held  by  us  in  the  early 
summer  was  regarded  as  of  the  utmost  importance  for 
•political,  quite  as  much  as  for  military  reasons.  It  was 
not  a  time  to  halt  and  reorganize  an  army.  The  question 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  pp.  S-IO. 


THE  SUMMERS  DELAYS  485 

of  foreign  intervention  was  apparently  trembling  in  the 
balance,  and  to  let  European  powers  rest  under  the  belief 
that  we  had  lost  most  of  what  had  been  gained  in  the 
advance  from  Donelson  to  Shiloh  and  Corinth,  was  to 
invite  complications  of  the  most  formidable  character. 
The  Washington  authorities  had  therefore  a  perfect  right 
to  decide  that  to  press  Bragg  vigorously  and  without  inter 
mission  was  the  imperative  duty  of  the  commander  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland.  He  would  be  rightly  held  to 
have  disappointed  the  expectations  of  his  government  if 
he  failed  to  do  so.  Rosecrans  had  been  chosen  to  succeed 
Buell  because  of  the  belief  that  his  character  was  one  of 
restless  vehemence  better  adapted  to  this  work  than  the 
slower  but  more  solid  qualities  of  Thomas,  who  was  already 
second  in  command  in  that  army.1  Halleck  was  obliged 
very  soon  to  remind  Rosecrans  of  this,  and  to  claim  the 
right  of  urging  him  onward  because  he  himself  had  given 
the  advice  which  had  been  decisive  when  the  question  of 
the  choice  was  under  consideration. 

Yet  as  soon  as  the  army  was  again  concentrated  about 
Nashville,  Rosecrans's  correspondence  took  the  form  of 
urgent  demands  for  the  means  of  reorganization.  He 
insisted  that  his  cavalry  force  must  be  greatly  increased, 
that  he  must  have  repeating  arms  for  his  horsemen,  that 
he  must  organize  a  selected  corps  of  mounted  infantry 
and  obtain  horses  for  them  —  in  short,  that  he  must  take 
months  to  put  his  army  in  a  condition  equal  to  his  desires 
before  resuming  the  work  of  the  campaign.  His  energy 
seemed  to  be  wholly  directed  to  driving  the  administration 

1  Since  the  text  was  written  the  Life  of  O.  P.  Morton  has  appeared,  and 
in  it  his  part  in  the  change  from  Buell  to  Rosecrans  is  given.  He  urged  the 
change  upon  Lincoln  on  the  ground  that  aggressive  vigor  was  imperatively 
demanded.  "  Another  three  months  like  the  last  six,  and  we  are  lost,"  said 
he.  "  Reject  the  wicked  incapables  whom  you  have  patiently  tried  and  found 
utterly  wanting."  On  October  24th  he  telegraphed,  "The  removal  of  Gen 
eral  Buell  and  the  appointment  of  Rosecrans  came  not  a  moment  too  soon.'* 
Life,  vol.  i.  pp.  197,  198. 


486          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

to  supply  his  wants,  whilst  Bragg  was  allowed  not  only  to 
stop  his  rather  disorganized  flight,  but  to  retrace  his  steps 
toward  middle  Tennessee. 

On  the  4th  of  December  Halleck  telegraphed  that  the 
President  was  so  disappointed  and  dissatisfied  that  another 
week  of  inaction  would  result  in  another  change  of  com 
manders.1  Rosecrans  replied  detailing  his  necessities,  but 
taking  a  high  tone  and  declaring  himself  insensible  to 
threats  of  removal.  The  next  day  Halleck  patiently  but 
decidedly  gave  the  reasons  which  made  the  demand  for 
activity  a  reasonable  one,  adding  the  reminder  that  no  one 
had  doubted  that  Buell  would  eventually  have  succeeded, 
and  that  Rosecrans's  appointment  had  been  made  because 
they  believed  he  would  move  more  rapidly.2  Meanwhile 
every  effort  was  made  to  furnish  him  with  the  arms,  equip 
ments,  and  horses  he  desired. 

The  battle  of  Stone's  River  had  many  points  of  resem 
blance  to  that  of  Antietam,  and  like  that  engagement  was 
indecisive  in  itself,  the  subsequent  retreat  of  the  Con 
federates  making  it  a  victory  for  the  national  arms.  The 
condition  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  after  the  battle 
was  a  sufficient  reason  for  some  delay,  and  a  short  time 
for  recuperation  and  reinforcement  was  cordially  accepted 
by  everybody  as  a  necessity  of  the  situation.  Congratula 
tions  and  thanks  were  abundantly  showered  on  the  army, 
and  promotions  were  given  in  more  than  common  number. 
It  was  not  concealed,  however,  that  the  government  was 
most  anxious  to  follow  up  the  success  and  to  make  the 
delays  as  short  as  possible.  An  aggressive  campaign  was 
demanded,  and  the  demand  was  a  reasonable  one  because 
the  means  furnished  were  sufficient  for  the  purpose. 

At  the  close  of  the  month  of  January,  Rosecrans's 
forces  present  for  duty  in  his  department  numbered  65,ooo,3 
the  Confederates  under  Bragg  were  40,400.*  The  end 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xx.  pt.  ii.  p.  118.  2  Id.,  p.  124. 

3  Id.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  29.  4  Id.,  p.  622. 


THE  SUMMER'S  DELAYS  487 

of  February  showed  the  National  forces  to  be  80,000, J  the 
enemy  43,6oo.2  After  this  Bragg's  army  gradually  in 
creased  till  midsummer,  when  it  reached  a  maximum  of 
about  57,000,  and  Rosecrans's  grew  to  84,000.  The  Con 
federates  had  a  larger  proportion  of  cavalry  than  we,  but 
this  was  at  the  expense  of  being  much  weaker  in  infantry, 
the  decisive  arm  in  serious  engagements.  In  fact  this 
disproportion  was  another  reason  for  active  work,  since 
experience  showed  that  the  enemy  kept  his  cavalry  at 
home  when  he  was  vigorously  pushed,  and  sent  them  on 
raids  to  interrupt  our  communications  when  we  gave  him 
a  respite.  Our  superiority  in  numbers  was  enough,  there 
fore,  to  make  it  entirely  reasonable  and  in  accord  with 
every  sound  rule  of  conducting  war,  that  the  government 
should  insist  upon  an  active  and  aggressive  campaign 
from  the  earliest  day  in  the  spring  when  the  weather 
promised  to  be  favorable.  Such  weather  came  at  the 
beginning  of  March,  and  the  Confederates  took  advantage 
of  it,  as  we  have  seen,  by  sending  Pegram  into  Kentucky. 
Their  cavalry  under  Wheeler  attacked  also  Fort  Donelson, 
but  were  repulsed.  A  reconnoissance  by  a  brigade  under 
Colonel  Coburn  from  Franklin  toward  Spring  Hill  re 
sulted  in  the  capture  of  the  brigade  by  the  Confederates 
under  Van  Dorn.3  In  the  same  month  Forrest  made  a 
daring  raid  close  to  Nashville  and  captured  Colonel  Blood- 
good  and  some  800  men  at  Brentwood.4  Rosecrans 
organized  a  raid  by  a  brigade  of  infantry  mounted  on 
mules,  commanded  by  Colonel  Streight,  with  the  object 
of  cutting  the  railroad  south  of  Chattanooga.  It  was 
delayed  in  starting  till  near  the  end  of  April,  and  was 
overtaken  and  captured  near  Rome  in  Georgia.5  These 
exasperating  incidents  were  occurring  whilst  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  lay  still  about  Murfreesboro,  and  its  com 
mander  harassed  the  departments  at  Washington  with  the 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  93.  2  Id.,  p.  654. 

3  Id.,  p.  115.  4  Id.,  pp.  171,  732.  5  Id.,  pp.  232,  321. 


488          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

story  of  his  wants,  and  intimated  that  nothing  but  care 
lessness  as  to  the  public  good  stood  between  him  and 
their  full  supply.  He  was  assured  that  he  was  getting 
his  full  share  of  everything  which  could  be  procured,  — 
rifles,  revolvers,  carbines,  horses,  and  equipments,  —  but 
the  day  of  readiness  seemed  as  far  off  as  ever. 

On  the  ist  of  March  the  President,  feeling  that  the 
time  had  come  when  his  armies  should  be  in  motion,  and 
plainly  discouraged  at  the  poor  success  he  had  had  in 
getting  Rosecrans  ready  for  an  advance,  authorized  Gen 
eral  Halleck  to  say  to  him  that  there  was  a  vacant  major- 
generalcy  in  the  regular  army  which  would  be  given  to 
the  general  in  the  field  who  should  first  win  an  important 
and  decisive  victory.1  The  appeal  to  ambition  was  treated 
as  if  it  had  been  an  insult  It  was  called  an  "  auctioneer 
ing  of  honor,"  and  a  base  way  to  come  by  a  promotion.2 
Halleck  retorted  conclusively  that  Rosecrans  himself  had 
warmly  advocated  giving  promotion  in  the  lower  grades 
only  for  distinguished  services  in  the  field,  and  said :  "  When 
last  summer,  at  your  request,  I  urged  the  government  to 
promote  you  for  success  in  the  field,  and,  again  at  your 
request,  urged  that  your  commission  be  dated  back  to 
your  services  in  West  Virginia,  I  thought  I  was  doing 
right  in  advocating  your  claim  to  honors  for  services 
rendered."3  In  view  of  this  unique  correspondence  it  is 
certainly  curious  to  find  Rosecrans  a  few  days  later  enu 
merating  his  personal  grievances  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  and  put 
ting  among  them  this,  that  after  the  battle  of  Stone's 
River  he  had  asked  "  as  a  personal  favor  "  that  his  com 
mission  as  major-general  of  volunteers  should  be  dated  back 
to  December,  1861,  and  that  it  was  not  granted.4  It  was 
considerably  antedated,  so  as  to  make  him  outrank  Gen 
eral  Thomas,  much  to  the  disgust  of  the  latter  when  he 
learned  it ;  but  the  date  was  not  made  as  early  as  Rose- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  95.  2  /^  p   TII 

3  Id.,  p.  138.  4  /^  p>  I46. 


THE  SUMMER'S  DELAYS  489 

crans  desired,  which  would  have  made  him  outrank  Grant, 
Buell,  and  Burnside  as  well  as  Thomas. 

Persuasion  and  exhortation  having  failed,  Grant  must 
either  be  left  to  take  the  chances  that  part  of  Bragg's 
army  would  be  concentrated  under  Johnston  in  Mississippi, 
or  he  must  be  strengthened  by  sending  to  him  that  part  of 
our  forces  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  which  could  most 
easily  be  spared.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  was  well 
judged  to  send  the  Ninth  Corps  to  him,  as  it  would  be  less 
mischievous  to  suspend  Burnside's  movement  into  East 
Tennessee  than  to  diminish  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
under  existing  circumstances.  It  is,  however,  indisputably 
clear  that  the  latter  army  should  have  been  in  active 
campaign  at  the  opening  of  the  season,  whether  we  con 
sider  the  advantage  of  the  country  or  the  reputation  of  its 
commander. 

If  we  inquire  what  means  the  administration  gave 
Burnside  to  perform  his  part  of  the  joint  task  assigned 
him,  we  shall  find  that  it  was  not  niggardly  in  doing  so. 
His  forces  were  at  their  maximum  at  the  end  of  May, 
when  they  reached  but  little  short  of  38,000  present  for 
duty  in  his  whole  department.1  This  included,  however, 
all  the  great  States  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Michigan 
as  well  as  the  eastern  half  of  Kentucky,  and  there  were 
several  camps  of  prisoners  and  posts  north  of  the  Ohio 
which  demanded  considerable  garrisons.  Eight  thousand 
men  were  used  for  this  purpose,  and  nobody  thought 
this  an  excess.  Thirty  thousand  were  thus  left  him  for 
such  posts  in  Kentucky  as  would  be  necessary  to  cover 
his  communications  and  for  his  active  column.  He  ex 
pected  to  make  his  active  army  about  25,000,  and  the 
advance  movements  had  begun  when,  as  has  been  stated, 
he  was  ordered  to  suspend,  and  to  send  the  Ninth  Corps 
to  Grant. 

The  enemy  in  East  Tennessee  were  under  the  command 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  380. 


490          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

of  General  Dabney  Maury  at  first,  but  when  he  was  sent 
to  Mobile,  General  S.  B.  Buckner  was  made  the  com 
mandant.  His  returns  of  forces  for  May  3ist  show  that 
he  had  16,267  present  for  duty,  with  which  to  oppose 
the  advance  of  Burnside.  The  information  of  the  latter 
was  that  his  opponent  had  20,000,  and  he  reckoned  on 
having  to  deal  with  that  number.  The  passes  of  the 
Cumberland  Mountains  were  so  few  and  so  difficult  that 
it  was  by  no  means  probable  that  his  campaign  would  be 
an  easy  one;  yet  the  difficulties  in  the  first  occupation 
were  not  so  serious  as  those  which  might  arise  if  Bragg 
were  able  to  maintain  an  interior  position  between  the  two 
National  armies.  In  that  case,  unless  he  were  kept  thor 
oughly  employed  by  Rosecrans,  he  might  concentrate  to 
crush  Burnside  before  his  decisive  conflict  with  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland.  This  was  the  inherent  vice  of  a 
plan  which  contemplated  two  independent  armies  attempt 
ing  to  co-operate ;  and  if  Rosecrans  had  been  willing  to 
open  his  campaign  on  the  ist  of  March,  it  is  almost 
certain  that  the  troops  in  Kentucky  would  have  been 
ordered  to  him.  The  President  did  not  determine  to 
send  Burnside  to  the  West  and  to  give  him  a  little  army 
of  his  own  till  he  despaired  of  the  liberation  of  East 
Tennessee  in  that  season  by  any  activity  of  Rosecrans. 
This  cannot  be  overlooked  in  any  candid  criticism  of  the 
summer's  work. 


CHAPTER   XXIV 

THE  MORGAN   RAID 

Departure  of  the  staif  for  the  field  —  An  amusingly  quick  return  —  Changes 
in  my  own  duties  —  Expeditions  to  occupy  the  enemy  —  Sanders'  raid 
into  East  Tennessee  —  His  route — His  success  and  return  —  The  Con 
federate  Morgan's  raid — His  instructions  —  His  reputation  as  a  soldier 

—  Compared  with  Forrest  —  Morgan's  start  delayed  —  His  appearance 
at  Green  River,  Ky.  —  Foiled  by  Colonel  Moore  —  Captures  Lebanon. 

—  Reaches   the  Ohio  at  Brandenburg — General  Hobson  in  pursuit  — 
Morgan  crosses  into  Indiana  —  Was  this  his  original  purpose? — His 
route  out  of  Indiana  into  Ohio —  He  approaches  Cincinnati  —  Hot  chase 
by  Hobson —  Gunboats  co-operating  on  the  river  —  Efforts  to  block  his 
way — He   avoids  garrisoned  posts  and  cities  —  Our  troops   moved   in 
transports  by  water  —  Condition  of  Morgan's  jaded  column  —  Approach 
ing  the  Ohio  at  Buffington's  —  Gunboats  near  the  ford  —  Hobson  attacks 

—  Part   captured,  the   rest  fly  northward  —  Another   capture  —  A  long 
chase — Surrender  of  Morgan  with  the  remnant  —  Summary  of  results 

—  A  burlesque  capitulation. 

THE  departure  of  General  Burnside  and  his  staff  for 
active  service  in  the  field  was  quite  an  event  in 
Cincinnati  society.  The  young  men  were  a  set  of  fine 
fellows,  well  educated  and  great  social  favorites.  There 
was  a  public  concert  the  evening  before  they  left  for 
Lexington,  and  they  were  to  go  by  a  special  train  after  the 
entertainment  should  be  over.  They  came  to  the  concert 
hall,  therefore,  not  only  booted  and  spurred,  but  there  was 
perhaps  a  bit  of  youthful  but  very  natural  ostentation  of 
being  ready  for  the  field.  Their  hair  was  cropped  as 
close  as  barber's  shears  could  cut  it,  they  wore  the  reg 
ulation  uniform  of  the  cavalry,  with  trim  round-about 
jackets,  and  were  the  "  cynosure  of  all  eyes."  Their  part 
ing  words  were  said  to  their  lady  friends  in  the  intervals 
of  the  music,  and  the  pretty  dramatic  effect  of  it  all 


492          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

suggested  to  an  onlooker  the  famous  parting  scene  in 
"  Belgium's  capital  "  which  "  Childe  Harold  "  has  made  so 
familiar. 

It  was  quite  an  anti-climax,  however,  when  the  gay  young 
officers  came  back,  before  a  week  was  over,  crestfallen, 
the  detaching  of  the  Ninth  Corps  having  suspended  opera 
tions  in  Kentucky.  They  were  a  little  quizzed  about  their 
very  brief  campaign,  but  so  good-humoredly  that  they 
bore  it  pretty  well,  and  were  able  to  seem  amused  at  it,  as 
well  as  the  fair  quizzers. 

In  preparation  for  a  lengthened  absence,  Burnside  had 
turned  over  to  me  some  extra  duties.  He  ordered  the 
District  of  Michigan  to  be  added  to  my  command,  and 
gave  general  directions  that  the  current  business  of  the 
department  headquarters  should  pass  through  my  hands. 
As  General  Parke,  his  chief  of  staff,  had  gone  to  Vicksburg 
in  command  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  Burnside  made  informal 
use  of  me  to  supply  in  some  measure  his  place.  Our 
relations  therefore  became  closer  than  ever.  He  hoped 
his  troops  would  soon  come  back  to  him,  as  was  promised, 
and  in  resuming  business  at  the  Cincinnati  headquarters, 
he  tried  to  keep  it  all  in  such  shape  that  he  could  drop  it 
at  a  moment's  notice. 

To  keep  the  enemy  occupied  he  organized  two  ex 
peditions,  one  under  Brigadier-General  Julius  White  into 
West  Virginia,  and  the  other  under  Colonel  W.  P.  Sanders 
into  East  Tennessee.  The  latter  was  one  of  the  boldest  and 
longest  raids  made  during  the  war,  and  besides  keeping  the 
enemy  on  the  alert,  destroying  considerable  military  stores 
and  a  number  of  important  railway  bridges,  it  was  a  pre 
liminary  reconnoissance  of  East  Tennessee  and  the  ap 
proaches  to  it  through  the  mountains,  which  was  of  great 
value  a  little  later.  The  force  consisted  of  1500  mounted 
men,  being  detachments  from  different  regiments  of  cavalry 
and  mounted  infantry,  among  which  were  some  of  the 
loyal  men  of  East  Tennessee  under  Colonel  R.  K.  Byrd. 


THE  MORGAN  RAID  493 

Sanders  was  a  young  officer  of  the  regular  army  who  was 
now  colonel  of  the  Fifth  Kentucky  Cavalry.  He  rapidly 
made  a  first-class  reputation  as  a  bold  leader  of  mounted 
troops,  but  was  unfortunately  killed  in  the  defence  of 
Knoxville  in  November  of  this  same  year.  His  expedi 
tion  started  from  Mount  Vernon,  Kentucky,  on  the  I4th 
of  June,  marched  rapidly  southward  sixty  miles  to 
Williamsburg,  where  the  Cumberland  River  was  fordable. 
Thence  he  moved  southwest  about  the  same  distance  by 
the  Marsh  Creek  route  to  the  vicinity  of  Huntsville  in 
Tennessee.  Continuing  this  route  southward  some  fifty 
miles  more,  he  struck  the  Big  Emory  River,  and  follow 
ing  this  through  Emory  Gap,  he  reached  the  vicinity  of 
Kingston  on  the  Clinch  River  in  East  Tennessee,  having 
marched  in  all  rather  more  than  two  hundred  miles. 
Avoiding  Kingston,  which  was  occupied  by  a  superior 
force  of  Confederates,  he  marched  rapidly  on  Knoxville, 
destroying  all  the  more  important  railway  bridges.  De 
monstrating  boldly  in  front  of  Knoxville,  and  finding  that 
it  was  strongly  held  and  its  streets  barricaded  for  defence, 
he  passed  around  the  town  and  advanced  upon  Straw 
berry  Plains,  where  a  great  bridge  and  trestle  crosses  the 
Holston  River,  2100  feet  in  length,  a  place  to  become 
very  familiar  to  us  in  later  campaigning.  Crossing  the 
Holston  at  Flat  Creek,  where  other  bridges  were  burned, 
he  moved  up  the  left  (east)  bank  of  the  river  to  attack 
the  guard  at  the  big  bridge,  the  Confederate  forces  being 
on  that  side.  He  drove  them  off,  capturing  150  of  the 
party  and  five  cannon.  He  not  only  destroyed  the  bridge, 
but  captured  and  burnt  large  quantities  of  military  stores 
and  camp  equipage.  On  he  went  along  the  railway  to 
Mossy  Creek,  where  another  bridge  300  feet  long  was 
burned.  He  now  turned  homeward  toward  the  north 
west,  having  greatly  injured  a  hundred  miles  of  the 
East  Tennessee  Railroad.  Turning  like  a  fox  under 
the  guidance  of  his  East  Tennessee  scouts,  he  crossed  the 


494          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Clinch  Mountains  and  the  valley  of  the  Clinch,  and  made 
his  way  back  by  way  of  Smith's  Gap  through  the  Cum 
berland  Mountains  to  his  starting-place  in  Kentucky. 
He  had  captured  over  450  prisoners,  whom  he  paroled, 
had  taken  ten  cannon  and  1000  stands  of  small  arms 
which  he  destroyed,  besides  the  large  amounts  of  military 
stores  which  have  been  mentioned.  He  marched  about 
five  hundred  miles  in  the  whole  circuit,  and  though  fre 
quently  skirmishing  briskly  with  considerable  bodies  of 
the  enemy,  his  losses  were  only  2  killed,  4  wounded, 
and  13  missing.  Of  course  a  good  many  horses  were 
used  up,  but  as  a  preliminary  to  the  campaign  which 
was  to  follow  and  in  which  Sanders  was  to  have  a  prom 
inent  place,  it  was  a  raid  which  was  much  more  profitable 
than  most  of  them.  He  was  gone  ten  days.1 

The  expedition  under  Brigadier-General  Julius  White 
was  sent  to  beat  up  the  Confederate  posts  in  the  Big  Sandy 
valley  and  to  aid  incidentally  the  raid  under  Sanders 
into  East  Tennessee.  Burnside  sent  another  southward 
in  the  direction  of  Monticello,  Kentucky.  The  object  of 
these  was  to  keep  the  enemy  amused  near  home  and  pre 
vent  the  raids  his  cavalry  had  been  making  on  the  railway 
line  by  which  Rosecrans  kept  up  his  communication  with 
Louisville.  They  seem  rather  to  have  excited  the  emula 
tion  of  the  Confederate  cavalryman  Brigadier-General 
John  H.  Morgan,  who,  a  few  days  before  Rosecrans's 
advance  on  Tullahoma,  obtained  permission  to  make  a 
raid,  starting  from  the  neighborhood  of  McMinnville, 
Tenn.,  crossing  the  Cumberland  near  Burkesville,  and 
thence  moving  on  Louisville,  which  he  thought  he  might 
capture  with  its  depots  of  military  stores,  as  it  was  sup 
posed  to  be  almost  stripped  of  troops.  His  division  con 
sisted  of  about  3000  horsemen,  and  he  took  the  whole  of 
it  with  him,  though  Wheeler,  his  chief,  seems  to  have 
limited  him  to  2000.  His  instructions  were  to  make  a 

1  Sanders'  Report,  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  pp.  385,  386. 


THE  MORGAN  RAID  495 

rapid  movement  on  the  line  of  the  Louisville  and  Nashville 
Railroad  in  Kentucky  and  to  get  back  to  his  place  in 
Bragg's  army  as  quickly  as  possible.1 

Morgan's  reputation  as  a  soldier  was  a  peculiar  one. 
He  had  made  a  number  of  raids  which  showed  a  good 
deal  of  boldness  in  the  general  plan  and  a  good  deal  of 
activity  in  the  execution,  but  it  cannot  be  said  that  he 
showed  any  liking  for  hard  fighting.  Like  boys  skating 
near  thin  ice,  he  seemed  to  be  trying  to  see  how  close  he 
could  come  to  danger  without  getting  in.  A  really  bold 
front  showed  by  a  small  body  of  brave  men  was  usually 
enough  to  turn  him  aside.  It  is  instructive  to  compare  his 
career  with  Forrest's.  They  began  with  similar  grade,  but 
with  all  the  social  and  personal  prestige  in  Morgan's  favor. 
Forrest  had  been  a  local  slave-trader,  a  calling  which 
implied  social  ostracism  in  the  South,  and  which  put  a 
great  obstacle  in  the  way  of  advancement.  Both  were 
fond  of  adventurous  raids,  but  Forrest  was  a  really  daring 
soldier  and  fought  his  way  to  recognition  in  the  face  of 
stubborn  prejudice.  Morgan  achieved  notoriety  by  the 
showy  temerity  of  his  distant  movements,  but  nobody  was 
afraid  of  him  in  the  field  at  close  quarters. 

The  official  order  to  Morgan  to  start  on  his  expedition 
was  dated  on  the  i8th  of  June,  but  he  did  not  get  off  till 
the  close  of  the  month.  It  would  seem  that  he  remained 
in  observation  on  the  flank  of  Rosecrans's  army  as  the 
left  wing  moved  upon  Manchester,  and  began  his  north 
ward  march  after  Bragg  had  retreated  to  Decherd  on  the 
way  to  Chattanooga.  At  any  rate,  he  was  first  heard  of 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Cumberland  on  the  2d  of  July, 
near  Burkesville  and  marching  on  Columbia.  Burnside 
immediately  ordered  all  his  cavalry  and  mounted  infantry 
to  concentrate  to  meet  him,  but  his  route  had  been  chosen 
with  full  knowledge  of  the  positions  of  our  detachments 
and  he  was  able  to  get  the  start  of  them.  Brigadier-General 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  p.  817. 


496          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

H.  M.  Judah,  who  commanded  the  division  of  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  which  covered  that  part  of  our  front,  seems  to 
have  wholly  misconceived  the  situation,  and  refused  to 
listen  to  the  better  information  which  his  subordinates 
gave  him.1  After  a  slight  skirmish  at  Columbia,  Morgan 
made  for  the  Green  River  bridge  at  Tebb's  Bend,  an  im 
portant  crossing  of  the  Louisville  Railroad.  The  bend 
was  occupied  by  Colonel  O.  H.  Moore  of  the  Twenty-fifth 
Michigan  Infantry,  who,  under  previous  instructions  from 
Brigadier-General  E.  H.  Hobson,  intrenched  a  line  across 
the  neck  of  the  bend,  some  distance  in  front  of  the  stock 
ade  at  the  bridge.  Morgan  advanced  upon  the  4th  of 
July,  and  after  a  shot  or  two  from  his  artillery,  sent  in  a 
flag  demanding  the  surrender  of  Moore's  little  force,  which 
amounted  to  only  200  men.  Moore  did  not  propose  to 
celebrate  the  national  anniversary  in  that  way,  and  an 
swered  accordingly.  The  enemy  kept  up  a  lively  skirmish 
ing  fight  for  some  hours,  when  he  withdrew.2  Moore  had 
beaten  him  off  with  a  loss  of  6  killed  and  23  wounded  of 
the  brave  Michigan  men.  He  reported  Morgan's  loss  at 
50  killed  and  200  wounded.  The  Confederate  authorities 
admit  that  they  had  36  killed,  but  put  their  wounded  at 
only  46,  an  incredibly  small  proportion  to  the  killed. 

The  raiders  continued  their  route  to  Lebanon,  where  was 
the  Twentieth  Kentucky  Infantry  under  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Charles  S.  Hanson,  numbering  less  than  400  men,  without 
artillery.  A  brigade  ordered  to  reinforce  the  post  delayed 
its  advance,  and  Hanson  was  left  to  his  own  resources. 
After  several  hours  of  a  lively  skirmishing  fight  without 
much  loss,  he  surrendered  to  save  the  village  from  destruc 
tion  by  fire,  which  Morgan  threatened.  The  loss  in  the 

1  Sketches  of  War  History,  vol.  iv.  (Papers  of  the  Ohio  Commandery  of 
the  Loyal  Legion).     A  paper  by  Capt.  H.  C.  Weaver,  Sixteenth  Kentucky 
Infantry,  who  was  on  the  staff  of  Brigadier-General  E.  H.  Hobson  during 
the  pursuit  of  Morgan. 

2  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  p.  645. 


THE  MORGAN  RAID  497 

post  was  4  killed  and  15  wounded.1  Hanson  reported  29 
rebel  dead  left  on  the  field  and  30  wounded,  also  abandoned. 
No  doubt  others  of  the  wounded  were  taken  care  of  and 
concealed  by  their  sympathizers  in  the  vicinity.  Some 
military  stores  had  been  burned  with  the  railway  station- 
house  before  Hanson  surrendered.  He  and  his  men  were 
paroled  in  the  irregular  way  adopted  by  Morgan  on  the 
raid. 

Bardstown  was  the  next  point  reached  by  the  enemy, 
but  Morgan's  appetite  for  Louisville  seems  now  to  have 
diminished,  and  he  turned  to  the  westward,  reaching  the 
Ohio  River  on  the  8th,  at  Brandenburg,  some  thirty  miles 
below  the  city.  The  detachments  of  mounted  troops 
which  were  in  pursuit  had  been  united  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Hobson,  the  senior  officer  present,  and 
consisted  of  two  brigades,  commanded  by  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  J.  M.  Shackelford  and  Colonel  F.  Wolford.  They 
approached  Brandenburg  on  the  evening  of  the  8th  and 
captured  the  steamboat "  McCombs  "  with  a  remnant  of  Mor 
gan's  men  and  stores  the  next  morning  when  they  entered 
the  town.  They  saw  on  the  opposite  bank  the  smoking 
wreck  of  the  steamboat  "  Alice  Dean  "  which  Morgan  had 
set  on  fire  after  landing  his  men  on  the  Indiana  shore. 
The  steamboat  "  McCombs "  was  sent  to  Louisville  for 
other  transports.  A  delay  of  twenty-four  hours  thus 
occurred,  and  when  Hobson's  command  was  assembled  in 
Indiana,  Morgan  had  the  start  by  nearly  two  days.2 

It  is  claimed  by  Morgan's  intimate  friend  and  chronicler 
that  he  intended  to  cross  the  Ohio  from  the  day  he  left 
camp  in  Tennessee,  although  it  would  be  contrary  to  his 
orders ;  3  and  that  he  had  made  investigations  in  advance 
in  regard  to  fords  on  the  upper  Ohio  and  particularly  at 
Buffington  Island,  where  he  ultimately  tried  to  cross  into 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  p.  649. 

2  Hobson's  Report,  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  p.  659. 

3  Id.,  p.  818.     History  of  Morgan's  Cavalry,  by  B.  W.  Duke,  p.  410. 
VOL.  i. — 32 


498  REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

West  Virginia.  If  true,  this  would  forfeit  every  claim  on 
his  part  to  the  character  of  a  valuable  and  intelligent 
subordinate;  for  operations  on  a  large  scale  would  be 
absolutely  impossible  if  the  commander  of  a  division  of 
cavalry  may  go  off  as  he  pleases,  in  disobedience  to  the 
orders  which  assign  him  a  specific  task.  Except  for  this 
statement,  it  would  be  natural  to  conclude  that  when  he 
approached  Louisville  he  began  to  doubt  whether  the  city 
were  so  defenceless  as  he  had  assumed,  and  knowing  that 
twenty-four  hours'  delay  would  bring  Hobson's  forces 
upon  his  back,  he  then  looked  about  for  some  line  of 
action  that  would  save  his  prestige  and  be  more  brilliant 
than  a  race  back  again  to  Tennessee.  It  is  quite  probable 
that  the  feasibility  of  crossing  the  Ohio  and  making  a 
rapid  ride  through  the  country  on  its  northern  bank  had 
been  discussed  by  him,  and  conscious  as  he  was  that  he 
had  thus  far  accomplished  nothing,  he  might  be  glad  of  an 
excuse  for  trying  it.  This  interpretation  of  his  acts  would 
be  more  honorable  to  him  as  an  officer  than  the  deliberate 
and  premeditated  disobedience  attributed  to  him.  But 
whether  the  decision  was  made  earlier  or  later,  the  capture 
of  the  steamboats  at  Brandenburg  was  at  once  made  use  of 
to  ferry  over  his  command,  though  it  was  not  accomplished 
without  some  exciting  incidents.  A  party  of  the  Con 
federates  under  Captain  Hines  had  crossed  into  Indiana 
a  few  days  before  without  orders  from  Morgan,  being  as 
independent  of  him,  apparently,  as  he  was  of  General 
Bragg.  Hines's  party  had  roused  the  militia  of  the  State, 
and  he  had  made  a  rapid  retreat  to  the  Ohio,  reaching  it 
just  as  Morgan  entered  Brandenburg.  It  may  be  that 
the  lucky  daredeviltry  of  Hines's  little  raid  fired  his  com 
mander's  heart  to  try  a  greater  one;  at  any  rate,  Morgan 
forgave  his  trespass  against  his  authority  as  he  prayed  to 
be  forgiven  by  Bragg,  and  turned  his  attention  to  driving 
off  the  Indiana  militia  who  had  followed  Hines  to  the  bank 
of  the  river  and  now  opened  fire  with  a  single  cannon. 


THE  MORGAN  RAID  499 

Morgan's  artillery  silenced  the  gun  and  caused  the 
force  to  retreat  out  of  range,  when  he  put  over  two  of  his 
regiments,  dismounted,  to  cover  the  ferrying  of  the  rest. 
At  this  point  one  of  the  "  tin-clad  "  gunboats  of  the  river 
fleet  made  its  appearance  and  took  part  in  the  combat. 
The  section  of  Parrot  guns  in  Morgan's  battery  proved  an 
overmatch  for  it,  however,  and  it  retired  to  seek  reinforce 
ments.  The  interval  was  used  to  hasten  the  transport  of 
the  Confederate  men  and  horses,  and  before  further  op 
position  could  be  made,  the  division  was  in  the  saddle  and 
marching  northward  into  Indiana. 

At  the  first  news  of  Morgan's  advance  into  Kentucky, 
Burnside  had  directed  General  Hartsuff,  who  commanded 
in  that  State,  to  concentrate  his  forces  so  as  to  capture 
Morgan  if  he  should  attempt  to  return  through  the 
central  part  of  it.1  Judah's  and  Boyle's  divisions  were 
put  in  motion  toward  Louisville,  and  the  remainder  of  the 
mounted  troops  not  already  with  Hobson  were  also 
hurried  forward.  These  last  constituted  a  provisional 
brigade  under  Colonel  Sanders.  It  may  help  to  under 
stand  the  organization  of  the  National  troops  to  note  the 
fact  that  all  which  operated  against  Morgan  were  parts 
of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  which  was  composed  of  four 
divisions  under  Generals  Sturgis,  Boyle,  Judah,  and  White. 
The  brigades  were  of  both  infantry  and  mounted  troops, 
united  for  the  special  purposes  of  the  contemplated  cam 
paign  into  East  Tennessee.  For  the  pursuit  of  Morgan 
the  mounted  troops  were  sent  off  first,  and  as  these  united 
they  formed  a  provisional  division  under  Hobson,  the 
senior  brigadier  present.  Quite  a  number  of  the  regi 
ments  were  mounted  infantry,  who  after  a  few  months 
were  dismounted  and  resumed  their  regular  place  in  the 
infantry  line.  For  the  time  being,  however,  Hobson  had 
a  mounted  force  that  was  made  up  of  fractions  of  bri 
gades  from  all  the  divisions  of  the  corps ;  and  Shackelford, 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  pp.  13,  679,  etc. 


500          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Wolford,  Kautz,  and  Sanders  were  the  commanders  of  the 
provisional  brigades  during  the  pursuit  Its  strength  did 
not  quite  reach  3000  men.1 

Morgan's  first  course  was  due  north,  and  he  marched 
with  some  deliberation.  On  the  loth  he  reached  Salem, 
about  forty  miles  from  the  river,  on  the  railway  between 
Louisville  and  Chicago.2  A  small  body  of  militia  had 
assembled  here,  and  made  a  creditable  stand,  but  were 
outflanked  and  forced  to  retreat  after  inflicting  on  him 
a  score  of  casualties.  The  evidences  Morgan  here  saw 
of  the  ability  of  the  Northern  States  to  overwhelm  him 
by  the  militia,  satisfied  him  that  further  progress  inland 
was  not  desirable,  and  turning  at  right  angles  to  the  road 
he  had  followed,  he  made  for  Madison  on  the  Ohio. 
There  was  evidently  some  understanding  with  a  detach 
ment  he  had  left  in  Kentucky,  for  on  the  nth  General 
Manson,  of  Judah's  division,  who  was  on  his  way  with  a 
brigade  from  Louisville  to  Madison  by  steamboats  under 
naval  convoy,  fell  in  with  a  party  of  Morgan's  men  seeking 
to  cross  the  river  at  Twelve-mile  Island,  a  little  below 
Madison.  Twenty  men  and  forty-five  horses  were  cap 
tured.3  If  any  of  this  party  had  succeeded  in  crossing 
before  (as  was  reported)  they  would  of  course  inform 
their  chief  of  the  reinforcements  going  to  Madison,  and  of 
the  gunboats  in  the  river.  Morgan  made  no  attack  on 
Madison,  but  took  another  turn  northward  in  his  zigzag 
course,  and  marched  on  Vernon,  a  railway-crossing  some 
twenty  miles  from  Madison,  where  the  line  to  Indianapolis 
intersects  that  from  Cincinnati  to  Vincennes.  Here  a 
militia  force  had  been  assembled  under  Brigadier-General 
Love,  and  the  town  was  well  situated  for  defence.  Morgan, 
declining  to  attack,  now  turned  eastward  again,  his  course 
being  such  that  he  might  be  aiming  for  the  river  at 
Lawrenceburg  or  at  Cincinnati. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  p.  658.  2  Id.,  pp.  717,  719. 

3  Id.,  pt.  ii.  pp.  729,  745- 


THE  MORGAN  RAID  501 

The  deviousness  of  his  route  had  been  such  as  to 
indicate  a  want  of  distinct  purpose,  and  had  enabled 
Hobson  greatly  to  reduce  the  distance  between  them. 
Hanson's  brigade  on  the  steamboats  was  now  about  2500 
strong,  and  moved  on  the  I2th  from  Madison  to  Lawrence- 
burg,  keeping  pace  as  nearly  as  possible  with  Morgan's 
eastward  progress.  Sanders's  brigade  reached  the  river 
twenty  miles  above  Louisville,  and  General  Boyle  sent 
transports  to  put  him  also  in  motion  on  the  river.  At  the 
request  of  Burnside,  Governor  Tod,  of  Ohio,  called  out  the 
militia  of  the  southern  counties,  as  Governor  Morton  had 
done  in  Indiana.  Burnside  himself,  at  Cincinnati,  kept 
in  constant  telegraphic  communication  with  all  points, 
assembling  the  militia  where  they  were  most  likely  to  be 
useful  and  trying  to  put  his  regular  forces  in  front  of  the 
enemy.  It  would  have  been  easy  to  let  the  slippery 
Confederate  horsemen  back  into  Kentucky.  The  force 
in  the  river,  both  naval  and  military,  unquestionably  pre 
vented  this  at  Madison,  and  probably  at  Lawrenceburg. 
On  the  1 3th  Morgan  was  at  Harrison  on  the  Ohio  State 
line,  and  it  now  became  my  turn  as  district  commander  to 
take  part  in  the  effort  to  catch  him.  I  had  no  direct 
control  of  the  troops  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  the 
only  garrisons  in  Ohio  were  at  the  prison  camps  at  Colum 
bus  and  Sandusky.  These  of  course  could  not  be  re 
moved,  and  our  other  detachments  were  hardly  worth 
naming.  Burnside  declared  martial  law  in  the  counties 
threatened  with  invasion,  so  that  the  citizens  and  militia 
might  for  military  purposes  come  directly  under  our 
control.  The  relations  between  the  general  and  myself 
were  so  intimate  that  no  strict  demarcation  of  authority 
was  necessary.  He  authorized  me  to  give  commands  in 
his  name  when  haste  demanded  it,  and  we  relieved  each 
other  in  night  watching  at  the  telegraph. 

A  small  post  had  been  maintained  at  Dayton,  since  the 
Vallandigham  disturbance,  and  Major  Keith,  its  com- 


502          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

mandant,  was  ordered  to  take  his  men  by  rail  to  Hamilton. 
He  went  at  once  and  reported  himself  holding  that  town 
with  600  men,  including  the  local  militia,  but  only  400 
were  armed.1  Lieutenant-Colonel  Neff  commanded  at 
Camp  Dennison,  thirteen  miles  from  Cincinnati,  and  had 
700  armed  men  there,  with  1200  more  of  unarmed  recruits.2 
At  both  these  posts  systematic  scouting  was  organized  so 
as  to  keep  track  of  the  enemy,  and  their  active  show  of 
force  was  such  that  Morgan  did  not  venture  to  attack 
either,  but  threaded  his  way  around  them.  At  Cincinnati 
there  was  no  garrison.  A  couple  of  hundred  men  formed 
the  post  at  Newport  on  the  Kentucky  side  of  the  river, 
but  the  main  reliance  was  on  the  local  militia.  These 
were  organized  as  soon  as  the  governor's  call  was  issued 
on  the  evening  of  the  I2th.  Batteries  were  put  in  position 
covering  the  approaches  to  the  city  from  the  north  and 
west,  and  the  beautiful  suburban  hills  of  Clifton  and 
Avondale  afforded  excellent  defensive  positions. 

The  militia  that  were  called  out  were  of  course  in 
fantry,  and  being  both  without  drill  and  unaccustomed 
to  marching,  could  only  be  used  in  position,  to  defend  a 
town  or  block  the  way.  In  such  work  they  showed  cour 
age  and  soldierly  spirit,  so  that  Morgan  avoided  collision 
with  all  considerable  bodies  of  them.  But  they  could  not 
be  moved.  All  we  could  do  was  to  try  to  assemble,  them 
at  such  points  in  advance  as  the  raiders  were  likely  to 
reach,  and  we  especially  limited  their  task  to  the  defensive 
one,  and  to  blockading  roads  and  streams.  Particular 
stress  was  put  on  the  orders  to  take  up  the  planking  of 
bridges  and  to  fell  timber  into  the  roads.  Little  was  done 
in  this  way  at  first,  but  after  two  or  three  days  of  constant 
reiteration,  the  local  forces  did  their  work  better,  and 
delays  to  the  flying  enemy  were  occasioned  which  con 
tributed  essentially  to  the  final  capture. 

No  definite  news  of  Morgan's  crossing  the  Ohio  line  was 
1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  pp.  742,  743.  2  Id,,  p.  749. 


THE  MORGAN  RAID  503 

received  till  about  sunset  of  the  I3th  when  he  was  march 
ing  eastward  from  Harrison.  Satisfied  that  Lawrenceburg 
and  lower  points  on  the  Ohio  were  now  safe,  Burnside 
ordered  the  transports  and  gunboats  at  once  to  Cincinnati. 
Manson  and  Sanders  arrived  during  the  night,  and  the 
latter  with  his  brigade  of  mounted  men  was,  at  dawn  of 
the  14th,  placed  on  the  north  of  the  city  in  the  village  of 
Avondale.  Manson  with  the  transports  was  held  in  readi 
ness  to  move  further  up  the  river. 

Feeling  the  net  drawing  about  him,  Morgan  gave  his 
men  but  two  or  three  hours'  rest  near  Harrison,  and  then 
took  the  road  toward  Cincinnati.  He  reached  Glendale, 
thirteen  miles  northwest  of  the  city,  late  in  the  night,  and 
then  turned  to  the  east,  apparently  for  Camp  Dennison, 
equally  distant  in  a  northeast  direction.  His  men  were 
jaded  to  the  last  degree  of  endurance,  and  some  were 
dropping  from  the  saddle  for  lack  of  sleep.  Still  he  kept 
on.  Colonel  Neff,  in  accordance  with  his  orders,  had 
blockaded  the  principal  roads  to  the  west,  and  stood  at 
bay  in  front  of  his  camp.  Morgan  threw  a  few  shells  at 
Nefif's  force,  and  a  slight  skirmish  began,  but  again  he 
broke  away,  forced  to  make  a  detour  of  ten  miles  to  the 
north.  We  had  been  able  to  warn  Neff  of  their  approach 
by  a  message  sent  after  midnight,  and  he  had  met  them 
boldly,  protecting  the  camp  and  the  railroad  bridge  north 
of  it.1  The  raiders  reached  Williamsburg  in  Clermont 
County,  twenty-eight  miles  from  Cincinnati,  in  the  after 
noon  of  the  I4th,  and  there  the  tired  men  and  beasts  took 
the  first  satisfactory  rest  they  had  had  for  three  days. 
Morgan  had  very  naturally  assumed  that  there  would  be  a 
considerable  regular  force  at  Cincinnati,  and  congratulated 
himself  that  by  a  forced  night  march  he  had  passed  round 
the  city  and  avoided  being  cut  off.  He  had,  in  truth, 
escaped  by  the  skin  of  his  teeth.  Could  Burnside  have 
felt  sure  that  Lawrenceburg  was  safe  a  few  hours  earlier, 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  pp.  748,  750. 


504          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Manson  and  Sanders  might  have  been  in  Cincinnati  early 
enough  on  the  I3th  to  have  barred  the  way  from  Harrison. 
He  had  in  fact  ordered  Manson  up  at  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  but  the  latter  was  making  a  reconnoissance  north 
of  the  town,  and  was  detained  till  late  in  the  night.  As 
soon  as  it  was  learned  on  the  I4th  that  Morgan  had  passed 
east  of  the  Little  Miami  River,  Sanders  was  ordered  to 
join  Hobson  and  aid  in  the  pursuit.1  Hobson's  horses 
were  almost  worn  out,  for  following  close  upon  Morgan's 
track,  as  he  was  doing,  he  found  only  broken  down  animals 
left  behind  by  the  rebels,  whilst  these  gathered  up  the 
fresh  animals  as  they  advanced.  Still  he  kept  doggedly 
on,  seldom  more  than  ten  or  fifteen  miles  behind,  but 
unable  to  close  that  gap  till  his  opponent  should  be  de 
layed  or  brought  to  bay. 

After  entering  Clermont  County,  the  questions  as  to 
roads,  etc,  indicated  that  Morgan  was  making  for  Mays- 
ville,  hoping  to  cross  the  river  there.2  Manson's  brigade 
and  the  gunboats  were  accordingly  sent  up  the  river  to 
that  vicinity.  The  militia  of  the  Scioto  valley  were 
ordered  to  destroy  the  bridges,  in  the  hope  that  that  river 
would  delay  him,  but  they  were  tardy  or  indifferent,  and 
it  was  a  day  or  two  later  before  the  means  of  obstruction 
were  efficiently  used.  Judah's  forces  reached  Cincinnati 
on  the  I4th,  a  brigade  was  there  supplied  with  horses,  and 
they  were  sent  by  steamers  to  Portsmouth.  Judah  was 
ordered  to  spare  no  effort  to  march  northward  far  enough 
to  head  off  the  enemy's  column.  On  the  i6th  General 
Scammon,  commanding  in  West  Virginia,  was  asked  to 
concentrate  some  of  his  troops  at  Gallipolis  or  Pomeroy 
on  the  upper  Ohio,  and  promptly  did  so.3  The  militia 
were  concentrated  at  several  points  along  the  railway  to 

1  In  the  reports  of  Hobson  and  Sanders  there  seems  to  be  a  mistake  of  a 
day  in  the  dates,  from  the  I2th  to  the  i6th.     This  may  be  corrected  by  the 
copies  of  current  dispatches  given  in  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  pp.  730-750. 

2  Id.,  p  749-  8  Id.,  p.  756. 


THE  MORGAN  RAID  505 

Marietta.     Hobson  was  in  the  rear,  pushing  along  at  the 
rate  of  forty  miles  a  day. 

Morgan  had  soon  learned  that  the  river  was  so  patrolled 
that  no  chance  to  make  a  ferry  could  be  trusted,  and  he 
made  his  final  effort  to  reach  the  ford  at  Buffington  Island, 
between  Marietta  and  Pomeroy.  He  reached  Pomeroy  on 
the  1 8th,  but  Scammon  was  occupying  it,  and  the  troops 
of  the  Kanawha  division  soon  satisfied  Morgan  that  he 
was  not  dealing  with  militia.  He  avoided  the  roads  held 
by  our  troops,  and  as  they  were  infantry,  could  move 
around  them,  though  a  running  skirmish  was  kept  up  for 
some  miles.  Hobson  was  close  in  rear,  and  Judah's  men 
were  approaching  Buffington.  Morgan  reached  the  river 
near  the  ford  about  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening.  The 
night  was  pitchy  dark,  and  his  information  was  that  a  small 
earthwork  built  to  command  the  ford  was  occupied  by  a 
permanent  garrison.  He  concluded  to  wait  for  daylight. 
The  work  had  in  fact  been  abandoned  on  the  preceding 
day,  but  at  daybreak  in  the  morning  he  was  attacked. 
Hobson's  men  pushed  in  from  west  and  north,  and  Judah 
from  the  south.  The  gunboats  came  close  up  to  the 
island,  within  range  of  the  ford,  and  commanded  it.  Hob- 
son  attacked  vigorously  and  captured  the  artillery.  The 
wing  of  the  Confederate  forces,  about  700  in  number,  sur 
rendered  to  General  Shackelford,  and  about  200  to  the 
other  brigades  under  Hobson.  The  rest  of  the  enemy, 
favored  by  a  fog  which  filled  the  valley,  evaded  their  pur 
suers  and  fled  northward.  Hobson  ordered  all  his  bri 
gades  to  obey  the  commands  of  Shackelford,  who  was  in 
the  lead,  and  himself  sought  Judah,  whose  approach  had 
been  unknown  to  him  till  firing  was  heard  on  the  other 
side  of  the  enemy.  Judah  had  also  advanced  at  daybreak, 
but  in  making  a  reconnoissance  he  himself  with  a  small 
escort  had  stumbled  upon  the  enemy  in  the  fog.  Both 
parties  were  completely  surprised,  and  before  Judah  could 
bring  up  supports,  three  of  his  staff  were  captured,  Major 


506          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE  CIVIL    WAR 

Daniel  McCook,  paymaster,  who  had  volunteered  as  an 
aide,  was  mortally  wounded,  ten  privates  were  wounded, 
and  twenty  or  thirty  with  a  piece  of  artillery  captured. 
Morgan  hastily  turned  in  the  opposite  direction,  when  he 
ran  into  Hobson's  columns ;  Judah's  prisoners  and  the 
gun  were  recaptured,  and  the  enemy  driven  in  confusion, 
with  the  losses  above  stated.1 

As  Hobson  was  regularly  a  brigade  commander  in 
Judah's  division,  the  latter  now  asserted  command  of  the 
whole  force,  against  Hobson's  protest,  who  was  provision 
ally  in  a  separate  command  by  Burnside's  order.  Fortu 
nately,  Shackelford  had  already  led  Hobson's  men  in  rapid 
pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and  as  soon  as  Burnside  was  in 
formed  of  the  dispute,  he  ordered  Judah  not  to  interfere 
with  the  troops  which  had  operated  separately.  By  the 
time  this  order  came  Shackelford  was  too  far  away  for 
Hobson  to  rejoin  him,  and  continued  in  independent  com 
mand  till  Morgan's  final  surrender.  He  overtook  the  fly 
ing  Confederates  on  the  2Oth,  about  sixty  miles  further 
north,  and  they  were  forced  to  halt  and  defend  them 
selves.  Shackelford  succeeded  in  getting  a  regiment  in 
the  enemy's  rear,  and  after  a  lively  skirmish  between  1200 
and  1300  surrendered.2  Morgan  himself  again  evaded 
with  about  600  followers.  Shackelford  took  500  volunteers 
on  his  best  horses  and  pressed  the  pursuit.  The  chase 
lasted  four  days  of  almost  continuous  riding,  when  the 
enemy  was  again  overtaken  in  Jefferson  County,  some  fif 
teen  miles  northwest  of  Steubenville.  General  Burnside 
had  collected  at  Cincinnati  the  dismounted  men  of  Hob- 
son's  command,  had  given  them  fresh  horses,  and  had 
sent  them  by  rail  to  join  Shackelford.  They  were  under 
command  of  Major  W.  B.  Way  of  the  Ninth  Michigan 
Cavalry  and  Major  G.  W.  Rue  of  the  Ninth  Kentucky 
Cavalry.  They  brought  five  or  six  hundred  fresh  men  to 
Shackelford's  aid,  and  their  assistance  was  decisive. 
1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  pp.  775~777-  2  ^->  PP-  77$,  781. 


THE  MORGAN  RAID  SO/ 

Morgan's  course  to  the  river  at  Smith's  Ferry  on  the  border 
of  Columbiana  County  was  intercepted,  and  near  Saline- 
ville  he  was  forced  to  surrender  with  a  little  less  than  400 
men  who  still  followed  him.  About  250  had  surrendered 
in  smaller  bodies  within  a  day  or  two  before,  and  stragglers 
had  been  picked  up  at  many  points  along  the  line  of  pur 
suit.  Burnside  reported  officially  that  about  3000  pris 
oners  were  brought  to  Cincinnati.1  General  Duke  states 
that  some  300  of  Morgan's  command  succeeded  in  cross 
ing  the  Ohio  about  twenty  miles  above  Buffington,  and 
escaped  through  West  Virginia.  He  also  gives  us  some 
idea  of  the  straggling  caused  by  the  terrible  fatigues  of  the 
march  by  telling  us  that  the  column  was  reduced  by 
nearly  500  effectives  when  it  passed  around  Cincinnati.2 
It  is  probable  that  these  figures  are  somewhat  loosely 
stated,  as  the  number  of  prisoners  is  very  nearly  the  whole 
which  the  Confederate  authorities  give  as  Morgan's  total 
strength.3  Either  a  considerable  reinforcement  must  have 
succeeded  in  getting  to  him  across  the  river,  or  a  very 
small  body  must  have  escaped  through  West  Virginia. 
Burnside  directed  the  officers  to  be  sent  to  the  military 
prison  camp  for  officers  on  Johnson's  Island  in  Sandusky 
Bay,  and  the  private  soldiers  to  go  to  Camp  Chase  at 
Columbus  and  Camp  Morton  at  Indianapolis.  Soon  after 
ward,  however,  orders  came  from  Washington  that  the 
officers  should  be  confined  in  the  Ohio  penitentiary,  in  re 
taliation  for  unusual  severities  practised  on  our  officers 
who  were  prisoners  in  the  South.  Morgan's  romantic  es 
cape  from  the  prison  occurred  just  after  I  was  relieved 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  p.  14. 

2  Hist,  of  Morgan's  Cavalry,  pp.  442,  443. 

8  A  note  attached  to  Wheeler's  return  of  the  cavalry  of  his  corps  for 
July  31  st  says  that  Morgan's  division  was  absent  "  on  detached  service,"  ef 
fectives  2743.  Add  to  this  the  officers,  etc.,  and  the  total "  present  for  duty  " 
would  be  a  little  over  3000.  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  941.  For  Bragg's 
circular  explaining  the  term  "  effectives  "  as  applying  only  to  private  soldiers 
actually  in  the  line  of  battle,  see  Id.,  p.  619,  and  ante,  p.  482. 


508          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

from  the  command  of  the  district  in  the  fall,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  joining  the  active  army  in  East  Tennessee. 

A  glance  at  the  raid  as  a  whole,  shows  that  whilst  it 
naturally  attracted  much  attention  and  caused  great  excite 
ment  at  the  North,  it  was  of  very  little  military  importance. 
It  greatly  scattered  for  a  time  and  fatigued  the  men  and 
horses  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  who  took  part  in  the 
chase.  It  cost  Indiana  and  Ohio  something  in  the  plunder 
of  country  stores  and  farm-houses,  and  in  the  pay  and 
expenses  of  large  bodies  of  militia  that  were  temporarily 
called  into  service.  But  this  was  all.  North  of  the  Ohio 
no  military  posts  were  captured,  no  public  depots  of 
supply  were  destroyed,  not  even  an  important  railway 
bridge  was  burned.  There  was  no  fighting  worthy  of  the 
name ;  the  list  of  casualties  on  the  National  side  showing 
only  19  killed,  47  wounded,  and  8  missing  in  the  whole 
campaign,  from  the  2d  of  July  to  the  final  surrender.1 
For  this  the  whole  Confederate  division  of  cavalry  was 
sacrificed.  Its  leader  was  never  again  trusted  by  his 
government,  and  his  prestige  was  gone  forever.  His  men 
made  simply  a  race  for  life  from  the  day  they  turned 
away  from  the  militia  at  Vernon,  Indiana.  Morgan  care 
fully  avoided  every  fortified  post  and  even  the  smaller 
towns.  The  places  he  visited  after  he  crossed  the  Ohio 
line  do  not  include  the  larger  towns  and  villages  that 
seemed  to  lie  directly  in  his  path.  He  avoided  the  rail 
roads  also,  and  these  were  used  every  day  to  convey  the 
militia  and  other  troops  parallel  to  his  route,  to  hedge  him 
in  and  finally  to  stop  him.  His  absence  was  mischievous 
to  Bragg,  who  was  retreating  upon  Chattanooga  and  to 
whom  the  division  would  have  been  a  most  welcome 
reinforcement.  He  did  not  delay  Burnside,  for  the  latter 
was  awaiting  the  return  of  the  Ninth  Corps  from  Vicks- 
burg,  and  this  did  not  begin  to  arrive  till  long  after  the 
raid  was  over.  None  of  the  National  army's  communica- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxlii.  pt.  i.  p.  637. 


THE  MORGAN  RAID  509 

tions  were  interrupted,  and  not  a  soldier  under  Rosecrans 
lost  a  ration  by  reason  of  the  pretentious  expedition.  It 
ended  in  a  scene  that  was  ridiculous  in  the  extreme. 
Morgan  had  pressed  into  his  service  as  guides,  on  the  last 
day  of  his  flight,  two  men  who  were  not  even  officers  of 
the  local  militia,  but  who  were  acting  as  volunteer  home- 
guards  to  protect  their  neighborhood.  When  he  finally 
despaired  of  escape,  he  begged  his  captive  guides  to 
change  their  role  into  commanders  of  an  imaginary  army 
and  to  accept  his  surrender  upon  merciful  and  favorable 
terms  to  the  vanquished  !  He  afterward  claimed  the  right 
to  immediate  liberation  on  parole,  under  the  conditions  of 
this  burlesque  capitulation.  Shackelford  and  his  rough 
riders  would  accept  no  surrender  but  an  unconditional  one 
as  prisoners  of  war,  and  were  sustained  in  this  by  their 
superiors.  The  distance  by  the  river  between  the  crossing  at 
Brandenburg  and  the  ferry  above  Steubenville  near  which 
Morgan  finally  surrendered,  was  some  six  hundred  miles. 
This  added  to  the  march  from  Tennessee  through  Ken 
tucky  would  make  the  whole  ride  nearly  a  thousand  miles 
long.  Its  importance,  however,  except  as  a  subject  for  an 
entertaining  story,  was  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  its  length. 
Its  chief  interest  to  the  student  of  military  history  is  in  its 
bearing  on  the  question  of  the  rational  use  of  cavalry  in 
an  army,  and  the  wasteful  folly  of  expeditions  which  have 
no  definite  and  tangible  military  object.1 

1  For  official  reports  and  correspondence  concerning  the  raid,  see  Burn- 
side's  report  (O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  i.  pp.  13,  14)  and  the  miscellaneous  docu 
ments  (Id.,  pp.  632-818). 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE   LIBERATION   OF  EAST  TENNESSEE 

News  of  Grant's  victory  at  Vicksburg  —  A  thrilling  scene  at  the  opera  — 
Burnside's  Ninth  Corps  to  return  —  Stanton  urges  Rosecrans  to  advance 
—  The  Tullahoma  manoeuvres  —  Testy  correspondence  —Its  real  mean 
ing  —  Urgency  with  Burnside  —  Ignorance  concerning  his  situation  — 
His  disappointment  as  to  Ninth  Corps  —  Rapid  concentration  of  other 
troops  —  Burnside's  march  into  East  Tennessee  —  Occupation  of  Knox- 
ville  —  Invests  Cumberland  Gap  —  The  garrison  surrenders  —  Good 
news  from  Rosecrans  —  Distances  between  armies  —  Divergent  lines  — 
No  railway  communication  —  Burnside  concentrates  toward  the  Vir 
ginia  line  —  Joy  of  the  people  —  Their  intense  loyalty  —  Their  faith  in 
the  future. 

DURING  the  Morgan  Raid  and  whilst  we  in  Ohio 
were  absorbed  in  the  excitement  of  it,  events  were 
moving  elsewhere.  Lee  had  advanced  from  Virginia 
through  Maryland  into  Pennsylvania  and  had  been  de 
feated  at  Gettysburg  by  the  National  army  under  Meade. 
Grant  had  brought  the  siege  of  Vicksburg  to  a  glorious 
conclusion  and  had  received  the  surrender  of  Pemberton 
with  his  army  of  30,000  Confederates.  These  victories, 
coming  together  as  they  did  and  on  the  4th  of  July,  made 
the  national  anniversary  seem  more  than  ever  a  day  of 
rejoicing  and  of  hope  to  the  whole  people.  We  did  not 
get  the  news  of  Grant's  victory  quite  so  soon  as  that  of 
Meade's,  but  it  came  to  us  at  Cincinnati  in  a  way  to  excite 
peculiar  enthusiasm. 

An  excellent  operatic  company  was  giving  a  series  of 
performances  in  the  city,  and  all  Cincinnati  was  at  Pike's 
Opera  House  listening  to  /  Puritani  on  the  evening  of 
the  7th  of  July.  General  Burnside  and  his  wife  had  one  of 
the  proscenium  boxes,  and  my  wife  and  I  were  their  guests. 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST  TENNESSEE      511 

The  second  act  had  just  closed  with  the  famous  trumpet 
song,  in  which  Susini,  the  great  basso  of  the  day,  had 
created  a  furore.  A  messenger  entered  the  box  where  the 
general  was  surrounded  by  a  brilliant  company,  and  gave 
him  a  dispatch  which  announced  the  surrender  of  Vicks- 
burg  and  Pemberton's  army.  Burnside,  overjoyed,  an 
nounced  the  great  news  to  us  who  were  near  him,  and 
then  stepped  to  the  front  of  the  box  to  make  the  whole 
audience  sharers  in  the  pleasure.  As  soon  as  he  was  seen 
with  the  paper  in  his  hand,  the  house  was  hushed,  and  his 
voice  rang  through  it  as  he  proclaimed  the  great  victory 
and  declared  it  a  long  stride  toward  the  restoration  of  the 
Union.  The  people  went  almost  wild  with  excitement, 
the  men  shouted  hurrahs,  the  ladies  waved  their  handker 
chiefs  and  clapped  their  hands,  all  rising  to  their  feet. 
The  cheering  was  long  as  well  as  loud,  and  before  it  sub 
sided  the  excitement  reached  behind  the  stage.  The 
curtain  rose  again,  and  Susini  came  forward  with  a  national 
flag  in  each  hand,  waving  them  enthusiastically  whilst  his 
magnificent  voice  resounded  in  a  repetition  of  the  song 
he  had  just  sung,  and  which  seemed  as  appropriate  as  if 
it  were  inspired  for  the  occasion, — 

"  Suoni  la  tromba,  e  intrepido 

lo  pugnero  da  forte, 
Bello  &  affrontar  la  morte, 
Gridando  libertk !  " 

The  rejoicing  and  the  cheers  were  repeated  to  the  echo, 
and  when  at  last  they  subsided,  the  rest  of  the  opera  was 
only  half  listened  to,  suppressed  excitement  filling  every 
heart  and  the  thought  of  the  great  results  to  flow  from  the 
victories  absorbing  every  mind. 

Burnside  reckoned  with  entire  certainty  on  the  imme 
diate  return  of  the  Ninth  Corps,  and  planned  to  resume 
his  expedition  into  East  Tennessee  as  soon  as  his  old 
troops  should  reach  him  again.  The  Morgan  raid  was 
just  beginning,  and  no  one  anticipated  its  final  scope.  In 


512          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  dispatch  from  the  Secretary  of  War  which  announced 
Grant's  great  victory,  Burnside  was  also  told  that  the  corps 
would  immediately  return  to  him.  In  answering  it  on  the 
8th  July,  he  said,  "  I  thought  I  was  very  happy  at  the 
success  of  General  Grant  and  General  Meade,  but  I  am 
still  happier  to  hear  of  the  speedy  return  of  the  Ninth 
Corps."  He  informed  Rosecrans  of  it  on  the  same  day, 
adding,  "  I  hope  soon  to  be  at  work  again."  1 

The  Washington  authorities  very  naturally  and  very 
properly  wished  that  the  tide  of  success  should  be  kept 
moving,  and  Secretary  Stanton  had  exhorted  Rosecrans  to 
further  activity  by  saying,  on  the  /th,  "  You  and  your  noble 
army  now  have  the  chance  to  give  the  finishing  blow  to  the 
rebellion.2  Will  you  neglect  the  chance?"  Rosecrans 
replied :  "  You  do  not  appear  to  observe  the  fact  that  this 
noble  army  has  driven  the  rebels  from  middle  Tennessee, 
of  which  my  dispatches  advised  you.  I  beg  in  behalf  of 
this  army  that  the  War  Department  may  not  overlook  so 
great  an  event  because  it  is  not  written  in  letters  of  blood." 
He,  however,  did  not  intimate  any  purpose  of  advancing. 
No  doubt  the  manoeuvring  of  Bragg  out  of  his  fortified 
positions  at  Shelbyville  and  Tullahoma  had  been  well 
done ;  but  its  chief  value  was  that  it  forced  Bragg  to 
meet  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  in  the  open  field  if  the 
advantage  should  be  promptly  followed  up.  If  he  were 
allowed  to  fortify  another  position,  nothing  would  be 
gained  but  the  ground  the  army  stood  on.  Had  Rose 
crans  given  any  intimation  of  an  early  date  at  which  he 
could  rebuild  the  Elk  River  bridge  and  resume  active 
operations,  it  would  probably  have  relieved  the  strain  so 
noticeable  in  the  correspondence  between  him  and  the 
War  Department.  He  did  nothing  of  the  kind,  and  the 
necessity  of  removing  him  from  the  command  was  a  matter 
of  every-day  discussion  at  Washington,  as  is  evident  from 
the  confidential  letters  Halleck  sent  to  him.  The  corre- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  522,  524.  2  Id.,  p.  518. 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST   TENNESSEE       513 

spondence  between  the  General-in-Chief  and  his  subordinate 
is  a  curious  one.  A  number  of  the  most  urgent  dispatches 
representing  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  President  and  the 
Secretary  were  accompanied  by  private  and  confidential 
letters  in  which  Halleck  explains  the  situation  and  strongly 
asserts  his  friendship  for  Rosecrans  and  the  error  of  the 
latter  in  assuming  that  personal  hostility  to  himself  was  at 
bottom  of  the  reprimands  sent  him  on  account  of  his 
delays.  It  was  with  good  intentions  that  Halleck  wrote 
thus,  but  the  wisdom  of  it  is  very  questionable.  It  gave 
Rosecrans  ground  to  assume  that  the  official  dispatches 
were  only  the  formal  expression  of  the  ideas  of  the  Presi 
dent  and  Secretary  whilst  the  General-in-Chief  did  not  join 
in  the  condemnation  of  his  dilatory  mode  of  conducting 
the  campaign.  To  say  to  Rosecrans,  as  Halleck  did  on 
July  24th,  "  Whether  well  founded  or  without  any  founda 
tion,  the  dissatisfaction  really  exists,  and  I  deem  it  my 
duty  as  a  friend  to  represent  it  to  you  truly  and  fairly,"  1 
is  to  neglect  his  duty  as  commander  of  the  whole  army  to 
express  his  own  judgment  and  to  give  orders  which  would 
have  the  weight  of  his  military  position  and  presumed 
knowledge  in  military  matters.  When,  therefore,  a  few  days 
later  he  gave  peremptory  orders  to  begin  an  active  advance, 
these  orders  were  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the  preced 
ing  correspondence,  and  lost  their  force  and  vigor.  They 
were  met  by  querulous  and  insubordinate  inquiries  whether 
they  were  intended  to  take  away  all  discretion  as  to  details 
from  the  commander  of  an  army  in  the  field.2  It  has 
been  argued  that  Rosecrans's  weakness  of  character  con 
sisted  in  a  disposition  to  quarrel  with  those  in  power 
over  him,  and  that  a  spirit  of  contradiction  thwarted  the 
good  military  conduct  which  his  natural  energy  might 
have  produced.  I  cannot  help  reading  his  controversial 
correspondence  in  the  light  of  my  personal  observation  of 
the  man,  and  my  conviction  is  that  his  quarrelsome  mode 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  552,  555,  601.          2  Aug.  4,  Id.,  p.  592. 
VOL.  i.  —  33 


5 14          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

of  dealing  with  the  War  Department  was  the  result  of  a 
real  weakness  of  will  and  purpose  which  did  not  take 
naturally  to  an  aggressive  campaign  that  involved  great 
responsibilities  and  risks.  Being  really  indecisive  in  fixing 
his  plan  of  campaign  and  acting  upon  it,  his  infirmity  of 
will  was  covered  by  a  belligerence  in  his  correspondence. 
A  really  enterprising  commander  in  the  field  would  have 
begun  an  active  campaign  in  the  spring  before  any  dis 
satisfaction  was  exhibited  at  Washington ;  and  if  he  had  a 
decided  purpose  to  advance  at  any  reasonably  early  period, 
there  was  nothing  in  the  urgency  shown  by  his  superiors 
to  make  him  abandon  his  purpose.  He  might  have  made 
testy  comments,  but  he  would  have  acted. 

Halleck's  correspondence  with  Burnside  in  July  is  hard 
to  understand,  unless  we  assume  that  it  was  so  perfunctory 
that  he  did  not  remember  at  one  time  what  he  said  or  did 
earlier.  In  a  dispatch  to  the  General-in-Chief  dated  the 
nth,  Rosecrans  had  said,  "It  is  important  to  know  if  it 
will  be  practicable  for  Burnside  to  come  in  on  our  left 
flank  and  hold  the  line  of  the  Cumberland ;  if  not,  a  line 
in  advance  of  it  and  east  of  us."  l  It  was  already  under 
stood  between  Rosecrans  and  Burnside  that  the  latter 
would  do  this  and  more  as  soon  as  he  should  have  the 
Ninth  Corps  with  him  ;  and  the  dispatch  must  be  regarded 
as  a  variation  on  the  form  of  excuses  for  inaction,  by 
suggesting  that  he  was  delayed  by  the  lack  of  an  under 
standing  as  to  co-operation  by  the  Army  of  the  Ohio.  On 
receipt  of  Rosecrans's  dispatch,  Halleck  answered  it  on 
the  1 3th,  saying,  "General  Burnside  has  been  frequently 
urged  to  move  forward  and  cover  your  left  by  entering 
East  Tennessee.  I  do  not  know  what  he  is  doing.  He 
seems  tied  fast  to  Cincinnati."  On  the  same  day  he 
telegraphed  Burnside,  "  I  must  again  urge  upon  you  the 
importance  of  moving  forward  into  East  Tennessee,  to 
cover  Rosecrans's  left." 2  It  is  possible  that  Burnside's 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  5i.  p.  529.  2  Id.,  p.  531. 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST  TENNESSEE      515 

telegraphic  correspondence  with  the  Secretary  of  War  was 
not  known  to  Halleck,  but  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  the 
latter  was  ignorant  of  the  proportions  the  Morgan  raid  had 
taken  after  the  enemy  had  crossed  the  Ohio  River.  The 
1 3th  of  July  was  the  day  that  Morgan  marched  from 
Indiana  into  Ohio  and  came  within  thirteen  miles  of 
Cincinnati.  Burnside  was  organizing  all  the  militia  of 
southern  Ohio,  and  was  concentrating  two  divisions  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  to  catch  the  raiders.  One  of  these 
was  on  a  fleet  of  steamboats  which  reached  Cincinnati 
that  day,  and  the  other,  under  Hobson,  was  in  close  pur 
suit  of  the  enemy.  Where  should  Burnside  have  been,  if 
not  at  Cincinnati?  If  the  raid  had  been  left  to  the  "  militia 
and  home  guards,"  as  Halleck  afterward  said  all  petty  raids 
should  be,  this,  which  was  not  a  petty  raid,  would  pretty 
certainly  have  had  results  which  would  have  produced 
more  discomfort  at  Washington  than  the  idea  that  Burn- 
side  was  "  tied  fast  to  Cincinnati."  Burnside  was  exactly 
where  he  ought  to  be,  and  doing  admirable  work  which 
resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  division  of  3000  rebel  cavalry 
with  its  officers  from  the  general  in  command  downward. 
That  the  General-in-Chief  was  entirely  ignorant  of  what 
was  going  on,  when  every  intelligent  citizen  of  the  country 
was  excited  over  it  and  every  newspaper  was  full  of  it, 
reflects  far  more  severely  upon  him  than  upon  Burnside. 

But  this  was  by  no  means  the  whole.  He  forgot  that 
when  he  stopped  Burnside's  movement  on  3d  June  to 
send  the  Ninth  Corps  to  Grant,  it  was  with  the  distinct 
understanding  that  it  prevented  its  resumption  till  the 
corps  should  return.  He  had  himself  said  that  this  should 
be  as  early  as  possible,  and  meanwhile  directed  Burnside 
to  concentrate  his  remaining  forces  as  much  as  he  could.1 
Burnside  had  been  told  on  the  8th  of  July,  without  inquiry 
from  him,  that  the  corps  was  coming  back  to  him,  and 
had  immediately  begun  his  preparation  to  resume  an 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  384. 


516          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

active  campaign  as  soon  as  it  should  reach  him.  Not 
hearing  of  its  being  on  the  way,  on  the  i8th  he  asked 
Halleck  if  orders  for  its  return  had  been  given.  To  this 
dispatch  no  answer  was  given,  and  it  was  probably  pigeon 
holed  and  forgotten.  Burnside  continued  his  campaign 
against  Morgan,  and  on  the  24th,  when  the  last  combina 
tions  near  Steubenville  were  closing  the  career  of  the  raider, 
Halleck  again  telegraphs  that  there  must  be  no  further 
delay  in  the  movement  into  East  Tennessee,1  and  orders 
an  immediate  report  of  the  position  and  number  of  Burn- 
side's  troops  organized  for  that  purpose !  He  was  still 
ignorant,  apparently,  that  there  had  been  any  occasion  to 
withdraw  the  troops  in  Kentucky  from  the  positions  near 
the  Cumberland  River. 

Burnside  answered  temperately,  reciting  the  facts  and 
reminding  him  of  the  actual  state  of  orders  and  corre 
spondence,  adding  only,  "  I  should  be  glad  to  be  more 
definitely  instructed,  if  you  think  the  work  can  be  better 
done."  Morgan's  surrender  was  on  the  26th,  and  Burn- 
side  immediately  applied  himself  with  earnest  zeal  to  get 
his  forces  back  into  Kentucky.  Judah's  division  at  But- 
fington  was  three  hundred  miles  from  Cincinnati  and  five 
hundred  from  the  place  it  had  left  to  begin  the  chase. 
Shackelford's  mounted  force  was  two  hundred  miles  fur 
ther  up  the  Ohio.  This  last  was,  as  has  been  recited, 
made  up  of  detachments  from  all  the  divisions  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  and  its  four  weeks  of  constant  hard 
riding  had  used  up  men  and  horses.  These  all  had  to  be 
got  back  to  the  southern  part  of  central  Kentucky  and  re 
fitted,  returned  to  their  proper  divisions,  and  prepared  for 
a  new  campaign.  The  General-in-Chief  does  not  seem  to 
have  had  the  slightest  knowledge  of  these  circumstances 
or  conditions. 

On  the  28th  another  Confederate  raid  developed  itself 
in  southern  Kentucky,  under  General  Scott.  It  seemed 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  553. 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST  TENNESSEE      $17 

to  be  intended  as  a  diversion  to  aid  Morgan  to  escape 
from  Ohio,  but  failed  to  accomplish  anything.  Scott  ad 
vanced  rapidly  from  the  south  with  his  brigade,  crossing 
the  Cumberland  at  Williamsburg  and  moving  through 
London  upon  Richmond.1  Colonel  Sanders  endeavored 
to  stop  the  enemy  at  Richmond  with  about  500  men 
hastily  collected,  but  was  driven  back.  He  was  ordered 
to  Lexington  and  put  in  command  of  all  the  mounted  men 
which  could  be  got  together  there,  2400  in  all,  and  ad 
vanced  against  Scott,  who  now  retreated  by  Lancaster, 
Stanford,  and  Somerset.  At  Lancaster  the  enemy  was 
routed  in  a  charge  and  200  of  them  captured.  Following 
them  up  with  vigor,  their  train  was  destroyed  and  about 
500  more  prisoners  were  taken.  At  the  Cumberland  River 
Sanders  halted,  having  been  without  rations  for  four  days. 
The  remnant  of  Scott's  force  had  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  river  after  abandoning  the  train.  Scott  claimed  to 
have  taken  and  paroled  about  200  prisoners  in  the  first 
part  of  his  raid,  but  such  irregular  paroles  of  captured 
men  who  could  not  be  carried  off  were  unauthorized  and 
void.  The  actual  casualties  in  Sanders's  command  were 
trifling.2 

The  effect  of  this  last  raid  was  still  further  to  wear  out 
Burnside's  mounted  troops,  but  he  pressed  forward  to  the 
front  all  his  infantry  and  organized  a  column  for  advance. 
In  less  than  a  week,  on  August  4,  he  was  able  to  announce 
to  the  War  Department  that  he  had  11,000  men  concen 
trated  at  Lebanon,  Stanford,  and  Glasgow,  with  outposts 
on  the  Cumberland  River,  and  that  he  could  possibly  in 
crease  this  to  12,000  by  reducing  some  posts  in  guard  of 
the  railway.3  Upon  this,  Halleck  gave  to  Rosecrans  per 
emptory  orders  for  the  immediate  advance  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  directing  him  also  to  report  daily  the 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  568. 

2  Id.,  pt.  i.  pp.  828-843  ;  pt.  ii.  pp.  568,  589. 
s  Id.,  p.  591. 


5l8          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

movement  of  each  corps  till  he  should  cross  the  Tennessee. 
On  the  next  day  Burnside  was  ordered  in  like  manner  to 
advance  with  a  column  of  12,000  men  upon  Knoxville,  on 
reaching  which  place  he  was  to  endeavor  to  connect  with 
the  forces  under  Rosecrans.1  The  dispatch  closed  with 
what  was  called  a  repetition  of  a  former  order  from  the 
Secretary  of  War  for  Burnside  to  leave  Cincinnati  and  take 
command  of  his  moving  column  in  person.  Burnside  had 
never  dreamed  of  doing  anything  else,  as  everybody  near 
him  knew,  though  he  had  in  fact  been  quite  ill  during  the 
latter  part  of  July.  The  mention  of  a  former  order  was 
another  sheer  blunder  on  General  Halleck's  part,  and 
Burnside  indignantly  protested  against  the  imputation  con 
tained  in  it.2  The  truth  seems  to  be  that  Halleck  was  in 
such  a  condition  of  irritation  over  his  correspondence  with 
Rosecrans,  that  nothing  pertaining  to  the  Department  of 
the  Ohio  was  accurately  placed  in  his  mind  or  accurately 
stated  when  he  had  occasion  to  refer  to  it.  In  cutting  the 
knot  by  peremptory  orders  to  both  armies  to  move,  he 
was  right,  and  was  justified  in  insisting  that  the  little 
column  of  12,000  under  Burnside  should  start  although  it 
could  only  be  got  together  in  greatest  haste  and  with  the 
lack  of  equipment  occasioned  by  the  "  wear  and  tear  "  of 
the  operations  against  Morgan.  If,  in  insisting  on  this,  he 
had  recognized  the  facts  and  given  Burnside  and  his  troops 
credit  for  the  capture  of  the  rebel  raiders  and  the  concen 
tration,  in  a  week,  of  forces  scattered  over  a  distance  of 
nearly  a  thousand  miles,  no  one  would  have  had  a  right  to 
criticise  him.  The  exigency  fairly  justified  it.  But  to 
treat  Burnside  as  if  he  had  been  only  enjoying  himself  in 
Cincinnati,  and  his  troops  all  quietly  in  camp  along  the 
Cumberland  River  through  the  whole  summer,  —  to  ig 
nore  the  absence  of  the  Ninth  Corps  and  his  own  suspen 
sion  of  a  movement  already  begun  when  he  took  it  away, 
—  to  assume  in  almost  every  particular  a  basis  of  fact  ab- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  pp.  592-593.  z  Id.,  pp.  593,  594. 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST  TENNESSEE       519 

solutely  contrary  to  the  reality  and  to  telegraph  censures 
for  what  had  been  done,  under  his  own  orders  or  strictly 
in  harmony  with  them,  —  all  this  was  doing  a  right  thing 
in  as  absurdly  wrong  a  way  as  was  possible.  A  gleam  of 
humor  and  the  light  of  common  sense  is  thrown  over  one 
incident,  when  Mr.  Lincoln,  seeing  that  Burnside  had  full 
right  from  the  dispatches  to  suppose  the  Ninth  Corps  was 
to  come  at  once  to  him  from  Vicksburg  and  that  no  one 
had  given  him  any  explanation,  himself  telegraphed  that 
the  information  had  been  based  on  a  statement  from  Gen 
eral  Grant,  who  had  not  informed  them  why  the  troops 
had  not  been  sent.  "  General  Grant,"  the  President 
quaintly  added,  "  is  a  copious  worker  and  fighter,  but  a 
very  meagre  writer  or  telegrapher.  No  doubt  he  changed 
his  purpose  for  some  sufficient  reason,  but  has  forgotten 
to  notify  us  of  it."  1  The  reference  to  copious  work  as  con 
trasted  with  the  copia  verborum  gains  added  point  from  a 
dispatch  of  Halleck  to  Rosecrans,  quite  early  in  the  season, 
in  which  the  latter  is  told  that  the  cost  of  his  telegraph 
dispatches  is  "  as  much  or  perhaps  more  than  that  of  all 
the  other  generals  in  the  field."  2  The  form  of  the  reference 
to  Grant  enables  us  also  to  read  between  the  lines  the  prog 
ress  he  was  making  in  reputation  and  in  the  President's 
confidence.  He  kept  "  pegging  away,"  and  was  putting 
brains  as  well  as  energy  into  his  work.  The  records  show 
also  that  Burnside  took  the  hint,  whether  intended  or  not, 
and  in  this  campaign  did  not  err  on  the  side  of  copiousness 
in  dispatches  to  Washington. 

To  avoid  the  delay  which  would  be  caused  by  the  dis 
tribution  of  his  mounted  force  to  the  divisions  they  had 
originally  been  attached  to,  Burnside  organized  these  into 
a  division  under  Brigadier-General  S.  P.  Carter,  and  an  in 
dependent  brigade  under  Colonel  F.  Wolford.  He  also 
reorganized  the  infantry  divisions  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps.  The  first  division,  under  Brigadier-General  J.  T. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxiii.  pt.  ii.  p.  561.  2  /</.,  p.  255. 


520          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

Boyle,  was  to  remain  in  Kentucky  and  protect  the  lines  of 
communication.  The  second  was  put  under  command  of 
Brigadier-General  M.  D.  Manson,  and  the  third  under  Brig 
adier-General  M.  S.  Hascall.  Each  marching  division  was 
organized  into  two  brigades  with  a  battery  of  artillery 
attached  to  each  brigade.  Three  batteries  of  artillery 
were  in  reserve.1 

On  the  nth  of  August  General  Burnside  went  to  Hick- 
man's  Bridge,  and  the  forward  movement  was  begun.2 
At  this  date  the  Confederate  forces  in  East  Tennessee 
under  General  Buckner  numbered  14,733  "  present  for 
duty,"  with  an  "  aggregate  present"  of  2000  or  3000  more. 
Conscious  that  the  column  of  12,000  which  Halleck  had 
directed  him  to  start  with  was  less  than  the  hostile  forces 
in  the  Holston  valley,  Burnside  reduced  to  the  utmost 
the  garrisons  and  posts  left  behind  him.  Fortunately  the 
advanced  division  of  the  Ninth  Corps  returning  from 
Vicksburg  reached  Cincinnati  on  the  I2th,  and  although 
the  troops  were  wholly  unfit  for  active  service  by  reason 
of  malarial  diseases  contracted  on  the  "  Yazoo,"  they  could 
relieve  some  of  the  Kentucky  garrisons,  and  Burnside  was 
thus  enabled  to  increase  his  moving  column  to  about 
15,000  men.  The  earlier  stages  of  the  advance  were  slow, 
as  the  columns  were  brought  into  position  to  take  up 
their  separate  lines  of  march  and  organize  their  supply 
trains  for  the  road.  On  the  2Oth  Hanson's  division  was 
at  Columbia,  Hascall's  was  at  Stanford,  Carter's  cavalry 
division  was  at  Crab  Orchard,  and  independent  brigades 
of  cavalry  under  Colonels  Wolford  and  Graham  were  at 
Somerset  and  Glasgow.3  On  that  day  orders  were  issued 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  ii.  pp.  553-555. 

2  Id.,  pt.  iii.  p.  1 6.     Hickman's  Bridge,  as  has  already  been  mentioned, 
was  at  the  terminus  of  the  Central  Kentucky  Railroad.     There,  on  the  bank 
of  the  Kentucky  River,  Burnside  made  a  fortified  depot  from  which  his 
wagon   trains  should  start  as  a  base  for  the  supply  system  of  his  army  in 
East  Tennessee.     It  was  called  Camp  Nelson  in  honor  of  the  dead  Kentucky 
general. 

3  Id.,  pt.  ii.  p.  548. 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST   TENNESSEE      521 


522  REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

for  the  continuous  march.  General  Julius  White  relieved 
Manson  in  command  of  the  second  division,  and  the  two 
infantry  divisions  were  to  move  on  Montgomery,  Tenn., 
Hascall's  by  way  of  Somerset,  Chitwoods,  and  Huntsville, 
and  White's  by  way  of  Creelsboro,  Albany,  and  Jamestown. 
Carter's  cavalry,  which  covered  the  extreme  left  flank, 
marched  through  Mt.  Vernon  and  London  to  Williams- 
burg,  where  it  forded  the  Cumberland,  thence  over  the 
Jellico  Mountains  to  Chitwoods  where  it  became  the 
advance  of  Hascall's  column  to  Montgomery.1  At  this 
point  the  columns  were  united  and  all  moved  together 
through  Emory  Gap  upon  Kingston.  Burnside  accom 
panied  the  cavalry  in  person,  and  sent  two  detachments, 
one  to  go  by  way  of  Big  Creek  Gap  to  make  a  demonstra 
tion  on  Knoxville,  and  the  other  through  Winter's  Gap  for 
the  same  purpose  of  misleading  the  enemy  as  to  his  line 
of  principal  movement. 

Nothing  could  be  more  systematic  and  vigorous  than 
the  march  of  Burnside's  columns.2  They  made  from 
fifteen  to  twenty  or  twenty-five  miles  a  day  with  the  reg 
ularity  of  clock-work,  though  the  route  in  many  parts  of 
it  was  most  difficult.  There  were  mountains  to  climb  and 
narrow  gorges  to  thread.  Streams  were  to  be  forded, 
roads  were  to  be  repaired  and  in  places  to  be  made  anew. 
On  the  ist  of  September  Burnside  occupied  Kingston, 
having  passed  through  Emory  Gap  into  East  Tennessee 
and  communicated  with  Crittenden's  corps  of  Rosecrans's 
army.3  Here  he  learned  that  upon  the  development  of 
the  joint  plan  of  campaign  of  the  National  commanders, 
Bragg  had  withdrawn  Buckner's  forces  south  of  the  Ten 
nessee  at  Loudon,  there  making  them  the  right  flank  of  his 
army  about  Chattanooga.  There  was,  however,  one  ex 
ception  in  Buckner's  order  to  withdraw.  Brigadier-General 
John  W.  Frazer  was  left  at  Cumberland  Gap  with  2500  men, 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  ii.  p.  548.  2  Id.,  p.  569. 

8  Itinerary,  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  ii.  pp.  576-578. 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST   TENNESSEE      523 

and  though  Buckner  had  on  August  3Oth  ordered  him  to 
destroy  his  material  and  retreat  into  Virginia,  joining  the 
command  of  Major-General  Samuel  Jones,  this  order  was 
withdrawn  on  Frazer's  representation  of  his  ability  to  hold 
the  place  and  that  he  had  rations  for  forty  days.1  There 
being  therefore  no  troops  in  East  Tennessee  to  oppose  its 
occupation,  Burnside's  advance-guard  entered  Knoxville 
on  the  3d  of  September.  Part  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
had  been  sent  toward  Loudon  on  the  2d,  and  upon  their 
approach  the  enemy  burned  the  great  railroad  bridge  at 
that  place.  A  light-draught  steamboat  was  building  at 
Kingston,  and  this  was  captured  and  preserved.2  It  played 
a  useful  part  subsequently  in  the  transportation  of  supplies 
when  the  wagon-trains  were  broken  down  and  the  troops 
were  reduced  nearly  to  starvation.  No  sooner  was  Burn- 
side  in  Knoxville  than  he  put  portions  of  his  army  in 
motion  for  Cumberland  Gap,  sixty  miles  northward.  He 
had  already  put  Colonel  John  F.  DeCourcey  (Sixteenth 
Ohio  Infantry)  in  command  of  new  troops  arriving  in  Ken 
tucky,  and  ordered  him  to  advance  against  the  fortifica 
tions  of  the  gap  on  the  north  side.  General  Shackelford 
was  sent  with  his  cavalry  from  Knoxville,  but  when  Burnside 
learned  that  DeCourcey  and  he  were  not  strong  enough 
to  take  the  place,  he  left  Knoxville  in  person  with  Colonel 
Samuel  Gilbert's  brigade  of  infantry  and  made  the  sixty- 
mile  march  in  fifty-two  hours.  Frazer  had  refused  to  sur 
render  on  the  summons  of  the  subordinates;  but  when 
Burnside  arrived  and  made  the  demand  in  person,  he 
despaired  of  holding  out  and  on  the  Qth  of  September 
surrendered  the  garrison.  A  considerable  number  got 
away  by  scattering  after  the  flag  was  hauled  down,  but 
2,205  men  laid  down  their  arms,  and  twelve  pieces  of  cannon 
were  also  among  the  spoils.3  DeCourcey's  troops  were 
left  to  garrison  the  fortifications,  and  the  rest  were  sent  to 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  ii.  p.  608.  *  Id.,  pt.  iii.  p.  333. 

3  Id.,  pt.  ii.  pp.  548,  599,  604,  6n. 


524          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

occupy  the  upper  valley  of  the   Holston  toward  the  Vir 
ginia  line. 

On  the  loth,  and  while  still  at  Cumberland  Gap,  Burn- 
side  received  a  dispatch  from  General  Crittenden  with 
the  news  that  he  was  in  possession  of  Chattanooga,  that 
Bragg  had  retreated  toward  Rome,  Ga.,  and  that  Rose- 
crans  hoped  with  his  centre  and  right  to  intercept  the 
enemy  at  Rome,  which  was  sixty  miles  south  of  Chat 
tanooga.1  Everything  was  therefore  most  promising  on 
the  south,  and  Burnside  had  only  to  provide  for  driving 
back  the  Confederates  under  Jones,  at  the  Virginia  line, 
a  hundred  and  thirty  miles  northeast  of  Knoxville.  It 
becomes  important  here  to  estimate  these  distances  rightly. 
Knoxville  is  a  hundred  and  eleven  miles  distant  from 
Chattanooga  by  the  railroad,  and  more  by  the  country 
roads.  From  Bristol  on  the  northeast  to  Chattanooga  on 
the  southwest  is  two  hundred  and  forty-two  miles,  which 
measures  the  length  of  that  part  of  the  Holston  and  Ten 
nessee  valley  known  as  East  Tennessee.  If  Rosecrans 
were  at  Rome,  as  General  Crittenden's  dispatch  indicated, 
he  was  more  than  a  hundred  and  seventy  miles  distant  from 
Knoxville,  and  nearly  three  hundred  miles  from  the  region 
about  Greeneville  and  the  Watauga  River,  whose  crossing 
would  be  the  natural  frontier  of  the  upper  valley,  if  Burn- 
side  should  not  be  able  to  extend  his  occupation  quite  to 
the  Virginia  line.  It  will  be  seen  therefore  that  the  prog 
ress  of  the  campaign  had  necessarily  made  Rosecrans's 
and  Burnside's  lines  of  operation  widely  divergent,  and 
they  were  far  beyond  supporting  distance  of  each  other, 
since  there  was  no  railway  communication  between  them, 
and  could  not  be  for  a  long  time.  Burnside  captured  some 
locomotives  and  cars  at  Knoxville;  but  bridges  had  been 
destroyed  to  such  an  extent  that  these  were  of  little  use 
to  him,  for  the  road  could  be  operated  but  a  short  distance 
in  either  direction  and  the  amount  of  rolling  stock  was, 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  Hi.  p.  523. 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST   TENNESSEE       $2$ 

at  most,  very  little.  Complete  success  for  Rosecrans, 
with  the  reopening  and  repair  of  the  whole  line  from 
Nashville  through  Chattanooga,  including  the  rebuilding 
of  the  great  bridge  at  Loudon,  were  the  essential  condi 
tions  of  further  co-operation  between  the  two  armies,  and 
of  the  permanent  existence  of  Burnside's  in  East  Tennessee. 
Efforts  had  been  made  to  extend  the  lines  of  telegraph 
as  Burnside  advanced,1  but  it  took  some  time  to  do  this, 
and  even  when  the  wires  were  up  there  occurred  a  diffi 
culty  in  making  the  electric  circuit,  so  that  through  all 
the  critical  part  of  the  Chickamauga  campaign,  Burnside 
had  to  communicate  by  means  of  so  long  a  line  of  couriers 
that  three  days  was  the  actual  time  of  transmittal  of  dis 
patches  between  himself  and  Washington.2  The  news 
from  Rosecrans  on  the  loth  was  so  reassuring  that  Burn- 
side's  plain  duty  was  to  apply  himself  to  clearing  the 
upper  valley  of  the  enemy,  and  then  to  further  the  great 
object  of  his  expedition  by  giving  the  loyal  inhabitants 
the  means  of  self-government,  and  encouraging  them  to 
organize  and  arm  themselves  with  the  weapons  which  his 
wagon  trains  were  already  bringing  from  Kentucky.  He 
had  also  to  provide  for  his  supplies,  and  must  use  the 
good  weather  of  the  early  autumn  to  the  utmost,  for  the 
long  roads  over  the  mountains  would  be  practically  im 
passable  in  winter.  The  route  from  Kentucky  by  way  of 
Cumberland  Gap  was  the  shortest,  and,  on  the  whole, 
the  easiest,  and  a  great  system  of  transportation  by  trains 
under  escort  was  put  in  operation.  The  camp  at  Cum 
berland  Gap  could  give  this  protection  through  the  moun 
tain  district,  and  made  a  convenient  stopping-place  in  the 
weary  way  when  teams  broke  down  or  had  to  be  replaced. 
Other  roads  were  also  used  whilst  they  seemed  to  be  safe, 
and*  the  energies  and  resources  of  the  quartermaster's 
department  were  strained  to  the  utmost  to  bring  forward 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  ii.  p.  574;  pt.  iii.  p.  717. 

2  Id.,  pt.  iii.  p.  718. 


526          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

arms,  ammunition  for  cannon  and  muskets,  food  and 
medical  supplies,  and  all  the  munitions  of  war.  The 
roads  were  covered  with  herds  of  beeves  and  swine,  and 
feeding  stations  for  these  were  established  and  the  forage 
had  to  be  drawn  to  them,  for  nothing  could  be  got,  along 
the  greater  part  of  the  route.  Burnside  hoped  that  the 
railway  by  Chattanooga  would  be  put  in  repair  and  be 
open  before  winter  should  shut  in,  but  he  very  prudently 
acted  on  the  principle  of  making  the  most  of  his  present 
means.  It  was  well  he  did  so,  for  otherwise  his  little  army 
would  have  been  starved  before  the  winter  was  half  over. 
From  Cumberland  Gap  the  courier  line  was  sixty  miles 
shorter  than  from  Knoxville,  and  the  first  dispatches 
of  Burnside  announcing  his  capture  of  Frazer's  troops 
reached  Washington  more  quickly  than  later  ones.  At 
noon  of  the  i  ith  Mr.  Lincoln  answered  it  with  hearty 
congratulations  and  thanks.  This  was  quickly  followed 
by  a  congratulatory  message  from  Halleck  accompanied 
by  formal  orders.1  These  last  only  recapitulated  the 
points  in  Burnside's  further  operations  and  administration 
which  were  the  simplest  deductions  from  the  situation. 
Burnside  was  to  hold  the  country  eastward  to  the  gaps  of 
the  North  Carolina  mountains  (the  Great  Smokies)  and 
the  valley  of  the  Holston  up  to  the  Virginia  line.  Hal 
leck  used  the  phrase  "the  line  of  the  Holston,"  which 
would  be  absurd,  and  was  probably  only  a  slip  of  the  pen. 
The  exact  strength  of  General  Jones,  the  Confederate 
commander  in  southwestern  Virginia,  was  not  known,  but, 
to  preserve  his  preponderance,  Burnside  could  not  pru 
dently  send  less  than  a  division  of  infantry  and  a  couple 
of  brigades  of  cavalry  to  the  vicinity  of  Rogersville  or 
Greeneville  and  the  railroad  crossing  of  the  Watauga. 
This  would  be  just  about  half  his  available  force.  The 
other  division  was  at  first  divided,  one  of  the  two  brigades 
being  centrally  placed  at  Knoxville,  and  the  other  at 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  555. 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST  TENNESSEE      $2? 

Sevierville,  thirty  miles  up  the  French  Broad  River, 
where  it  covered  the  principal  pass  over  the  Smokies  to 
Asheville,  N.  C.  The  rest  of  his  cavalry  was  at  Loudon 
and  Kingston,  where  it  covered  the  north  side  of  the  Ten 
nessee  River  and  communicated  with  Rosecrans's  out 
posts  above  Chattanooga. 

Halleck  further  informed  Burnside  that  the  Secretary 
of  War  directed  him  to  raise  all  the  volunteers  he  could 
in  East  Tennessee  and  to  select  officers  for  them.  If  he 
had  not  already  enough  arms  and  equipments  he  could 
order  them  by  telegraph.  As  to  Rosecrans,  the  Gen 
eral-in-Chief  stated  that  he  would  occupy  Dalton  or  some 
other  point  south  of  Chattanooga,  closing  the  enemy's  line 
from  Atlanta,  and  when  this  was  done,  the  question  would 
be  settled  whether  the  whole  would  move  eastward  into 
Virginia  or  southward  into  Georgia  and  Alabama. l  Burn- 
side's  present  work  being  thus  cut  out  for  him,  he  set 
himself  about  it  with  the  cordial  earnestness  which  marked 
his  character.  He  had  suggested  the  propriety  of  his 
retiring  as  soon  as  the  surrender  of  Frazer  had  made  his 
occupation  of  East  Tennessee  an  assured  success,  but  he 
had  not  formally  asked  to  be  relieved.2  His  reasons  for 
doing  so  dated  back  to  the  Fredericksburg  campaign,  in 
part;  for  he  had  believed  that  his  alternative  then  pre 
sented  to  the  government,  that  he  should  be  allowed  to 
dismiss  insubordinate  generals  or  should  himself  resign, 
ought  to  have  been  accepted.  His  case  had  some  resem 
blance  to  Pope's  when  the  administration  approved  his 
conduct  and  his  courage  but  retired  him  and  restored 
McClellan  to  command,  in  deference  to  the  supposed 
sentiment  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Halleck's  per 
sistent  ignoring  of  the  officially  recorded  causes  of  the 
delay  in  this  campaign,  and  his  assumption  that  the  Mor 
gan  raid  was  not  an  incident  of  any  importance  in  Burn- 
side's  responsibilities,  had  not  tended  to  diminish  the 
latter's  sense  of  discomfort  in  dealing  with  army  head- 

i  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  555.  2  /</.,  p.  523. 


528          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

quarters.  A  debilitating  illness  gave  some  added  force  to 
his  other  reasons,  which,  however,  we  who  knew  him  well 
understood  to  be  the  decisive  ones  with  him.1  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  sincere  friendship  and  confidence  he  never  doubted, 
but  his  nature  could  not  fully  appreciate  the  President's 
policy  of  bending  to  existing  circumstances  when  current 
opinion  was  contrary  to  his  own,  so  that  he  might  save 
his  strength  for  more  critical  action  at  another  time. 
Burnside  had  now  the  falat  of  success  in  a  campaign 
which  was  very  near  the  heart  of  the  President  and  full 
of  interest  for  the  Northern  people.  This,  he  felt,  was  a 
time  when  he  could  retire  with  honor.  Mr.  Lincoln  post 
poned  action  in  the  kindest  and  most  complimentary 
words,2  and  when  he  finally  assigned  another  to  command 
the  department,  did  not  allow  Burnside  to  resign,  but  laid 
out  other  work  for  him  where  his  patriotism  and  his  cour 
age  could  be  of  use  to  the  country. 

The  advent  of  the  army  into  East  Tennessee  was,  to 
its  loyal  people,  a  resurrection  from  the  grave.  Their 
joy  had  an  exultation  which  seemed  almost  beyond  the 
power  of  expression.  Old  men  fell  down  fainting  and 
unconscious  under  the  stress  of  their  emotions  as  they  saw 
the  flag  at  the  head  of  the  column  and  tried  to  cheer  it ! 
Women  wept  with  happiness  as  their  husbands  stepped 
out  of  the  ranks  of  the  loyal  Tennessee  regiments  when 
these  came  marching  by  the  home.3  These  men  had  gath 
ered  in  little  recruiting  camps  on  the  mountain-sides  and 
had  found  their  way  to  Kentucky,  travelling  by  night  and 
guided  by  the  pole-star,  as  the  dark-skinned  fugitives 
from  bondage  had  used  to  make  their  way  to  freedom. 
Their  families  had  been  marked  as  traitors  to  the  Confed- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  523  ;  vol.  xxxi.  pt.  i.  p.  757. 

-  Id.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  554.  "  Yours  received.  A  thousand  thanks  for 
the  late  successes  you  have  given  us.  We  cannot  allow  you  to  resign  until 
things  shall  be  a  little  more  settled  in  East  Tennessee.  If  then,  purely  on 
your  own  account  you  wish  to  resign,  we  will  not  further  refuse  you." 

3  Temple's  East  Tennessee  and  the  Civil  War,  pp.  476,  478.  Humes's 
The  Loyal  Mountaineers,  pp.  211,  218. 


THE  LIBERATION  OF  EAST  TENNESSEE      529 

eracy,  and  had  suffered  sharpest  privations  and  cruel 
wrong  on  account  of  the  absence  of  the  husband  and 
father,  the  brother,  or  the  son.  Now  it  was  all  over,  and 
a  jubilee  began  in  those  picturesque  valleys  in  the 
mountains,  which  none  can  understand  who  had  not  seen 
the  former  despair  and  the  present  revulsion  of  happi 
ness.  The  mountain  coves  and  nooks  far  up  toward  the 
Virginia  line  had  been  among  the  most  intense  in  loyalty 
to  the  nation.  Andrew  Johnson's  home  was  at  Greene- 
ville,  and  he  was  now  the  loyal  provisional  governor  of 
Tennessee,  soon  to  be  nominated  Vice-President  of  the 
United  States.  General  Carter,  who  had  asked  to  be 
transferred  from  the  navy  to  organize  the  refugee  loyal 
ists  into  regiments,  was  a  native  of  the  same  region.  It 
was  at  the  Watauga  that  the  neighboring  opponents  of 
secession  had  given  the  first  example  of  daring  self- 
sacrifice  in  burning  the  railway  bridge.  For  this  they 
were  hanged,  and  their  memory  was  revered  by  the  loyal 
men  about  them,  as  was  Nathan  Hale's  by  our  revolu 
tionary  fathers.  East  Tennessee  was  full  of  such  loyalty, 
but  here  were  good  reasons  why  Burnside  should  push  his 
advance  at  least  to  the  Watauga,  and  if  possible  to  the 
Virginia  line.  His  sympathies  were  all  alive  for  this 
people.  The  region,  he  telegraphed  the  President,  is  as 
loyal  as  any  State  of  the  North.1  It  threw  off  all  dis 
guise,  it  blossomed  with  National  flags,  it  took  no  coun 
sel  of  prudence,  it  refused  to  think  of  a  return  of  Confed 
erate  soldiers  and  Confederate  rule  as  a  possibility.  It 
exulted  in  every  form  of  defiance  to  the  Richmond  govern 
ment  and  what  had  been  called  treason  to  the  Confederate 
States.  The  people  had  a  religious  faith  that  God  would 
not  abandon  them  or  suffer  them  to  be  again  abandoned. 
If  such  an  incredible  wrong  were  to  happen,  they  must 
either  leave  their  country  in  mass,  or  they  must  be  ready 
to  die.  They  could  see  no  other  alternative. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  523. 
VOL.  i.  — 34 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

BURNSIDE  IN  EAST  TENNESSEE 

Organizing  and  arming  the  loyalists  —  Burnside  concentrates  near  Greene- 
ville  —  His  general  plan  —  Rumors  of  Confederate  reinforcements  — 
Lack  of  accurate  information  —  The  Ninth  Corps  in  Kentucky  —  Its 
depletion  by  malarial  disease —  Death  of  General  Welsh  from  this  cause 
—  Preparing  for  further  work  —  Situation  on  i6th  September — Dis 
patch  from  Halleck — Its  apparent  purpose— Necessity  to  dispose  of 
the  enemy  near  Virginia  border  —  Burnside  personally  at  the  front  — 
His  great  activity — Ignorance  of  Rosecrans's  peril  —  Impossibility 
of  joining  him  by  the  2Oth  —  Ruinous  effects  of  abandoning  East 
Tennessee  —  Efforts  to  aid  Rosecrans  without  such  abandonment  — 
Enemy  duped  into  burning  Watauga  bridge  themselves  —  Ninth  Corps 
arriving  —  Willcox's  division  garrisons  Cumberland  Gap — Reinforce 
ments  sent  Rosecrans  from  all  quarters  —  Chattanooga  made  safe  from 
attack  —  The  supply  question  —  Meigs's  description  of  the  roads  —  Burn- 
side  halted  near  London  —  Halleck's  misconception  of  the  geography  — 
The  people  imploring  the  President  not  to  remove  the  troops  —  How 
Longstreet  got  away  from  Virginia  —  Burnside's  alternate  plans  —  Minor 
operations  in  upper  Holston  valley  —  Wolford's  affair  on  the  lower 
Holston. 

FOR  a  week  after  the  capture  of  Cumberland  Gap 
Burnside  devoted  himself  to  the  pleasing  task  of 
organizing  the  native  loyalists  into  a  National  Guard  for 
home  defence,  issuing  arms  to  them  upon  condition  that 
they  should,  as  a  local  militia,  respond  to  his  call  and 
reinforce  for  temporary  work  his  regular  forces  whenever 
the  need  should  arise.  The  detailed  reports  from  the 
upper  valley  reported  the  enemy  under  Jones  at  first  to  be 
4000,  and  later  to  be  6000  strong.  These  estimates 
came  through  cool-headed  and  prudent  officers,  and  were 
based  upon  information  brought  in  by  loyal  men  who  had 
proven  singularly  accurate  in  their  knowledge  throughout 
the  campaign.  Point  was  added  to  these  reports  by  the 


BURNSIDE  IN  EAST  TENNESSEE  531 

experience  of  one  of  his  regiments.  A  detachment  of 
300  men  of  the  One  Hundredth  Ohio  had  been  sent  to 
support  a  cavalry  reconnoissance  near  Limestone  Station 
on  the  railroad,  whilst  Burnside  was  investing  Cumber 
land  Gap,  and  these  had  been  surrounded  and  forced  to 
surrender  by  the  enemy.  This  showed  the  presence  of  a 
considerable  body  of  Confederates  in  the  upper  valley, 
and  that  they  were  bold  and  aggressive.  It  was  the  part 
of  prudence  to  act  upon  this  information,  and  Burnside 
ordered  all  his  infantry  except  one  brigade  to  march 
toward  Greeneville.  Two  brigades  of  cavalry  were  already 
there,  and  his  purpose  was  to  concentrate  about  6000 
infantry,  try  to  obtain  a  decisive  engagement  with  the 
Confederates,  and  to  punish  them  so  severely  that  the 
upper  valley  would  be  safe,  for  a  time  at  least,  from  inva 
sion  by  them,  so  that  he  might  be  free  to  withdraw  most 
of  his  troops  to  co-operate  with  Rosecrans  in  a  Georgia 
campaign,  if  that  alternative  in  Halleck's  plans  should 
be  adopted.  He  felt  the  importance  of  this  the  more,  as 
the  news  received  from  Virginia  mentioned  the  movement 
of  railway  rolling-stock  to  the  East  to  bring,  as  rumor 
had  it,  Ewell's  corps  from  Lee  to  reinforce  Jones.1  The 
sending  of  the  railway  trains  was  a  fact,  but  the  object, 
as  it  turned  out,  was  to  transport  Longstreet's  corps  to 
reinforce  Bragg.2  Of  this,  however,  Burnside  had  no  in 
timation,  and  must  act  upon  the  information  which  came 
to  him. 

The  Ninth  Corps  began  to  arrive  at  Cincinnati  from 
Vicksburg  on  the  I2th  of  August,  half  of  it  coming  then, 
and  the  second  division  arriving  on  the  2Oth.  It  was  re 
duced  to  6000  by  casualties  and  by  sickness,  and  was  in 
a  pitiable  condition.  Being  made  up  of  troops  which  had 
served  in  the  East,  the  men  were  not  acclimated  to  the 
Mississippi  valley,  and  in  the  bayous  and  marshes  about 
Vicksburg  had  suffered  greatly.  Malarial  fevers  ate  out 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  pp.  661,  717.  2  Id.,  p.  731. 


532          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

their  vitality,  and  even  those  who  reported  for  duty 
dragged  themselves  about,  the  mere  shadows  of  what 
they  had  been.  General  Parke  reported  their  arrival  and 
was  then  obliged  to  go  upon  sick-leave  himself.  General 
Welsh,  who  had  distinguished  himself  at  Antietam,  re 
ported  that  his  division  must  recuperate  for  a  few  weeks 
before  it  could  take  the  field.  He  made  a  heroic  effort 
to  remain  on  duty,  but  died  suddenly  on  the  I4th,  and  his 
loss  was  deeply  felt  by  the  corps.1  Potter's  division  was 
as  badly  off  as  Welsh's,  and  both  were  for  a  short  time 
scattered  at  healthful  camps  in  the  Kentucky  hills.  Each 
camp  was,  at  first,  a  hospital ;  but  the  change  of  climate 
and  diet  rapidly  restored  the  tone  of  the  hardy  soldiery. 

General  Willcox,  who  commanded  the  Indiana  district, 
belonged  to  the  corps,  and  asked  to  be  returned  to  duty 
with  it.  He  was  allowed  to  do  so  on  the  nth  of  Sep 
tember,  and  the  War  Department  sent  with  him  a  new 
division  of  Indiana  troops  which  had  been  recruited  and 
organized  during  the  summer.  Burnside  had  ordered 
recruits  and  new  regiments  to  rendezvous  in  Kentucky, 
and  prepared  to  bring  them  as  well  as  the  Ninth  Corps 
forward  as  soon  as  the  latter  should  be  fit  to  march. 
Every  camp  and  station  at  the  rear  was  full  of  busy  prepa 
ration  during  the  last  of  August  and  the  beginning  of 
September,  and  at  the  front  the  general  himself  was  now 
concentrating  his  little  forces  to  strike  a  blow  near  the 
Virginia  line  which  would  make  him  free  to  move 
afterward  in  any  direction  the  General-in-Chief  should 
determine. 

On  the  i6th  of  September  Hascall's  division  was 
echeloned  along  the  road  from  Morristown  back  toward 
Knoxville;  White's  division  passed  Knoxville,  moving 
up  the  valley  to  join  Hascall.  Hartsuff,  who  commanded 
the  Twenty-third  Corps,  had  been  disabled  for  field  work 
by  trouble  from  his  old  wounds  and  was  at  Knoxville. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  45. 


BURNSIDE  IN  EAST  TENNESSEE  533 

Burnside  was  also  there,  intending  to  go  rapidly  forward 
and  overtake  his  infantry  as  soon  as  they  should  approach 
Greeneville.  In  the  night  the  courier  brought  him  a  dis 
patch  from  Halleck,1  dated  the  I3th,  directing  a  rapid 
movement  of  all  his  forces  in  Kentucky  toward  East 
Tennessee,  where  the  whole  Army  of  the  Ohio  was  to  be 
concentrated  as  soon  as  possible.2  He  also  directed  Burn- 
side  to  move  his  infantry  toward  Chattanooga,  giving  as 
a  reason  that  Bragg  might  manoeuvre  to  turn  Rosecrans' s 
right,  and  in  that  case  Rosecrans  would  want  to  hand 
Chattanooga  over  to  Burnside  so  that  he  himself  could 
move  the  whole  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  meet  Bragg. 
There  was  nothing  in  this  dispatch  which  intimated 
that  Rosecrans  was  in  any  danger,  nor  was  Burnside  in 
formed  that  Bragg  had  been  reinforced  by  Longstreet's 
corps.  On  the  other  hand,  his  information  looked  to 
Swell's  joining  Jones  against  himself.  The  object  Hal 
leck  had  in  view  seemed  to  be  to  get  the  Ninth  Corps 
and  other  troops  now  in  Kentucky  into  East  Tennessee  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  and  then  to  move  the  whole  Army  of 
the  Ohio  down  toward  Rosecrans.  It  certainly  could  not 
be  that  he  wished  Cumberland  Gap  abandoned,  and  the 
trains  and  detachments  coming  through  it  from  Kentucky 
left  to  the  tender  mercies  of  Jones  and  his  Confederates, 
who  could  capture  them  at  their  leisure  and  without  a 
blow.  It  was  equally  incredible  that  the  government 
could  wish  to  stop  the  organization  of  the  loyalists  just 
as  weapons  were  being  distributed  to  them,  and  to  aban 
don  them  to  the  enemy  when  their  recent  open  demon 
strations  in  favor  of  the  Union  would  make  their  condi 
tion  infinitely  worse  than  if  our  troops  had  never  come  to 
them.  The  rational  interpretation,  and  the  one  Burnside 
gave  it,  was  that  the  alternative  which  had  been  stated  in 
the  earlier  dispatch  of  the  nth  had  been  settled  in  favor 
of  a  general  movement  southward  instead  of  eastward, 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  617.  3  Id.,  pt.  ii.  p.  550. 


534          REMINISCENCES   OF  THE    CIVIL    WAR 

and  that  this  made  it  all  the  more  imperative  that  he 
should  disembarrass  himself  of  General  Jones  and  estab 
lish  a  line  on  the  upper  Holston  which  a  small  force  could 
hold,  whilst  he  with  the  rest  of  the  two  corps  should 
move  southward  as  soon  as  the  Ninth  Corps  could  make 
the  march  from  Kentucky.  This  was  exactly  what  Gen 
eral  Schofield  did  in  the  next  spring  when  he  was  ordered 
to  join  Sherman  with  the  Army  of  the  Ohio;  and  I  do 
not  hesitate  to  say  that  it  was  the  only  thing  which  an 
intelligent  military  man  on  the  ground  and  knowing  the 
topography  would  think  of  doing.  To  make  a  panicky 
abandonment  of  the  country  and  of  the  trains  and  detach 
ments  en  route  to  it,  would  have  been  hardly  less  dis 
graceful  than  a  surrender  of  the  whole.  To  Burnside's 
honor  and  credit  it  should  be  recorded  that  he  did  not 
dream  of  doing  it.  He  strained  every  nerve  to  hasten  the 
movement  of  his  troops  so  as  to  get  through  with  his 
little  campaign  against  Jones  by  the  time  the  Ninth  Corps 
could  come  from  Kentucky,  and  if  he  could  accomplish  it 
within  that  limit,  he  would  have  the  right  to  challenge 
the  judgment  of  every  competent  critic,  whether  he  had 
not  done  that  which  became  a  good  soldier  and  a  good 
general. 

On  the  1 7th  of  September  the  concentration  of  Burn- 
side's  infantry  toward  Greeneville  had  so  far  progressed 
that  he  was  preparing  to  go  personally  to  the  front  and 
lead  them  against  the  enemy.  It  is  noticeable  in  the 
whole  campaign  that  he  took  this  personal  leadership  and 
activity  on  himself.  In  Hartsuff's  condition  of  health  it 
would  have  been  within  the  ordinary  methods  of  action 
that  the  next  in  rank  should  assume  command  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  and  that  the  department  commander 
should  remain  at  his  headquarters  at  Knoxville.  But 
Hartsuff  was  able  to  attend  to  office  business,  and  so 
Burnside  practically  exchanged  places  with  him,  leaving 
his  subordinate  with  discretion  to  direct  affairs  in  the 


BURNSIDE  IN  EAST   TENNESSEE  535 

department  at  large,  whilst  he  himself  did  the  field  work 
with  his  troops.  He  had  done  it  at  Cumberland  Gap 
when  he  received  the  surrender  of  Frazer;  he  was  doing 
it  now,  and  he  was  to  do  it  again,  still  later,  when  he  met 
Longstreet's  advance  at  the  crossing  of  the  Holston 
River. 

In  preparation  for  an  absence  of  some  days,  he  wrote, 
on  the  date  last  mentioned,  a  long  dispatch  to  General 
Halleck,  in  the  nature  of  a  report  of  the  state  of  affairs 
at  that  date.1  He  explained  the  failure  of  the  telegraph 
and  the  efforts  that  were  making  to  get  it  in  working 
order.  He  gave  the  situation  of  the  troops  and  stated  his 
purpose  to  attack  the  enemy.  He  noticed  the  report  of 
Ewell's  coming  against  him  and  promised  stout  resist 
ance,  finding  satisfaction  in  the  thought  that  it  would  give 
Meade  the  opportunity  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  against 
Lee's  reduced  army.  He  reported  the  condition  of  his 
trains  and  cattle  droves  on  the  road  from  Kentucky,  and 
the  contact  of  his  cavalry  in  the  south  part  of  the  valley 
with  Rosecrans's  outposts.  The  bridge  over  the  Hiwassee 
at  Calhoun,  he  said,  could  be  finished  in  ten  days,  and  the 
steamboat  at  Kingston  would  soon  be  completed  and  ready 
for  use.  All  this  promised  better  means  of  supply  at  an 
early  day,  though  at  present  "  twenty-odd  cars  "  were  all 
the  means  of  moving  men  or  supplies  on  the  portion  of 
the  railroad  within  his  control. 

Later  in  the  same  day  he  received  Halleck' s  dispatch 
of  the  I4th,  which  said  it  was  believed  the  enemy  would 
concentrate  to  give  Rosecrans  battle,  and  directed  him  to 
reinforce  the  latter  with  all  possible  speed.2  Still,  no 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  717. 

2  Burnside's  dispatches  of  the  I7th  in  answer  to  Halleck's  seem  to  show 
that  both  those  of  I3th  and  I4th  were  received  by  him  after  he  had  written 
the  long  one  in  the  morning.     The  internal  evidence  supports  this  idea,  and 
his  second  dispatch  on  the  I7th  acknowledges  the  receipt  of  Halleck's  two 
together.     O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  718.     In  his  official  report,  however, 
Burnside  says  the  dispatch  of  I3th  was  received  "on  the  night  of  the  i6th" 


REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

information  was  given  of  the  movement  of  Longstreet  to 
join  Bragg,  and  indeed  it  was  only  on  the  I5th  that  Hal- 
leek  gave  the  news  to  Rosecrans  as  reliable.1  Burnside 
must  therefore  regard  the  enemy  concentrating  in  Geor 
gia  as  only  the  same  which  Rosecrans  had  been  peremp 
torily  ordered  to  attack  and  which  he  had  been  supposed 
to  be  strong  enough  to  cope  with.  No  time  was  stated 
at  which  the  battle  in  Georgia  would  probably  occur.  To 
hasten  the  work  in  hand,  to  put  affairs  at  the  Virginia 
line  in  condition  to  be  left  as  soon  as  might  be,  and  then 
to  speed  his  forces  toward  Chattanooga  to  join  in  the  Geor 
gia  campaign,  was  plainly  Burnside' s  duty.  If  it  would 
be  too  rash  for  Rosecrans  to  give  battle  without  reinforce 
ments,  that  officer  was  competent  to  manoeuvre  his  army 
in  retreat  and  take  a  defensible  position  till  his  reinforce 
ments  could  come.  That  course  would  be  certainly  much 
wiser  than  to  abandon  East  Tennessee  to  the  enemy,  with 
all  the  consequences  of  such  an  act,  quite  as  bad  as  the 
loss  of  a  battle.  As  matters  turned  out,  even  such  in 
stantaneous  and  ruinous  abandonment  would  not  have 
helped  Rosecrans.  It  was  now  the  afternoon  of  the  i/th 
of  September.  The  battle  of  Chickamauga  was  to  begin 
in  the  early  morning  of  the  igth  and  to  end  disastrously 
on  the  2Oth.  One  full  day  for  the  marching  of  troops 
was  all  that  intervened,  or  two  at  most,  if  they  were  only 
to  reach  the  field  upon  the  second  day  of  the  battle.  And 
where  were  Burnside's  men?  One  division  at  Greeneville 
and  above,  more  than  two  hundred  miles  from  Chatta 
nooga,  and  the  other  near  New  Market  and  Morristown, 
a  hundred  and  fifty  miles.  Burnside's  "twenty-odd  cars  " 
were  confined  to  a  section  of  the  railroad  less  than  eighty 

(O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  ii.  p.  550),  and  I  have  followed  this  statement,  although 
his  report  was  not  written  till  November,  1865,  when  lapse  of  time  might 
easily  give  rise  to  an  error  in  so  trifling  a  detail.     The  matter  is  of  no  real 
consequence  in  the  view  I  have  taken  of  the  situation. 
1  O  R.,  xxx.  pt.  ii.  p.  643. 


BURNSIDE  IN  EAST  TENNESSEE  537 

miles  long,  and  could  hardly  carry  the  necessary  baggage 
and  ammunition  even  for  that  fraction  of  the  way.  The 
troops  must  march,  and  could  not  by  any  physical  possi 
bility  make  a  quarter  of  the  distance  before  Rosecrans's 
fate  at  Chickamauga  should  be  decided.  The  authorities 
at  Washington  must  bear  the  responsibility  for  complete 
ignorance  of  these  conditions,  or,  what  would  be  equally 
bad,  a  forgetfulness  of  them  in  a  moment  of  panic. 

But  Burnside  did  not  know  and  could  not  guess  that  a 
battle  was  to  be  fought  so  soon.  All  he  could  do  was  to 
prepare  to  carry  out  the  wishes  of  the  War  Department 
as  speedily  as  could  be,  without  the  total  ruin  of  East 
Tennessee  and  all  he  had  accomplished.  Such  ruin 
might  come  by  the  fate  of  war  if  he  were  driven  out  by 
superior  force,  but  he  would  have  been  rightly  condemned 
if  it  had  come  by  his  precipitate  abandonment  of  the 
country.  He  did  more  to  carry  out  Halleck's  wish  than 
was  quite  prudent.  He  stopped  the  troops  which  had  not 
yet  reached  Greeneville  and  ordered  a  countermarch.  He 
hastened  up  the  country  to  make  the  attack  upon  the 
Confederates  with  the  force  he  already  had  in  their  pres 
ence,  and  then  to  bring  the  infantry  back  at  once,  hoping 
the  cavalry  could  hold  in  check  a  defeated  enemy. 

The  necessity  of  delivering  a  blow  at  General  Jones 
was  afterwards  criticised  by  Halleck,  but  it  was  in  accord 
ance  with  the  sound  rules  of  conducting  war.  To  have 
called  back  his  troops  without  a  fight  would  have  been  to 
give  the  enemy  double  courage  by  his  retreat,  and  his 
brigades  would  have  been  chased  by  the  exulting  foe. 
They  would  either  have  been  forced  to  halt  and  fight  their 
pursuers  under  every  disadvantage  of  loss  of  prestige  and 
of  the  initiative,  or  have  made  a  precipitate  flight  which 
would  have  gone  far  to  ruin  the  whole  command  as  well 
as  the  Tennessee  people  they  had  just  liberated.  It  is 
true  that  this  involved  an  advance  from  Greeneville  upon 
Jonesboro,  but  the  cavalry  were  already  in  contact  with 


538          REMINISCENCES   OF   THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  enemy  near  there,  and  this  was  the  only  successful 
mode  of  accomplishing  his  purpose.1 

Making  use  of  the  portion  of  the  railroad  which  could 
be  operated,  Burnside  reached  Greeneville  on  the  iSth 
and  rode  rapidly  to  Jonesboro.  On  the  iQth  a  brigade 
of  cavalry  under  Colonel  Foster  attacked  the  enemy  at 
Bristol,  defeated  them,  tore  up  the  railroad,  and  destroyed 
the  bridges  two  miles  above  the  town.2  Foster  then 
returned  to  Blountsville,  and  marched  on  the  next  day 
to  Hall's  Ford  on  the  Watauga,  where,  after  a  skirmishing 
fight  lasting  several  hours,  he  again  dislodged  the  enemy, 
capturing  about  fifty  prisoners  and  a  piece  of  artillery 
with  slight  loss  to  himself.  These  were  flanking  move 
ments  designed  to  distract  the  attention  of  the  enemy 
whilst  Burnside  concentrated  most  of  his  force  in  front  of 
their  principal  position  at  Carter's  Station,  where  the 
most  important  of  the  railway  bridges  in  that  region 
crosses  the  Watauga.  To  impress  his  opponent  with  the 
belief  that  he  meant  to  make  an  extended  campaign, 
Burnside,  on  the  22d,  notified  Jones  to  remove  the  non- 
combatants  from  the  villages  of  the  upper  valley.  Fos 
ter's  brigade  of  cavalry  was  again  sent  to  demonstrate  on 
the  rear,  whilst  Burnside  threatened  in  front  with  the 
infantry.  The  enemy  now  evacuated  the  position  and 
retreated,  first  burning  the  bridge.  This  was  what  Burn- 
side  desired,  and  the  means  of  resuming  railway  commu 
nication  to  support  an  advance  toward  Knoxville  being 
taken  from  the  Confederates  for  a  considerable  time,  he 

1  Messrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay,  in  their  "  Life  of  Lincoln,"  give  the  draft  of 
a  letter  to  Burnside  which  Mr.  Lincoln  wrote  but  did  not  send,  in  which  he 
expressed  his  surprise  that  Burnside  should  be  moving  toward  Virginia 
when  they  at  Washington  were  so  anxious  to  have  him  in  Georgia.     Mr. 
Lincoln's  judgments   of  military  affairs  were  excellent  when  he  was  fully 
possessed  of  the  facts ;  and  I  have  elaborated  somewhat  my  statement  of 
the  circumstances  in  East  Tennessee,  and  of  the  distances,  etc.,  to  show  how 
little  they  were  known  or  understood  in  Washington.     Nicolay  and  Hay's 
Lincoln,  vol.  viii.  p.  166. 

2  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  ii.  p.  592. 


BURNSIDE  IN  EAST   TENNESSEE  539 

was  now  able  to  put  all  his  infantry  except  two  regiments 
in  march  for  Knoxville.  A  brigade  of  cavalry  with  this 
small  infantry  support  at  Bull's  Gap  was  entrusted  with 
the  protection  of  this  region,  and  by  the  help  of  the  home 
guards  of  loyal  men,  was  able  to  hold  it  during  the  opera 
tions  of  the  next  fortnight.  Burnside' s  purpose  had 
been,  if  he  had  not  been  interrupted,  to  have  pressed  the 
Confederates  closely  with  a  sufficient  force  in  front  to 
compel  a  retreat,  whilst  he  intercepted  them  with  the 
remainder  of  his  army,  moving  by  a  shorter  line  from 
Blountsville.  He  made,  however,  the  best  of  the  situa 
tion,  and  having  driven  the  enemy  over  the  State  line  and 
disengaged  his  own  troops,  he  was  free  to  concentrate  the 
greater  part  of  them  for  operations  at  the  other  end  of  the 
valley. 

The  Ninth  Corps  was  now  beginning  to  arrive,  and 
was  ordered  to  rendezvous  first  at  Knoxville.  Willcox 
had  assembled  his  division  of  new  troops,  mostly  Indian- 
ians,  and  marched  with  them  to  Cumberland  Gap,  where 
he  relieved  the  garrison  of  that  post,  and  was  himself 
entrusted  by  Burnside  with  the  command  of  that  portion 
of  the  department,  covering  the  upper  valleys  of  the 
Clinch  and  Holston  as  well  as  the  lines  of  communication 
with  Cincinnati  and  the  Ohio  River. 

In  the  days  immediately  preceding  the  battle  of  Chick  - 
amauga,  Halleck  had  urged  reinforcements  forward  toward 
Rosecrans  from  all  parts  of  the  West.  Pope  in  Minne 
sota,  Schofield  in  Missouri,  Hurlbut  at  Memphis,  and 
Sherman  at  Vicksburg  had  all  been  called  upon  for  help, 
and  all  had  put  bodies  of  troops  in  motion,  though  the 
distances  were  great  and  the  effect  was  a  little  too  much 
like  the  proverbial  one  of  locking  the  stable  door  after 
the  horse  had  been  stolen.  As  there  was  no  telegraphic 
communication  with  Burnside,  the  General-in-Chief  gave 
orders  through  the  adjutant-general's  office  in  Cincinnati 
directly  to  the  Ninth  Corps  and  to  the  detachments  of 


540          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

the  Twenty-third  Corps  remaining  or  assembling  in  Ken 
tucky,  to  march  at  once  into  East  Tennessee.  An  advi 
sory  supervision  of  the  department  offices  in  Cincinnati 
had  been  left  with  me,  and  Captain  Anderson,  the  assist 
ant  adjutant-general,  issued  orders  in  General  Burnside's 
name  after  consultation  with  me.  General  Parke  cut 
short  his  sick-leave,  and,  though  far  from  strong,  assumed 
command  of  the  Ninth  Corps  and  began  the  march  for 
Cumberland  Gap.  The  guards  for  the  railways  and  neces 
sary  posts  were  reduced  to  the  lowest  limits  of  safety,  and 
every  available  regiment  was  hurried  to  the  front. 

By  the  end  of  September  Burnside's  forces  were  pretty 
well  concentrated  between  Knoxville  and  Loudon,  the 
crossing  of  the  Holston  River.  It  had  now  been  learned 
that  Bragg's  army  had  suffered  even  more  than  Rosecrans's 
in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  and  notwithstanding  the 
rout  of  the  right  wing  of  the  Cumberland  Army,  the  stub 
born  fighting  of  the  centre  and  left  wing  under  Thomas 
had  made  the  enemy  willing  to  admit  that  they  had  not 
won  a  decisive  victory.  Our  army  was  within  its  lines  at 
Chattanooga,  and  these  had  been  so  strengthened  that 
General  Meigs,  who  had  been  sent  out  in  haste  as  a  spe 
cial  envoy  of  the  War  Department,  reported  to  Mr.  Stan- 
ton  on  the  2/th  of  September  that  the  position  was  very 
strong,  being  practically  secure  against  an  assault,  and 
that  the  army  was  hearty,  cheerful,  and  confident.1  Meigs 
was  himself  a  distinguished  officer  of  the  Engineer  Corps 
as  well  as  quartermaster-general,  and  the  weight  of  his 
opinion  at  once  restored  confidence  in  Washington.  He 
saw  at  a  glance  that  the  only  perilous  contingency  was 
the  danger  of  starvation,  for  the  wagon  roads  over  the 
mountains  on  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee  were  most 
difficult  at  best,  and  soon  likely  to  become  impassable. 
The  army  was  safe  from  the  enemy  till  it  chose  to  resume 
the  offensive,  provided  it  could  be  fed.  He  concluded 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  890. 


BURNSIDE  IN  EAST  TENNESSEE  541 

his  dispatch  by  saying,  "  Of  the  rugged  nature  of  this 
region  I  had  no  conception  when  I  left  Washington. 
I  never  travelled  on  such  roads  before."  l  It  was  only  too 
evident  that  Halleck  shared  this  ignorance,  and  had 
added  to  it  a  neglect  to  estimate  the  distances  over  these 
mountains  and  through  these  valleys,  and  the  relations 
of  the  points,  he  directed  Burnside  to  hold,  with  the  imme 
diate  theatre  of  Rosecrans's  operations. 

On  the  same  date  as  Meigs's  report,  Burnside  was  also 
sending  a  full  statement  of  his  situation  and  an  expla 
nation  of  his  conduct.2  The  telegraphic  communication 
was  opened  just  as  he  finished  his  dispatch,  and  for  the 
first  time  he  had  the  means  of  rapid  intercourse  with 
army  headquarters.  He  patiently  explained  the  miscon 
ceptions  and  cross  purposes  of  the  preceding  fortnight, 
and  showed  how  impossible  and  how  ruinous  would  have 
been  any  other  action  than  that  which  he  took.  Hal 
leck  had  said  that  it  would  now  be  necessary  to  move  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio  along  the  north  side  of  the  Tennessee 
till  it  should  be  opposite  Chattanooga  and  reinforce  Rose- 
crans  in  that  way.  Burnside  pointed  out  that  this  would 
open  the  heart  of  East  Tennessee  to  Bragg's  cavalry 
or  detachments  from  his  army.  He  offered  to  take  the 
bolder  course  of  moving  down  the  south  side  of  the  rivers, 
covering  Knoxville  and  the  valley  as  he  advanced. 

Mr.  Lincoln  replied  by  authorizing  Burnside  to  hold 
his  present  positions,  sending  Rosecrans,  in  his  own 
way,  what  help  he  could  spare.3  Halleck's  answer  was  an 
amazing  proof  that  he  had  never  comprehended  the  cam 
paign.  He  reiterated  that  Burnside's  orders,  before  leav 
ing  Kentucky  and  continuously  since,  had  been  "  to  con 
nect  your  right  with  General  Rosecrans's  left,  so  that  if 
the  enemy  concentrated  on  one,  the  other  would  be  able 
to  assist."4  If  this  meant  anything,  it  meant  that  Burn- 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  890.  2  Id.,  p.  904. 

3  Id.,  p.  905.  *  Id.,  p.  906. 


542          REMINISCENCES  OF   THE   CIVIL    IV A  R 

side  was  to  keep  within  a  day's  march  of  Rosecrans;  for 
two  days  was  more  than  enough  to  fight  out  a  battle  like 
Chickamauga.  Yet  he  and  everybody  else  knew  that 
Burnside's  supply  route  from  Kentucky  was  through 
Cumberland  Gap,  and  he  had  warmly  applauded  when 
Burnside  turned  that  position,  and  by  investing  it  in  front 
and  rear,  had  forced  Frazer  to  surrender.  He  had  expli 
citly  directed  Burnside  to  occupy  and  hold  the  upper  Hol- 
ston  valley  nearly  or  quite  to  the  Virginia  line,  and  one 
gets  weary  of  repeating  that  between  these  places  and 
Chattanooga  was  a  breadth  of  two  hundred  miles  of  the 
kind  of  country  Meigs  had  described  and  more  than  ten 
days  of  hard  marching.  His  present  orders  are  equally 
blind.  Burnside  is  directed  to  reinforce  Rosecrans  with 
"all  your  available  force,"  yet  "East  Tennessee  must  be 
held  at  all  hazards,  if  possible."  To  "hold  at  all  haz 
ards  "  might  be  understood,  but  what  is  the  effect  of  the 
phrase  "  if  possible  "  ?  It  must  amount  in  substance  to 
authority  to  do  exactly  what  Burnside  was  doing,  —  to 
hold  East  Tennessee  with  as  small  means  as  he  thought 
practicable,  and  to  reinforce  Rosecrans  with  what  he 
could  spare. 

It  was,  on  the  whole,  fortunate  for  the  country  that 
Burnside  was  not  in  telegraphic  communication  with 
Washington  sooner.  Had  he  been  actually  compelled  to 
abandon  East  Tennessee  on  the  I3th  or  I4th  of  September, 
incalculable  mischief  would  have  followed.  The  Ninth 
Corps  was  en  route  for  Cumberland  Gap,  and  it  with  all 
the  trains  and  droves  on  the  road  must  either  have  turned 
back  or  pushed  on  blindly  with  no  probability  of  effecting 
a  junction  with  the  Twenty -third  Corps.  Even  as  it  was, 
the  terror  in  East  Tennessee,  when  it  became  known  that 
they  were  likely  to  be  abandoned,  was  something  fearful. 
Public  and  private  men  united  in  passionate  protests,  and 
the  common  people  stood  aghast.  Two  of  the  most  prom 
inent  citizens  only  expressed  the  universal  feeling  when, 


BURNS  IDE  IN  EAST  TENNESSEE  543 

in  a  dispatch  to  Mr.   Lincoln,  they  used  such  language 
as  this,  — 

"  In  the  name  of  Christianity  and  humanity,  in  the  name  of  God 
and  liberty,  for  the  sake  of  their  wives  and  children  and  everything 
they  hold  sacred  and  dear  on  earth,  the  loyal  people  of  Tennessee 
appeal  to  you  and  implore  you  not  to  abandon  them  again  to  the 
merciless  dominion  of  the  rebels,  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  Union 
forces  from  East  Tennessee."  l 

With  the  evidence  of  the  ability  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  to  hold  its  position  at  Chattanooga,  there 
came  a  breathing  spell  and  a  quick  end  of  the  panic.  It 
was  seen  that  there  was  time  to  get  all  desirable  rein 
forcements  to  Rosecrans  from  the  West,  and  Hooker  was 
sent  with  two  corps  from  the  East,  open  lines  of  well- 
managed  railways  making  this  a  quicker  assistance  than 
could  be  given  by  even  a  few  days'  marches  over  country 
roads.  The  culmination  of  the  peril  had  been  caused  by 
the  inactivity  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  had 
permitted  the  transfer  of  Longstreet  across  four  States; 
and  now  Hooker  was  sent  from  that  army  by  a  still  longer 
route  through  the  West  to  the  vicinity  of  Bridgeport, 
thirty  miles  by  rail  below  Chattanooga  on  the  Tennessee 
River,  but  nearer  fifty  by  the  circuitous  mountain  roads 
actually  used.  It  became  evident  also  that  Burnside's 
army  could  only  subsist  by  making  the  most  of  its  own 
lines  of  supply  through  Kentucky.  To  add  its  trains  to 
those  which  were  toiling  over  the  mountains  between 
Chattanooga  and  Bridgeport,  would  risk  the  starvation 
of  the  whole.  Until  a  better  line  could  be  opened,  Burn- 
side  was  allowed  to  concentrate  most  of  his  forces  in  the 
vicinity  of  London,  where  he  guarded  the  whole  valley. 
His  cavalry  connected  with  Rosecrans  on  the  north  side 
of  the  Tennessee,  and  also  held  the  line  of  the  Hiwassee 
on  the  left. 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iv.  p.  401. 


544          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

On  the  last  day  of  September  Burnside  reported  the 
concentration  of  his  forces  and  submitted  three  alternate 
plans  of  assisting  Rosecrans:1  First,  to  abandon  East 
Tennessee  and  move  all  his  forces  by  the  north  bank  of 
the  Tennessee  River  to  Chattanooga.  This  was  what 
Halleck  had  seemed  to  propose.  Second,  to  cross  the 
Holston  and  march  directly  against  Bragg' s  right  flank 
whilst  Rosecrans  should  attack  in  front.  This  was  essen 
tially  what  Grant  afterward  did,  putting  Sherman  in  a 
position  similar  to  that  which  Burnside  would  have  taken. 
Third,  to  march  with  7000  infantry  and  5000  cavalry 
entirely  around  Bragg  by  the  east,  and  strike  his  line  of 
communications  at  Dalton  or  thereabouts.  This  had  a 
strong  resemblance  to  the  strategy  of  Sherman  next 
spring,  when  he  forced  Johnston  out  of  Dalton  by  send 
ing  McPherson  to  his  rear  at  Resaca.  Burnside  added  to 
it  the  plan  of  a  march  to  the  sea,  proposing  that  if  Bragg 
pursued  him,  he  should  march  down  the  railroad  to 
Atlanta,  destroying  it  as  thoroughly  as  possible,  and  then 
make  his  way  to  the  coast,  living  on  the  country. 

The  last  of  these  plans  was  that  which  Burnside  pre 
ferred  and  offered  to  put  into  immediate  execution. 
Neither  of  them  was  likely  to  succeed  at  that  moment, 
for  Rosecrans  was  so  far  demoralized  by  the  effects  of  his 
late  battle  that  he  was  in  no  condition  to  carry  out  any 
aggressive  campaign  with  decisive  energy.  He  declared 
in  favor  of  the  first2  (for  they  were  communicated  to  him 
as  well  as  to  Halleck),  and  this  only  meant  that  he  wanted 
his  army  at  Chattanooga  reinforced  by  any  and  every 
means,  though  he  could  not  supply  them,  and  the  fortifi 
cations  were  already  so  strong  that  General  Meigs  reported 
that  10,000  men  could  very  soon  hold  them  against  all 
Bragg's  army.  The  plans,  however,  give  us  interesting 
light  on  Burnside's  character  and  abilities,  and  show  that 
he  was  both  fertile  in  resources  and  disposed  to  adopt  the 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iii.  p.  954.  2  Id.,  pt.  iv.  p.  72. 


BURNSIDE  IN  EAST  TENNESSEE  545 

boldest  action.  Halleck  in  reply  said  that  distant  expe 
ditions  into  Georgia  were  not  now  contemplated,  nor  was 
it  now  necessary  to  join  Rosecrans  at  Chattanooga.1  It 
was  sufficient  for  Burnside  to  be  in  position  to  go  to 
Rosecrans's  assistance  if  he  should  require  it.  He  was, 
however,  to  "  hold  some  point  near  the  upper  end  of  the 
valley,"  which  kept  alive  the  constant  occasion  for  mis 
understanding,  since  it  implied  the  protection  and  occu 
pation  of  all  East  Tennessee,  and  the  general  there  in 
command  was  the  only  one  who  could  judge  what  was 
necessary  to  secure  the  object.  The  necessity  for  activity 
soon  showed  itself.  About  the  6th  of  October  General 
Jones  was  reported  to  be  showing  a  disposition  to  be 
aggressive,  and  Burnside  determined  to  strike  a  blow  at 
him  again  and  with  more  force  than  that  which  had  been 
interrupted  a  fortnight  before.  Willcox  was  ordered  from 
Cumberland  Gap  to  Morristown  with  his  four  new  Indiana 
regiments ;  the  Ninth  Corps  (having  now  only  about  5000 
men  present  for  duty)  was  moved  up  the  valley  also, 
whilst  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  with  two  brigades  of  cav 
alry,  was  left  in  its  positions  near  Loudon.  The  rest  of 
the  cavalry,  under  Shackelford,  accompanied  the  move 
ment  up  the  valley  of  which  Burnside  took  command 
in  person.  Leaving  the  cavalry  post  at  Bull's  Gap  and 
advancing  with  his  little  army,  he  found  the  enemy 
strongly  posted  about  midway  between  the  Gap  and  Greene- 
ville.  Engaging  them  and  trying  to  hold  them  by  a 
skirmishing  fight,  he  sent  Foster's  cavalry  brigade  to 
close  the  passage  behind  them.  Foster  found  the  roads 
too  rough  to  enable  him  to  reach  the  desired  position  in 
time,  and  the  enemy  retreating  in  the  night  escaped.  The 
pursuit  was  pushed  beyond  the  Watauga  River,  and  a 
more  thorough  destruction  was  made  of  the  railroad  to 
and  beyond  the  Virginia  line.  Considerable  loss  had 
been  inflicted  on  the  enemy  and  150  prisoners  had  been 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxx.  pt.  iv.  p.  25. 
VOL.  i.  —  35 


546          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

captured,  but  no  decisive  engagement  had  been  brought 
about,  Jones  being  wary  and  conscious  of  inferiority  of 
force.  Willcox  was  left  at  Greeneville  with  part  of  the 
cavalry,  while  Burnside  brought  back  the  Ninth  Corps  to 
Knoxville.  The  activity  was  good  for  the  troops  and  was 
successful  in  curbing  the  enemy's  enterprise,  besides 
encouraging  the  loyal  inhabitants.  There  was  now  a  lull 
in  affairs  till  November,  broken  only  by  a  mishap  to 
Colonel  Wolford's  brigade  of  cavalry  on  the  south  of  the 
Holston,  where  he  was  watching  the  enemy's  advanced 
posts  in  the  direction  of  Athens  and  Cleveland.  Burnside 
had  sent  a  flag  of  truce  through  the  lines  on  the  iQth 
of  October,  and  the  enemy  taking  advantage  of  it,  de 
livered  an  unexpected  blow  upon  Wolford,  capturing 
300  or  400  of  his  men  and  a  battery  of  mountain  how 
itzers,  together  with  a  wagon  train  which  was  several 
miles  from  camp.1  Wolford  heard  that  his  train  was 
attacked  and  sent  two  regiments  to  protect  it.  These 
were  surrounded  by  a  superior  force,  and  Wolford  then 
brought  up  the  rest  of  his  command,  only  700  strong,  and 
made  a  bold  effort  to  rescue  his  comrades.  This  he  did, 
with  the  loss  of  the  prisoners  mentioned  and  the  how 
itzers,  which  were  taken  after  they  had  fired  their  last 
cartridge.  The  wagons  were  burned,  but  the  men  bravely 
cut  their  way  out.  Approaching  Loudon,  they  were  met 
by  General  Julius  White  with  infantry  reinforcements. 
The  tables  were  now  turned  on  the  Confederates,  who 
fled  over  the  Hiwassee  again,  losing  in  their  turn  about 
100  prisoners.2 

1  O.  R.,  vol.  xxxi.  pt.  i.  p.  273.  2  Id.,  pp.  5,  6. 


APPENDIX   A 

List  of  Letters  and  Dispatches  relating  to  the  campaign  in  the 
Great  Kanawha  valley,  1861,  which  are  not  found  in  the  pub 
lication  of  the  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate 
armies  (see  footnote ',  chapter  iv.  p.  60). 

Letters  and  Dispatches  of  General  McClellan  to  General  J.  D. 
Cox,  of  dates  July  6th,  i2th,  i3th,  i4th,  i5th,  i6th,  20th,  August  ist. 

Letters  and  Dispatches  of  General  J.  D.  Cox  to  General 
McClellan,  of  dates  July  4th,  6th,  ioth,  lyth. 

Letters  and  Dispatches  of  General  Rosecrans  to  General  Cox  of 
dates  July  26th,  29th,  3ist,  four  of  August  5th,  one  of  August  6th, 
8th,  two  of  i3th,  three  of  i6th,  one  of  iyth,  i8th,  two  of  2oth, 
one  each  of  26th,  27th,  2Qth,  3oth. 

Letters  and  Dispatches  of  General  Cox  to  General  Rosecrans,  of 
dates  August  6th,  yth,  ioth,  igth,  28th,  two  each  of  3 oth  and  3ist, 
one  of  September  2d  (enclosing  Colonel  Tyler's  report  of  en 
gagement  at  Cross  Lanes),  3d,  gth,  22d,  October  5th  (order  of 
withdrawal  from  Sewell  Mountain),  two  of  October  yth,  one  each 
of  8th,  gth,  three  of  ioth,  one  of  i6th. 

There  are  also  missing  numerous  ones  from  and  to  Colonel 
Tyler,  Colonel  W.  Sooy  Smith,  Colonel  J.  V.  Guthrie,  and  other 
officers. 

APPENDIX    B 

Letters  of  Generals  R.  B.  Hayes  and  George  Crook  as  to  the  dis- 
cipline  and  conduct  of  the  Kanawha  Division  in  the  campaign 
of  September,  1862.  The  death  of  President  Hayes  has  re 
moved  any  objections  to  the  publication  of  his  letter. 

FREMONT,  OHIO,  8th  September,  1882. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL,  —  Your  note  of  the  4th  instant  came  dur 
ing  a  brief  absence  from  home.  I  appreciate  your  kindness  and 


548          REMINISCENCES  OF  THE   CIVIL    WAR 

your  friendly  suggestions.  After  sleeping  on  it,  I  am  not  inclined 
to  depart  from  my  custom  in  dealing  with  attacks  upon  me.  .  .  . 
Besides,  to  give  a  correct  relation  of  the  Reno  altercation  would 
be  to  disparage  an  officer  who  died  in  battle  a  few  days  after  the 
affair,  and  who  cannot  now  give  his  side  of  the  controversy. 

One  of  the  brigades  of  the  division  was  commanded  by  General 
Crook  and  another  by  General  Scammon,  both  regular  army  offi 
cers  conspicuous  for  attention  to  strictness  of  discipline.  General 
Scammon  was  at  the  time  still  colonel  of  the  Twenty-third.  The 
regiment  on  that  march  repeatedly  reported,  as  I  was  glad  to  do, 
not  a  single  absentee  on  the  first  roll-call  immediately  after  the 
halt. 

The  altercation,  in  its  general  facts,  was  as  you  recall  it.  But 
the  occasion  of  it  was  this.  The  regiment  halted  to  bivouac  in  a 
stubble-field.  The  men  got  bundles  of  straw,  or  possibly  of  wheat 
unthreshed,  from  a  stack  in  the  field  to  lie  upon.  General  Reno 
saw  it.  I  was  temporarily  absent.  The  general,  as  you  say,  "  in 
a  rough  way "  accosted  the  men,  and  as  I  returned,  I  heard 
his  language  and  retorted  in  behalf  of  my  men,  not  in  my  own 
case  at  all,  for  he  had  said  nothing  to  me.  Hence  the  row  be 
tween  us.  I  was  told,  while  I  was  lying  wounded,1  that  General 
Reno  was  greatly  pleased  by  our  vigorous  attack,  and  that  he  paid 
us  a  high  compliment,  expressing  gratification  that  our  difficulty 
had  gone  no  further  than  it  did. 

Now  excuse  my  suggestion.  Let  officers  tell  the  story  whose 
names  are  not  called  in  question  in  the  note  referred  to  —  say 
General  Scammon,  General  Crook,  and  yourself.  I  am  grateful 
for  your  attention  to  this  misrepresentation,  and  hope  you  will  not 
differ  widely  from  me  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  course  I  take. 

Sincerely, 

(Signed)          R.  B.  HAYES. 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  ARIZONA,  WHIPPLE  BARRACKS, 
PRESCOTT,  A.  T.,  November  27,  1882. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL,  —  Referring  to  your  letter  of  the  3d  instant 

asking  replies  to  certain   queries  with  reference  to  the  conduct  of 

the  Kanawha  Division  during  the  Antietam  campaign,  I  can  only 

reply  generally.     The  twenty  years  which  have  elapsed  make  my 

1  During  the  battle  of  South  Mountain.  —  J.  D.  C. 


APPENDIX  B  549 


memory  indistinct,  and  I  can  now  recall  only  prominent  features 
or  particular  incidents  in  which  I  was  especially  interested.  I  re 
member  distinctly,  however,  that  the  Kanawha  Division  compared 
favorably  in  discipline  and  general  good  conduct  with  the  best 
troops  of  the  army.  In  my  own  brigade  there  was  no  straggling, 
or,  if  any,  so  little  that  it  did  not  come  to  my  notice.  I  am  quite 
sure  there  was  no  pillaging  in  my  brigade.  My  men  probably 
took  fence  rails  for  their  bivouac  fires,  and  straw  and  hay  for  their 
beds,  but  to  the  best  of  my  belief  there  was  nothing  done  that 
could  be  called  pillaging. 

I  heard,  at  the  time,  something  with  reference  to  a  contro 
versy  between  Generals  Reno  and  Hayes,  but  if  ever  I  knew  what 
it  was  about,  I  have  forgotten  it.  In  this  matter  it  seems  as  if  the 
statement  of  General  Hayes  should  be  conclusive. 

I  am  very  glad  that  you  have  interested  yourself  in  refuting  the 
numberless  charges  which  the  writers  of  personal  histories  have 
found  it  convenient  to  lay  against  the  Kanawha  Division,  and  which 
in  almost  every  instance  are  base  slanders.  The  personnel  of  the 
division  should  in  itself  be  a  sufficient  refutation.  The  regiments 
were  mainly  of  '61  men  from  country  districts  who  enlisted  from 
motives  of  patriotism,  and  as  a  rule  were  never  disgraced  by  con 
duct  which  many  of  the  regiments  enlisted  in  the  large  cities  of 
the  East  were  notorious  for  throughout  the  army. 

The  Kanawha  Division  did  not  belong  to  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,  and  it  was  therefore  an  easy  matter  to  shift  responsibility 
from  its  own  organization  by  throwing  it  on  the  shoulders  of  the 
troops  serving  with  it.  The  subsequent  reputation  of  this  division 
is  in  itself  a  sufficient  answer,  and  I  challenge  history  to  show  an 
organization  which  was  more  distinguished  for  all  soldierly  quali 
ties  than  the  one  you  had  the  honor  to  command  during  the  cam 
paign,  until  the  death  of  Reno  gave  you  the  Ninth  Corps. 

You   are  at  liberty  to  use  this  letter  in  any  way  you  deem  best, 
and  I  am  only  sorry  that  I  can  do  no  more  to  assist  you. 
Very  Sincerely,  Your  friend, 

GEORGE  CROOK,  Brig.  Gen'l. 
To  General  J.  D.  Cox. 


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